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INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARISTOTLE'S *EUDEMIAN* AND *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*

Edited by
Giulio Di Basilio

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Giulio Di Basilio is an Irish Research Council postdoctoral fellow at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, and a member of the Plato Centre. He has published articles on Aristotle's ethics and Aquinas' philosophy of action, as well as on the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

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Edited by Giulio Di Basilio

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Contributors

Giulia Bonasio is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom.

Giulio Di Basilio is an Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.

Friedemann Buddensiek is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt, Germany.

Dorothea Frede is Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany.

Terence Irwin is Emeritus Fellow at Keble College, Oxford, United Kingdom.

Mi-Kyoung Lee is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, Colorado.

Carlo Natali is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Ca' Foscari University, Venice, Italy.

Karen Margrethe Nielsen is Associate Professor in Philosophy at Somerville College, Oxford, United Kingdom.

Jozef Müller is Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of California, Riverside, California.

Christopher Rowe is Emeritus Professor of Greek at Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom.

Marco Zingano is Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil.

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1 Introduction

Aristotle's Two Ethics

Giulio Di Basilio

1.1 Introduction: Aristotle's Two Ethics

The tradition has handed down to us under Aristotle's name a series of ethical writings, namely the *Magna Moralia*, the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*), and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*). Doubts of authenticity loom large over the first treatise, and the majority of scholars hesitate to treat it on a par with the other two.[1] In the 19th century, doubts of inauthenticity loomed over the *EE* too, but have since been dispelled.[2] Currently, there is general agreement on the importance of both the *EE* and the *EN* as authoritative sources of Aristotle's ethical views.

The presence of two ethical works within the Aristotelian corpus raises a number of interesting questions. Interpreters are faced with two treatises of certain authorship presenting Aristotle's considered views on ethical matters. This is the only ostensible case of a subject which Aristotle has addressed twice over in his philosophical output. To make matters worse, the *EE* and the *EN* share three books in common (i.e. *EN* V, VI, and VII coincide with *EE* IV, V, and VI) transmitted to us in the manuscripts (MSS) of both treatises; these books are sometimes referred to as "disputed books" in contrast to the "undisputed" *Nicomachean* or *Eudemian* books.

Let us look more closely at the composition of Aristotle's *EE* and *EN*. Both of these works start off with an investigation of the human good, then move on to enquire into virtue, alongside a number of related themes like voluntariness and decision, and then conduct a survey of the individual virtues of character, e.g. courage, temperance, and generosity. These two blocks correspond to *EE* books I–III and *EN* books I–IV. As such, they are quite naturally seen as running roughly in parallel.[3] Afterwards, the trajectories of the two works converge into the common books. That is, both *EE* I–III and *EN* I–IV refer forward to themes examined only in the common books, namely justice, the virtues of the intellect, and then self-control/lack thereof as well as pleasure[4]; examinations of these themes are to be found in *EN* V, VI, and VII (=*EE* IV, V, and VI), respectively. This is presumably the reason why, at this point, our manuscripts of Aristotle's ethics insert the common books in their usual order so as to bring the examination of virtue to completion before moving on to other ethical themes. At the end of the common books, the two treatises part ways

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and proceed to examine friendship in their respective lengthy investigations devoted to that theme, namely *EE* VII and *EN* VIII–IX.[5] The two treatises end with significantly different books: the *EE* with a short book devoted to an aporia (ch. 1), the question of good luck (ch. 2), and a final chapter on *kalokagathia* and its *horos* (ch. 3),[6] whereas the *EN* with a second treatment of pleasure (chs. 1–5), a second examination of happiness (chs. 6–8), and a chapter announcing the transition to politics (ch. 9). The structure of the two treatises can be gleaned from the following synoptic overview:

Happiness and Virtue	*EE* I, II, III (1214a1–1234b14)	*EN* I, II, III, IV (1094a1–1128b35)
Justice	*EE* IV = *EN* IV (1129a1–1138b14)[7]	
Intellectual Virtues	*EE* V = *EN* VI (1138b15–1145a11)	
Self-Control and its Lack, Pleasure	*EE* VI = *EN* VII (1145a13–1154b34)	
Friendship	*EE* VII (1234b16–1246a25)	*EN* VIII, IX (1155a1–1172a15)
Concluding Sections	*EE* VIII (1246a26–1249b25)	*EN* X (1172a17–1181b23)

This state of affairs raises an interesting question, which has been restated recently by Christopher Rowe as follows: why did Aristotle write two major treatises covering almost exactly the same ground?[8]

Some might not find this question particularly pressing. One might point out, for instance, that the case of the *EE* and the *EN* is not entirely without parallel in the corpus of Aristotle's writings: repetitions, overlaps, and other inconcinnities abound elsewhere in the corpus; that, in other words, the ethical case only exacerbates a number of ubiquitous issues with which scholars of Aristotle are confronted on a regular basis.[9] In a similar vein, one might think that the above question reflects a mistaken approach to Aristotle's works, which are not to be thought of as modern texts. What is held together by the covers of Aristotle's *EN*, for instance, is the product of the editorial act of bringing together separate investigations (*logoi*) on related topics so as to constitute independent treatises (*pragmateiai*).[10] Indeed, these stand-alone investigations are listed separately in the ancient catalogues of Aristotle's works, which is evidence of the fact that they must have been conceived independently originally and have been assembled only at a later stage by his followers. This would explain the most awkward result of this editorial endeavour, namely that the *EN* contains two examinations of pleasures which ignore one another, i.e. *EN* VII 11–14 = *EE* VI 11–14 and *EN* X 1–5.

However, it seems unwise to shrug off the above question along these lines as this would prevent understanding of a unicum in Aristotle's writings. After all, the case of the ethics is unique in presenting us with two ethical treatises with the same goal (*skopos*), namely, as Aristotle famously puts it, to become virtuous (*EE* I 5, 1216b10–25; *EN* II 2, 1103b26–9; X 9, 1179a35–b4). The sheer presence of two ethical treatises breaking strikingly similar ground and crying out for investigations of the same topics for completion, e.g. justice and pleasure, demands explanation, and warrants close study.

Now, ever since scholars took an interest in these issues, explanations have been offered along significantly different lines. Historically, the first attempt at

an explanation has involved the idea that Aristotle changed his mind on some of his ethical views and decided to write another ethical treatise anew. The name of Werner Jaeger is still often attached to this view, for he suggested in the 1920s an overall interpretation of Aristotle's development, including the ethics.[11] According to Jaeger, Aristotle started off as a faithful Platonist and then progressively departed from his master to develop his own ethical views. Crucial to Jaeger's argument was the usage of one of the so-called common books, namely *EN* VI (=*EE* V), which, on his account, harboured clear anti-Platonic views about practical thinking, and hence was to be assigned a late date. Jaeger thought that the conception of practical thinking articulated in the *EE* was at variance with that common book and that the latter was instead at home in the *EN*. Since it was assumed that the three common books belonged together, this further entailed that they were to be assigned *in toto* to the *EN*. In this way, the *EE* was relegated to the role of a juvenile and incomplete treatise.

Jaeger's argument was inconclusive, for it failed to take adequately into account the peculiar status of the common books. This became clearer thanks to the research of Dieter Harlfinger on the manuscripts of the *EE*.[12] Harlfinger showed that part of our manuscripts of the *EE* include the common books, contrary to the then-dominant idea that they were borrowed wholesale from the *EN*. Once this is taken into account, it no longer becomes possible to argue along Jaeger's lines without begging the question as to the origin of the common books. For, if these books are common to the two works, which is what Harlfinger is commonly taken to have shown,[13] they can hardly be used to settle the question of the two ethics in the way Jaeger intended to do. At this point, it became clear that two questions had to be faced by scholars of Aristotle' ethics: why did Aristotle write two ethical treatises which cover the same ground? Where do the common books belong, in the *EE* or the *EN*, and why?

The next chapter of the debate around the two ethics is inextricably linked to the name of Anthony Kenny. In 1978, Kenny suggested that the question of the relationship between Aristotle's *EE* and *EN* and the question of the common books could not be handled independently: the answer to the first will in large part depend on the answer to the latter. In his 1978 book, and in a series of later re-evaluations, Kenny made a case for associating the common books with the *EE*. His proposal has been discussed for more than 40 years, and it would be a lengthy enterprise to summarize the debate which has resulted from it.[14] What I propose to do instead is to sum up the impact of Kenny's work on current Aristotelian studies.

First, a quasi-consensus view on the question of the books common to the two ethics has emerged. In view of Kenny's general argument, and above all of his stylistic investigations of Aristotle's *EE* and *EN*,[15] most scholars today accept the idea that the books common to Aristotle's ethics have originated in the *EE*.[16] Now, this is only part of what Kenny had argued for, for his argument was more ambitious and consisted in the idea that not only did the common books originate in the *EE*, but they also *belonged* with that work,

in the sense of having close affinity with it from a number of points of view (doctrine, cross-references, style, etc.). Since, as we have seen, for Kenny the question of the relative chronology of Aristotle's ethical writings will depend in large part on the proper home of the common books, he also intended to show that, once the common books were restored to it, the *EE* lays claim to being the later work.[17] Nevertheless, the majority of scholars today follow Kenny only with regard to the question of the origin of the common books but are reluctant to accept Kenny's stronger conclusion. Typically, they do so by means of a revision hypothesis to the effect that, whatever their origin, the books common to Aristotle's ethics have been revised for insertion into the *EN*.[18] As for the envisaged revision, the idea is that it may have been carried out by Aristotle himself, or alternatively by the editor(s) of his ethical writings. However that may be, what matters for present purposes is that a different picture of the status of the common books has emerged as a result of Kenny's work and its reception among scholars. In brief, in contemporary scholarship the common books seem to be "mobile,"[19] so to speak, in that they can be read as part of either work depending on the nature and scope of the investigation each time carried out by interpreters. This practice has also been facilitated by the fact that a number of new editions of the *EE* include the common books, which allows readers to judge for themselves to what extent they fit in with that work as a whole.[20] This, by and large, seems to be the current state of the art with regard to the question of the common books, although some scholars remain opposed to it.[21]

It should be clear that this understanding of the position of the common books within Aristotle's ethics leaves room for scholars to adopt different stances to the question of the two ethics. Much will depend on the relative chronology adopted: although the quasi-consensus view presented above suggests that the *EE* is the early work and the *EN* the later one, for this would quite naturally explain why the common books were transferred from the former into the latter work, as we have seen, this has not been the only approach to the issues involved. Kenny, for one, believed that the question of the relative chronology of the two ethics depends on the answer given to the question of the common books: once the common books are assigned to the *EE*, the latter will have a claim to being considered the later work. But this has remained a minority view accepted by few only.[22] Thus, more often than not the quasi-consensus view outlined above with regard to the question of the common books goes hand in hand with the idea that the *EE* is the early and the *EN* the late treatise, the common books having been transferred from the former into the latter, and perhaps revised for that purpose.

This raises the question as to whether a narrative can be attained capable of explaining the divergences between the two works and provide an intelligible account of Aristotle's trajectory in ethics. But on the whole it has been harder for scholars to come up with overarching narratives capable of explaining the divergences between the two works in terms of chronology. One such attempt deserves special mention. It is sometimes noted that there is a divergence between the *EE* and the *EN* significantly more important than

others as it involves a general feature of Aristotle's ethics, namely the close link between ethics and politics, apparent in the *EN*. Interpreters at times speak of "a political frame"[23] to refer to the *EN*'s characteristic way of presenting the connection between ethics and politics both at the beginning (*EN* I 2) as well as at the end of the treatise (*EN* X 9), where the baton is passed on to the other discipline. While this is no doubt worth pointing out and reflecting on, it is not clear whether this amounts to more than a difference of emphasis between the two treatises. Our evidence seems compatible with the idea that in the *EE*, Aristotle is simply assuming the connection between ethics and politics without ever stating this explicitly. This would account for the way politics is occasionally and abruptly brought into Aristotle's discussion in the *EE*.[24] In fact, it has been argued that at times the *EE* may well be considered more markedly political in its examinations, for instance in the way it goes about motivating the investigation of friendship.[25] It is, then, far from obvious that only in the *EN* did Aristotle conceive of ethics as a discipline subordinate to politics. Other overarching explanations for Aristotle's trajectory in ethics have been few and far between.[26] As a result, nowadays scholars are more likely to be content with pointing out a list of divergences between the *EE* and the *EN*.[27]

Of course, in order to draw up a list of divergences between the two works, one would have to determine what is to count as a difference. The risk is to mistake for a difference between the two works what might in actual fact be a mere peculiarity of either treatise or an emphasis of either on a particular topic or problem. Still, without any claim to comprehensiveness a few of these *prima facie* divergences between the *EE* and the *EN* can be readily mentioned: for instance, the role to be attributed to, and the nature of, pleasure. From the very beginning, the *EE* comes across as more open to endorsing some qualified form of "hedonism" in so far as happiness is immediately characterized, among other things, as the pleasantest thing there is (1214a7–8). In view of there being two separate examinations of pleasure, i.e. *EN* VII 11–14 = *EE* VI 11–14, and *EN* X 1–5, this issue naturally invites the question whether, as some have thought, the first treatise of pleasure contained in the third common book may be proprietary to the *EE*. This is a clear case in which the question of the two ethics and the issue of the common books intersect quite naturally. With regard to the nature of happiness, the *EE* is more inclined to conceive of it in terms of its parts and to think of its most complete form as including precisely all of its parts (1219a35–39). This has been taken to mean that the *EE* is more amenable to an inclusivist reading of happiness, while the same issue, as is well known, is still strongly disputed when it comes to the *EN*. Further, Aristotle's catalogue of character virtues is not exactly the same in the two works: some of the "social virtues" of the *EN* are conceived of as mere praiseworthy character traits falling short of being virtues in the *EE*. While barely mentioned in the *EN*, the notion of *kaloka-gathia* makes a prominent appearance at the end of the *EE* in a way which suggests that it might be of crucial importance to the overarching argument of that work. Many *prima facie* differences between the two ethics, however, are less conspicuous than this. The respective examinations of voluntariness and

prohairesis in the *EE* and the *EN* show considerable independence combined with equal philosophical sophistication in a way that resists simple assessments. Somewhat similar is the case of the *ergon* arguments advanced in *EE* II 1 and *EN* I 7: subtle differences between them stand out and invite several thought-provoking questions. Other divergences between the two works are slightly harder to assess, for in many cases the *EN* is simply lengthier and, more often than not, devotes more space to its examinations of the same topics; thus, for instance it is hard to tell whether, in comparison to the *EN*, the *EE* is just very brief on the topic of habituation or substantially different from it. Similarly, both the *EE* and the *EN* begin their enquiry with a proem, but while some of the questions dealt with in these opening sections are the same, for instance with regard to the method to be employed in the ensuing investigation, others are strikingly different (e.g. the issues considered in *EE* I 5).

Before concluding this brief overview, it will be necessary to mention another possible strategy scholars have suggested in order to tackle the question of the two ethics. The thought is that, instead of being characterized by doctrinal differences, the two ethics might have been targeted at different audiences. This approach comes with a number of consequences. To begin with, if that idea were correct, the relative chronology of the two works would become a less pressing question. Neither treatise would be meant to replace the other as they would rather be complementary to one another. To spell out this idea further, scholars standardly point to the *EE*'s greater technicality, which suggests a philosophically more sophisticated audience already trained in Aristotle's *Analytics* (1217a17; 1222b38; 1227a10) and works of natural philosophy (1214a27–28; *EE* II 6). The *EN*, by contrast, would be a work intended for a broader audience, or, at any rate, for less philosophically minded people.[28] So, on this view, it would be possible to explain divergences between Aristotle's *EE* and *EN* by considering their respective audience. There is no reason to resist the idea that this view may be, at least locally, explanatory useful. Still, one might wonder about its viability as a general explanation of the two ethics. For example, it may be doubted whether the hypothesis of different audiences may truly be explanatory of substantial differences between the treatises rather than, say, stylistic ones. Moreover, Aristotle raises explicitly the issue of his expected audience only to advise his addressees in the *EN* that the young are not suitable auditors of his lecture on ethics (1095a2–13). Hence, he does not divide audiences depending on whether they have received proper philosophical training.

As we shall see in what follows, the essays gathered in the present volume reflect all of these strands of contemporary research and attempt to take stock of, and build on, the current debate.

1.2 Contents and Aims of the Volume

The present volume collects examinations of themes of Aristotle's *EE* and *EN*. Underlying these examinations is the question of the two ethics, namely

the issue posed by there being two ethical treatises of Aristotelian authorship covering similar ground; but that broad question may often remain in the background and be replaced by more specific questions, of which the following is a representative list: How does a given argument in the *EE* compare to its counterpart in the *EN*? Are the differences significant? Do they amount to a matter of exposition or to doctrinal differences? Are the peculiarities of either treatise demanded by their context? Is either work, for whatever reason, philosophically more satisfactory? Is a reconciliation between the two possible? As we have seen above, these questions quite often naturally intersect with the question of the common books, that is, the host of issues raised by *EN* V, VI, and VII, which are identical with *EE* IV, V, VI. It will depend on the specific investigation each time pursued of how, if at all, it is best to utilize these books. Some of the contributions which make up the volume are explicitly devoted to themes dealt with in the common books, and thus require us to think through the issues posed by these particularly awkward texts of Aristotle's ethics.

The goal of the volume as a whole is to breathe new life into these issues with a view to furthering our understanding of Aristotle's ethics. The following contributions amount to novel ways of looking at the *EE* and the *EN* in a way which intends to take stock of the current debate and make progress. Here, as often in the scholarship on similar themes, a degree of pluralism in the views presented is representative of the current *status quaestionis*: the contributors to the volume adopt different approaches to the question of the two ethics and the common books, and champion different perspectives. Still, the different contributions jointly contribute to showing what Kenny has recently stated crisply about the two ethics, namely that "the relationship between the two treatises can only be explained by *a combination of factors*."[29] That is to say, it seems unlikely that any given overarching narrative concerning Aristotle's *EE* and *EN* will be capable of shedding light on *all* the relevant divergences between the two treatises we may wish to single out for investigation. Such a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to work in the case at hand. Worse, the search for any such overarching story might make us less sensitive to the details of the text of both treatises. What is required to get clearer on the relationship between the two works is more likely to be local examinations of prominent themes of Aristotle's ethics. It bears emphasizing that it is not at all obvious how such investigations are to be conducted, nor what the most promising strategies are, which is why this endeavour requires more work than hitherto done. There is reason to believe that such work will significantly enrich our understanding of both treatises, for instance by making stand out distinctive features of either work and prompting us to make sense of them in their respective contexts. This endeavour is the best way to appreciate fully, and make the best of, the fortunate happenstance of having two ethical treatises by Aristotle at our disposal for us to confront and from which to learn.

All this, of course, does not rule out that lines of development spanning the two works may be detected, and interpreters should remain open to that

possibility; but significant preparatory work is necessary to that effect. In particular, in reading the *EE* we should be alive to the possibility that it might not conform to Aristotle's familiar tenets in the *EN*, and we should question readings which unduly reduce the former to the latter. In fact, we should be alive to the possibility that Aristotle's *EE* might have constituted an independent and self-standing ethical project in its own right, regardless of where exactly it should be positioned in his philosophical production. Sometimes, as some of the following essays bear witness to, the right reading of a given *Eudemian* text may well be buried under textual emendations which have accrued to it during its troublesome tradition. On the other hand, conciliatory readings of the two ethics, aimed at reducing the distance between the treatises, are also legitimate, but they should be the result of careful scrutiny of the relevant texts at hand, and not the projection of one's own prior commitments.

As for the particular choice of topics addressed in the volume, it should be noted that some effort has been made to prioritize themes which have received less attention in the extant scholarship. Just to mention the most visible case, the volume does not include, by design, an examination of friendship as this theme has received significant attention since the first renewal of interest in the *EE* and continues to do so.[30] The volume also seeks to pay heed to portions of the *EE* in their own right, for instance the last chapter of the treatise on *kalokagathia* and its *horos* (*EE* VIII 3), which is still the cause of significant disagreement among scholars and raises questions crucial to our understanding of that work as a whole. As for the flow of the several essays, this corresponds roughly to the order of exposition in Aristotle's *EE* and *EN*; so, for instance, readers will find the *ergon* arguments discussed earlier in the volume than lack of self-control or pleasure.[31]

I now provide a brief presentation of the contents of the volume.

Carlo Natali carries out an investigation of the proems to Aristotle's ethics. This is, as mentioned above, ostensibly a point of similarity between the two treatises, which nonetheless has not yet been scrutinized with care. Natali compares and contrasts Aristotle's use of proems with that of two other 4th-century BC writers, namely Isocrates and Plato. These are important foils for getting clear about Aristotle's own uses of proems in his philosophical writing. Stylistically speaking, the proems to Aristotle's works are always beautifully and carefully written. For Natali, the function of Aristotle's proems is to give the audience a hint of what is to follow in the ensuing treatise without getting into too much detail. His conclusion is that the hypothesis of there being different audiences to Aristotle's *EE* and *EN* appears to be the best explanation for the divergences between the two treatises in this regard.

In the second contribution, Friedemann Buddensiek looks at the *ergon* argument in the *EE* and *EN*. It is well known that this argument plays an important role in both ethical works alike, being as it were the lynchpin of Aristotle's examinations of happiness and virtue. As alluded to previously, this is one of the best cases of the same argument featuring in both treatises in interestingly different forms. There are a number of subtle but significant differences

between the two arguments, to which Buddensiek draws attention. The focus of his essay, however, is on the function of the *ergon* arguments in their respective treatises: first, the *EE* uses the argument to prioritize the *energeia* or the product over the disposition, while the *EN* to specify the type of activity in question; second, the *EE* abstains from providing a criterion for the inclusion of activities, while the *EN* does provide such a criterion.

Marco Zingano examines the definitions of moral virtue in the *EE* and the *EN*. He starts off by looking at how these definitions are arrived at by looking at their individual components. He then restricts his attention to one notable divergence between the two definitions, namely the fact that the *EE* includes a reference to pleasure and pain in the very definition of moral virtue (1227b8–10), whereas the *EN* does not and instead refers to the reasoning of the person with practical wisdom (1106b36–1107a2). To be sure, the *EN* too stresses the importance of pleasure and pain for moral virtue, but, significantly, does so outside the definitional context. Zingano suggests that in the *EN*, Aristotle emphasizes the theme of doing virtuous action for the sake of the fine to the detriment of pleasure and pain; and that there is reason to think that this shift occurred to Aristotle whilst examining the individual character virtues. This is another case on which the two ethics seem to defend subtly different views when it comes to the role to be assigned to, and the nature of, pleasure and pain.

In "Decision in the *Eudemian Ethics*," Karen Margrethe Nielsen focuses on a textual issue with far-reaching consequences. She argues that the way Aristotle explicates the meaning of the term *prohairesis* in the *EE* differs from the *EN*. Nielsen defends this view by rehabilitating the text of the manuscripts at 1226b8. On this reading, a *prohairesis* is of something *for the sake of* something, which she dubs "the teleological reading." Unfortunately, this reading has been buried under a textual emendation dating back to the 16th century and since then accepted by all editors of the Greek text of the *EE* and translators alike. Nielsen shows that what underlies this emendation is a conciliatory approach to the two ethics, which attempts to superimpose on the *EE* the text of the *EN*. In the latter, we find a different explanation of the word *prohairesis* to the effect that *prohairesis* is of something *before* something. In addition to defending the MSS reading of the *EE*, Nielsen makes a case for interpreting Aristotle's notion of *prohairesis* in light of the examination of the *EE*, and to this effect suggests a way in which the *EN* too may be defending a teleological reading of *prohairesis*. However, she cautiously points out that this is just a possible way of explaining the apparent divergence between the *EE* and the *EN*; it is still possible that Aristotle changed his mind on this issue.

Di Basilio considers the topic of the voluntariness of character states in the *EE* and the *EN*. As is well known, Aristotle considers the voluntary extensively in both the *EE* and the *EN*. Although these examinations share some core ideas, a number of differences between them stand out and have been pointed out by scholars. One such difference concerns the question of whether, in addition to actions, character states too are voluntary or not. While this question is

explicitly addressed in *EN* III 5, nothing corresponds to it in the *EE*. Di Basilio seeks to put this idea on a firmer footing by noting, first, that the conclusion reached in *EN* III 5 is alluded to previously in *EN* III 1; most importantly, the upshot of *EN* III 5 represents an extension to character states of the account of voluntariness Aristotle has defended in *EN* III 1 for actions. To be sure, there are a number of *Eudemian* texts which seem to argue for a conclusion similar to *EN* III 5. On closer inspection, however, they are revealed to be focused on actions; if one considers closely the arguments Aristotle gives there, it becomes clear that he does not attempt to secure the conclusion that one's having a virtuous or vicious character, or any other character trait for that matter, is voluntary.

Aristotle's notion of *phronêsis* ("practical wisdom") has been the focus of intense discussion concerning the relationship between the *EE* and the *EN*. In his essay, Christopher Rowe looks at its intellectual counterpart, namely *sophia*, and asks whether any conclusion can be drawn with regard to Aristotle's *EE* and *EN* by examining how that notion appears in them. He points out that, strikingly, in the undisputed *Eudemian* books *sophia* is never used according to the technical sense given in *EN* VI, while the undisputed *Nicomachean* books make abundant use of it. For Rowe, this is a *prima facie* reason to associate that common book more closely with the *EN*. In the second part of his contribution, Rowe considers *EE* VIII as a whole, especially the last chapter, to ascertain whether, similar to the ending of the *EN*, the contemplative life of *sophia* may be assigned a dominant role in the *EE* too. He answers this question in the negative, and suggests that what we get in *EE* VIII 3 is a defence of the idea that we need to lead rational lives, whether it be in their practical or theoretical forms, in stark contrast to the ending of the *EN*.

In his contribution, Jozef Müller starts off by looking at a number of claims Aristotle makes about self-control and its lack in *EE* II 7–8. As is well known, self-control and the lack of it are intermediate character states examined in the first section of the third common book (*EN* VII = *EE* VI chs. 1–10). Outside of these well-known and much debated sections, Aristotle says very little about them, except for the above-mentioned chapters of the *EE* examined by Müller. He takes pains to lay out the claims Aristotle makes there, and argues that this is important evidence for our understanding of the kind of knowledge of the good, or lack of it, the self-controlled and the uncontrolled agent have – regardless, of course, of how they act. Müller makes a strong case for thinking that it is *not* the case that these agents have knowledge of the good, nor that they simply fail to apply it in particular circumstances. Rather, their behaviour betrays a commitment to goods other than the virtues and their characteristic activities in a way that disqualifies these agents from having knowledge of the good. His investigation is a felicitous example of how undivided attention to *EE* texts can result in very significant gains for our overall interpretation of Aristotle's ethical views.

Dorothea Frede takes head-on the question of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics. Pleasure has always been a core topic for discussion of Aristotle's *EE* and *EN*

in view of the fact that Aristotle's first examination of this theme is found in the last common book, whereas *EN* X examines the topic anew without any hint that the two examinations were ever meant to be part of the same work. Frede is a staunch critic of the quasi-consensus view concerning the common books outlined earlier, according to which these books would be *Eudemian* in origin. Accordingly, in her contribution she treats these books as part of the *EN*. She emphasizes the extent to which Aristotle's engagement with the topic of pleasure is far from being exhaustive (significantly, she refers to them as the first and the second "excursus" on pleasure). Several important questions, she argues, fail to receive the treatment which readers of Aristotle's *EN* would expect in light of claims previously defended in the ethics. Examples of these questions are the nature of pain, whether bad pleasures are really pleasures at all, and, most importantly for Frede's purposes, the question of the relevance of pleasure and pain for the virtues of character. In the *EN*, pleasure and pain are connected both to actions and to affections, but, for Frede, they can hardly be the same phenomenon in the two cases: this makes Aristotle's failure to examine the issue conspicuous. In the second part of her essay, Frede focuses on a difference between the *EE* and the *EN* concerning pleasure, namely that in the former virtues and vices tend to be characterized only in terms of the affections involved, and not in terms of both affections and actions, like the latter does. In her view, the explanation of this lies in *EE*'s assignment of virtue of character to the non-rational part of the soul. More generally, the first excursus on pleasure was not meant to end up in the *EE*, for that examination is for the most part a record of, and response to, academic discussions with regard to the nature of pleasure. This is true of *EN* X as well, which leads her to the conclusion that "neither of the two are satisfactory treatments of the concept of pleasure (and pain) for the purposes of his ethics."

Two notable features of Aristotle's *EE* are the emphasis placed on the idea of complete virtue, on the one hand, and on the virtue of *kalokagathia*, on the other. In her essay, Giulia Bonasio argues that, by Aristotle's lights, these two notions are one and the same. This identification ties the ending of the *EE*, with its emphasis on *kalokagathia*, to the conclusion of the *ergon* argument in *EE* II 1, according to which happiness consists in activity according to complete virtue. To show that this is the correct reading, Bonasio sets up three criteria for something to be complete virtue, and shows that *kalokagathia* meets all of them. Alternative candidates, such as justice, *phronesis*, or *sophia*, are considered and discounted as inadequate. Her investigation involves material coming from Aristotle's works on natural philosophy and metaphysics. As such, it offers support to the idea that the *EE* may be a more philosophically minded treatise. Finally, she makes a persuasive case for thinking that, far from being a reference to traditional views about virtue, Aristotle's use of *kalokagathia* is theoretically innovative. This idea emerges as the protagonist of Aristotle's *EE* as a whole.

The volume rounds off with a second piece on *kalokagathia*. Terence Irwin considers the first part of the closing chapter of the *EE*, namely VIII 3,

1248b8–1249a17. Some critics have argued that in this chapter, Aristotle distinguishes between those who are good and those who, in addition to being good, also have the virtue of *kalokagathia*. Irwin counters this reading by arguing that, for Aristotle, it is not possible to be good without having *kalokagathia* as Aristotle intends the two features to pick out different properties of the same class of people. The first part of *EE* VIII is meant to explain why that is the case by articulating the distinction between these two notions and showing how they relate to one another. Famously, in this stretch of text Aristotle introduces a type of character, exemplified by the Spartans, according to which one should be virtuous but for the sake of the so-called natural goods. Interpreters who think Aristotle distinguishes between being good and having *kalokagathia* have suggested that this group exemplifies those who are good but do not have *kalokagathia*. By re-establishing the reading of the manuscripts at 1249a, Irwin shows that this reading should be rejected: Aristotle is not claiming that the Spartans are good, but rather that they are wild ("*agrioi*" instead of "*agathoi*"); another case in which textual emendations accrued to the *EE* during its troublesome tradition should be submitted to careful scrutiny. On reflection, the interpretation defended by Irwin is in keeping both with the argument of *EE* VIII 3 as well as with what has been argued for previously in the *EE*. Lastly, although the *EE* is unique in assigning a central role to *kalokagathia* and in distinguishing it from being good, the conditions for virtue accepted in the *EE* are the same in substance as the *EN*.

Notes

1 The last book-length treatment of the authorship of Aristotle's *Magna Moralia* is Donini, 1965, who argues that the treatise is not by Aristotle. For similar views, see Broadie, Rowe, 2002, p. 4; Frede, 2020, p. 208. I have omitted mention of the little treatise *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, on which there is a near-unanimous consensus view as to its inauthenticity; contrast, Simpson, 2013.

2 Doubts of inauthenticity are apparent in the 19th-century edition of the *EE*, namely Susemihl, which bears the title *Eudemi Rhodii Ethica*. On the authenticity of the *EE*, see Kapp, 1912; Dirlmeier, 1962, pp. 109–121; Rowe, 1971, pp. 9–14; Buddensiek, 1999, pp. 22–43. The only exception being Pakaluk, 1998, who argues that the *EE*'s egalitarianism casts doubt on its authenticity. Pakaluk's argument is addressed in Buddensiek, 1999, pp. 30–36.

3 The tendency to think of the two ethics in parallel is embedded in Burnet 1900 commentary on Aristotle's *EN*, which, in addition to the text of the *EN*, includes in smaller font the parallel texts of the *EN* below. Of note is that, in keeping with the consensus view of the 19th century, Burnet believed the *EE* had been written by Eudemus and to be a sort of commentary on his master's ethical views as presented in the *EN*. This tendency is still present more recently in the introduction to Bodéüs, 2004, pp. 15–17.

4 For a study of these references, see Kenny, 2016, pp. 50–59 and 276–277.

5 For evidence that the treatises on friendship were originally independent treatises but were appropriately incorporated into the *EE* and the *EN*, respectively, see Kenny, 2018.

6 The structure of this book is presented in Rowe's own contribution to this volume, see pp. xxx; it is worth mentioning that some MSS present these last sections of the *EE* as *EE* VII 13–15, see Susemihl, 1883, p. xi and 109 for more details.

7 We are forced to reference the common books by means of the standard Bekker lines as printed in the *EN*.
8 Rowe, 2015, p. 223.
9 Case 1910/1996, p. 26 mentioned the cases of the two redactions of *Physics* VII which, according to Simplicius, were early drafts of *Physics* VIII, as well as the other redactions of *De Anima* II, on this following Torstrik. In his view, both the *Magna Moralia* and the *EE* are "Aristotle's first drafts of his ethics" (p. 30).
10 This view of the composition of Aristotle's ethics has been advocated by Pakaluk, 2011, and more extensively by Natali, 2017. For a recent introduction to the question of the formation of the Aristotelian corpus, see Hatzimichali, 2016, pp. 81–100.
11 Jaeger, 1923 (English transl. 1948). See also Bobonich, 2006, pp. 16–18. It bears emphasizing that some of Jaeger's seminal views had been anticipated by Thomas Case, author of an important entry for "Aristotle" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, reprinted in abridged form in Wians, 1996, pp. 1–40; cf. esp. pp. 31–32 for his view of Aristotle's philosophical development in ethics. In the early 1970s, Rowe, 1971, p. 69 argued among lines similar to Jaeger's while submitting the common books to close scrutiny, see also his essay in this volume.
12 Harlfinger, 1971, pp. 38–50 on the common books. As Harlfinger showed, some 11 MSS of one of the two families of the *EE* include the common books; see p. 40. As for the other family, the two main testimonies, namely P and C, report the title of the books as well as their incipit, see pp. 38–39. Rowe, 1971, pp. 79–89 helpfully presents an overview and assessment of the scholarly views proposed in the 19th and 20th century, until Harlfinger, with regard to the common books.
13 There is some controversy over the upshot of Harlfinger's findings. Some scholars took him to have shown that the common books were truly common in that they were equally attested in MSS of the *EE* and the *EN*. However, most recently, Frede, 2019, pp. 88–89 has called into question this understanding of Harlfinger's research by arguing that the status of the common books is more complicated than this: although it is true that Harlfinger argued that the common books have been handed down to us in one of the two main families of the MSS of the *EE*, he also suggested that they were taken from the MSS of the *EN*. For Frede, this does not allow scholars to claim that, from a codicological point of view, the common books are truly common. See also Frede, 2020, pp. 215–217.
14 I have found some seven or eight reviews of Kenny's book and its sequels, some of which are quite extensive; the most important of these is arguably Rowe, 1983, especially when it comes to Kenny's stylistic arguments.
15 It bears emphasizing that Kenny pioneered the study of stylometry by submitting to computer-based analysis the style of the *EE*, the common books, and the *EN*. Reception of this aspect of Kenny's research has been mixed.
16 Hutchinson, 1995, p. 198; Crisp, 2000, p. 66; Bostock, 2000, p. 1; Broadie, Rowe, 2002, p. 4; Inwood, Wolf, 2013, pp. viii–ix; Bobonich, 2006, p. 15.
17 See Kenny, 2016, p. 300.
18 This view goes back to Mansion, 1927, p. 126; Dirlmeier, 1962, p. 362–363; Lorenz, 2009, p. 180; Inwood, Leigh, 2012, p. xvii; Lorenz, 2013, review of Inwood, Woolf, 2013; Jost, 2014, pp. 414–415; Irwin, 2019, p. xv.
19 Dalimier, 2013, p. 43; see also Simpson, 2013, pp. xiii–xiv.
20 Kenny, 2011 (see also Kenny, Barnes, 2014); Inwood, Woolf, 2013; Simpson, 2013.
21 Particularly vociferous among the critics of this consensus is Frede, 2019. On the other hand, Primavesi, 2007, p. 73 makes a case for the idea that the common books have been inserted into the *EE* at a later stage based on the numeration of its books.
22 In fact, very few have followed Kenny in arguing that the case of chronology rests for the most part on the proper home of the common books, see e.g. Jost, 1983. Others have argued for the *EE*'s lateness on the strength of other considerations: see Monan, 1968, pp. 37–59 and 149–156 for an argument based on moral knowledge; Schofield, 2002, who

argues that the *EE* is the later work based on the examination of friendship in the *EE*; Green, 2010; Zanatta, 2012.

23 Frede, 2020, p. 215; Jost, 2014, p. 420, n. 21; Inwood, Woolf, 2013, pp. xviii–xix.

24 See, for instance, *EE* I 6, 1216b36–39; *EE* I 8, 1218a33–36; *EE* VII 1, 1234b22–25.

25 This is argued in Schofield, 2002; cf. also Rowe, 2015, p. 224.

26 It is well worth mentioning Donini, 2014, which argued that the *EN* was the fruit of Aristotle's more mature reflection on habituation and character formation under the influence of Plato's *Laws*.

27 Inwood, Wolf, 2013, pp. xxvii–xxiv list six distinctive features of the *EE*; see also Bobonich, 2006, pp. 24–29.

28 The idea of there being different audiences of Aristotle's ethics has been suggested quite early in the debate by Allan, 1961. For recent statements of this view, see Simpson, 2013, pp. xii–xiii; Jost, 2014, pp. 419–420; Price, 1989, p. xi.

29 Kenny, 2016, p. 305, emphasis added.

30 Moreover, a recent volume on the *EE* is available, featuring no less than three contributions on friendship, namely Leigh, 2012.

31 It is well known that this is not exactly the same in the *EE* and the *EN*, but by and large divergences are negligible in this regard.

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2 The Preambles to the Ethics

Carlo Natali

2.1 Preambles in Isocrates and Plato

The custom of announcing the theme of a work in a preamble or opening sentence(s) is as old as Greek literature; it begins with the Homeric epics, as Mansfeld says.[1] But for the moment, we are interested in considering how preambles are used by authors of the 4th century BC, such as Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. We will limit ourselves to the passages that they explicitly identify as *prooimia*, and will not consider additional passages that we, based on our own criteria, might describe as "proems."

In Isocrates we find some indication of how he conceives of preambles, and we can gain some insight from what he says about their relationship to the main part of a speech.

He speaks about preambles three times (*Panath.* 33, *Paneg.* 13, *Antid.* 71). In the *Panathenaicus*, he says that

> I perceive that I am being carried beyond the due limits which have been assigned to a preamble
>
> (XII, 33)

In the *Antidosis*, he describes his own speech *To Nicocles*, saying:

> In the preamble and in the opening words of that discourse I reproach monarchs because they, who more than others ought to cultivate their understanding, are less educated than men in private station. After discussing this point, I enjoin upon Nicocles not to be easy-going.
>
> (XV, 71)

From his references to other parts of his writings, we can identify those passages that Isocrates considers to be preambles: *Panathenaicus* 1–33 and *To Nicocles* 1–7. In both of these passages, Isocrates speaks about himself: in the first, he complains about the abuses of his calumniators and defends his kind of *paideia*; in the second, he explains to Nicocles that his speech is the finest, the most

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serviceable present, and also the most suitable for him to give and for Nicocles to receive. We have here a sort of *capitatio benevolentiae*.

All the same, in the *Panegyricus* he criticizes the preambles of other authors (IV, 13). He blames his contemporaries because they employ the preamble to

> seek to conciliate their hearers and make excuses for the speeches that they are about to deliver
>
> (IV, 13)

It is strange that Isocrates considers this to be a flaw since he does the same.

Blass observes that for Isocrates the most important part of a speech is the conclusion, where the main arguments are exposed (*Panath.* 176 and 199; cf. Blass, 1874, p. 102). He thinks that the preamble is just an introductory section, useful for obtaining the good will of the audience. In this respect, Isocrates is not very original, since from the beginning the preambles in ancient Greece had the function of establishing the credibility of the speaker, by exposing some personal elements of his life, and making the audience well disposed towards him (Cappuccino, 2014, p. 8).

In Plato, "*prooimion*" is first of all a common term used by the participants in the dialogues and has no technical sense. We can certainly say that it does not refer to the dialogue itself as a written work, because the characters who utter the word don't know they are in a dialogue written by Plato. It refers to the first parts of the dialogue as an event experienced by them and not as a written work; for this reason, it is possible that what is described as a preamble does not coincide with the beginning of the work. This is the case, for example, of the *Symposium*, of the *Parmenides*, and the so-called narrated dialogues.[2]

Sometimes the term simply indicates the first part of a discussion, as in the *Republic* 432e. It acquires a more technical meaning in the late dialogues, e.g. in the *Laws* and the *Timaeus*. In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger proposes to add preambles to the various laws. In this case, they serve the function of persuading the citizens of the new *polis* to follow the prescriptions given by the legislators. They perform this function in two ways. On the one hand, the preambles use rhetorical and poetic devices to impress upon the feeling of the hearers in order to produce *pistis*; on the other hand, they want to teach the public, as an educated doctor does when persuading the patient to follow his precepts (857d).[3] The most recent scholars have distinguished three main types of this kind of preamble in the *Laws:* some promote their laws by means of rational argumentation, e.g. the proems to the laws against *asebeia* (891b–897d); others praise or blame some kind of behaviour (843a, etc.); others again make reference to a divine sanction and advise the citizens not to offend the gods, as in the laws against incest (838b). This is to be connected, as many scholars have remarked, to the idea of a healthy rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*.[4]

Apart from such particular preambles, which aim at convincing their specific audience – the citizens of Magnesia – more generally, we see that the late Plato considers a preamble to be a part of the dialogue in which he can introduce some important premises of the discussion. Thus, the Athenian Stranger says

that the discussion contained in the first five books of the *Laws* is the preamble to the legislation, which is the main subject matter of the dialogue: "everything we have said up till now has been simply a legislative preamble" (722d). In the same vein, shortly after Timaeus has begun his speech in the eponymous dialogue, Socrates interrupts and refers to the description that Timaeus has just given of the main genera of being – *that which always is* and *that which becomes* – and the fact that the cosmos is an image of something (27d–29c), as a preamble:

> Excellent, Timaeus! We must by all means accept it, as you suggest; and certainly we have most cordially accepted your preamble; so now, we beg of you, proceed straight on with the main theme
>
> (29d)

In sum, at times Plato uses the word *prooimoin* to indicate the first part of a discussion in which the main premises are established and the fundamental concepts in an inquiry are analyzed. This, however, is not confined to the first lines of a dialogue, but it can be described in larger passages. Thus, the *prooimoia* are not merely identical with the introductory lines of the dialogues.

Sometimes, those introductory pieces can be misleading. For instance, on the basis of the opening lines, a reader of the *Timaeus* would be justified in expecting to read a dialogue on matters of government (20b). However, it is only after having read some pages that such a reader discovers that, instead, what he will get is a very long speech by Timaeus about the origin of the cosmos and the nature of human beings (27a).

This point is addressed in a well-known polemic by Aristotle against Plato. Aristotle criticizes Plato's habit of not explaining clearly the real theme of his lecture. The testimony is given by Aristoxenus, in his *Elementa harmonices* II 1:

> It will be better, perhaps, to review in anticipation the kind of our treatise … in order not to have a false idea of our subject. Such was the condition, as Aristotle often used to relate, of most of the audience that attended Plato's lecture On the Good … It was for these very reasons, as he told us, that Aristotle himself used to give to those who were going to listen to him (*tois mellousin akroasthai par'autou*) a preamble indicating the subject and the method of his treatise (*peri tinôn t'estin ê pragmateia kai tis*).

2.2 Aristotelian Preambles: The *Rhetoric*

Aristotle uses the term *prooimion* a few times in his corpus. In the *Categories* it is used simply as an example of *taxis*: the *prooimion* is prior to the *diêgesis* (12, 14b3). More important is the discussion in the *Rhetoric*. In book III.14, he distinguishes two types of preambles. The first is like a prelude in flute playing: the players make an introduction *ad libitum*, to show how good they are, and only after that do they play the rhythm. This preamble is typical of encomia, such as Isocrates' *Helen* (*Hel.* 1–13). The second type of preamble, on the other hand, is typical of forensic speeches and epic poems.

> It aims to provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about … he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the *logos* (1415a12–15)

In addition to these two main types, Aristotle also discusses other kinds of preambles in *Rhetoric* III.14. There are preambles that work as remedies when the audience is inattentive, or is unfavourably disposed, and the like (Cope-Sandys, 1877, p. 169). In these cases, the purpose of the preamble is to generate a positive disposition in the audience towards the speaker, as in Isocrates' prologues, or to stimulate the indignation of the audience, or to awaken their attention, or to extinguish it.

Aristotle's analysis is closely connected to the practices of the law courts and is difficult to extend to other fields. However, some of his remarks have a general impact, for example, the idea that in a *logos* directed to any audience there must be a preamble that makes a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may have a head (1415b8–10); and also the suggestion that the absence of such a preamble, "makes the speech appear offhand" (1415b36). Aristotle's comments here are evidently about rhetorical *logoi* and not about his treatises, but he clearly thinks highly of the idea of giving the audience, at the very beginning of a speech, a hint of the content of that speech, and he criticizes Plato for not always doing that, as we have seen.

Aristotle often simply explains, at the beginning of a work, what the intention and utility of the treatise is (e.g. *Top.* 100a18, 101a25; *A. Po.* 24a10, etc.). In some passages, he explicitly uses the verb *prooimiazomai* to describe what he is doing, and in those cases he uses the rhetorical term in a slightly metaphorical way, because he obviously is not doing forensic or epideictic speeches. Such uses can be found in treatises on practical philosophy, such as the *Politics* and the two *Ethics*, but there is also an example from the *Metaphysics*. Let's examine them briefly.

2.3 *Politics*

In *Politics* VII, we find a preamble. It begins at VII.1, but it is not clear where it ends, because we have two passages in which Aristotle says "This may suffice as preface" at VII.1, 1323b37, referring to VII.1, and at VIII.4, 1325b33, referring to VII.1–3. This may be a sign that the book was revised, as Schütrumpf (2005, IV p. 293) aptly notes.

Aristotle expresses some of his views on the better life, happiness, and related issues, summarizing what he has said in the *exoterikoi logoi* (1323a22–3). His exposition does not imply that the audience already has any knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy, and it is a very simplified version of what we find in *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*) I or *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) I–II. Aristotle does not define virtue or happiness, but uses popular ideas, such as the distinction of three kinds of human good (of the soul, of the body, external, 1323a23–5)

and two kinds of good life (political and contemplative, 1324a14–17). He also discusses whether the best life for the city is identical to the best life for the individual, and says that it is (1326a30–32).

The first half of the 20th century saw a protracted debate among scholars on the topic of which of his published work is Aristotle drawing his material from, with no clear solution. In any case, it is clear that the aim of the preamble is to present to a non-philosophical public some basic points of Aristotle's ethics, in order to give a standard in relation to which one may judge how the best *polis* should be organized (Schütrumpf, 2005, IV p. 83).

The style of the preamble is not very different from the style of the rest of books VII and VIII, and this entire section of the *Politics* has some exoteric flavour. Since the 19th century, scholars have noted that in *Politics* VII–VIII Aristotle follows Isocrates in avoiding hiatus, as Plato does in his *Timaeus* and *Laws* (Blass, 1874, p. 130). According to Kaibel, Aristotle's style is influenced not only by Isocrates' stylistic prescriptions, but also – as one might expect – by Plato's style:

> mutet … der kunstvolle, figurenreiche Satzbau, die breitere, gefälligere, wärmere Tonart die manchmal auf Platon erinnert
>
> (Kaibel, 1893, p. 113)

Schütrumpf has studied the style of these two books extensively. He observes that, in addition to avoiding hiatus, they have many further rhetorical refinements. There are *homoteleuta*, balanced reciprocal phrases ("Sometime the right end is set before men/but in practice they fail to attain it," 1331b19, cf. b21, 1333b15, 1341a8, etc.). We find opposing concepts placed side by side, connections between different forms of the same word ("they alone trained against people who did not train [*tôi monous mê pros askounta askein*]"). We have here extreme examples, succinct parallels, sarcasm, rhetorical questioning, anecdotes, ethnographic details, legends, and many other means of keeping the attention of the hearers. Schütrumpf and Newman even suppose that books VII–VIII were intended to be published.[5]

So, regarding the content, the preamble of the final books of the *Politics* prepares the audience for the subsequent analysis of the best state by giving them a simplified version of the basic concepts of Aristotle's practical philosophy, asking some preliminary and general questions, and in general setting the scene for what will follow. In this way, it accomplishes the task of the preamble that Aristotle identifies in the *Rhetoric*, i.e. to tell the audience what the subject that will be discussed is, and the way in which it will be discussed. As for the style, there is no difference between *Politics* VII 1–3 and the rest of the two final books of the *Politics*; they are all written in an audience-friendly style.

2.4 *Metaphysics*

It may come as a surprise to the modern reader that the whole book A of the *Metaphysics* should be considered a preamble. In fact, in *Metaphysics* A we find

some of the most important theories of the treatise: the presentation of the idea of wisdom as a science of causes and principles, and the history of the progressive discovery of the four causes by Aristotle's predecessors, accompanied by a long criticism.

People are justified in having missed the preamble status of *Metaphysics* A, because the passage in which Aristotle refers to it as a preamble is not in A itself, but in book B, and book B, in the form in which we have the work, does not immediately follow book A, but it follows book a, which has been inserted at a later time between A and B. So, in general, those scholars who are interested in A typically simply ignore the words of B:

> The first *aporia* concerns the subject which we discussed in our preamble (*en tois prephromiasmenois*, 995b5).

The reference is clearly to book A. Ross has nothing to say about it; Bonitz is happy to call *Metaphysics* a *proemium*, but provides no further discussion of the term; Owens does the same.[6] Menn says that "A is certainly the introduction to a treatise on wisdom" (Ia5, p. 8).[7]

But hardly anyone seems to have bothered to consider the sense in which A is a preamble. In the case of the *Metaphysics*, we do not have a full stylistic and content analysis comparable to that which Schütrumpf provided for the last books of the *Politics*. In general, some scholars consider book A to be already part of first philosophy (esp. Cooper, 2012), and do not consider the sense in which it is an introduction to it. Others seem to consider it to be an introduction, because Aristotle is raising, *in nuce*, some of his main concepts of first philosophy here (*archai*, *sophia*, but not *protê philosophia*). They use "introduction" in a rather loose sense, also referring to PA I and *Politics* I–II as "introductions." Aristotle, however, does not refer to either of these texts as a *prooimion*.

We can find a useful tip in one of the contributions of Sarah Broadie. She provides a careful study of *Metaphysics* A 2 and says that in A 1–2 Aristotle indicates what his conception of *philosophia* is, in opposition to different and concurrent conceptions, such as Isocrates' idea of philosophy as the construction of grand discourses about pan-Hellenic politics, on one side, and the reduction of Platonic dialect is to a kind of mathematization of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics by the Academia, on the other. Broadie says:

> It is not so implausible that A 1-2 is, among other things, something of a cultural manifesto, claiming the word *philosophia* for studies as we get in the *Metaphysics* in face of Isocrates' claiming it for *his* kind of activity … these chapters, in short, represent the contrary value of pure research as conducted according the most stringent standards of thoroughness and penetration.
>
> (Broadie, 2012, p. 50)

To be sure, Aristotle reserves his defence of the *bios theoretikos* for the ethics, but in the proem of the *Metaphysics* he expresses his position in refined language, and in explicit opposition to his predecessors and to their theory of the causes. Even if we do not have a complete analysis of the style of *Metaphysics* A, in particular of A 1–3, it seems evident to me that Aristotle wrote this book in an elegant and relaxed style, very different from the compressed writing we find in books B–N, a style that Jaeger described as "das trockenen Tenor des aristotelischen Kollegstils" (Jaeger, 1912, p. 125). Book A is an example of what Jaeger describes as the dramatic changes in tone in the treatises in general and in the *Metaphysics* in particular:

> Eben noch der gleichmäßige Gang der schulgemäßen Sprache … mit einem Mal schreitet die Rede im Prunkgewande feierlicher isokrateischer Perioden, geschmückt mit platonischer Bilderpracht, reich dahin. Hier will der Autor mit einem besonderen Gedanken auf das Auditorium starken Eindruck machen. … Da Aristoteles aber gehalten ist, wenn er schön schreiben will, nach dem Kunstgeschmack der zeitgenössischen, tonangebenden Prosaiker zu schreiben und zu stilisieren … Dann wendet sie die *kataskeuê* an, wo sie ihrer bedarf, bedient sich sämtlicher *schêmata lexeôs*, der dichterischen *metaphora*, der *lexis katestrammenê*, meidet den Hiat und bildet wohl gar einen klangvollen *arithmos* aus. Das nächste Kapitel zeigt sich vielleicht schon wieder von Kunstprosa gänzlich unberührt.
>
> (Jaeger, 1912, pp. 136–137)

In the two texts from the *Politics* and the *Metaphysics,* which Aristotle explicitly describes as preambles, we find some common characteristics. They are both long texts, carefully written from a stylistic perspective, in which Aristotle expresses, in a general and preliminary way, some of the lines that he will pursue in more detail later about what *sophia* is, or what the best *polis* should look like.

2.5 *Eudemian Ethics*

Let's now move to the preamble to the *Eudemian Ethics*. This text is divided into two sections: the first corresponds to the modern chapters *EE* I 1–5, and is aporetic; the second, *EE* I 6, is about the method one should follow in responding to the problems posed in the preceding chapters. From a stylistic point of view, Diels and Dirlmeier have remarked that the first chapters of the *EE*, as well as book VII of the *Politics* and book A of the *Metaphysics*, have a lofty tone. *EE* I 1–6 avoids hiatus and abounds in realistic details and metaphors, it uses poetic words such as *anelpistos* (1215a13), it uses a variety of terms, it employs Platonic turns of phrase (*autous paraskeauzousi*, 1215a19, cf. Plato *Apol.* 39d7), and so on.[8]

Let us now look at *EE* I 1–5. After rejecting an opinion inscribed on the temple at Delos, Aristotle begins by telling us that

> about each kind and nature there are many considerations that raise problems and need investigation
>
> (1214a9–10)[9]

The questions to be asked can be divided into two main groups:

> (1) what the good life consists in, and (2) how it is to be acquired (1214a15).[10]

These issues were also discussed in Plato's *Meno* (100b4–6). After establishing what the two main problems are, Aristotle shows that some questions derive from them directly, as we will see. Aristotle does not randomly accumulate questions, but distinguishes the two main problems into sub-questions, and follows a clear pattern in multiplying them (Bodeüs, 2017).

A warning is now necessary. Many people wrongly identify the question *en tini estin* with the question *ti estin*.[11] An exception to this is von Fragstein (1974, p. 14), who rightly notes that the first question is only preliminary to the second and is answered using the opinions of common people, who do not have a proper definition of *eudaimonia*, but only a general idea of what *eudaimonia* involves. In other words, knowing what *eudaimonia* consists in can simply amount to recognizing some *per se* attributes of the thing, without grasping its essence. This corresponds to knowing something of an object X, as indicated in *Posterior Analytics* 93a22 (*echontes ti autou tou pragmatos*). It represents a necessary step in the process of finding a definition. This is also mentioned in the *EE* itself, in a passage which is very similar to that from the *Analytics*:

> We must research in the same way as all people do in other matters, when they grasp something: we must endeavour by means of statements that are true but not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both true and clear. For our cognitive state is as if we knew that health is the best disposition of the body and that Coriscus is the darkest man in the market-place; for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help towards knowing what is each of these things.
>
> (*EE* 1220a15–22)[12]

With respect to question (1), what the good life consists in, Aristotle lists some opinions about the component parts of happiness: *en trisi* (1214a31–33). The things the good life consists in are identified with its *parts* (*merê* 1214b11–24): practical wisdom, virtue, and pleasure. After that, question (1) is specified by a further distinction between (1.1) what the good life is, and (1.2) the necessary conditions for it (1214b12–27). And again, a distinction is made within the necessary conditions: (1.2.1) conditions necessary for life in general, and (1.2.2) conditions necessary for a good life (1214b11–27). After a few lines, Aristotle raises question (1) again from another point of view, that is, by

asking if (1.3) happiness consists only in having a soul of a certain character or if (1.4.) it is also necessary that our actions should be of a certain character (1215a20–25).

With respect to question (2), how to acquire it, i.e. what the sources of the good life and its origins (*ex tinôn*, 1215a9) are, Aristotle gives us a list of five possible ways to acquire it:

- *phusei*
- *dia mathêseôs*
- *dia askêseôs* (i.e. *ethizesthai*)
- *daimoniai epinoiâi*
- *dia tuchên* (1214a15–25)

But after a few lines, he reduces them to two, eliminating god's influence, nature, and chance, because they do not depend on us, and we are only interested in sources that depend on us (1215a8–15). So, the main distinction is between that which depends on us, and that which does not.

We can summarize them in the following diagram. Here, I present a simplified schema:



The first section of the book has the same function as book B of the *Metaphysics* – to present a series of *aporiai* that define the field of research – but is better organized from a systematic point of view; in fact, there is no clear diairetic procedure in *Metaphysics* B, as there is in *EE* I 1–2.

After presenting the systematic list of problems, Aristotle begins looking for a solution. First of all, he examines the most important *doxai*. *EE* I 3–5 presents an extensive list and discussion of the opinions about ways of life (*bioi*). Aristotle distinguishes between the opinions of the *hoi polloi*, the masses, who do not deserve consideration (1214b28–1215a2), and the opinions of the *sophoi*, cultured people, who deserve to be examined (*episkepsis*). This will help to find the definition of happiness. In fact, he says:

> Since every research has special problems related to it, it is clear that there are problems in regard to the highest life and the best mode of existence too; it is then well to examine those opinions, since the refutations of disputants are demonstrations of the *logoi* opposed to them.
>
> (1215a3–7)[13]

The passage reminds us of a famous declaration in *NE* VII 1:

> We must, as in other cases, keep to the *phainomena* and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to demonstrate: by preference all the *endoxa* pertaining to these affections, or (failing this) the majority, and the most important. For if the difficulties are resolved and the *endoxa* remain in place the demonstration will have been sufficient.
>
> (1145b2–7)[14]

There are, however, differences between the two passages, as we shall see.

According to Aristotle, it is useful to examine the *hupolepseis* of other people and refuse them, because it enables us to better see the path to follow in searching for the definition of happiness. The three components of happiness quoted above are now expanded into three different kinds of lives, as Rowe rightly notes (1971, 17), rather than the kinds of lives being reduced to these components, as Gigon (1971, 108) maintains. The transition from discussing the parts of happiness to comparing *bioi* is a good move, because within the concept of a *bios*, the qualities of the person and the qualities of his acting are connected. A *bios* includes both *ethê* and *praxeis*.

The relevant opinions are those of people who do not have to earn their lives but can freely choose how to live (1215a 36). They will choose either the political life, or the intellectual life, or the life of pleasure (1215b 1–2). The passage resembles the discussion of *NE* I 3, but in the *NE* it is the first step in finding the definition of happiness, while here it is still part of the preamble. I do not have the space here to consider this section in detail. I just want to underline that in the *NE*, as we will see, the discussion of contrasting opinions is part of the search for the definition of happiness, whereas at this point in the *EE* this is only a component of a preliminary discussion. It seems that in the *EE*, Aristotle wants to get rid of the section of the inquiry on *endoxa* about what happiness does consist in, before starting the philosophical inquiry proper. I will come back to this point.

At the end of I 5, Aristotle concludes the discussion of *bioi* and returns to the discussion of what happiness consists in, i.e. pleasure, virtue, wisdom:

> About the *pleasure* connected with the body and with enjoyment, its nature and quality and the means that procure it, are not hard to see; so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these pleasures are … let us first consider *virtue* and *practical wisdom*, what the nature of each is, and also whether they are parts of the good life, either themselves or the actions that spring from them, since that they are connected with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody, at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of consideration.
>
> (1216a30–b2)[15]

None of the problems posed in 1214a1–b28 is solved in the preamble, because the solution depends on finding the definition of happiness. This is the main difference with the passage in *NE* VII 1. It is interesting to compare the passage 1216a30–b2 with the final part of the proem, *EE* I 6. There, Aristotle explains that an analysis of puzzles and a conservation of the main *endoxa*, such as the one he provides in *NE* VII, are not sufficient to get out of difficulty. The clarification in *EE* I 6 depends on *finding the nature of the thing*, because if we start from a definition, it will become easier to solve the problems. This passage introduces the content of *EE* I 6, which is dedicated to the method to be followed.

EE I 6 has been widely discussed in recent years, and I do not have the space here to examine it in full. It is mainly polemical in character, and continues the criticism of previous thinkers, begun in I 5, with a criticism of Socrates' theory (1216b2-1–16). The main idea is that much caution (*polles eulabeias*, 1216b40) is required in the search for truth in political matters, because there are authors who have arrived at wrong positions. They correctly understand that in practical matters, as well as in theoretical inquiries, a philosophical approach is required, and it is necessary to explain the nature and the causes of virtue and *phronêsis*, but they present idle and inappropriate arguments, either through ignorance or vanity (1217a2–4); their arguments have no practical impact nor can they organize action with a wide constructive approach (a6–7). The practical politicians, as it happens, believe the arguments of such people, because they do not know the rules of argument and do not know how to distinguish appropriate arguments from extraneous ones.[16]

The error can be twofold. In fact, there is a need not only to judge the result of an argument in the light of *phainomena*, but also to consider whether the right conclusion has been reached with a wrong middle term, i.e. by mentioning an extraneous cause.[17] So, the error can be relative to the *hoti* and/or to the *dioti*. To avoid the first kind of error, the philosopher must start from examples and the opinions of people as evidence. This is the typical Aristotelian method, starting from things said in an obscure way in order to arrive at clear judgements. We find it in the *Physics* and in many other

works.[18] People can come to see the truth clearly if philosophers persuade them to change their positions (*metabibazomenoi*, 1216b30) to the extent necessary for this (*zêtein tên pistin*, 1216b36). What is peculiar in this passage is that here, as in *Metaphysics* α 1, it is said that everybody has some affinity with the truth (*oikeion ti pros tên alêtheian*, 1216b31, cf. *Metaph.* 993a31–b5). It is an element that creates a bridge between dialectic and science, against the position of modern scholars who distinguish sharply between the two.

This passage brings together elements from the dialectical procedure, i.e. the idea of starting from the opinions of the audience in order to modify those opinions, and elements from the theory of definition in the *Posterior Analytics*, i.e. the distinction between the *hoti* and *dioti*. It is not strange that scholars diverge widely on the interpretation of this passage.[19] In my view, we have here a clear indication that Aristotle feels free to employ dialectical arguments and procedures in a framework largely inspired by the doctrine of the *Analytics*, which are explicitly quoted here.

2.6 *Nicomachean Ethics*

Let us now consider the proem to the *NE*. At first glance, this proem has three distinguishing features: it is much shorter than the others, it addresses the question of the kind of public that can benefit by listening to the lectures that constitute the *NE*, and it concludes with a summary.

Let's examine each of these differences in turn. The preamble to the *NE* is much shorter than the preamble to the *EE*, because Aristotle shifts much of the material in the *EE* preamble to the main discussion of *NE*. The clearest example is the quotation of the Delic inscription that opens the first chapter of the *EE* (1214a5–6), which is moved to the final part of book I of the *NE* (1099a27–28). This is a result of the different general characters of the two preambles. As Richard Bodeüs has shown in an excellent recent contribution (Bodeüs, 2017), the proem to the *EE* is dialectical in many ways. It opens with a criticism (*hêmeis d'auotôi mê sunchôrômen*, "Let us disagree with him" 1214a7); it asks questions and describes every possible *aporia* and problem about happiness; it has a distinctive "philosophical" flavour and never speaks about politics. On the other hand, in the *NE* we find the material used in the proem of the *EE* after the definition of happiness with the aim of confirming that definition. That which in the *EE* was the material of one or more *aporiai* is used in the *NE* as material for "confirmative" dialectics, a usage of *endoxa* typical of many Aristotelian discussions (see e.g. *Phys.* I 8–9).

The proem to the *NE* proceeds towards the definition of happiness with no hesitation or doubt. In an authoritative way, Aristotle presents a number of theses about the human good and the validity, for the most part, of human judgements. He never says that his work has a philosophical character; on the contrary, he insists that the search he is beginning is a *political* one. He wants his audience to understand how important the theory he is about to articulate

is for the life of the Athenian citizen. This is why he warns the audience that he is speaking to a mature audience and not one composed of youngsters:

> Because of that, a young man is not an appropriate student of political science, for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his emotions, his study will be vain and unprofitable.
>
> (1095a25)[20]

The general impression is that Aristotle's intent is to gain the attention and favour of the audience. This resembles how Isocrates would have written a proem, but in *NE* Aristotle accomplishes this with greater philosophical depth.

I think that the *NE* is addressed to a public of free citizens, who are not already dedicated to *philosophia* or to a *philosophikos bios*, and because of this, Aristotle does not want to raise doubts in his audience towards his proposal about what should be considered to be the best human good. This is why he does not employ his usual tactic of accumulating *aporiai* at the beginning of a *logos*, but instead he insists on the importance and interest of his proposal. He also underlines the practical aspect of his research. He says that our aim is not only to arrive at knowledge of what the human good is, but also to become better (1095a6; 1103b26–29; 1179a35–b4).

Lastly, let us consider the final summary of the preamble (1095a12–13). It is typical for Aristotle to present a summary in the first books of the *NE*. Aristotle alerts the audience to the main shifts in his argument and describes how the argument develops. This indicates that Aristotle wants to help the audience follow his reasoning, and that he clearly has little faith in the ability of the typical Athenian citizen to follow lengthy demonstrations. This is why he repeats phrases such as

> Let us then resume the argument (1095a13) and
> But let us return to the point from which we digressed (1095b14).

In the *NE*, Aristotle wants his arguments to be convincing, that is, to inspire *pistis*. In the *EE*, on the other hand, he doesn't need to do that quite so much. I think that the fact that the two treatises are aimed at different audiences is the best explanation of the difference between the two preambles, and, indeed, of the difference between Aristotle's two treatises on *Ethics*, in general.

From a stylistic point of view, the situation in *NE* I–IV and in *Politics* VII–VIII looks very similar. Aristotle addresses his speech to a non-philosophical audience, and because of that he writes in an elegant and polished style. There is no difference between the proem and the ensuing treatise, in the *NE* and in *Politics* VII–VIII; instead, there is a remarkable difference between the proem and the ensuing treatise in the *EE* and the *Metaphysics*.

2.7 Conclusion

Let's take stock. Among the three authors considered there is a substantial difference between Isocrates, on the one hand, and Plato and Aristotle on the other. But there are also minor differences between Plato and Aristotle.

For Isocrates, the most important part of a speech seems to be the conclusion. In the proem, he tries to ingratiate himself with the audience by talking about himself and his enemies. He complains about calumnies and underlines the importance of the subject matter of the speech.

Plato's characters sometimes use the word *prooimion* and seem to place much importance on it. In the late dialogues, the proem seems to contain the basic notions upon which an extensive presentation is erected, be it the description of the cosmos in the *Timaeus*, or the entire legislation of Magnesia in the *Laws*. The proem contains some basic elements, but not the detail and the refinement of a doctrine.

In Aristotle, as in Isocrates, the term *prooimion* is used by the author when speaking about his own *logos*, and not by the characters in a fictional dialogue. Aristotle places the proem at the beginning of a work, because he thinks that it is important to be clear with the audience what the *logos* is about. From the point of view of style, Aristotle's proems are always very elegant and carefully written, avoiding hiatus. From this point of view, we can see some influence of Isocrates on Aristotle. In some cases, such as in *Politics* VII–VIII and in *NE* I, the prologues share this type of style with the *logos* they introduce. In other cases, as in the *Metaphysics* and in the *Eudemian Ethics* they stand in sharp contrast to the scholastic prose of the main part of the work. In this case, scholars have suspected that Aristotle was using sections of his *exoterikoi logoi*. This may be the case, but not without some elaboration and adaptation: e.g. in *Politics* VII 1, 13123a22–23, he refers to the *exoterikoi logoi* as something different from the present speech, VII 1.

In general, the Aristotelian way of writing preambles is more similar to Plato's than to Isocrates', which shouldn't come as a surprise, but in the *NE* he uses some Isocratean tricks, the *captatio benevolentiae*. Even in the *NE*, however, this is not the main point of the piece.

Does Aristotle agree with Plato that it is best to present the basic notions of his treatise in the *prooimion?* Yes and no. In reality, in his preambles Aristotle describes, only in a very general way, the issues he wants to discuss, and gives the audience just a hint of the direction he wants to take. Nothing very decisive is presented in the *prooimia*. In my view, this is explained by Aristotle's customary procedure in his treatises, starting from a universal and vague description of the subject and working towards a more precise description of its nature. This is the way in which Aristotle proceeds in the *Physics*, the *Ethics*, and the *Metaphysics* too. So, at the beginning we have some true but unclear statements, and only after much discussion do we arrive at a definition that is true and clear *per se* and not only to us. In Plato, on the contrary, some basic points are clearly established in the preambles.

In any case, it is interesting to note that in all the cases examined here, Aristotle's prefaces are elegant and general introductions to a given philosophical inquiry, which may, or may not, be written in a more scientific way.[21]

Notes

1 Mansfeld, 1994, p. 195. On preambles in Greek literature in general see also the essays collected by Dunn and Cole, 1992.
2 I will discuss here only the passages explicitly referred to as "proemia" by Plato's characters. The question of the function and relevance of Plato's beginnings in general is widely discussed. See Cappuccino, 2014 for a general assessment of the question and a very wide bibliography.
3 Cf. Ritter, 1896, p. 48; Gastaldi, 1984, Cappuccino, 2014, p. 6.
4 Laks, 1995, p. 53; Schöpsdau, 2003, pp. 223–225.
5 Newman, 1887, I p. 297; Schütrumpf, 2005, IV pp. 87–88.
6 Bonitz, 1849, p. 139; Crubellier, 2009, p. 47; Owens, 1951, p. 157.
7 See https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/antike/mitarbeiter/menn/texte/ia5.
8 Diels, 1894, p. 226; Dirlmeier, 1962, p. 75.
9 πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα καὶ περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως.
10 ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν.
11 Dirlmeier, 1962, p. 147, Gigon, 1971, p. 98, Décarie, 1978, p. 46, Kenny, 1978, p. 191, and others.
12 δεῖ δὴ ζητεῖν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες, ὥστε ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ σαφῶς. νῦν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰδείημεν> καὶ ὑγίειαν, ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ Κορίσκος ὁ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μελάντατος· τί μὲν γὰρ ἑκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἴσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἑκάτερον αὐτῆς πρὸ ἔργου τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν. At line 1220a18 I supply εἰδείημεν with Spengel and Donini, 1999.
13 ἐπεὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἑκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσίν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγχοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξ εις εἰσίν (cf. *De caelo* 279b6–7: αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀποδείξεις ἀπορίαι περὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσίν).
14 δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
15 τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, {καὶ} τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐτίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς […] περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν, τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου τίς ἐστι, καὶ πότερον μόρια ταῦτα τῆς ἀγαθῆς ζωῆς ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ προσάπτουσιν αὐτὰ κἂν εἰ μὴ πάντες εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ λόγου ἄξιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες.
16 I refer *paschousi* at line 1217a7 to *oi empeiroi* of line 5 and not to *tines* of line 1216b40.
17 Aristotle refers here to *Prior Analytics* 53b3–5 and to *Posterior Analytics* 88a20, Cf. *NE* 1142b22–4.
18 *Phys.* I 1, 184a16–23.
19 It is a method inspired by dialectic, according to Zingano, 2007 and Bodéüs, 2017, and contrary to the views of Karbowski, 2015 and Mendonça, 2017. In my opinion, there is

an ambiguity in the use of the term "dialectical"; in one sense of the term the "dialectical" method can be used together with that of the *Analytics*.

20 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς.

21 I would like to thank Dr Peter Larsen for correcting and improving my not very idiomatic English.

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3 The *Ergon* Argument in the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*[1]

Friedemann Buddensiek

3.1 Introduction

The *ergon* argument in the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE* II 1, 1218b32–1219a39) and the *ergon* argument in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* I 7, 1097b22–1098a18) are the arguments leading to the definition of *eudaimonia* (in the *EE*) or of the human good (in the *NE*). As such, they play a common central role given that *eudaimonia* or the human good is one of the central topics in either work. This common role of the arguments allows and asks for an examination of some differences between them and this comparison may help us to improve our understanding of either argument.

In the following examination of such differences, my focus will be more on some aspects of the *Eudemian* argument, but the comparison will also highlight certain aspects concerning the *Nicomachean ergon* argument. After a brief remark on the demarcations of the text of the arguments and a look at differences between them, I discuss the different functions of the notion of *ergon* in the two arguments as well as some aspects connected with these different functions.

I want to argue for two claims: (i) The function of the *Eudemian* notion of *ergon* is to highlight and to prioritize the *energeia* or the product over the corresponding disposition, while the function of the *Nicomachean* notion of *ergon* is to specify the *energeia* constitutive for the human good. (ii) The *Eudemian ergon* is compatible with weakly founded inclusivism: while Aristotle is certain that the *aretê* of the activity which is constitutive for *eudaimonia* has to be the whole *aretê*, he abstains – for good reasons – from including a criterion for inclusion of *energeiai* and *aretai* in the argument for the account of *eudaimonia*. This lack of a criterion is not found in the *NE* argument which relies on the specifying function of its notion of *ergon*.

3.2 The Demarcations of the Arguments

I adopt the traditional demarcations of the arguments as indicated above, that is, I take the expression "*ergon* argument" in the *EE* to refer to the passage beginning right after the announcement of a fresh start and ending with the definition of *eudaimonia*. In the *NE*, the argument starts with the demand to

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define more precisely what *eudaimonia* is and ends with an "extended" definition of the human good (while 1098a18–20 may be regarded as an important addendum). This is not to say that the end of either passage is also the end of what Aristotle has to say about *eudaimonia* in either work. In fact, the *NE* makes it quite clear that the definition is only an outline or a sketch that may be filled in later (1098a20–22), whereas the *EE* does claim that the definition has provided the genus and the definition well, but still seeks for corroboration from generally held views (1219a39–40). But the *NE*, just as the *EE*, takes the conclusion of the argument as the answer to the question of what *eudaimonia* is (compare, for instance, I 13, 1102a5f.) – even if the details have yet to be filled in – and there will not be any other definition.

All this may be taken as self-evident. But it has been suggested that, for instance, the *EE* argument up to 1219a39 is only the "first, more formal, part of the argument"[2] and that the argument runs in fact through the conclusion in 1239a38–39 till 1220a4. This would mean that for any comparison of the arguments we would have to take account of a longer stretch of text and this would have implications for the results of the comparison. Doug Hutchinson, for instance, maintains that the *NE* argument is "a cryptic and compressed version of a more elaborate and persuasive argument in the *EE*" (1986, 40), it is "the same in essentials as the *EE* argument" (57): "the *NE* argument differs from that in the *EE* only in matters of detail and presentation" (52).

I do not think, though, that this is the most plausible way to understand the *EE* argument: The passage following the presentation of evidence for the correctness of the genus and the definition of *eudaimonia* (1219a39–b26) – that is, the passage about the soul and its parts (1219b36–1220a) –simply does not contribute to the argument as such. We do not need this passage in order to reconstrue a valid argument in the passage leading to the definition of *eudaimonia* (1218b32–1219a39). A similar line of thought holds for the demarcation of the *NE* argument.

3.3 Some Differences between the *EE* and the *NE* Argument

In this section, I list some differences between the *EE* and the *NE* argument in order to provide the basis for our further discussion. Among the more important differences are the following:

1. The *EE* argument employs the notion of the *ergon* of the soul, while the *NE* argument employs the notion of the *ergon* of man. This difference may in part be due to the greater proximity of the *EE* argument to the *ergon* argument in Plato's *Politeia*, which is also concerned with the *ergon* of the soul.[3] It may also be due to the line of thought in the *EE* argument that leads from "life" as the *ergon* of the soul to "good life" as the content of *eudaimonia*. It may finally be due to the fact that the *NE* argument operates with the notion of a *specific ergon* of man, whereas the *Eudemian* reference to the soul lacks the same degree of specificity.

2. The *NE* argument deals with and defines the human good, while the *EE* argument does not speak of the human good (or of human beings at all), but defines *eudaimonia* – though it is clear from *EE* I 7 that the good Aristotle is interested in is the human good and that in the *NE* the human good is the same as *eudaimonia* (compare *NE* I 7, 1097b22–24, I 13, 1102a5f.). The *Nicomachean* reference to the *human* good may, again, be due to the specifying role of its notion of *ergon*.
3. The *ergon* argument of the *EE* does *not* specify the kind of activity constitutive for *eudaimonia*, while the *NE* argument specifies that activity as the activity of that which has *logos*. Although it does so only within the lead-up to the conclusion, not in the conclusion itself, the *NE* conclusion has been understood as referring not just to *energeia*, but to *rational energeia*.[4]
4. The *NE* argument rules out – as an *energeia* constitutive for the human good – the vegetative "life" as well as the life concerned with perception. Within the argument, the *EE* does not rule out any kind of activity of the soul – or capacity for an activity of the soul – though outside and after the argument it rules out the *threptikon* explicitly (1219b20–24, b31f., b38f.), but still seems to include the part concerned with perception (alongside desire).[5]
5. In the *ergon* argument of the *EE*, the notion of *telos* (and *teleion*) plays a major role, as the argument operates with the premise that the *ergon* is the end (1219a8). This may have ramifications for our understanding of "*ergon*" – on which I am going to comment below. The *NE* argument does not use the word "*telos*" and does *not* tell us that the *ergon* is the end. Nevertheless, it may be clear from the context of the *NE* argument that here, too, the notion of *ergon* has a major, though less immediate role in the determination of the end.
6. The notion of *hexis* (or *diathesis* or *dunamis*) and its contrast to the notion of *energeia* play an important role in the *EE* argument, but not in the *NE* argument, where *hexis* (or *diathesis* or *dynamis*) is not explicitly mentioned and where the contrast between *hexis* and *energeia*, while equally important, is mentioned only in an indirect, very abbreviated way (1098a5). Accordingly, the point repeatedly made in the *EE* that an *ergon* or an *energeia* is "better" than its corresponding *hexis* (1219a9–12, a17f., a31) is taken up in the *NE* argument only very briefly (1098a6f.).[6]
7. The *EE* argument distinguishes two ways of speaking of "*ergon*," referring to two classes of cases of *erga*: in one case, an *ergon* of a capacity is a product different from the actualization of the capacity (its *chrêsis*); in the other case, the actualization of a capacity *is* the *ergon* of the item (1219a13–18). In both cases, the *ergon* is the end of the item of which it is the *ergon*. There is no such distinction in the *Nicomachean* argument, though the *NE* does make a similar distinction between ends right at the beginning of *NE* I: some ends are *energeiai*, some are *erga* beside *energeiai* (I 1, 1094a4f.).
8. The most famous difference: The *EE* stresses the point that the *aretê* could be a whole or a part and that the *aretê* and the *energeia* could be *teleia*

or *atelês* ("perfect" or "complete" and "imperfect" or "incomplete"): so, *eudaimonia* should be an *energeia* of a *zôê teleia* ("perfect life") based on *aretê teleia*. The *NE* argument does not mention wholes and parts, and it has been discussed extensively whether its use of "*teleiotatê*" ("most perfect," 1098a18) should be understood in terms of wholeness.

3.4 What Is the Function of the Notion of *Ergon*?

Let us now take a look at the function of the notion of *ergon*, beginning with the *EE* argument. The function of the notion of *ergon* should depend on – and should be determined by – its role within the *ergon* argument. The *ergon* argument leads to the definition of *eudaimonia* (in the *EE*): "*eudaimonia* must be activity of a perfect life based on perfect *aretê*." In the *NE*, the *ergon* argument leads to the definition of the human good: "the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with *aretê* (and if there are more *aretai*, in accordance with the best and the most perfect)."

The *EE* argument as well as the *NE* argument starts with a new beginning – explicitly so in the *EE*, *de facto* so in the *NE*. We may expect that the notion of *ergon* makes an important contribution that helps to solve a difficulty that could not – or could not as easily – be solved without it. In the *EE*, we are facing the problem that the argument makes a new beginning (*allê archê*), but does not begin with a question that would need to be solved. The question could be a question that is answered by the conclusion – that is, a question like: what is *eudaimonia*? This, at least, was the question at the beginning of the main part of the *EE* (I 7, 1217a20f.). According to a first answer, *eudaimonia* was the best (*ariston*) of the things that may be achieved by humans by their own doings (they are *prakta* for them, 1217a39f.). This "best" was determined later on in I 8 as the end (the *telos*) – which was said to be the cause (*aition*) of the things subordinate to it and to be the first of all *prakta* (1218b10–12). So, we have determined what is meant by "*ariston*," but we have not yet been given the definition of *eudaimonia*. Given the results from I 8 (it is the *telos* that is the best): What contribution is needed and could be provided by the notion of *ergon*?

The notion of *ergon* is introduced a few lines into the argument by using the notion of *aretê* which has been introduced just before as a good in the soul (1218b34–36): "Let it be assumed … about *aretê*, that it is the best state, disposition, or capacity of anything that has some employment or *ergon*" (1218b37–1219a1). We already know that we are talking about the *aretê*. But we must understand that something follows from this: namely that we are talking about the *ergon* of the thing that has that *aretê*: we are talking about an item (activity, product) something is good at (namely its *ergon*), thanks to the quality of its disposition (or *diathesis* or *dunamis*). The introduction of the notion of *ergon* is an introduction of an item something is or may be good at (thanks to the quality of its disposition).

But what is the function of the notion of the *ergon*? Following the introduction of the *ergon*, Aristotle is doing two things: (a) He highlights the difference

between a disposition (*hexis*) and the *ergon*. (b) He points out that – due to the fact that the *ergon* is the *telos* – the *ergon* is *better* than the *hexis*, no matter whether the *ergon* is a product or an activity itself: as an end, the *ergon* is that for the sake of which other things, that is, capacities and dispositions are (see 1219a8–11). The function of the *ergon*, then, is to highlight that there is something better than the disposition, namely its use (actualization) or the product of its actualization.

If we want to place the notion of *ergon* in the argument leading to the definition of *eudaimonia*, we may go as far as saying that it is responsible for the notion of *energeia* within that definition. And we may say that "*energeia*" corresponds to "*prakton*" in the initial answer to what *eudaimonia* is, that is, the *ariston prakton* (*EE* I 7, 1217a39f.). But since *energeia* is better than *hexis* (see 1219a31, which takes up 1219a9, a12), the *ergon* – as a *telos* – has its share in accounting for the goodness of the *ariston prakton*: this goodness derives not only from the fact that *energeia* is based on perfect *aretê*, but also from the fact that this *energeia* is better than *aretê*. Without the *ergon* (or the *chrêsis*) in the *ergon* argument, Aristotle may have found himself at an impasse: he might have found himself stuck with *aretê*, although he intended to speak about a *prakton*. The *ergon* solves this problem by establishing the *energeia* side of *eudaimonia*.

This is all we get here. The function of the notion of *ergon* is *not* a specification of the *energeia* that is constitutive for *eudaimonia*. In the *EE*, we find the specification of the *energeia* only after the *ergon* argument, the definition of *eudaimonia*, and the "evidence" following it: namely in *EE* II 1, 1219b26–1220a4, where Aristotle distinguishes parts of the soul, indicates which parts are included in the further discussion (the rational part and the part that is able to listen to the rational part), and attributes *aretai* to those parts (this section corresponds to *NE* I 13). Apparently, he does not think that this specification would be required for the *EE* argument and the final definition of *eudaimonia*.

If the function of the *ergon* in the *EE* argument is to highlight that there is something better than the disposition, namely its actualization or the product of its actualization, a note on the translation of "*ergon*" may be in place. The common translation of "*ergon*" by "function" would not bring out this function well, at least not as well as a translation such as "work" or, perhaps, "achievement" (though the former may sound somewhat antiquated in those cases in which the *ergon* is an activity, while the latter could be – and should not be – mistaken as referring also to the function of the item in question).[7]

While this may not be regarded as decisive, the choice of "work" or "achievement" may get further support from the answer to the question of which kind of entity an *ergon* has to be in the *EE* argument. First of all, it is said to be the *telos* (1219a8), which in turn is to be understood as something that human beings can achieve by their own doing (that is, a *prakton*): the "for-the-sake-of-which" (which is the *telos*) has been said to be a *prakton* and to be the best. This, then, makes the *ergon* itself a *prakton* (since it is an end and the end is a *prakton*). However, a *prakton* has to be a product or an activity, that is, something we can achieve by our own doing. Thus, it may be a

fulfilment of a function, but not a function itself, and we must not conflate the function which is to be fulfilled with the fulfilment of the function. We may fulfil a function by doing or producing something. But a "work that is function-fulfilling" is ontologically different from a function, and we cannot do or produce the function.

Furthermore, Aristotle also claims that the *ergon* is better than the *hexis*. The relation "x is better than y" requires that x and y are comparable entities. But we cannot compare functions to dispositions (at least not by using them as relata in an "x is better than y" relation): these are not items of the right kinds to be compared. Finally, according to Aristotle, the *ergon* of a thing is also the *ergon* of the *aretê*, that is, of the *aretê* of that thing, though not in the same manner (*all' ouch hôsautôs*, 1219a20): a shoe is the *ergon* of the art of shoe-making and the activity of shoe-making, so the *ergon* of the good shoe-maker is a good shoe (1219a19–23). Now, the *function* of a thing and of that thing in a good state *is* the function in the *same* manner: only the fulfilment of that same function differs. The function of the good shoe-maker is not a shoe of a different quality in comparison with the shoe of any other shoe-maker, while their work – the fulfilment of their function – will differ in quality. If, all things considered, "*ergon*" is to be understood as referring to the work, achievement, or, in general, fulfilment of a function of an item, not to the function itself, we can also understand how the notion of *ergon* fits its two roles: the role of drawing a contrast to the notion of a disposition of which the *ergon* is the actualization and, since the *ergon* is the end, the role of highlighting that the *ergon* is better than the item (the capacity, the disposition) of which it is the *ergon*.

What about the translation of "*ergon*" in the *NE*? We must not jump to the conclusion that the same line of thought as in the *EE* would apply here as well. After all, the *NE* argument does not say that the *ergon* is the *telos* (the *NE* argument does not speak of *telos* at all). Still, similar to the *EE*, the *NE*, too, claims that the *ergon* of an item and of that item in a good state are the same in kind (1098a8–10), which seems to imply that they are not numerically the same – which they would be, if Aristotle were talking about their function (there is only one function for items of the same kind), not about the differing fulfilments of a function (which may be the same in kind). So much for the note on the translation of "*ergon*."

Let us now move on to consider the function of the notion of *ergon* in the *NE* argument. "*hexis*" comes up in the *NE* argument only in an implicit reference to it (1098a5) and the notion of *ergon* is not used to highlight the priority of the *ergon* of an item over the capacity of the item corresponding to it. What, then, is the function of the notion of *ergon* in the *NE*? Again, we would expect that it is to make a contribution to – or, on the way to – the conclusion of the argument: the definition of the human good. In contrast to the *EE*, the argument begins with a question, and we may expect (a) that this question is answered by the conclusion of the argument and (b) that the notion of *ergon* contributes to the answer. The task set at the beginning of the *ergon* argument is not entirely clear (see *NE* I 7, 1097b22–24). Yet, given that the conclusion

of the *ergon* argument is an answer to the question of what the human good is, we should understand the task presented at the beginning of the argument as working towards an answer to this question.

How does the notion of *ergon* contribute to the argument leading to the answer to this question, that is, to the conclusion that the human good is an activity of the soul based on *aretê*? In difference to the *EE* argument, the notion of *ergon* in the *NE* argument does not serve the purpose of highlighting the activity (over the disposition). Instead, it serves the purpose of specifying the activity. However, if that is the purpose of the notion of *ergon* in the *NE*, one may wonder, why the *conclusion* of the argument does not mention this specification, if it is so important. I think the conclusion does take up the specification: Aristotle is explicitly talking about the *human* good: the whole point of speaking about the *ergon* of human beings was the specification of the human activity we are supposed to be good at. So, when the conclusion defines the human good, it seems natural to read the *definiens* as being concerned with *specific* human *energeia* only. It is hard to see how a reader of the *NE* argument would not understand "*energeia*" in the conclusion of the argument as referring to the kind of *energeia* that has been specified immediately before.

What is meant by "specification"? "Specification" refers to the determination of the specific *ergon* (the *ergon* that is *idion*, 1097b33f.). By way of excluding *erga* that are common also to other living beings, the specification gives as its result – and as the specific *ergon* – a certain practical life of that which has *logos* and this includes that which is "obedient to reason" as well as that which by itself has *logos* and thinks: The *ergon* specific for a human being is an activity of the soul in accordance with *logos* or not without *logos* (1098a3–5, a7f.). This specification goes as far and only as far as necessary: it provides the *ergon* that is *idion* for human beings, but does not present any details concerning this *ergon* – for instance, as to whether every activity in accordance with *logos* or only some activities are to be included in the activity constitutive for *eudaimonia*. But Aristotle still makes a decisive step towards a definition of the human good by determining that the activity in accordance with *logos* is the kind of activity which is constitutive for the human good.

Why isn't the *ergon* said to be the end in the *NE* argument as it is said to be in the *EE*? Here, I would like to refer to a crucial interpretation of the *NE* argument by Philipp Brüllmann which is pertinent also to this question: according to this interpretation, put in a very abbreviated way, the *NE* argument is to be read as part of an extended line of thought from *NE* I 1 to I 8. This line of thought begins with the assumption that goods are to be understood as ends of actions and it determines then (in the *ergon* argument) the human good on the basis of the *ergon* of human beings as a certain activity. But it still needs to corroborate the initial assumption for the case of the human good, which means it still needs to show that the human good is to be understood in terms of ends of actions (for which see *NE* I 8). Aristotle does not seem to consider it a task of the *Nicomachean ergon* argument to make the connection between the end and the notion of *ergon* which is instrumental rather in determining the content of

the human good. Bringing up the connection between the *ergon* and the end would serve no particular purpose, neither for the sub-argument that there is an *ergon* for human beings as well nor for the sub-argument that their specific *ergon* is a certain practical life connected with *logos*: there is no need to make the contrast between the end and that of which it is the end explicit within the argument.

After this discussion of the different functions of the notion of *ergon* in either argument, I would now like to discuss a fact connected with this difference – namely the fact that we do not find a specification of the *energeia* constitutive for *eudaimonia* in the *EE* argument (as we find it in the *NE* argument), but instead an embracement of inclusivism of a kind, which we do not find – at least not in terms of wholes and parts – in the *NE* argument. In its last part, the *EE* argument highlights the fact that *aretê* – as a basis for that *energeia* that is constitutive for *eudaimonia* – has to be "whole" (*holê*), not merely a part (*morion*). This has been considered to be one of the advantages of the *EE* argument and of the *EE* version of *aretê* and, hence, of *eudaimonia*.[8] Yet, the insistence on the wholeness of *aretai* is soon undercut, when Aristotle says – a few lines later after the *ergon* argument – that the *aretê* of one of the parts (of the soul) – namely of the vegetative part – is not a part of the whole *aretê* (1219b21) and that this part is to be excluded from further consideration (1219b21, b36f.).

Furthermore, the first reason Aristotle gives for the exclusion of the *threptikon* and its *aretê* after the *ergon* argument is also not very helpful with regard to our understanding of the basis of inclusivism. For this reason, Aristotle points to the fact that the *threptikon* is active mostly during sleep, while the parts for perception and desire are imperfect (*atelê*) during sleep. So, the reason we get is basically the assumption that only *energeia* of something being awake matters and that only the good state of the capacity for this *energeia* is to be included in the whole *aretê*. But this is merely an assumption (even though one that has been introduced before, namely within the *ergon* argument itself, see 1219a24f.). No further reason is given for the conclusion "hence the *aretê* of that other part is not part of the whole *aretê*" (1219b20f.).

With the next reason, however, Aristotle does provide the criterion for the exclusion – and for the inclusion, respectively – when he mentions the connection with *logos* which the relevant parts must have: he points out that "we are looking for *human aretê*" and he takes this as a reason for the assumption that there are two parts of the soul that partake in *logos* and that any other part of the soul that is non-rational is to be left aside (1219b27–32). He makes this point again in the next passage when he justifies the omission, for instance, of the *threptikon*, where he stresses once more that he is interested in the human soul.[9] But even in this case, he does not link the newly introduced criterion for the exclusion and inclusion of parts with any reference to the whole *aretê* or the whole soul, even though he could have easily referred to the remaining part of the soul as the "whole" soul, without including the *threptikon* (see *EE* II 8, 1224b25 and b27): neither does he introduce the criterion as an elucidation

of what is meant by "whole *aretê*" nor as an elucidation of what is meant by "perfect *aretê*" ("*teleia aretê*").

One might point, though, to the very end of this passage (II 1, 1220a2–4), where Aristotle compares the *aretê* of the soul with a good overall state of the body (*euhexia*) which is composed of the particular *aretai* (of the relevant parts of the body): just as there is this state composed of those *aretai*, there is also the *aretê* of the soul (composed of the particular *aretai* of the relevant parts of the soul), to which Aristotle adds the qualification: "*hêi telos*" – "*qua* end," as it is usually translated. Doesn't this mean after all that he does connect the wholeness of *aretê* with the inclusion criterion of "partaking in *logos*" which he has introduced just before?

It does not seem so. First, it would come as somewhat of a surprise, if Aristotle had meant to claim that the *aretê* of the soul is to be regarded as an end, after he has highlighted in the *ergon* argument that the *ergon* and the *energeia* (of the soul) are the end. How, then, should we understand his reference to *aretê* "*qua* end"? Up to 1220a2, Aristotle has spoken of two main parts of the soul, namely the "*logos*-related" parts, and has concluded that it is necessary "to have them." He moves on to the comparison of the *aretê* of the soul "*qua* end" with the good state of the body which is composed of the *aretai* of its parts. This remark, then, provides the transition to the discussion of the *aretai*. So, what is Aristotle doing here? He singles out the parts of the soul we should be concerned with (namely the "*logos*-related" parts, 1219b36–1220a2). He concludes that someone (or: the soul) must have *these* parts (1220a2) and claims that the *aretê* of the soul is composed of the *aretai* of these parts (1220a3f.). He then goes on to discuss these *aretai* (starting in 1220a4).

Now, the claim that *these* parts must be present and that *their aretai* compose the *aretê* of the soul – which is why we are going on to discuss *these aretai* – is not a claim concerning completeness, but concerning the identification of the relevant parts: it is these parts that compose the *aretê* of the soul. Completeness, however, is not an issue here in 1220a4. If asked, Aristotle would agree at once that the *aretê* of the soul mentioned in 1220a4 is complete, but it is *the aretê* of the soul only up to a point: namely only as far as it is the *aretê* composed of the *aretai* of the relevant parts. "*hêi telos*" means "insofar as it is the end" in a restrictive sense. Understood in this way, we have less difficulties in accepting that the *aretê* of the soul is an end – despite the results of the *ergon* argument: in *some* quite important sense, obviously, the *aretê* of the soul *is* an end, and we are interested in the *aretê* of the soul (and its parts) as far as it is such an end.[10] Aristotle could have added: We are interested in the *aretê* of the soul insofar and only insofar as it is the end and it is this *aretê* as a whole in which we are interested.

This brings us back to the observation that Aristotle does not make an explicit connection between the inclusion criterion – namely the connection of the relevant parts with *logos* (in 1219b26–1220a4) – and the preceding reference to whole *aretê* (in 1219a37 and b21): the criterion is not introduced as an elucidation of what "whole" or "perfect *aretê*" means. Instead, it is introduced

in a consideration of the soul and the parts of the soul that are relevant for further consideration (1219b26), and this is an elucidation of what "soul" referred to in the *ergon* argument where the notion of the soul served as an anchor for the notion of *ergon*: it was the *ergon* of the soul that we were interested in (1219a5, a24). If we want to understand what the soul is good at, we need to understand what "soul" refers to in this context.

Now, the criterion for the selection of the relevant parts is based on the fact that we are interested in *human aretê* and parts of the human soul (see 1219b27, b37f.), not that we are interested in the whole or perfect *aretê* – which is still true, but not the issue: a reference to the whole *aretê* would distract us from the task at hand, which is to appropriately delimit the area of the soul under consideration. This delimitation is provisionally achieved by reference to human *aretê* and parts of the human soul: the fact that we are interested in human *aretê* restricts the parts of the soul we are interested in to those parts of which human *aretê* is the *aretê*. This restriction to human *aretê* is not an arbitrary decision: it takes up a restriction Aristotle had introduced at the beginning of the main part where, in his preliminary answer to the question of what *eudaimonia* is, he restricted the availability of *eudaimonia* to human beings and determined *eudaimonia* as the best of those things a human being can attain by action (*EE* I 7).

However, this restriction to human *aretê* and parts of the human soul is, while true, not yet clear and Aristotle clarifies the criterion: the relevant parts of the soul partake in *logos* (see 1219b28). This does not mean that the parts to be included have to be rational: this would exclude the non-rational part that, while not being rational itself, is capable of listening to the rational part. So, partaking in *logos* means something quite different in the case of the two parts under consideration: In the case of the rational part "partaking in *logos*" means: having the very property that makes the part what it is. In the case of the non-rational part "partaking in *logos*" means: having a relation to something that in itself (in its nature) is different from the non-rational part in question.

If the non-rational part is not included because of any of its natural properties: how does its inclusion come about? It is included by means of its coherence with the rational part. According to 1219b28–31, the non-rational part partakes in *logos* insofar as it is its nature (*pephukenai*) to obey and listen to the rational part, while the rational part partakes in *logos* insofar as it is its nature to issue commands to the non-rational part.[11] The non-rational part is in need of guidance from the rational part, the rational part needs something that it can control (*archei*), namely inclination and affections – that is, those activities of the non-rational part with regard to which the non-rational part can listen to the rational part (or, to *logismos*).[12] The non-rational part is included because of this commanding–obeying relation that it has with the rational part. This asymmetrical relation and mutual dependence is the connector that keeps the parts together, at least if each part is well disposed: the *aretê* of the soul is *composed* (*sunkeitai*, 1220a3) by the *aretai* of these parts. The non-rational part, then, is included not because of any of its natural properties as such. Instead, it

is included due to its asymmetrical connection with the rational part – a connection which is grounded in the commanding–obeying relation.

This leaves us with two related questions: (1) Why does Aristotle not include the inclusion criterion in the *ergon* argument? (2) Why does he include there the reference to whole *aretê* (and, thus, a reference also to perfect *aretê*)? Question (1) comes down to the question: What could a specification of the *ergon* of the soul or even only of the relevant section of the soul have looked like? Aristotle could not have pointed to an activity based on *logos* or *logismos*, since this would not have included all the parts and their *aretai* he thought should be included. Not every part and its *aretê* which he wanted to include is in itself sufficiently connected to *logos* or *logismos*. After all, the part concerned with non-rational desires *is alogon* (1220a10, 1231b30f., 1246b12–25, 1247b18f., implied also by 1219b31), which, in the *EE*, means that the *aretê* of this part is an *aretê* of a non-rational part. This non-rational part partakes in *logos* insofar as it is by its nature able to listen to *logos* (1219b30f., 1220a10f.). But this does not mean that the part and its *aretê* by itself is something rational in such a way that its activity would be included by an account of an *ergon* according to which rational activity is the *ergon* of human beings (or, of their soul). Furthermore, the reason given why this part is to be further considered at all (why "one must have it") is that *logismos* needs something to rule over (1220a1f.) – which is not a particularly strong reason and which is not a reason presupposing proper rationality on the side of this part. Finally, the non-rational part is good at its activity because it is listening to the rational part, but the *ergon* of the non-rational part is presumably not an activity that in itself consists in listening to and obeying the rational part. Given all this, there is good reason to think of the *ergon* of the relevant section of the soul as something very complex. An inclusion of it in the *ergon* argument would have required a discussion of this complex notion and of psychological and metaphysical questions it raises which would have exceeded by far the scope of the *EE* (compare already its dismissal of the discussion of parthood, 1219b32).

This brings us to Question (2): Why does Aristotle speak of whole *aretê* or perfect *aretê* within the *ergon* argument, even though he does not come back to it any time soon (in fact, with the brief exception of 1224b25–27, not before *EE* VIII 3)? An answer could be: he does this – obviously, and trivially – in order to make sure that all parts that should be included are, in fact, included. However, a further answer to the question might be: the *EE* has no other means available to make sure that all parts are included – that is, no other means than simply insisting that they should be included: no part must be left out. If we have become accustomed to thinking in terms of *inclusive vs. dominant end*, this may seem to be rather disappointing. But we must always remember that these are not Aristotle's terms: he has no reason to highlight an inclusivist notion of *eudaimonia* in contrast to, for instance, a dominant end view.

But if this – that is, the worry that the non-rational part and its *aretê* might be undesirably excluded by determining the *ergon* of the human soul as rational activity – is the reason for Aristotle's procedure, why did he choose in the *NE*

argument a different path: why did he think he could do just that and could determine the *ergon* of the human soul as rational activity (that is, as "a practical life of that which has *logos*," 1098a3f.)? Why did he think that this did imply the activity that is based on ethical *aretê* as well? The *NE*, too, relates ethical *aretê* to the part of the soul that is non-rational, but, in some way, takes part in *logos* and is capable of listening to the rational part (if well disposed; *NE* I 13, 1102b13f., b25–1103a3; see also 1117b23f.). There are, at least, some affections – such as *epithumia* and, perhaps, fear – that also by *NE* standards could occur in animals as well and, hence, do not seem to be part of the *energeia* that is the specific human *ergon*. So, how can the *NE* argument determine the *ergon* of the human soul as a practical life of something that has *logos* and still include the activities of the non-rational part?

There seem to be, at least, three options: (1) Aristotle *did* have a different view about the activities of the non-rational part (and about their *aretai*), in particular with regard to their proper share in *logos*. Human *epithumia* (hunger, thirst, sexual drive) would be different from the *epithumia* of animals insofar as it would somehow contain in itself something rational. It is notoriously difficult to tell, however, how we have to understand the relations of the various affections with *logos* in the *NE* (or, for that matter, in any work by Aristotle) and it would be difficult to give a convincing account of this different view.

(2) Aristotle did have the same view about affective activities, but had a different view about the rationality of the *aretai* corresponding to them. Hendrik Lorenz has pointed out (2009, 192f.) that the *NE* (in I 13) does not quite say that ethical *aretê* is the *aretê of* the non-rational part (as Aristotle does say in the *EE*, see 1220a10f., 1221b27–34). Instead, he says that the *aretê* is divided according to the difference (between the parts) (see *NE* I 13, 1103a4), and this is not quite the same as saying that one of the *aretai* is the *aretê* of one part, the other of the other part. Yet, even if we would prefer to think that the attribution of the *aretai* to their specific parts is as straightforward in the *NE* as it is in the *EE*, this still does not mean that Aristotle would understand the *aretai* in the same way – with regard to their internal relation to rationality – in either treatise. In any case, even if one should make this argument, it would not focus on the *ergon* argument and would not help us to understand why Aristotle proceeds in the argument itself in the way he does.

(3) This leaves a third option: Aristotle is less worried about the complexity of the notion of *ergon*: dependence on *logos* ("not without *logos*," 1098a8) is all he needs for the inclusion of the non-rational activity. Because of this dependence, we can deal with it in the appropriate way, and since we can deal with it, we must, if we want the capacity underlying this activity to develop in the best possible way. The perspective is then not so much on what those parts in themselves are, but rather on what we can do with them in difference to non-human beings. This would conform with the specifying role of the *Nicomachean* notion of *ergon*: the *ergon* of human beings is what they can do in difference to non-human beings. The focus on specificity allows and demands

spelling out what we mean by saying "what humans can do in difference to animals."

3.5 Conclusion

We have seen that the notion of *ergon* has a different function in the *Eudemian* and in the *Nicomachean ergon* argument: in the former, it serves to highlight the activity and to place it over the corresponding capacity (or disposition or state). In the latter, it serves to specify the kind of activity constitutive for *eudaimonia*. We have explained the lack of specification of this activity in the *Eudemian* argument by the complexity of the notion of *ergon* Aristotle would have had to account for, if he had included the specification in the argument. If he had included this specification, without accounting for the complexity of the notion of *ergon*, he would have run the risk of excluding one of the parts of the soul he wanted to include, namely the non-rational part as well as its *aretê*. In order to avoid this, he omits the specification and, thus, the criterion for the inclusion and the exclusion of parts and their *aretai*, and replaces its function by the requirement that the *aretê* of the activities constitutive for *eudaimonia* has to be "whole" (or "perfect"). We may still be used to reading this in the context of the *inclusive-dominant-end* discussion – even though this discussion has moved on – and reading the final part of the *Eudemian ergon* argument as a plea for inclusivism. But while Aristotle would agree that all the parts (and their *aretai*) that are to be included are indeed included, his emphasis is on making sure that all and only the right ones are included.

We have not established a reason why Aristotle moved from one function of the notion of *ergon* to another, quite different one. It seems to be much easier to imagine, why he would have moved from the *Eudemian* notion to the *Nicomachean* notion (and, hence, from the *Eudemian* argument to the *Nicomachean* argument) than the other way round. The *NE* answers neatly to open questions in the *EE* argument concerning specification, while keeping and including the important observation of the *EE* that of the two factors – capacity (or disposition or state) and its actualization – it is the *energeia* that counts and should be included in the definition of the human good. It avoids the *Eudemian* question of how to account for the inclusion of the relevant parts and their *aretai* by changing the perspective to the question of what human beings can do in difference to non-rational beings.

Notes

1 References to Aristotle are to the Oxford Classical Texts (OCTs), translations are from Woods (*EE*) and Rowe (*NE*, from Broadie, Rowe, 2002), with occasional changes. I should like to thank the participants of the Dublin workshop as well as audiences in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Mainz for useful discussions.

2 Hutchinson, 1986, p. 43; see also pp. 48–51.

3 For the relation between the *Politeia*-, the *EE*-, and the *NE*-argument see, for instance, Kapp, 1912, pp. 29–31, Buddensiek, 1999, pp. 37–41, Baker, 2015, pp. 231–236, 242f.

4 S. Lawrence, 2001, p. 447, Baker, 2015, p. 260.

5 Aristotle has determined the *ergon* of the soul as "to make things live," and he has added "but that is an employment and a waking state, since sleep is an idle and inactive state" (1219a24f.). But while this rules out inactive states and dispositions as the *ergon* of the soul, it does not yet rule out the *threptikon*, which *is* active ("employed") especially during sleep. The perceptive part is to be included in the area of the soul under consideration, since and insofar as perception is connected with affections (see *EE* II 2, 1220b12–14, II 1, 1219b23). But this does not mean that the whole *aretê* includes the *aretê* of any other non-rational part than that which is capable of listening to *logos*.

6 The *NE* mentions *hexis* and the contrast between *ktêsis* and *chrêsis* later in I 8 (see 1098b32f.).

7 In the traditional translation of "*ergon*" by "function," "function" seems to refer to something that in itself is a standard of a certain kind – this, at least, is what we usually mean by "function," when we say, for instance, that something has a certain function, something fulfils (or does not or not fully fulfil) its function, etc. For "characteristic achievement," see Baker, 2015, pp. 229–231, 252f.

8 Aristotle comes back to parts and wholes of *aretê* only much later again – at, what is now, the beginning of *EE* VIII 3 (on which see Buddensiek, 1999, ch. 6): there he points out that the parts have to be good, if the whole is to be good – so that there has to be each single *aretê*, if someone is to have *kalokagathia* (1248b8–16), which seems to be some kind of whole *aretê*. This, again, does not include the *aretê* of the *threptikon*.

9 However we understand the relation between the *phutikon*, the *threptikon*, and the *auxêtikon* in 1219b37–39 and whatever we regard as the proper reading in 1219b39, it is clear that Aristotle wants to eliminate the *threptikon* (as well).

10 There is no need, then, and no justification to understand "*telos*" in 1220a4 as "perfection" (see Dirlmeier, 1969, p. 234 on 1220a3) or to change it to "*telea*" (so Ross, according to the OCT apparatus).

11 At first sight, "commanding" could indicate a reference to practical reason, which is in charge of certain commands. However, this does not exclude theoretical reason which, in some other way, is also a ruler, namely in such a way that practical reason issues commands for the sake of the activity of theoretical reason (see *EE* VIII 3, 1249b6–23).

12 1219b39–1220a2, see for either direction (of commanding and of obeying) also 1220a8–11, b5–7, b28, 1229a1–11, 1232a35–38, 1233a22, 1249b14f. as well as 1249b16–23.

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4 Pleasure and Pain in the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean* Definitions of Moral Virtue

Marco Zingano

Both indisputably Aristotelian *Ethics* – the *Eudemian* (*EE*) and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*) – are set up as a conceptual analysis prompted by the definition of happiness. The definition of happiness is arrived at in the very first thematic section in both *Ethics*. Happiness is the chief and supreme good the obtainment of which all our actions are subordinated to. The definition of happiness is not only pivotal to moral philosophy as Aristotle conceives of it, but also provides the elements for the subsequent parts of the treatise, as the following sections build on and unfold what is mentioned in, or presupposed by it, both treatises being concluded with a discussion about first and second happiness, thus closing the loop in what looks like a ring construction.[1]

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, the definition of happiness comes by the end of the first section, which runs from *EE* I 1 to II, 1 1219b29. This first section discusses the aim of ethics and reports the commonly held three ways of life (*EE* I 1–5), delineates the method most suited to the investigation of moral topics (I 6), and then proceeds to obtain the definition of happiness (I 7 and II, 1 1218b31–1219b26), interpolating in between the criticism of Plato's philosophical doctrine of the Form of the Good (I 8). This first section thus kicks off the philosophical analysis Aristotle is engaged in as he sets himself to examine "the philosophy of human matters" (*NE* X 9, 1181b15) from the vantage point of the actions and characters of the individuals. The definition of happiness comes by the end of this section and reads as follows:

> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν. (*EE* II 1, 1219a35–39)

Solomon's translation in the revised Oxford edition is as follows:

> But since happiness was something complete, and living is either complete or incomplete and so also excellence – one excellence being a whole, the other a part – and the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, therefore happiness would be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete excellence.

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From now on, I will speak of *virtue* instead of *excellence* whenever translating ἀρετή, but nothing hinges on this semantical choice for the argument I want to deploy. A more important point concerns how to translate τέλειον in its different uses here: for a life to be τελεία amounts presumably to having all or a good number of its parts in the sense of "being complete," but it is not clear what it means for a virtue to be τέλειον. The passage states that τελεία virtue requires a whole, whereas an ἀτελής one is only a part of it, but the clarification is not very illuminating, for one can take the relation whole–part in a variety of ways. As a matter of fact, Aristotle himself acknowledges different senses of τέλειον, to wit, being complete and being perfect.[2] These senses may diverge (a perfect Irish stew may not have all the possible ingredients and thus not be complete, and a complete one may not be perfect), but they may also converge; even so there is a difference to be made: something can be perfect because it is complete, or be complete because it is perfect. Which sense has τέλειον here? One might think that in so small a context, one and only one sense can be the case, but actually nothing prevents it from having two different senses in this passage. A τελεία life seems quite clearly a *complete* life, a life that has all, or most of, or the most important of its parts, as it stretches over time, but we are left clueless as to which sense τέλειον bears in the other case, when connected to *virtue*.

As we will soon see, the *EE* may be seen as the unfolding of this definition (and the *NE* alike, for that matter), as it unpacks what is only mentioned or presupposed in it. In so doing, light is shed on all parts of it, but, as we have just seen, some elements in it may resist elucidation – in our case, τέλειον remains undecided throughout the whole book. And this is not insignificant, for τέλειον is part and parcel of the phrase κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, and this phrase is crucial for understanding what Aristotle does mean by *happiness*. It is crucial because the κατά in κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν is not only saying that happiness is brought about *in accordance with* a virtue of some sort (the τελεία one), but it is also saying, and more importantly, that happiness is obtained *on the basis* of it, thus vindicating a causal role for virtue in bringing about happiness, or, to say it more precisely, that virtue is the main cause of happiness. How virtue operates as the main cause of happiness is something the following books are bound to show, and will do it to a large extent, as they explore how virtue deploys its causal power in bringing about happiness, even if some issues remain vague, unexplored, or not fully charted – as we have already seen with τέλειον, in spite of τέλειον having an important task to discharge. Why τέλειον remains non-elucidated, or at least not totally elucidated, despite its significance for a correct grasp of the definition, is one of the *cruces* with which the interpreter must cope. This is not something peculiar to the *EE* approach, for in the *NE* as well, when Aristotle recalls his definition of happiness in *NE* I 13, just after having closed the first section devoted to producing its definition, he also says that happiness is brought about κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, and we are again left clueless as to how to construe τέλειον.

I want now to emphasize an important dissemblance between the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean* definition of happiness. At the surface level, a pretty similar definition seems to be found in the *Nicomachean* version, but some differences are worth noticing, and are actually pretty salient. To begin with, the *Nicomachean* definition of happiness takes place not at the end, but in the middle of the first thematic discussion, in which Aristotle, in a similar fashion to what happens in the *EE*, presents the aim of the treatise, gives some clues about its method, mentions common opinions about what is best, introduces us to the three ways of life, and comes out with his criticism of Plato's philosophical stand on goodness. But this is a minor difference, and up to this point, the *Nicomachean* version is quite similar to the *Eudemian* one. But there are other differences, and quite significant ones. The *Nicomachean* definition runs as follows:

> τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ
> (*NE* I 7, 1098a16–18)

In Ross' translation (revised by Urmson):

> Human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete. But we must add in a complete life.

Ross sticks to the traditional rendering of κατά as "in accordance with," which is not incorrect, but one would be better off translating it as "on the basis of" to stress the causal link between virtue and happiness. In the *Nicomachean* definition, the complete life seems to be envisaged as a clause or supplemental condition to the definition itself. It is no longer inside the definition, but is added to it as in an afterthought, signalled by ἔτι, "furthermore." This may, however, be a product more of its linguistic clothing than of a different conception of its nature, for happiness continues to require the obtaining of two conditions to be the case: virtue being the case, and its occurring throughout the lifetime of the agent.[3] A more salient difference lies in that the definition now gets involved with choosing one virtue among others: if there is more than one virtue, says the passage, happiness will be engendered on the basis of the best and most τελεία one. The τέλειον issue comes back again, under the description of κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην, but the main issue now concerns more the fact that its role is directly linked to the discrimination of one and only one virtue among other virtues.

In his translation, Ross opens a new paragraph after "the best and most complete," but this seems an overzealous rendering of the ἔτι clause, for it may still belong to the definitional context. But the rearrangement is noteworthy, as if it were driving a wedge between the two usages of τέλειον. For the complete life is added as a secondary clause; and the main point resides in what it means to be a τελεία virtue, referred to in the first, separate clause. Whatever

τέλειον means in this clause, it should be taken in direct connection with its expression in the superlative case, or, as the text says, on the basis of the best and τελειοτάτη virtue, which seems to go in the direction of the *most perfect* virtue, and not necessarily the *most complete*. Much attention has been drawn, and rightly so, to the problem of determining the most τελεία virtue in contrast with the plurality of moral virtues. The contrast between one τελειοτάτη virtue and the many other moral virtues will become central in the second half of the last book of the *NE*, as an argument is there produced to identify which one is the τελειοτάτη virtue and, based on this, endeavours to ground a hierarchy between contemplative and political life.[4] Surprisingly, however, it plays no relevant role from I 8 to X 5.[5] The bulk of the *Nicomachean* treatise has no dealing with the superlative issue. A sign of this is the fact that Aristotle, when opening in the *NE* the second thematic section of his *Ethics*, the one devoted to defining moral virtue, in direct dependence on the definition of happiness, recalls the definition of happiness with no mention at all of this one–many virtue(s) issue, while accentuating the central (causal) place virtue has for there being happiness:

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη
>
> (*NE* I, 13 1102a5–6)

The issue of the meaning of τέλειον is again well in place, but the superlative sense and its corresponding choosing of one virtue among others are dropped from the text. No notice seems to be taken of it, at least not for the time being, and attention is again focused on the fact that virtue is qualified as τέλειον. A provisional translation, or rather a transliterating version that attempts to stay close to some of the points observed above, runs as follows:

> Since happiness is an activity of soul on the basis of τελεία virtue, we must investigate the nature of virtue.

Such an investigation is made necessary indeed given the very definition of happiness, for the latter comprises the notion of virtue, but not only has no explanation been previously offered of what virtue means, but also, which is quite significant, it comes accompanied by an adjective whose meaning remains obscure. It is thus necessary to examine next the notion of virtue. And this is exactly what is done from *NE* I 13 to III 5, which can conveniently be labelled as the Aristotelian *Treatise on Moral Virtue*, for in it the definition of moral virtue is obtained, and its basic traits are also examined. The fact that it is the notion of moral virtue that is examined, and not the τελειοτάτη virtue, is surely a factor that produces some tension that persists from the beginning throughout the whole treatise, and will only be resolved in the second half of the tenth and last book. Tensions aside, because virtue is embedded in the definition of happiness, the next step is to define what (moral) virtue is; in so doing, we will be unpacking what comes along with the notion of happiness. After distinguishing moral

virtue from intellectual virtue (*NE* I 13), making some comments on the way the former is acquired (II 1), and on the sort of accuracy one can expect to have in practical philosophy (II 2), as well as on its relation to pleasure (II 3), and after having dealt with a difficulty that might be raised concerning becoming virtuous by doing virtuous actions (II 4), Aristotle officially inaugurates his quest for a definition of moral virtue saying that "after these things, one must consider what virtue is" (*NE* II 5, 1105b19). The quest is framed as a "what-it-is question": τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή (1105b19): we now enter into the second definitional context, the one devoted to clarifying the nature of moral virtue, which comes as the logical sequence after happiness having been defined in the first section as a certain activity of soul on the basis of virtue. The outcome is this

> ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.
>
> (*NE* II 6, 1106b36–1107a2)

> moral virtue is, therefore, a disposition issuing in decisions, lying in a mean relative to us, being determined by a piece of reasoning, that is, in the way in which the person of practical wisdom would determine it.

This is Bekker's text, who follows the manuscripts; Bywater adopts a version based on Aspasius' commentary, and Susemihl–Apelt mix both versions. According to the manuscripts, one has it that moral virtue is a disposition issuing in decisions by weighing the pros and cons of an action, the fulfilment of which consists in finding a mean relative to us determined by means of reasoning, or stating it otherwise, in the way in which the wise person would determine them. This sounds clear enough, but controversy lurks everywhere. One may wonder what the meaning of λόγῳ precisely is. Is it the reason by reference to which the intermediate term is determined[6] in the sense of some reasoning based on which the agent decides for a certain option, or is it rather a sort of norm the agent is supposed to take into account to act well? On the former reading, moral particularism is in view; on the latter, morality can well consist of a set of fixed rules or generalizations moral agents are supposed to grasp and follow. One reckons that it is a mean term, and this already excludes both types of vice, excess and deficiency, but this does not go too far in determining what the agent ought to do. By making a reference to a λόγος, however, Aristotle gives a hint as to the sense to be given to what he has previously said about moral virtue, namely that moral virtue is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου (1106b15, 28): the sort of guessing by means of which one hits upon the mean term is not blind guesswork, but is steered by reasoning of some sort, although one can still wonder what sort of reasoning it is: how it operates, which rules it follows, and so forth.

Can we glean more information from this passage? Part of the difficulty this passage raises lies in the fact that it is often taken for granted that this definition puts together several pieces *already* discussed, and consequently should be

clear as to their content and meaning. A good example of this expectation is provided by Aspasius' commentary on this passage:

> It is obvious that the definition has been rightly rendered. For in fact *it has been shown* to be a habitual state and to be choice-based, whether it is a choice or not; and *it has also been shown* to reside in a mean, not in accord with the thing but in the mean with respect to us.
>
> (Konstan's translation; my italics)[7]

Aspasius is right in saying that it has been shown that moral virtue lies in a mean, and that this mean is the one relative to us. But nothing has been shown in connection either to decision or to reason, let alone to the person with practical wisdom, except the allusion a bit earlier that moral virtues "are decisions of some kind, or require decision" (II 5, 1106a3–4). This remark cannot count as a clarification, for it only says that there should be some connection, making us expect to find it discussed at some later moment, but not yet showing which connection there is. In fact, the definition is rather *forward-looking*: one is set up to investigate what decision is, and what role the person with practical wisdom plays in determining it, if one wants to fully grasp what moral virtue really is. The definition itself is construed in this way, always engaging in a step forward: moral virtue is a disposition issuing in decisions, the decision-taking process consists in finding a mean relative to us, this mean relative to us is determined by a piece of reasoning, and reasoning occurs in the way in which the person of practical wisdom would determine it.[8] Susemihl–Apelt's text, as they mix the manuscripts version and Aspasius', seems thus to be preferred, for it makes more apparent the forward-looking structure (*a* is *b*, *b* is tantamount to *c*, *c* is obtained through *d*, and *d* is explained by means of how *e* operates):

> ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν
>
> (*NE* II 6, 1106b36–1107a2)[9]

Now, according to this definition, new terms are to be examined: decision is examined in III 1–5, and practical wisdom is examined in book VI; in between, from III 6 to V 11, the study of particular virtues allows us to have a better grasp of how moral virtue operates in each case as it strives for a medium point. We have already seen this strategy of introducing new elements not previously examined inside the definition so that we have to keep going and discriminate next what goes in the *definiens*: the definition of happiness brought in the not-yet elucidated notion of τελεία virtue, and the attempt to understand what this τελεία virtue is lead us to discuss disposition, decision-making process, and practical wisdom.

This forward-looking structure (*pace* Aspasius) gives us no pause in the continuous unfolding of the definition of happiness, as we still have to go forward and inquire into decision and practical wisdom. But there is something

quite significant at this juncture, not in what is said in the definition, but in what the definition shrinks from saying. To see this, we have to turn to the *Eudemian Ethics*. In direct sequence of the definition of happiness reached at *EE* II 1, 1219b38–39 (quoted above), book II of the *EE* aims at reaching the definition of moral virtue. Similarly to the *Nicomachean* version, the *EE* overtly announces its goal in book II in terms of a quest for a definition:

> After this, we must first investigate about moral virtue what it is and which are its parts (for it brings up to this point) and by which ways it is brought into existence
>
> (*EE* II 1, 1220a13–15)[10]

Both *Ethics* are thus pursuing the same pattern of analysis as they carry on the analysis in terms of a search for the definition of moral virtue in a forward-looking procedure. The clause inserted in the *Eudemian* version, εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνῆκται, seems not to be clear at first sight and has consequently been variously translated: "for our inquiry has been forced back on this" (Solomon), "what amounts or comes to the same thing" (Inwood and Woolf; Kenny), "a questa, infatti, è giunta la discussione" (Donini), "car c'est à ce point qu'on est parvenu" (Décarie). What does it precisely mean? The verb ἀνάγω has different senses: (i) to bring from a lower to a higher point, bring up; (ii) bring someone before a jury; (iii) bring an offering, offer up; (iv) restore, bring back; (v) reduce, return; (vi) put out to sea, set sail; (vii) ascend to higher unity, only to register the most important ones. To complicate matters further, the subject of the clause is hidden. One may think that asking "what moral virtue is" comes down to asking "which are its parts" (as read in the translations by Inwood and Woolf and Kenny: sense v). It is true that inquiring into what moral virtue is requires determining which parts it has, but the former cannot be reduced to the latter, for the former is explanatory of the latter and not the other way round. Donini and Décarie seem to be on the right track. As I read it, Aristotle is warning us that a new step is reached: the definition of happiness *leads up to* the definition of moral virtue, which is our present task (sense i and vii). The general quest for a definition that steers the course in both *Ethics*, and which begins with the definition of happiness, does not come down to, nor amounts to defining moral virtue, but has this new inquiry as its second step. If I am correct, Aristotle takes time to announce it to his readers: this is our next task, to define moral virtue, after having defined happiness, the definition of which requires examining the nature of moral virtue, or saying it otherwise, *it leads us up to that*.

But there are significant differences in each version. Whereas in the *NE* the definition of moral virtue paves the way for the investigation of decision and practical wisdom, which come soon afterwards, as we have seen, in the *EE* the definition of moral virtue is reached after two preparatory steps, and its final version is produced not before, but after voluntariness and decision have been examined. The *Eudemian* first preparatory step is gained at *EE* II 3,

1220b34–35, a concluding remark saying that moral virtue has to do with intermediate states and is some sort of intermediacy:

> Hence moral virtue must be related to certain means and be a certain mean point
>
> (*EE* II 3, 1220b34–35)[11]

The second step is gained as soon as it becomes clear, granted that the emotions (τὰ πάθη) are defined by means of the pleasures and pains they are the expressions of (*EE* II 4, 1221b36–37: τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ διώρισται), that dispositions are a certain way of reacting to the emotions, and that moral virtue is a character disposition:

> It follows that moral virtue is the mean that is relative to each individual person or is concerned with certain means in pleasures and pains, and in the pleasant and the painful things as well
>
> (*EE* II 5, 1222a10–12)[12]

The received text seems to call for emendation. Susemihl substituted καί for the ἤ, eliminating thus the disjunction on behalf of a conjunction (to be read in an epexegetical sense). Spengel expunged the αὐτόν, and is followed by Walzer and Mingay; Ross proposed to read τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὑτὴν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι instead of τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι attributed to the manuscripts (no modern editor retains the second τήν in τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι, found in both families according to Rowe).[13] I think, however, we can keep the text of the manuscripts. It had just been said, in the preceding lines, that the mean term virtue consists in is the one relative to us, and this is why it is reasserted here that moral virtue is a mean in relation to each individual person. As to the disjunction, this is still a provisional step, to be further elaborated, and as things get clearer, we will see that the disjunction is in fact an alternation. But as things stands at this juncture, the disjunction opens different paths. Aristotle then goes on to state, in the third and final step, what the nature of moral virtue finally is. To do this, he goes through a rather convoluted discussion on voluntariness, what is up to us, and decision, which makes up the largest part of book II. Then, near the end of book II, he provides us with the much searched-for definition of moral virtue:

> It follows then […] that moral virtue is a disposition that issues in decisions with regard to the mean relative to us in respect of those pleasant and painful things by which the person is said to have a certain sort of character, according as one is pleased or pained.
>
> (*EE* II 10, 1227b5–10)[14]

That which is relative to each individual person or that which is concerned with certain means in pleasures and pains is now reframed in terms of taking

decisions with regard to the mean relative to us in respect of pleasant and painful things. The definition is at last settled, and at the same time the most important difference between the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian* definition of moral virtue is brought to light. For in the *Eudemian* definition, pleasure and pain come to the fore and belong to the defining phrase, whereas in the *Nicomachean* version all mention of pleasure and pain is avoided and in its place one finds a reference to the reasoning the person with practical wisdom does when determining the mean term in an action. Is it only a literary device to express the same tenet, or is there something more substantial to their distinction? I think there is something philosophically significant going on here. Aristotle has definitely not two distinct theses, let alone two contrasting ones, but there is some different emphasizing that is worth noticing. The phrase κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is not absent from *Eudemian* book II (see e.g. 5 1222a8), and reference is even expressly made at II 5, 1222b7 to the treatment this notion will receive later on in *EE* V = *NE* VI, the book devoted to examining practical wisdom. Decision and its role in determining the right mean is also present in the *Eudemian* discussion of voluntary acts and what is up to us. Still, stress is laid not on them, but upon being pleased or pained as one acts, and on acting well or badly in relation to pleasant or painful things: prominence is given to pleasure and pain within the definitional phrase of moral virtue. The connection between, on the one hand, acting well and being pleased, and, on the other, between acting in a mean way and being pained is reinforced in the *EE* by the idea that there are *naturally* pleasant things, which are at the same time good things, and unpleasant things *by nature* as well, which are at the same time morally inconvenient things, but which may on some occasions be pursued by people of perverted nature (see *EE* VII 2, 1237a4–5, 26–27).

In the *NE*, Aristotle is also eager to show the connection between moral virtue and pleasure. But this is done *outside* the definitional context of moral virtue. As a matter of fact, it is argued in *NE* II 3, by means of eight arguments, that there is a close connection between moral virtue and pleasure, but this is done *before* we begin the proper search for the definition of moral virtue (which starts at *NE* II 5). Moreover, *NE* II 3 examines their close connection expressly referring to pleasure or pain that *supervenes* on acts (*NE* II 3, 1104b4–5: τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις). The idea of pleasure as a supervenient end that attaches itself to an activity, and is morally good provided that the activity on which it supervenes is morally good, or is morally bad if that activity is morally bad, is present only in the *Nicomachean* treatise of pleasure. This may be controversial, but I am taking for granted that the common books partake of a *Eudemian* atmosphere, including the first treatise on pleasure transmitted to us at the end of *NE* book VII, whereas the second treatise on pleasure, found in the first chapters of *NE* book X, is rather to be taken as typically *Nicomachean*. Anyway, all this is in line with the attitude of moving pleasure and pain from inside to outside the definitional context of moral virtue. And this replacement is made transparent if we compare the two definitions we have of moral virtue, the one at *EE* II 10 and the one at

NE II 6. To say it again from the vantage point of what is lacking in each definition: right reason and the way the person of practical wisdom determines the mean are not mentioned in the *Eudemian* version, while the connection with pleasure and pain is absent from the *Nicomachean* version, which stresses instead the role of reasoning in determining the right mean. It is surely a question of emphasis, but quite often philosophical issues hinge on giving or refraining from giving emphasis.

Another sign of a change of emphasis is this. In both *Ethics*, when discussing the connection between pleasure and virtue, Aristotle pauses to mention a pervasive attitude he finds in philosophers to define moral virtue as a sort of state of impassivity and rest. In the *EE*, he writes as follows:

> It is on account of pleasures and pains that we call men vicious, for pursuing and avoiding in the wrong way or the wrong ones. That is why everyone tries προχείρως to define the virtues as impassivity or rest in the matter of pleasures and pains, and the vices as the opposite.
>
> (*EE* II 4, 1222a1–5)[15]

Much hinges on the translation we give to προχείρως, which I left untranslated. It can mean *readily* or *offhand*, meaning a sort of spontaneous tendency people have when speaking about the nature of virtues. In this sense, it is rather neutral: this tendency may be wrong, or may not be wrong. But προχείρως can also mean *hasty* or *hurriedly*, in which case it carries a negative sense, indicating something which requires some correction, for it has been done hastily or carelessly. Nothing forces one to go either way, but if one takes into account the fact that the *EE* is more akin to dialectical contexts, and that dialectical arguing supposes that all people lean somehow the, or at least are able to recognize it as soon as they see it, it seems preferable to translate it in a more neutral way: this is why people naturally think of virtues as states of impassivity, for pursuing bad pleasures or pursuing them in the wrong way seems to be the cause of vice in them.

The *NE* strikes a pretty similar note, but nonetheless it sounds slightly different. After having said that people become bad by pursuing and avoiding pleasures and pains, either the pleasures and pains they ought not to or when they ought not to or as they ought not, Aristotle concludes as follows:

> This is also why people define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say 'as one ought' and 'as one ought not' and 'when one ought or ought not', and all the other things that may be added.
>
> (*NE* II 3 1104b24–26)[16]

Maybe Aristotle is obliquely referring to Speusippus, or to Democritus, or to common theses in the Academy,[17] or even to himself[18] – we can no longer decide. He is, however, more cautious about its pervasiveness – he does not say

"all people," but only "(some) people." And, more importantly, he is bluntly saying that they are wrong, and the reason they are wrong lies in the fact that they drop the clause "as one ought," "when one ought" – those clauses right reasoning determines for each occasion. Maybe this is too subtle, but we see again pleasure and pain receding from the core of moral virtues on behalf of reasoning and the way in which the person with practical wisdom determines it, and this receding makes προχείρως now sound in a rather negative tone.

Unfortunately, the *Magna Moralia* (*MM*) is of little help in understanding how this change comes about. In *MM* I iv 10, Aristotle opens the section on moral virtue raising the question on its "what-it-is":

> After this, then, we must consider what virtue is
>
> (*MM* I iv 10)[19]

In a first approach, moral virtue is seen as liable to be destroyed either by defect or by excess. Then another route is suggested, the one according to which one should define moral virtue in terms of pain and pleasure (I vi 1). As moral virtue is seen as a disposition to be correctly affected by emotions, and emotions "are either pains or pleasures or else do not come about without pain or pleasure" (I viii 2: τὰ δὲ πάθη ἤτοι λῦπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναὶ ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς), we are to conclude that

> It also clear from these considerations that, then, virtue is concerned with pains and pleasures
>
> (*MM* I viii 2)[20]

This is all too close to the *Eudemian* approach, but does not shed any light on it. Moreover, the *MM* introduces the idea of a disposition issuing in decision only when discussing not moral virtue, but practical wisdom (see *MM* I xxxiv 11).

Much more rewarding is the way Aristotle examines the particular virtues, especially the first one, courage. In the *Eudemian* version, courage is connected to pleasure and pain in so far as it is relative to what is fearful: the courageous person faces what is fearful, while the coward is quickly and intensely frightened by any danger, and the reckless is overconfident in cases when one should be fearful. The definition of fearful things is

> The fearful is, in general, what is productive of fear, and that in turn is whatever is manifestly capable of producing pain that is destructive
>
> (*EE* III 1, 1229a33–35)[21]

Fearful things are restricted to those things that can bring about death; one might get a different type of painful feeling when, for instance, one experiences the pain of jealousy, but this is not what fear precisely means, nor the pain it brings about. The courageous person, then, has a certain attitude towards that kind of pain that appears to be imminent and which is capable of destroying

life, that is, he is rightly disposed towards death and the pain of death as he *faces it*. Courage, then, is concerned with those fearful things that are capable of producing pain of a destructive sort, provided that they are imminent rather than distant. As such, death cannot be pleasant, and consequently no one who faces death because of the prospect of some pleasure, or even to avoid greater pains, could justly be said to be courageous:

> Some even endure danger because of other pleasures. Spirit, after all, brings pleasure of a sort, since it comes with the hope of revenge. Still, no one who faces death because of this or some other pleasure, or to avoid greater pains, could justly be said to be courageous.
>
> (Inwood, Woolf's; *EE* III 1, 1229b30–34)[22]

There is no pleasure in acting courageously, for to act courageously is tantamount to facing what is deprived of any pleasure, to wit: death itself. Why should then the courageous person face death, if no pleasure is involved in an episode of courage? The courageous person endures the pain indeed, and they endure it because "reason bids them to choose what is fine" (*EE* III 1, 1229a2: ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει). Aristotle brings in the connection between being virtuous and doing what is fine via the notion of a rational decision in order to explain why the courageous person faces what is totally deprived of pleasure:

> Now given that all virtue issues in decisions (we have said previously what we mean by this – virtue makes everyone choose for the sake of something, and this 'for the sake of which' is what is fine)[23], it is clear that courage too, being a virtue, will make us endure what is fearful for the sake of something, and that will be due neither to ignorance (since virtue rather makes us judge correctly) nor to pleasure, but because doing so is fine, because, if it were not fine but foolish, one does not endure danger, since that would be shameful.
>
> (*EE* III 1, 1230a26–33)[24]

Aristotle is referring back to *EE* II 7, 1227b35–28a7, where he says that decision is Janus-faced, for it has a two-side structure: one deliberates and decides about the means, but the means cannot but be means to an end, for the sake of which every deliberation and decision are taken. Decision is of something (a mean) for the sake of another thing (the end). However, he has not said in this passage that the end is the fine whenever the action is virtuous. This is something he says only when examining moral virtues one by one, beginning in III 1 with courage. And it seems that it is this new approach, in which doing something virtuously is tantamount to doing it for the sake of the fine, that comes to the fore and makes the presence of pleasure or pain recede as the essential feature when one acts virtuously, at the same time as reason takes a more central role in acting virtuously.

In the *Nicomachean* analysis of courage, the idea of acting courageously for the sake of the fine is so prominent that this idea manages to render the death itself the courageous person faces in battle the "noble death," τὸν καλὸν θάνατον (*NE* III 6, 1115a33). The "for the sake of the fine," τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, is ubiquitous in his analysis of courage: what is fearful is defined in terms of what is fine to endure (III 7, 1115b11–15); the courageous person endures danger for the sake of the fine (1115b23–24); he chooses the fine and endures danger (1116a11–12); he does this because it is fine to do it and shameful not to do it (8 1117a17). Aristotle generalizes the point a bit later, when examining liberality, and asserts that every moral virtue is directed towards what is fine as every moral action is done for the sake of the fine:

> Now moral actions done on the basis of a virtue are fine and for the sake of the fine
>
> (*NE* III 1, 1120a23–24)[25]

I think this theme, doing something virtuously insofar as one does it for the sake of the fine, becomes philosophically much more salient to Aristotle's eyes than the idea that moral virtue is deeply connected to pleasure and pain. Moral action continues to have some connection with pleasure and pain, but this connection no longer appears inside the definitional phrase of moral virtue, it is no longer an essential feature of it. From now on, doing what is fine is the essential feature, and this is captured by the clause of "doing as one ought, when one ought, how one ought to do it," or, to sum up, as reason bids us do, as reasoning strikes a balance between excess and deficiency. Acting for the sake of the fine and weighing the pros and cons of an action go hand in hand. One may wonder whether this change is brought about by a stronger realization that morality lies in rationality, and moreover that Aristotle chooses the fine instead of the good because the latter was too closely linked to personal advantage and usefulness, while the former was more apt to convey an idea of unselfishness. This all sounds quite plausible, and most likely is being broached here in a pregnant way for the first time. But I want to stress the more pedestrian idea that this change was occasioned by his growing acknowledgement that moral virtue is better understood when detached from the deep and constant company of pleasure people normally attached to it, and this was done in close connection with a better reassessing of the importance of acting as reason bids us to do, a better reassessing which was prompted by the study of the moral virtues one by one, especially because this study begins with courage. A sign of this is the fact that, in the *NE*, Aristotle justifies his close analysis of the particular virtues by saying

> But we should not simply state this [*scl.*: what moral virtue is] in general terms; we should also show how it fits the particular cases. For with

> discussions that relate to actions, those of a general have a wider application, but those that deal with the subject bit by bit are closer to the truth.
> (Rowe's; *NE* II 7, 1107a28–31)[26]

They are closer to the truth indeed. We can see this movement of unyoking the pleasure from morality in other domains as well – the most significant one being the rejection of the life of pleasures as an acceptable way of life, performed already in *NE* book I, but cemented at *NE* X 1–5. The official sign of this disconnecting, a sort of weaning from pleasure, is the fact that pleasure and pain no longer figure in the definition of moral virtue. But the ties were strong between pleasure and morality, and Aristotle seems to be a bit regretful to have finally cut them. This may explain why, in two passages of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he is keen to recall that there is also pleasure in the courageous action as one faces death (*NE* III 9, 1117a35–6, 17b15–16). I quote only the first, as the second one is a reminder of the first one:

> Yet the end which courage sets before it would seem to be pleasant, but to be concealed by the attending circumstances, as happens also in athletic contests; for the end at which boxers aim is pleasant – the crown and the honours – but the blows they take are distressing to flesh and blood, and painful, and so is their whole exertion; and because the blows and the exertions are many the end, which is small, appears to have nothing pleasant in it (Solomon's translation).
> (*NE* III 9, 1117a35–b6)[27]

Pleasure is always involved in moral action, but its stronghold on well-doing is now weakened. It is no longer within the definition of moral virtue, but without. Still, it remains in the vicinity, as a vestige of its ancient definitional role, as we can glean from this passage. The disconnecting, however, of morality from pleasure is definitely sealed when pleasure and pain no longer figure in the very definition of moral virtue, as one can see from the contrast between the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian* versions of what moral virtue is. To compensate for the blank left in the definition by the unyoking of pleasure from moral virtue, Aristotle fills in the notion of acting for the sake of the noble when examining the virtues case by case. In these analyses, rationality – acting as reason bids us do – comes to the fore as that which the agents recognize as what they ought to do, however unpleasant the consequences of their action may prove to be – as is particularly the case of courageous actions of facing death on the battlefield.[28]

Notes

1 See Natali, 2017 for the unfolding of the *Nicomachean* argument in a sort of ring construction governed by the definition of happiness.
2 See *Metaph.* Δ 16. Aristotle lists three senses: (i) that outside of which no portion is to be found; (ii) that which cannot be surpassed relative to its genus; (iii) that which has

reached its fulfilment. In the recapitulation of the senses listed in the chapter, Aristotle reduces them to two cases: (a) being complete and (b) being perfect. Sense (i) is the same as (a), and senses (ii) and (iii) are contained in (b), but in different ways: sense (ii) is linked to the relative superlative, and sense (iii) is connected to the absolute superlative.

3 In the *Nicomachean* version, it is quite clear that they are not two independent conditions, but the first implies the second, for whatever be the sense of τελεία in κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην (either complete or perfect in both senses of perfection), it will be one such that its achievement requires time and completeness of life in the relevant sense, as no children can have "perfect" or "complete" virtue, but only natural virtue.

4 On the argument deployed at *NE* X 6–9, I refer to my treatment of this issue in Zingano, 2017, which improves upon my previous treatment in Zingano, 2014.

5 Except for some parts of book V 1, 1129b30–1130a1 and VI 12, 1144a3–6.

6 One might also wonder whether ὡρισμένη is to be taken in the sense of "being defined" or in the sense of "being determined." I think ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν in the next clause settles its meaning as "being determined": the person with practical wisdom is not concerned as such with defining what moral virtue this (this is the philosopher's task), but with determining what one ought to do in the current situation.

7 48, 13–15: ὅτι δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδοται, δῆλον. καὶ γὰρ ἕξις οὖσα δέδεικται καὶ προαιρετική, εἴτε προαίρεσίς ἐστιν εἴτε μή· δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

8 See Natali (*op. cit.*) on this way of construing the sentence.

9 Bekker's text supposes as structure "*a* is *b*, *b* is tantamount to *c*, *b* is obtained through *d*, and *d* is explained by means of how *e* operates," whereas Bywater gives "*a* is *b*, *b* is tantamount to *c*, *c* is obtained through *d*, and how *e* operates is explained by *d*"; in the former case, the third moment is backward-looking; in the latter, the fourth and last moment is backward-looking. In contrast, Susemihl–Apelt's version is always forward-looking: "*a* is *b*, *b* is tantamount to *c*, *c* is obtained through *d*, and *d* is explained by means of how *e* operates."

10 μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἠθικῆς, τί ἐστι καὶ ποῖα μόρια αὐτῆς (εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνῆκται), καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων.

11 ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἄττα εἶναι καὶ μεσότητα τινά.

12 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν καθ' αὑτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι ἢ περὶ μέσ' ἄττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.

13 I printed the text of both families according to Rowe, who prefers to read ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸ ἑκάστην μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ἄττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, and explains in a note: "that each aretê is a μεσότης καθ' αὐτὸ, i.e. not κατὰ συμβεβηκός (see, e.g. 1221b4), is rather more to the point than that it is a μεσότης in/in relation to each individual person, as the transmitted text would be saying" (C. Rowe, *Eudemian Ethics*, forthcoming).

14 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν […] τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς καθ' ὅσα ποιός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος. The clause "in respect of those pleasant and painful things by which the person is said to have a certain sort of character, according as one is pleased or pained" is not an explanatory, but a defining relative clause, for, as the text goes on to say, there are other things we are pleased or pained by without having thereby a special sort of moral character, such as liking what is sweet or what is bitter.

15 δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἠρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

16 διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.

17 See for instance *Topics* IV 5, 125b22–23.

18 See *Phys.* VII 3, 246b19–20: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὠδὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως ἀπαθές ("virtue disposes its possessor to be unaffected or

to be affected thus and so, while vice disposes its possessor to be affected or to be unaffected in a contrary way").

19 Μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν λεκτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή.

20 ἡ ἄρα ἀρετή ἐστιν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ ἐντεῦθέν ἐστι δῆλον.

21 ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς.

22 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἂν> ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων.

23 One may translate καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ καλόν slightly differently, depending on the way one parses it: "and this is the for the sake of which, the fine," instead of "and this for the sake of which is what is fine." I prefer the latter version because this is the first time the fine is explicitly introduced as a moral notion in the *EE*, and it would come as a surprise to find it simply in apposition to the for the sake of which.

24 ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

25 αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.

26 Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι. The MSS oscillate in line 1107a30 between κοινότεροι ("a wider application") and κενώτεροι ("are emptier," the reading Susemihl–Apelt retain).

27 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος·διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

28 The topic of acting for the sake of the noble has been brought to the attention of contemporary commentators by Terence Irwin in his seminal paper, see Irwin, 1985; Irwin revisits the same topic in light of the discussions raised since the publication of his first paper in Irwin, 2011.

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5 Voluntariness of Character States in Aristotle's *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*

Giulio Di Basilio

5.1 Introduction

Both Aristotle's *Eudemian* (*EE*) and *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) devote significant attention to the topic of the voluntary (τὸ ἑκούσιον; cf. *EN* III, chs. 1 and 5; *EE* II, chs. 6–9).[1] Although these accounts share important core ideas, a number of divergences between them, of varying degrees of philosophical significance, have been pinpointed by scholars. In what follows, I want to focus on one particular divergence, namely the fact that the *EN* does, while the *EE* does not, tackle the question of whether states of character (ἕξεις) are voluntary. I will start from the *EN* and show how the positive answer to that question is reached in the context of the *Nicomachean* account of voluntariness. I will then turn to the *EE* to show that, despite appearances, none of the relevant texts argues for a similar conclusion.

5.2 Voluntariness of Character States in the *EN*

I start on a linguistic note. Aristotle is wont to refer to the phenomenon at stake as the voluntary (τὸ ἑκούσιον). This nominalizes the slightly more common Greek adverb (ἐκών, ἑκουσίως). Standardly in Greek, ἐκών, and its opposite ἄκων, qualify actions (πράξεις); it is common in Greek to wonder, for instance, whether someone did something ἐκών or ἄκων. Aristotle's practice of preferring the noun to the adverb no doubt serves the purpose of presenting the voluntary as an independent object of enquiry, as it were. But it also leaves the door open to an extension of the notion of voluntariness beyond its standard domain, i.e. human action. This is what is achieved in *EN* III 5, where the voluntary embraces character states (ἕξεις). This is the central claim that I will focus on in this section.

To begin with, it bears pointing out that there are a few neighbouring claims defended in *EN* III 5, and it will be useful to determine how they stand to one another. On the one hand, Aristotle's conclusion goes as follows: If "the virtues are voluntary" (1114b22 ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί), or similarly "up to us and voluntary" (b29 ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι), then "the vices will be voluntary too; for [they are] equally [voluntary]" (b24–25). This formulation is connected to the ostensible polemical target of this chapter, namely some kind

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of asymmetry thesis, which denies that virtue and vice are equally voluntary.[2] There is, however, a more general conclusion secured at the end of this chapter, namely that states of character are voluntary. Indeed, Aristotle concludes also that "actions and states [of character] are not voluntary in the same way" (1114b30–31), which makes clear that he takes himself to have shown not only that virtue and vice, but also that character states more generally are voluntary. Of course, the two conclusions are not unrelated, for it is *qua* states of character that virtue and vice are voluntary. It is then worth bearing in mind that Aristotle's conclusion will extend beyond virtue and vice, for instance to lack of self-control and other intermediate character states too. This broader conclusion and the way Aristotle formulates it alert us to an important qualification appended to it, namely that actions and character states are not voluntary in the same way, which I will return to and discuss in detail later on. Thus, we can state the results of Aristotle's argument in *EN* III 5 as follows: actions and states of character are voluntary, and although voluntariness does not apply equally to both, *qua* states of character virtue and vice are equally voluntary.[3]

I now move on to examine the way in which the *EN* establishes the claim that character states are voluntary. Once we get clearer on how the *EN* treats this claim, we will be in a better position to consider whether the same conclusion is ever established in the *EE*. Let us start by recalling the account of voluntariness defended in *EN* III 1 for actions. There, Aristotle starts off by considering two involuntary-making factors, namely (i) force and (ii) ignorance (1109b35–110a1). Either of these factors is sufficient for a subsequent action to be involuntary, as in the case of being carried off by the wind, or in the case of someone firing a gun mistakenly believing it to be unloaded. What follows in *EN* III 1 is in large part an attempt to refine (i) and (ii) and show when they are legitimately given application. Important qualifications are added, notably that the force at stake has to be external to the agent who contributes nothing to the ensuing outcome, and that the ignorance which exculpates has to be non-culpable unawareness of the circumstantial features of one's action; but (i) and (ii) are, by and large, vindicated in the rest of the chapter.[4] A positive account of the voluntary is arrived at as that of which the principle is internal to the agent who is aware of the particulars in which the action takes place (*EN* III 1, 1111a22–4). On this view, for an action to be voluntary two requirements have to be met, which Aristotle derives from the involuntary-making factors (i) and (ii), namely (i*) the internality of the principle and (ii*) the knowledge condition. It would seem that by the end of *EN* III 1, Aristotle has left us with an ingenious account of what it is for an action to be voluntary, but has not so far broached the question of what it is for a character state to be voluntary.

This is not entirely correct, however. In *EN* III 1, in an attempt to pre-empt an objection to the idea that forced actions originate in what is external to the agent, the qualification appended to (i*), Aristotle argues as follows: if someone were to claim that pleasant and fine things force one to act upon them, then all actions would turn out to be forced, which is clearly absurd. On the contrary, one should not blame anything external for the attraction that thing exercises

on us but rather oneself for being easy prey to it (1110b9–17). This remark brings in for the first time in Aristotle's examination the importance of one's character. For, to be easy prey to something (εὐθήρατος) is to be such that one cannot help acting on it when the opportunity presents itself. It is in virtue of one's character that certain things strike us as pleasant and fine (1113a31). Already in *EN* III 1, Aristotle clearly implies that people are somehow open to praise and blame for their character in addition to their action, which anticipates the later examination of *EN* III 5.[5]

Having defended the above account in *EN* III 1 and having looked in the intervening sections at the notions of decision (ch. 2), deliberation (ch. 3), and wish (ch. 4), in *EN* III 5 Aristotle turns to virtue and vice. A large part of what Aristotle does in *EN* III 5, I submit, is to show that the account of the voluntary advocated in *EN* III 1 can be extended beyond actions. First, though, he shows that the account of the voluntary advocated earlier applies equally to virtue and vice (1113b3–1114a21).[6] This is indicative of his resistance to asymmetry claims about virtue and vice, which, as we have seen, will be emphasized in the conclusions to the chapter. Next, he brings in ordinary practices of punishment and reward, both on the level of individual citizens and of legislators, to support his point that virtue and vice are equally voluntary (1113b21–26). Afterwards, he argues that one can be responsible for one's own ignorance which results in wrongdoing, for instance if one does something prohibited by the laws in ignorance of the prohibition. In this way, it turns out that a condition like ignorance can be up to one and something for which people can be responsible.[7] This amounts to a first extension of the account of voluntariness advocated for actions in chapter 1. That this is the argumentative strategy of the text can be gleaned from the way Aristotle goes about showing this, for he points out that one's condition of ignorance can be voluntary precisely by showing that (i*), the requirement that the principle be internal to the agent, is fulfilled in this case. (Presumably, he does not think that [ii*], the knowledge requirement, can be fulfilled in the present case.) At this point, there is something of a turn in the chapter and the remainder is taken up by two objections as well as Aristotle's replies to them (first objection at ll. 1114a3–30; second ll. 1114a30–b25). From now on, every claim can be interpreted one way or the other as relevant to the thesis of voluntariness of character states. Since it is the first objection which brings in the question of the voluntariness of character states, I will focus on it in greater detail.[8] In view of Aristotle's account of voluntariness in *EN* III 1, according to which what is voluntary is what fulfils (i*) and (ii*), the question whether character traits too are voluntary comes down to whether (i*) and (ii*) hold of one's character too.

Aristotle is sanguine that the principle of acquiring a given character trait lies within the agent, and hence that (i*) holds of character states. The origin of a given character trait lies in the agent's past actions. If someone were to say she cannot help but act the way her character prompts her to do, the retort would then be that she's to blame for acquiring her character in the first place. One cannot deflect responsibility by saying, for instance, that one was

born with their character, for character is not something one is born with, but is rather the product of a process in which the agent has the leading role.[9] The argument used to support this (1114a3–31) relies heavily on Aristotle's account of habituation defended in *EN* II 1–4. For someone to be of a certain type (τοιῦτός ἐστιν, 1114a3) comes down to having certain character states (ἕξεις), and character states are acquired by previously engaging in corresponding activities (ἐνέργειαι). Earlier in *EN* II 2, actions were said to be in control (κύριαι, 1103b30–31) of engendering corresponding character states through habituation. What Aristotle is doing in this later chapter is looking at the process from the opposite vantage point, so to speak: earlier, we were told that actions have the capacity to engender corresponding character traits; now that those character traits come about as a result of one's previous actions. There are good textual indications that, in reply to the first objection of *EN* III 5, Aristotle is deliberately showing how (i*) applies to the case at hand by resorting to the mechanism of habituation: most clearly, he concludes that "the principle is in oneself" (ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, 1114a19) when it comes to forming character states.

Now, notoriously, Aristotle does not pause to ask questions which are likely to occur to us, in particular whether it is true that people are in control of the activities formative of corresponding character traits early on when the influence of one's social environment might resemble external force. He presumably believes that in all such cases the principle is still internal. Any kind of influence exercised on the habituand will have to follow an internal route, and so long as the route is internal, then (i*), as defended earlier in chapter 1, will be fulfilled. We are likely to feel some discomfort at his solution on this point, but since this has been commented upon enough by others,[10] I will refrain from taking this further. Instead, I will move on to the question as to how, if at all, the second requirement for voluntariness applies to character states, namely (ii*), the knowledge requirement.

The question to be asked is: what must one have knowledge of in order for the resulting character state to be voluntary? An answer to this question will amount to defining (ii*), the knowledge condition for voluntariness, for the case of character states. In the case of action, the requisite knowledge has been spelt out at length in *EN* III 1 as knowledge of the circumstances in which the action occurs (1110b18–1111a21). By contrast, Aristotle is somewhat elusive on the knowledge requisite for a given character trait to be voluntary. He never appears to tackle this issue as clearly as he does for (i*), when he shows by appeal to his account of habituation that the origin of character states lies within the agent. In principle, having argued that (i*) is fulfilled for character traits, Aristotle might presume that it is enough for all the actions leading up to the acquisition of a given character trait be voluntary in order for the ensuing character trait to be voluntary too. We should, however, review attentively any text from *EN* III 5 that might seem to bear on the question of the knowledge involved in the formation of character states. One such text is

> "Not knowing that [character] states [derive] from being active [in a certain way] in each domain is a sign of great insensibility"[11]
>
> (1114a9–10)[12]

In the text leading up to this, Aristotle has argued that the principle that character traits derive from previous activity is evident in the case of athletes training ahead of competitions. Here, we find a pre-emptive response to a possible objection: if someone were to disavow knowledge that character traits are formed by acting in a certain way in the past, the reply would be that the objection is hardly believable. There are two implications of this claim, both of which are *prima facie* puzzling: first, it seems to suggest that knowledge of this principle is necessary in order for the resulting character trait to be voluntary. Second, it implies that Aristotle considers the core idea of the account of habituation previously defended in book II as a piece of knowledge to which most people ordinarily somehow have access.

The thought is that nobody can reasonably disavow knowledge of the principle whereby one's character is the product of, and results from, one's past actions. The obvious retort is that such knowledge can hardly be expected of anyone, of children, for instance. Since earlier in the ethics Aristotle has emphasized the importance of early habituation, he appears to be particularly vulnerable to this criticism. A possible solution to this complication would be to suppose that he is here addressing an audience of mature agents.[13] Such a restriction may be less abrupt than one might at first think, if we suppose, as some critics have suggested, that he has been addressing mature agents since the beginning of *EN* III 5 by focusing on actions out of decision.[14] Even so, the challenge can be reiterated by asking why one should suppose that every adult knows that actions are formative of character. It seems plausible to think that some people might not know this, or that, even if they do, they fail to take it to heart and cannot as a result be expected to act accordingly.

It also seems puzzling to claim that everyone knows that character is formed by engaging in activities, a principle sometimes referred to as "like state from like activity."[15] For it has taken Aristotle careful argument to defend his own view, and nowhere in his account of habituation does he seem to take it for granted as obvious. To be sure, he does draw support from ordinary practices of rewards and punishments as well as from Plato as trailblazer for the importance of habituation; and he has resorted to the etymology of character virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) from habit (ἔθος) as evidence that the former derives from the latter (*EN* II 1, 1103a17–18); but he has by no means given the impression to be appealing to ordinarily accessible knowledge in defence of his account in *EN* II 1–4.

Perhaps Aristotle's point is that this sort of knowledge is available under normal circumstances to most people via the admonitions of one's educators and the like.[16] If so, the idea is not that everyone possesses factual knowledge of the principle that character is formed by past actions, but rather that everyone has plenty of opportunities to learn this under normal circumstances.

If Aristotle is right and opportunities to learn this are aplenty, then one will be culpably ignorant in failing to cop on to this principle. Understood in this sense, this type of ignorance would be analogous to the case of ignorance of what is prohibited by the laws considered earlier in *EN* III 5, in so far as it would concern what one can be reasonably expected to know under normal circumstances. I think there is a fitting analogy, employed in this chapter and elsewhere, which supports this reading, namely the analogy of bad and wretched people being like those who become sick by disregarding their doctor's advice (1114a16). The very same image had been used at the end of *EN* II 1–4 to rebuke those who do not bother to engage in virtuous activity to acquire virtue but prefer to take refuge in discourses: there too Aristotle had said that their case is analogous to refusing to take one's doctor's advice and hoping to stay in good health regardless (1105b12–16). If this is the thought behind the puzzling claim we have been focusing on, perhaps Aristotle may further take himself to be contributing to this protreptic endeavour by reminding people of the formative power of engaging in the right activities and abstaining from bad ones.[17]

We are still faced with the question about the kind of knowledge necessary for someone to be said to have acquired one's character voluntarily. I suggest we look at one last text from *EN* III 5 which seems to deal with this question, if only indirectly.

As we have mentioned earlier, Aristotle's conclusion has it that actions and character traits are not voluntary in the same way (1114b30, οὐχ ὁμοίως, etc.). In a bid to expand on the requisite qualification, Aristotle goes into some more detail about what exactly, in the case of character traits, we do *not* have knowledge of. It is now worth quoting the whole passage.

> Actions and states, however, are not voluntary in the same way: for we are in control of actions from beginning to end, so long as we know the particular circumstances, but [we are in control] of the beginning of states, while the progressive advancement [of the state] in the particular circumstances is not known to us [καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος], as in the case of diseases; but since it was up to us to use [the particular circumstances] this way or that way, for this reason [states] are voluntary.
> (*EN* III 5, 1114b30–1115a2)[18]

It is clear that Aristotle is qualifying the second requirement of voluntariness, namely (ii*) the knowledge condition. The qualification at stake is asserted elsewhere in this chapter in a number of slightly different ways, which are presented as equivalent:

i. while people are in control of their actions from beginning to end, they are only in control of the beginning of their character traits (1114b31–1115a1);
ii. everyone is responsible for their own character state in a way (1114b1–2, ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος);

iii. we are jointly responsible in a way of our character traits (1114b22-23, τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν).

There is a close link, in other words, between the fact that we are only in control of the onset of character formation, the way voluntariness applies to character states, and our qualified responsibility for them. Scholars have discussed at length the nature of the qualification at stake.[19] A common explanation has it that Aristotle is making room for other partners responsible for our character states, presumably nature and upbringing.[20] In my view, this is only partly correct: it is true that there is a qualification of the voluntariness of character states at stake here; but this has nothing to do with the involvement of other causal factors like nature and upbringing in addition to the agent. If that were the case, we would expect Aristotle to qualify (i*) the internality of the principle requirement, whereas it is (ii*), the knowledge requirement, which is at stake in the above passage. More precisely, the qualification is introduced in view of there being some kind of ignorance involved in character formation.

Before developing this, let us take our bearings by focusing on the general sense of the qualification. This is best understood as a restatement of a vivid claim made earlier in *EN* III 5 about character traits: while we are not in control of retrieving a stone once it has been thrown, it was clearly up to us not to throw it in the first place (1114a16–19). The thought seems to be that there is a certain momentum in the way in which character traits develop to the effect that our control over them gradually diminishes as they become ingrained. The explanation for this is presumably to be found in the idea that it is in virtue of one's character traits that things appear to us in a certain way, and, most importantly that some of them strike us as pleasant and fine (1113a31). Once established, then, character traits will incline us to pursue the things that strike us as pleasant and fine. Since one cannot act upon the way things appear to us to the same extent as one can take action to pursue the things that strike us as pleasant and fine, our control over the former is bound to be inferior to our control over the latter.

Now, presumably with his stone example, Aristotle has exaggerated the extent to which character cannot be changed once established. For one thing, earlier Aristotle contrasted the mechanism of acquisition of character virtue through habituation with the case of natural movements by arguing precisely that a stone cannot be habituated to fall upwards (1103a18–23). This implies that forming one's character is not like the throwing of a stone. The image of the stone being irretrievable once thrown is probably best understood *inter alia* as a warning to make sure we throw the right stones, as it were; that is, that we develop the right habits.[21] Nor does the image rule out the possibility of character change: elsewhere, Aristotle points out that "it is not impossible, or *not easy*, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed as a result of one's habits" (*EN* X 9, 1179b15–20). The parallel with diseases in *EN* III 5 makes clear that Aristotle is especially concerned with cases of people having developed bad habits and not being able to act otherwise once their character has

become ingrained. In other words, since it will take an awful lot of effort to break a bad habit once it is formed, it is better not to acquire it in the first place; once again, a protreptic thread runs through this chapter.

There is another idea in the last text quoted which still deserves comment, namely the fact that our diminished control over character states is, on the face of it, *explained* by a certain ignorance. For there, Aristotle compares and contrasts the knowledge condition, i.e. (ii*), in the case of actions and character states. In *EN* III 1, the relevant type of knowledge requisite for voluntariness of actions was elaborated as knowledge of the particulars in which the action occurs (1111a22–4). If someone has this type of knowledge whilst acting, their control over the ensuing action is complete. In the case of character states, by contrast, the progressive advancement of the state is not known to us. The idea seems to be that people are in no position to know the exact contribution of individual actions to the incipient character state. There is reason to think that this idea concerns especially bad actions and their contribution to the development of vice and other undesirable character traits. The parallel with diseases is instructive here: in this case too it is hard to know in advance what kind of behaviour will be sufficient to trigger the onset of a disease. Someone may do action x_1 at time t_1 and not be aware that x_1 contributes to developing disease y, and then do action x_2 at time t_2, action x_3 at time t_3, and so on, all the while contributing to disease y; yet there is no way to know in advance which x will cause the onset of disease y to the point where one is no longer capable of preventing it.[22]

If this is along the right lines, two remarks are in order. First, it suggests that this qualification is Aristotle's last minute concession to the idea that vice is involuntary and not to blame. For, as we have seen, Aristotle is prepared to concede that there is an element of ignorance connected to the impossibility to know in advance the contribution of individual actions to the formation of character states, and this type of ignorance is of the kind which exculpates. However, the concession does not undermine the voluntariness of character. Second, with his examination Aristotle most likely intends to exhort his audience to pay close attention to the habits one sets out to develop. Since we are not able to know in advance what kind of effect activities, in particular bad ones, will have on us, the rational reaction to this is an overall policy of caution and the adoption of a reflective attitude towards the character traits one is in the progress of developing.

5.3 Voluntariness of Character States in the *EE*

Let us briefly take stock. In the previous section, I hope to have shown that the question addressed in *EN* III 5, namely whether character states are voluntary, is not simply tacked onto Aristotle's previously reached conclusions about voluntariness: on the one hand, that question has been alluded to previously in Aristotle's *EN*; on the other, the affirmative answer reached to that effect in large part amounts to an extension to the character states of Aristotle's

account of voluntariness for actions. In view of all of this, it will be of interest to consider whether the *EE* takes any stance on the question of character states, whether they are voluntary or otherwise.

Some critics have read into a couple of texts of the *EE* arguments for the conclusion that character states are voluntary.[23] More generally, there are a few texts of the *EE* that might seem to deal with voluntariness of character states, and it will be worth reviewing them all in what follows. The first relevant text occurs at the end of *EE* II 6. This chapter prefaces Aristotle's enquiry into voluntariness, which is to follow in the next chapter, with a series of remarks on what it means to be causally responsibly for, and the originating principle of, actions.[24] Towards the end of the chapter, Aristotle goes back to his enquiry into virtue of character, which is the principal focus of *EE* book II as a whole.

> Since virtue and vice and the deeds [that originate] from them are objects of praise and blame; for, one does not bestow praise and blame on what happens either because of necessity, chance, or nature, but on those things for which we are causally responsible. Indeed, of those things for which someone else is causally responsible it is that person who receives praise or blame. It is clear that both virtue and vice concern those things that one is causally responsible for and the originating principle of.
>
> (*EE* II 6, 1223a9–1223a15)[25]

Aristotle reasons as follows: (a) virtue and vice receive praise and blame, respectively; (b) one praises and blames not what happens by necessity, chance, or nature, but rather that for which one is causally responsible; hence, (c) virtue and vice concern those things for which one is causally responsible. Now, (a) does not make it clear whether what is meant is virtue and vice as states, or only the actions which derive from them, or both. Nor does the reference to praise and blame help us settle this, for praise and blame are reactions appropriate in principle both to actions and character states.[26] Since explicit mention is made of the deeds which flow from virtues and vices (cf. τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα),[27] it seems that actions are clearly within the scope of the argument; hence the two options left would seem to be either that the argument is about both character states and action, or about actions exclusively.[28] Nevertheless, in (c) the conclusion drawn concerns only the actions of virtue and vice (the ταῦτα in [c] presumably picking up on τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα of [a]); this implies that the focus of the argument is on the actions characteristic of virtues, things like returning a debt or abstaining from overeating as manifesting justice and moderation, respectively.

Aristotle could have argued as follows: (a) virtue and vice receive praise and blame; (b) one praises and blames not what happens by necessity, chance, or nature, but rather that for which one is causally responsible; hence, (c*) virtue and vice are things for which one is causally responsible. It is significant that he stops short of drawing this conclusion. I suggest that the weaker conclusion, namely (c) above, is more in line with Aristotle's purposes in *EE* II 6. This chapter paves the way for the examination of the voluntary by situating human

action in the natural world as Aristotle conceives of it. Aristotle argues that although human beings are unique in nature in being originating principles of action, still action does not lie outside of nature, so to speak; this is the reason why action is characterized as (a type of) movement (1222b28–29). Aristotle sets up to show that virtue and vice are up to us in the sense that it is open to us to engage in the actions characteristic of them in view of the domain in which they occur.[29] This is the domain of virtue; and of vice as well. This text shares this much with *EN* III 5, namely the refusal to leave room for asymmetry claims about virtue and vice. Indeed, human beings are causally responsible for, and originating principles of, opposite outcomes (1222b41–42), hence what applies to virtue applies to vice just as well. Nevertheless, unlike *EN* III 5, the argument here is centred on action. Once we bring into clearer focus the objectives of this section, it at once becomes clear that there is no intention on Aristotle's part to drive home the stronger point that virtue and vice, understood as character states, are things for which we are responsible.[30]

The last text quoted does not use the notion of voluntariness. What follows immediately in *EE* II 6 brings in the voluntary by establishing an equivalence class between that for which one is responsible, previously used in the text above, and the voluntary.

> It is hence necessary to grasp which actions one is causally responsible for and originating principle of. Everyone agrees that one is causally responsible for voluntary things and things in accord with one's decision, whereas one is not causally responsible for involuntary things. But everything which has been decided on is also clearly done voluntarily. Hence, it is clear that both virtue and vice will be of voluntary things
>
> (*EE* II 6, 1223a15–20)[31]

Here, the same conclusion reached earlier is re-affirmed by using the newly introduced notion of voluntariness. Earlier, the conclusion had been that virtue and vice concern those things that one is responsible for and principle of, whereas now virtue and vice are within the domain of voluntary things. There is no denying that the expression used in the conclusion is unhelpfully ambiguous, the genitive "of voluntary things" (a20, τῶν ἑκουσίων) potentially meaning things as different as "virtue and vice concern voluntary things" and "virtue and vice are voluntary." However, in these lines Aristotle intends the new conclusion to follow from the previous one on the strength of the invoked consensus about the connection between the notion of voluntariness and responsibility. (While introduced for the first time here, the notion of decision is left in abeyance during the examination of the voluntary in *EE* II 7–9, but will reappear in the next and last text to look at.) Since, as I said earlier, this chapter is devoted to assigning a somewhat clearer ontological domain to human action within the natural world, I suggest that our reading of these lines should be in keeping with the general understanding of this chapter. Thus, Aristotle is best understood as claiming that virtue and vice are within the domain of voluntary things in the sense that the actions characteristic of them are voluntary.[32]

So much for *EE* II 6. The last relevant text from the *EE* occurs in the final chapter of book II, i.e. *EE* II 11. This chapter is, in Woods' words, "something of an appendix to the discussion of virtue of character and decision, to which as a whole nothing corresponds in the *EN*."[33] It will be helpful to remind us briefly of the question addressed there. The topic of the chapter is whether (i) virtue prevents mistakes with regard to one's decision and makes the goal correct, or whether (ii) virtue makes one's reasoning correct (1227b12–15). Aristotle comes down on the former side of the question and accuses those who come down on the latter side of mistaking virtue for self-control (ἐγκράτεια). What emerges fairly clearly is Aristotle's firm commitment to the idea that virtue is responsible in a special way for giving its possessor the right goal at which to aim. Despite being on a par with virtue as a praiseworthy state, self-control falls short of this. Indeed, only the virtuous person aims at the mean (τὸ μέσον), which is an indication of the fact that virtue is responsible for making one's goal right (1227b37–38). What is characteristic of virtue is that its possessor takes action with the right end in view. Looking at someone's decision (προαίρεσις), which has been previously examined in *EE* II 10, is of help here as it enables us to assess someone's goal in acting. Aristotle has suggested that decision has a standard structure, namely that it is always of something for the sake of something (1226a11–13;1227b36–37), where the first variable refers to an action and the second to the goal the agent has in view in acting as she does (call this "decision schema"). This nexus of ideas is put to use in what follows in the text, which reads thus:

> And it is because of this [sc. the decision schema] that we judge what one is like from their decision: this is what one acts for the sake of, not [simply] what one does. Similarly, vice too makes one's decision be for the sake of contrary things. If, therefore, someone, when it is up to him to do fine things and to refrain from doing shameful ones, does the opposite, it is clear that such a human being is not good. It follows that it is necessary that vice and virtue are voluntary: for, there is no necessity to do wretched things. For these reasons it is the case both that vice is blamed and virtue is praised: for, neither does one blame shameful and bad things done involuntarily, nor does one praise good things [done involuntarily], but rather voluntary ones.
>
> (*EE* II 11, 1228a2–11)[34]

The argument is reminiscent of the passages from *EE* II 6 already looked at, not least for its conclusion that virtue and vice are voluntary. If, at this point, Aristotle can go into some more detail it is because he has defined in the meantime the notion of decision, which is key to his argument here.[35] In particular, here decision serves the purpose of showing that that which is true of virtue is, by parity of reasoning, true of vice as well. For someone's character is manifested most clearly in their acting in a certain way for the sake of a given end, namely in their decision. The best condition of one's character, i.e. virtue, is

responsible for decision's aiming at the right goal, namely the mean; by parity of reasoning, vice will be responsible for decision's aiming at the opposite goal. (Presumably by using the plural "opposite goals" Aristotle refers to the two opposite directions in which it is possible to depart from the mean either by excess or deficiency.) Whenever someone does a bad act, it being up to them to refrain from it, one is voluntarily bad and reveals one's character accordingly; they have chosen a bad end as worth pursuing and are prepared to take action accordingly.

On the face of it, here there might seem to be more to Aristotle's talk of virtue and vice than simply their respective characteristic actions. For one thing, in the preceding chapter, namely *EE* II 10, virtue has been defined as a character state (1227b5–11, esp. ἕξις at l. 8). Hence, one might think that from there on the default understanding of virtue will be according to its definition. Similarly, Aristotle's controversial claim that virtue provides the right goal is more naturally construed as a claim about virtue as character state than virtue as pattern of actions. On the other hand, in the last text quoted, the emphasis of Aristotle's argument is placed on action, as the use of the verb πράττειν and cognate throughout makes clear. I suggest, therefore, that, not unlike *EE* II 6, here the focus is on the voluntariness of the actions which manifest virtue and vice and that Aristotle is content with showing that the actions of virtue and vice are equally up to us. To be sure, there is no reason to deny that Aristotle may well believe virtue and vice to be voluntary in a sense which goes beyond the voluntariness of the actions they give rise to; but, contrary to what we have seen in *EN* III 5, he is not in the business of giving an argument to that effect.

5.4 Conclusion

If my argument above is correct, *EN* III 5 is the only place where Aristotle tackles the question of the voluntariness of states of character by giving an argument in its defence. I hope to have shown that that conclusion is admirably consonant with the account of the voluntary previously established for action in *EN* III 1. When we turn to the *EE*, despite appearances we do not find any argument to that effect. As often in similar cases, it seems easier to think that the *EN* was written with the benefit of the *EE*, otherwise it would be unclear why Aristotle would have left out the question of the voluntariness of character states entirely in the latter work; at the same time, we have found evidence that the two works pursue significantly different agendas in a way which resists simplistic assessments. Both of them deserve assiduous attention.

Notes

1 I use "voluntary" for τὸ ἑκούσιον and "involuntary" for τὸ ἀκούσιον; "cause" or "causally responsibly" for αἴτιος. None of these translations is without its difficulties, but they are preferable to their competitors.

2 That is, the Platonic Socrates, according to Sauvé Meyer, 2011, ch. 5; the Plato of the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, according to Kamtekar, 2019, p. 60. Despite there being important differences between their interpretations, they are agreed that some kind of asymmetry thesis is Aristotle's polemical target.
3 See Lienemann, 2018, p. 452, 512; contrast Sauvé Meyer, 2011, p. 128.
4 I disregard another puzzling requirement for involuntariness, namely that the agent has to regret the action done; for one thing, this is not mentioned in the final account of involuntariness (1111a22-24); for the other, it can be thought of as a symptom of, and not a condition for, involuntariness.
5 Along similar lines, see Furley, 1977, pp. 49–50.
6 These lines have been much discussed with regard to the determinism/compatibilism debate, see Destrée, 2011; Bobzien, 2013.
7 Sauvé Meyer, 2011, p. 139 argues that the reference is to Socrates and his conviction that vice lies in ignorance of the good. See also Lienemann, 2018, pp. 511–512.
8 Careful analyses of the second objection are Grgić, 2017; Kamtekar, 2019, pp. 80–82 helpfully suggests that the second objection re-articulates the challenge posed by the first by means of some ideas accepted by Aristotle himself.
9 Broadie, 1991, p. 165 has emphasized how the argument of *EN* III 5 is largely aimed at refuting the idea that character is innate. Although her remarks are very helpful, she perhaps overly restricts Aristotle's arguments to this particular target for criticism.
10 Lienemann, 2018, pp. 479–488; Sauvé Meyer, 2011, pp. 123–124; Broadie, 1991, p. 167; Sorabji, 1980, pp. 266–269; Furley, 1977, p. 53.
11 On the meaning of the expression κομιδῆ ἀναισθήτου, see Bondeson, 1974, pp. 61–62. I disagree with Bondeson that people "who are ignorant of this are beyond the bound of sense and are probably so deficient that they cannot be counted as moral agents" (p. 64).
12 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῆ ἀναισθ ήτου.
13 Irwin, 1980, p. 140; Cooper, 2013, pp. 308–309.
14 The suggestion is Donini's, who however does not accept it in the end, see Donini, 2003, p. 11.
15 Lawrence, 2011, p. 246.
16 This is the suggestion made in Donini, 2003, p. 19; see also Lienemann, 2018, pp. 492–493.
17 For the idea that Aristotle's ethics, and the *EN* in particular, belongs to the genre of protreptic discourses, see Hutchinson, Johnson, 2014. According to them, in the *EN* Aristotle's protreptic efforts are aimed at exhorting his audience to philosophy; but they do make room for the idea that there might be instances of apotreptic discourses against vice and protreptic discourses in favour of particular virtues, see esp. pp. 396–397.
18 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μ έχρι τοῦ τέλους κύ-ριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕ καστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσ-περ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕ-τως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι. Scholars have doubted both whether this passage did not originate as a marginal note and, more plausibly, whether its position in the MSS is correct, for more details see Stewart, 1892, p. 281; Frede, 2020, pp. 47–48 suggests, following Rassow, moving it to 114b25; Gauthier, 1970, *ad loc.*, suggests moving it earlier to 1114a31.
19 Sauvé Meyer, 2011, p. 127 argues that Aristotle intends to establish only what she calls qualified, as opposed to full, responsibility for one's character states; see also Lienemann, 2018, pp. 508–509. Other interpreters, e.g. Ott, 2006; Grgić, 2017, argue against this by maintaining that Aristotle is not qualifying one's responsibility for character states at all. Ott, 2006, p. 74 argues that if Aristotle were to qualify one's responsibility for character, then he would have to qualify one's responsibility for actions too; but this flies in the face of (i)–(iii), which clearly state that there is a difference between the voluntariness of actions and character states. Grgić, 2017, pp. 118–119 argues that the qualification has to do with there being other explanatory factors which account for people's character

states, notably goals in addition to efficient causes (i.e. us); this is, of course, true, but it would fail to apply to character states exclusively, for that is true of actions as well.

20 Irwin, 1999, p. 211; Destrée, 2011, p. 310. Modern commentators follow Aspasius, who argues along similar lines, but mentions nature and chance, see 70.33–80.3.

21 Di Muzio, 2000 is an informative discussion of the issues involved here. He argues that Aristotle does not rule out character change and moral reform. In particular, the stone example, on his view, is only meant to show that one cannot change one's character simply by wishing to do so. Cf. also *EN* IX 3, 1165b13–22; *Cat.* 10, 13a23–31; *Pol.* 1332b4–11.

22 Aspasius' reading seems to be along similar lines, see 80.21–29; see also Donini, 2003, p. 12, n. 26.

23 See Wolt, 2019; Broadie, 1991, p. 162.

24 I use "causally responsible" for αἴτιος and "originating principle" for ἀρχή. Although cumbersome, these seem close to how Aristotle introduces them in *EE* II 6. I sometimes omit the qualifications and use "responsible" and "principle" for brevity's sake.

25 ἐπεὶ δ' ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά· ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ ὑπάρχοντα ἀλλ' ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν, ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει· δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ὧν αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων.

26 Contrast Simpson, 2013, pp. 260–261.

27 Cf. 1220a19–21.

28 The issue could be settled by taking the καί at l. 9 as epexegetic. I have preferred not to iron out the ambiguity of the argument. I have no objection in principle, however, to adopting this construal as a result of my argument. I thank Dan Ferguson for pressing me on this issue.

29 On the connection between this chapter and the project of the *EE*, see the helpful suggestions in Müller, 2015, pp. 215–216; Wolt, 2019.

30 On this passage, I agree with Sauvé Meyer, 2011, p. 43; however, she goes on to mention the conclusion drawn at *EE* II 6, 1223a15–20, which is the next passage I will look at, as the only place where possibly the voluntariness of character traits might be affirmed.

31 ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσ α μὲν ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἑκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ' ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἑκὼν δῆλον ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι κ αὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἑκουσίων ἂν εἴησαν. Wolt, 2019, stresses the importance of the optative mood used in the conclusion which, on his view, would signal that he hopes to demonstrate this claim in what follows. This is plausible, and one might further suggest that the conclusion in question is established in *EE* II 11, the last passage I will consider below.

32 Similar considerations apply to the version of this argument given in *MM* I 9, 1187a19–23.

33 Woods, 1992, pp. 151–152. I have replaced Woods' "choice" with "decision"' for the sake of consistency with the rest. A very helpful discussion of this part of *EE* II 11 is Lienemann, 2018, pp. 345–352.

34 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποιός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πρ άττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττ-ει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαί ρεσιν. εἰ δή τις, ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὂν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοὐναντίο ν ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τήν τε κακίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγε ται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑκούσια.

35 Müller, 2015, p. 249, n. 71 agrees that the *EE* does not tackle the question of the voluntariness of character. However, he argues that someone acting out of decision is responsible not only for the action done but also for "being the kind of person who does the action" (p. 250). Strictly speaking, though, all that Aristotle is entitled to conclude is that the agent is responsible for the kind of person she wants to be (see p. 248, where, as I understand it, Müller argues along these lines).

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6 Decision in the *Eudemian Ethics*[1]

Karen Margrethe Nielsen

Ever since renaissance scholars started including the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) in editions of Aristotle's Ethics in the 15th and 16th centuries, the treatise has been read through a Nicomachean prism. Though, questions about its authenticity have now been laid to rest,[2] the treatise poses particular challenges for the reader, especially given the sorry state of the manuscript tradition. In his masterly study of the transmission history of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Dieter Harlfinger calls it "the most corrupt treatise" in the Corpus Aristotelicum,[3] and Jonathan Barnes remarks that "the text of the *EE* is in a vile state – hideous corruption on every page."[4]

The issue is unfortunately compounded by new errors in the apparatus criticus of the most recent edition, Walzer and Mingay's *Oxford Classical Text* (OCT) (1991), which is the culmination of a scholarly relay run started by David Ross, continued by Walzer, and completed by Mingay. As Barnes notes in his review, the editors have perhaps been a little too ready to accept the emendations of modern scholars, and sometimes misattribute the emendations they accept, making it hard for the reader to trust both the accuracy of the apparatus and the judiciousness of their choices.[5] Even modern translators who are aware of the issue, and prepared to reject proposals in the OCT where the manuscripts (MSS) can be made intelligible, find themselves hobbled by centuries of received opinion. The challenge, then, is to handle a manuscript tradition that is hideously corrupt, and at least five centuries of scholarly attempts to plaster over or repair the problems, a challenge that is made all the harder by our tendency to read the *Eudemian Ethics* as a treatise that either foreshadows or shadows the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) on most points of substance. Whether we follow the majority view, and read the *EN* rather than the *EE* as the ultimate expression of Aristotle's thought, or follow Kenny, who argues for the reverse relationship, the temptation is to use assumptions about the concepts and arguments of the *EN* to illuminate obscure passages in the *EE*, without asking whether these assumptions are sound in their own right, and whether – and to what extent – they carry over from one treatise to the other.[6] In the case I will consider in this chapter, restoring an MSS reading in the *EE* and reversing a Renaissance emendation make us confront what appears to be a conceptual divergence between the nominal definitions of *prohairesis* in the *EE* and *EN*.

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Taking the MSS at face value should make us reconsider standard analyses of *prohairesis* in Aristotle's ethics.

Prohairesis is the keystone of Aristotle's argument in both the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.[7] He defines virtue as a "state that decides" (*hexis prohairetikê*) (*EN* II 6, 1106b36–1107a1; *EE* II 10, 1227b5–11), and argues that decision distinguishes characters better than actions do (*EN* III 2, 111b7; *EE* II 11, 1228a3–4). We only use actions to judge character when the *prohairesis* of the agent is not easy to discern (*EE* II 11, 1228a14–16), for the decision reveals what someone has chosen to do and for what end. *Prohairesis* is further described as the efficient cause of action (*praxis*) – in this role, it is "*hothen hê kinesis*" ("that from which the movement arises") rather than the *telos* ("that for the sake of which" we act) (*EN* VI 2/*EE* V 2, 1139a32–3). In the *EN*, and in the first common book, Aristotle maintains that virtuous agents decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, as instances of *eupraxia* (*EN* I 8, 1098b22; II 4; VI 2, 1139a34; b3). While emotions may dispose non-virtuous agents to do right acts, they do not choose these acts as a result of a rational commitment (*EN* II 6, 1106a1–6; *EE* III 7, 1234a23–4).

The term "*prohairesis*" has no direct descendant in English, making it hard to capture its sense. In the Anglophone literature, it is rendered with terms ranging from "choice" to "commitment," "rational choice," "deliberate choice," "purposive choice" (sometimes just "purpose"), "preferential choice," "decision," and "election,"[8] the last following Aquinas' Latin. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Which one we should prefer depends, in part, on how we understand Aristotle's explication of the concept, and whether we wish to build Aristotle's remarks about the nature of *prohairesis* into the very term, as "preferential choice," "deliberate choice," "purposive choice," and "rational choice" all do.[9] The term had not been regimented for philosophical use before Aristotle offered his definition: we need to understand what Aristotle means when he speaks of *prohairesis* to understand his analysis of virtue and human action.

6.1 *Prohairesis* in the *Eudemian Ethics*

In light of the many problems facing the reader of the *EE*, we should not be surprised if even the most able recent translators, benefiting from Harlfinger's painstaking work on the MSS and stemma codicum, as well as a burgeoning critical literature, occasionally trip up and accept a reading that should have been rejected. In the case I'll consider, the error of judgment is shared by all modern readers, and hard to avoid, because its source lies so far back in the reception history as to have been effectively obscured from view. However, once we trace the emendation back to its source and restore the original readings of the MSS, we will see that it distorts Aristotle's argument.

The distortion I shall consider, at 1226b8, is not, remarkably, an unintended consequence of an attempt to correct a corruption in the MSS, but instead a conjecture that made it into Greek editions of the *Eudemian Ethics*

starting in the 16th century, despite lacking manuscript basis, and despite being both unnecessary and philosophically ill-fitting in the context of the argument where it appears. The motive behind the emendation is conciliatory. The commentator, the German scholar Friedrich Sylburg (1536–1596), wished to smooth out what he (perhaps rightly) saw as a doctrinal discrepancy between the Eudemian and Nicomachean treatises, so that the *Eudemian Ethics* agreed with the theory with which he was familiar from the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[10] He therefore made a proposal in the commentary included in his 1587 edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* that later editors have accepted without question or sufficient scrutiny. Based on his own commentary, where he lays out his case for overriding the MSS, we know that Sylburg was reading a perfectly wholesome line in the MSS, with no grammatical errors giving him reason to correct the transmitted text. Still, he thought something must be amiss, since the explanation of the term *prohairesis* offered by the *Eudemian Ethics* seemed to depart from what he took the parallel passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to say. As a result, he changed the Greek of the *EE* to make it conform to what he thought the *EN* stated. Sylburg's emendation shows up in contemporary translations in the shape of almost comically contorted efforts to make sense of Aristotle's line in the *EE*, and an oddly disjointed interpretation of the surrounding argument. The conjecture concerns Aristotle's nominal definition of *prohairesis*, or decision, at *EE* II 10, 1226b8 – a definition that highlights the meaning of the term before Aristotle examines the nature of the mental act that the verb "*prohaireisthai*" denotes. Sylburg's proposal is accepted in Susemihl's Teubner edition (1884), as well as in Walzer and Mingay's OCT, and presupposed in all modern English translations.[11]

Despite the universal acceptance it has enjoyed, the proposal obscures a distinctive feature of the *Eudemian Ethics* from view, a feature that, when properly understood, allows us to appreciate the Eudemian definition of decision on its own terms. Attempting to understand the Eudemian analysis of *prohairesis* without filtering it through preconceptions derived from the corresponding passages in the Nicomachean treatise, will, I wager, yield a better understanding of the progression of Aristotle's argument in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and also potentially open a window into the development of Aristotle's thought.

The disputed line appears in the context of Aristotle's extended discussion of *prohairesis* in *Eudemian Ethics* II 10. Aristotle here seeks to determine its genus by considering puzzles that arise about *prohairesis*. The analysis parallels that of *Nicomachean Ethics* III 2–4, though in the *EE*, unlike the *EN*, Aristotle has already introduced the theme of decision in his preceding analysis of the voluntary.[12] In both Ethics, Aristotle defines virtue of character as a *hexis prohairetikê*, a state that decides (*EN* II 6, 1106b36–1107a1; *EE* II 10, 1227b5–11).

In the *EN*, the full definition of virtue appears prior to the analysis of the voluntary and decision, and so motivates the ensuing inquiry into the nature of *prohairesis*. In the *EE*, Aristotle does not introduce the phrase *hexis prohairetikê* into his definition of character virtue until *after* he has concluded the topical

analysis of *prohairesis* in II 10. Instead, he presents a provisional definition of virtue at *EE* II 5, 1222a6–12, which is fully articulated at the conclusion of book II 10, and repeated at the heading of book III (*EE* III 1, 1228a20–25), to specify that it is a state that decides. His approach in the *EE* is therefore inductive rather than deductive: Aristotle works *towards* the precise definition of virtue of character, starting from an analysis of decision, whereas his approach in the *EN* is deductive: Aristotle works *from* the precise definition of virtue as a state that decides, and then explicates the differentia that sets this state apart from others.

Whatever the reasons for this difference in approach, that decision is a central concept in Aristotle's ethics cannot be doubted. In the *EN*, Aristotle says that "decision seems to be most proper to virtue, and to distinguish characters from one another better than actions do" (III 2, 1111b6–7), and in the *EE*, Aristotle remarks that virtues and vices all involve decision; therefore, states that are *mere emotional* means (cf. the doctrine of the mean) don't qualify as character states (*EE* III 7, 1234a24–5). In both treatises, he defines decision as a "deliberate desire for actions that are up to us" (*orexis bouleutikê tôn eph'hêmin* [*EN* III 3, 1113a11]; *orexis tôn eph'hautôi bouleutikê* [*EE* II 10, 1226b17]), on the basis of its causal origin in deliberation. We start by having a wish (*boulêsis*) for an end. Once we have inquired about the means to that end through deliberation and have considered what we can do to promote it, we form a desire to do the act we judge we should do because it promotes our end best or well enough not to necessitate further inquiry. However, the underlying analyses of deliberation (*bouleusis*) in the *EE* and the *EN* seem, on the face of it, to highlight different aspects of practical reasoning, the *EE* emphasizing that deliberation seeks means to an end, and the *EN* taken to underscore the preferential nature of *prohairesis* as a choice of *this* course of action rather than *that*, and so the comparative aspect of the preceding deliberation. The nominal definitions of "*prohairesis*" that guide Aristotle in his inquiry also seem to diverge, at least if we don't accept Sylburg's conjecture and instead take the MSS of the *Eudemian Ethics* at face value, while preserving the standard analysis of the Nicomachean analysis.

The *EE*, like the *EN*, approaches the inquiry into the nature of *prohairesis* dialectically, by taking what "some say" as its starting point.[13] In the *EE*, decision is said to be one of two things, either belief (*doxa*) or desire (*orexis*). In the *EE*, Aristotle thinks that this view has *something* in its favour, since decision seems to accompany both.[14] However, Aristotle observes that it is neither of these singly. It cannot *simply* be defined as desire, for then it would have to be identical to wish, appetite, or spirit – the three types of desire identified by Plato. And it cannot be spirit or appetite, since these are shared with non-rational animals, and we can make decisions without feeling an appetite or emotion; these are always accompanied by pain, whereas a decision is not. However, it cannot simply be wish (*boulêsis*) either, since we wish for what we know to be impossible, but we do not decide to do what we know to be impossible – to be king of all mankind or immortal, for instance. Nor, in

general, do we decide on things that are possible, but which we do not believe to be up to us to do or not to do. What we decide to do are those things that we believe to be in our own power. If decision is a kind of wish, it's a specific kind of wish.

Does this entail, by elimination, that decision is a kind of belief? Decision is not belief simply speaking, for we have many beliefs about things that are not up to us, for instance that the diagonal is not commensurable with the sides. Further, belief is true or false, but decision is not true or false. It is not even any particular kind of thinking, for instance beliefs that something should or should not be done. What is missing is apparently some desiderative element making us commit to the act.

Aristotle now observes that belief and wish have something in common. Whereas we can have either a belief about an end or a wish for it, no one decides on the end, but rather on what promotes the end (*outheis gar telos ouden prohaireitai, alla to pros to telos*). This is the first appearance of the expression "*to pros to telos*" in the *Eudemian Ethics*. What we decide to do – *to prohaireton* – is what is "towards," *pros*, the end, namely what promotes it, and what promotes the end are some of the actions that we believe are up to us to do or not to do. No one decides to be healthy, but rather to walk about or to sit down *for the sake of* his health (*tou hugiainein heneken*), and no one decides to be happy, but rather to go into commerce or to embark on a venture *for the sake of* being happy (*tou eudaimonein heneka*). "In general," says Aristotle, "one who makes a decision simultaneously makes it clear what he is deciding to do and for the sake of what he decides to do it" (*ti te kai tinos [heneka] prohairetai*). The "for what" (*tinos*) is the thing for whose sake he makes the decision, but the "what" (*to ti*) is the thing he decides to do for the sake of the other, viz., for the sake of the end. This analysis is significant, since it already suggests that a *prohairesis* is a choice of *one thing for the sake of another*, an analysis that Aristotle endorses when he considers the meaning of the term "*prohairesis*" a few lines further on. The *Eudemian Ethics*, then, unlike the *Nicomachean Ethics*, explicitly connects the famous claim, familiar from the *EN*, about deciding on what is "*pros to telos*" to the meaning of *prohairesis*.

Aristotle identifies the end as an object of wish, since wish is primarily (*malista*) about ends; the end is also a subject matter of belief, since the agent believes that he should be healthy or that he should do well. Aristotle concludes that it is clear from these considerations that, though decision in some way involves wish and belief, it is not identical to either of these, for they are primarily (*malista*) concerned with ends, but decision is not. That wish is "*malista*" about the end, and decision "*malista*" about what promotes it, leaves open the possibility that a decision is a kind of wish, as Aristotle later seems to maintain. Without qualification, wish is for the end, just as without qualification, decision is for what promotes the end. With qualification, however, decision is for the end insofar as it is of "this for the sake of that," an act insofar as it promises to promote our end. Conversely, with qualification, wish is for the means, since a decision is a *deliberate* desire for an act that is up to us, where the

desire in question is a wish. By stating that wish is for the end, and decision for what promotes the end, Aristotle identifies their primary objects; he now needs to explain what distinguishes a wish simply speaking from a decision, and how a belief about what we should do differs from a decision.

At this point, Aristotle introduces deliberation (*bouleusis*) into his analysis. Its appearance is abrupt, but since we are looking for a differentia – whatever distinguishes a decision from a mere belief about what we should do or a mere wish – we should expect a new element to be introduced at this stage of the analysis.

Aristotle first considers what deliberation is about – what kinds of things are open to deliberation? There are some things that are capable of being and not being, and among these, some are up to us to do and not to do; these are the objects of deliberation. No one deliberates about the affairs of the Indians, or about squaring the circle, since the former isn't up to *us*, and the latter can't be done by anyone. We deliberate about what is up to us to do and not to do when we need to work out what promotes our end – while doctors can fail either in working out the right course of action or in paying attention to the right way to proceed, scribes can only make mistakes through inattention, since it is evident how to proceed in the application of their craft. Summing up the result of his analysis so far, Aristotle comes closer to pinning down its nature: since decision is neither belief nor wish taken separately (*hôs hekateron*), nor indeed both (*amphô*), since we can form a wish or a belief that we should do something suddenly (*exaiphnês*), while we cannot suddenly decide, it must be a *product* of both (*ex amphoin*), for both are present when a person makes a decision.

In the passage that is my main focus in this chapter, and to which I will return imminently, Aristotle now observes that the *name itself* provides a clue to the nature of decision as a product of wish and belief. A *prohairesis* is a kind of *hairesis*, he says, not simply, but – and here we reach the contested line that Sylburg would not accept – *of one thing for another* ("*heterou pros heteron*") (1226b8). For this is not possible without examination and deliberation. So, he concludes, decision is the product of deliberative belief (it is *ek doxês bouleutikês* 1226b9).

This nominal definition provides Aristotle with the resources he needs to give a real definition of decision at the conclusion of the same paragraph (1226b9–20). The text of this paragraph is unfortunately a complete mess, caused mainly by the lexical similarity between *boulêsis* or *bouleusis* and their cognates, and the confusion to which this similarity gives rise. Although sorting through the apparatus to reconstruct a plausible reading of these lines is a worthy objective, let me simply state Aristotle's conclusion: decision is a deliberate desire for what is up to us. In subsequent paragraphs, starting with "*dio*" at *EE* II 10, 1226b21, Aristotle defends the real definition he has presented by showing that it explains a number of beliefs that we hold, viz., beliefs about the voluntary. Having explained these beliefs in light of his definition of decision, he expands his analysis of deliberation, as being about what is "*pros to*

telos" – we deliberate when we aim to trace our end back to an act that is up to us to do or not to do and that promises to promote that end. What, then, is the end? By nature, the good, but by corruption, and contrary to nature, something that is not good but only apparently good may be the end. This corruption is due to pleasure or pain. These observations allow Aristotle to define virtue at the conclusion of the chapter as a state of character that decides on what is mean relative to us in pleasures and pains (*êthikê hexis prohairetikê mesotêtos tês pros hêmas en hêdesi kai lupêrois*); viz. those pleasures and plains in respect of which a person's enjoyment or distress indicates his character.

6.2 *Prohairesis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

Let us compare the *Eudemian* analysis of decision with its *Nicomachean* counterpart. The *Nicomachean* analysis of *prohairesis* follows a similar trajectory – arguing first that decision is not the same as any particular kind of desire, though it is close to wish, and second that it is not the same as belief, whether in general, or any specific kind of belief. It arrives at a nominal definition of decision via an observation about deliberation, but it offers an analysis of the meaning of the term that seemingly departs from that of the MSS of the *EE*:

> Then what sort of thing, is decision, since it is none of the things mentioned? Well, apparently it is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is decided. Then perhaps what is decided is what has been deliberated (be)for(e) (*to probebouleumenon*). For decision involves reason and thought, and even the name itself would seem to indicate that what is decided [*prohaireton*] is chosen [*haireton*] (be)for(e) [*pro*] other things.
>
> (*EN* III 2, 1112a13–17)

What appears to be missing from the *EN* is the *EE*'s detailed discussion, leading up to the nominal definition, of decision as being of one thing for the sake of another. Although the *EN* also underlines that we wish for the end, but deliberate and decide about what promotes it, this insight is not spelled out with the same kind of specificity that the *EE* offers. The discussion of deliberation and decision that follows the real definition of the *EN* likewise does not offer the explicitly teleological conception of deliberation and decision that we find in the *EE*, though the analysis of the *EN* is, arguably, compatible with the one we encounter in the *EE*. Most scholars have taken the "*pro*" in the *EN*'s nominal definition to have a preferential sense (e.g. Dirlmeier, Woods, Charles), whereas others (Aspasius, Joachim, Gauthier-Jolif, Irwin) take it to have a temporal sense. Those who favour the temporal reading typically claim that this makes better sense of the "*probebouleumenon*," which they claim must mean "previously deliberated." I shall later suggest that a third alternative is possible, and that this third interpretation of "*pro*" has gone unexplored, but I shall leave that to the side for now to focus on the nominal definition in the *Eudemian Ethics*.

Before we look at the textual issues, let me distinguish between three senses of "*prohairesis*" that we have encountered so far:

1. The preferential
2. The temporal
3. The teleological

Of these, the preferential and the temporal are standard interpretations of the "*pro*" in "*prohairesis*" in the *EN*. The teleological is, I have suggested, the only reading available of the "*pros*" in the MSS of the nominal definition in the *EE*, which cannot be taken in a temporal or a preferential sense. If we follow the existing interpretations of the *EN*, it would seem that the *EE* and the *EN* diverge over the meaning of *prohairesis*. Since this, in turn, suggests that the treatises operate with different conceptions of deliberation, either as something that precedes decision, or as the weighing of alternatives, or as inquiry into means to ends, these different nominal definitions also affect our understanding of a decision as an *orexis bouleutikê*. While the temporal reading appears to state the obvious – a decision requires prior deliberation – a point on which both the *EE* and *EN* converge, we might think that it fits in both contexts. However, this cannot be the sense of the *EE* nominal definition if we accept the MSS, and so not Aristotle's reason for employing the compound noun *prohairesis*.

6.3 Textual Issues

It is time to look at the textual issues and Sylburg's conjecture up close. The reading I just gave of the *Eudemian* nominal definition, "*heterou pros heteron*," follows the MSS family descending from L, which Harlfinger dubs the "recensio Constantinopolitana." On this reading, a decision is a kind of choice, not simply speaking, but rather a choice of one thing *for the sake of* another. The other main family of MSS, which Harlfinger calls the "recensio Messanensis," instead offers the ungrammatical reading "*heterou pros heterou*" at 1226b8. This family has Codex Vaticanus 1342 (P in Walzer-Mingay; Pb in Susemihl) and Codex Cantabrigensis 1897 (C in Walzer-Mingay; Cc in Susemihl) as its primary extant members (P and C are "twins," as Barnes notes, copies of the same archetype).

All MSS, including the corrupt ones, agree, however, that the preposition contained in Aristotle's nominal explication of *prohairesis* in the *Eudemian Ethics* is "*pros*," governing the accusative, rather than the preposition we find in the corresponding nominal definition in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *pro*, governing the genitive.

The text actually printed in both the Teubner edition and the OCT is not, however, one that can be found in any MSS, but rather a result of combining parts of the reading in the recensio Messanensis with Sylburg's proposal that "*pros*" should be "*pro*." This yields a line reading "*heterou pro heterou*," which does not appear in any of the 20 extant MSS of the *EE*.

Despite consulting MSS in both families, which as he acknowledges in his apparatus are *unanimous* in printing "*pros*" at 1226b8, Susemihl accepts Sylburg's emendation of "*pros*" to "*pro*." The MSS in the L-family, including Codex Marcianus, all have "*heterou pros heteron*" at 1226b8, which is unassailable on grammatical grounds. The MSS in the recensio Messanensis, on the other hand, all read "*heterou pros heterou*." This makes no sense grammatically, and needs to be amended one way or another – either by replacing "*pros*" with a preposition governing the genitive ("*pro*" does the job), or by emending the last "*heterou*" to "*heteron*." Assuming that the two *heterous* are correct, and preferring P to the grammatically correct Marc., Susemihl accepts Sylburg's proposal. Familiarity with the parallel passage in the *EN* makes this solution seem more attractive than the alternative. However, the existence of the L-family makes the choice indefensible. A scholar considering only the L-family would have no reason to question the line. The existence of an alternate tradition offers only a weak desideratum, since L and its descendants are in much better shape than P and C and its descendants.[15] Even someone working from both families of MSS would have reason to prefer L's reading since it doesn't cause a muddle. We can further explain how the second "*heterou*" made it into the MSS by duplication – the scribe's eyes may have landed twice on the "*heterou*" preceding "*pros*," leading to a classical, if minuscule, dittography. If this is right, the question we should be asking ourselves is not "*utrum in alterum abiturum erat*?"– which of the two readings would have been changed into the other – since the reading of L shows no signs of corruption. Rather, the question is, how did the conjectured archetype MSS of both families end up being corrupted in the recensio Messanensis? I have offered a conjecture of how that may have happened.

Against my explanation, one might object that "*pro*" is correct, and that the corruption to "*pros*" occurred at an earlier stage of transmission, either before the two families parted ways, or in the transition from this conjectured common ancestor to L. If the latter, whoever made L may himself have "corrupted" an archetype common to both main families into a grammatically permissible form. We cannot rule out that the MSS that he copied read "*heterou pro heterou*," and that he added a sigma by mistake, and subsequently changed the last "*heterou*" to "*heteron*" in an effort to smooth over the wrinkle caused by the superfluous sigma. However, such a process of corruption seems harder to explain on the basis of familiar categories of scribal errors. The "s" would have had to appear out of thin air – why would he add it? We would furthermore have to believe that when he noticed that something was amiss with the grammar upon turning to the next word on the line, namely "*heterou*," his impulse would not be to check the accuracy of the preposition that he had just written down, but rather to alter "*heterou*" to "*heteron*" to fit with his mistaken "*pros*." This seems implausible.[16]

Alternatively, if we assume that the MSS were corrupted into reading "*pros*" even before the two families parted ways, we must assume that the two families dealt with the issue caused by the hypothesized corruption in different ways, either by smoothing over, as in the Byzantine tradition following L,

or by changing the last *heteron* to "*heterou*," or by simply letting it all hang out and printing an impossibility, as in the Codex Messanensis descending from P and C. My own view is that, on purely philological grounds, the hypothesis of dittography in the PC family makes more sense than the conjecture of an erroneous sigma creeping into the hyparchetype from which both main families derive or into the L-family. And as we shall see, there are also compelling philosophical reasons deriving from the surrounding argument for thinking that the L-family should be respected, and that Sylburg's conjecture has caused a muddle in the way we interpret Aristotle's theory of decision in the *Eudemian* – and possibly – *Nicomachean Ethics*. In other words, even if there had not been overwhelming evidence in the context of 1226b8 that "*heterou pros heteron*" is the correct reading, we should prefer it because it conforms to principles of sound textual criticism and principles of sound philosophical analysis.

The explanation that I have offered at first made me suspect that Sylburg was commenting on an edition of the *EE* which relied on the P and C family. However, this turned out not to be the case. When I consulted Sylburg's commentary in the Balliol College special collections, it revealed that the Greek text on which Sylburg is commenting, included in his 1587 edition of the *EE*,[17] in fact gives the L-family reading, "*heterou pros heteron*." But in a section titled "Variae lectiones," Sylburg expresses unhappiness with this:

> p. 108, v.I, rectius forsan *heterou pro heterou*: ut significetur *alterius prae altero electio*: sicut scilicet in *Nicomacheis*, 40,13, *prohaireton* dictum tradit *hôs on pro heterôn haireton*. Aretius tamen vulgatam scripturam secutus vertit, *alterius ad alterum*.
>
> (p. 271)

> More correct, possibly, *heterou pro heterou*: so that it means *alterius prae altero electio* (the choice of one thing before another): just as in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 40,13, where the expression *hôs on pro heterôn haireton* renders *prohaireton*. Aretius, notwithstanding, having followed the commonly accepted manuscript, translates *alterius ad alterum* (of one thing for the sake of another).[18]

The entry is, as far as I can tell, not cited by any of the scholars who accept the emendation, though their rationale is likely similar to Sylburg's. Without amending the text, the *EE* will diverge from the *EN*.

Now, Sylburg was no upstart, having studied with Henri Estienne (Stephanus) in Paris. His edition of Aristotle's complete works, which includes an earlier edition of the *EN* and the *Magna Moralia* (*MM*), confirms that he was a dedicated and generally knowledgeable reader of Aristotle. Nevertheless, the principle on which he bases his conjecture seems weak: Sylburg assumes that the *EE* should conform to the sense he has extracted from the parallel passage in the *EN*, where he finds "*pro*," and infers that the sense of "*pro*" must be preferential, so that Aristotle's nominal definition states that a decision is a choice, not simply, but of one thing *in preference to* another. He rejects the

MSS reading adopted by Leonardus Aretius (the renaissance scholar Leonardo Bruni, 1369–1444), who relied on what he calls "the commonly accepted manuscripts." Bruni is one of the most important early Italian humanists; he invented the label *studia humanitatis*, from which "humanist" and "humaniora" derive, in addition to serving as chancellor of Florence. His Latin translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* was widely disseminated; among other works in the corpus, he also edited the *Eudemian Ethics*. The MSS that Sylburg prints and comments on has the very same reading that Aretius relies on from "the commonly accepted manuscripts," so it can't be that Sylburg had access to scripts that supported his conjecture, in which case he would surely have cited them. Sylburg's proposal is based, it seems, solely on his wish to make the *EE* conform to the *EN*, which he had edited a few years before the *EE*.

Once Sylburg's conjecture is incorporated into editions of the *EE*, force of habit seems to have prevented scholars from examining his rationale critically. Consider first the three most recent editions of the text, Fritzsche's *Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia* (Regensburg 1851); Susemihl's Teubner (Leipzig 1884), and Walzer and Mingay's OCT (Oxford 1991). Each prints "*heterou pro heterou*," with exactly the same reference to Sylburg in the apparatus, and the same list of textual variants. Fritzsche, who adds his own Latin translation after the Greek text, renders the phrase "*unius rei prae altera*," "one thing before another."

Modern translators predictably follow suit, as a chronologically ordered selection reveals:

1. Solomon (1915, rev. 1984); transl. based on Susemihl:
   "But we must ask – how compounded out of these? The very name is some indication. For choice is not simply picking but **picking one thing before another**; and this is impossible without consideration and deliberation; therefore choice arises out of deliberative opinion."
2. Rackham's Loeb (1936) prints *heterou pro heterou* without comment:
   "But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term "choice" makes this clear. "Choice" is "taking," but not taking simply – it is **taking one thing in preference to another**; but this cannot be done without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises out of deliberative opinion."
3. Dirlmeier (1962) translates:
   "In gewisser Weise enthüllt dies allein schon der Name. Denn die Entscheidung ist **eine Wahl**, aber nicht in einfachem Sinn, sondern **indem man dem einen vor dem anderen den Vorzug gibt**." He explains that "prohairesis ist wörtlich 'die vorzuggebende Wahl'" (note ad 1226b6, p. 294), or as English translators sometimes say, "preferential choice."
4. Woods' (1992) translation again follows Sylburg, though his choice of terms is perhaps more careful than that of his Anglophone forebears. "To some extent the word 'choice' itself shows us: Choice (*prohairesis*) is a

taking (*hairesis*), but not without qualification – **a taking of one thing before (pro) another**; that is not possible without examination and deliberation." In his commentary *ad loc*, Woods offers the following justification for his translation:

"The Greek word here translated choice (*prohairesis*), and the corresponding verb, have the form of a compound of a word meaning "taking" with a preposition meaning "before"; the latter may have a purely temporal sense or it may have the force of "in preference to" (cf. English "I'd sooner do A than B") (…) The same etymological observations occurs also at E.N. 1112a16–17, where Gauthier and Jolif, following Aspasius and Joachim, hold that the preposition has a temporal sense; i.e., the object of choice is that which comes first in the sequence leading to the end. But it seems clear that the prefix has the other sense in this passage, and the same is indisputably true at *MM* 1189a12–16 (which may be held to be decisive against Gauthier and Jolif's reading of the E.N. passage: in *MM* there is reference to choosing the better *instead* of the worse) (…)."

Woods' argument for thinking that the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* passages coincide is, alas, circular. Now that we know not just that the "*pro*" is Sylburg's conjecture, but also that it rests solely on his assumption that the *EE* must mirror the *EN*, it is trivially true that "the same etymological observation also occurs in the *EN*." Woods' argument against the temporal reading of the "*pro*" further assumes that all *three* Aristotelian *Ethics* must agree on the meaning of "*prohairesis*," and that the parallel passage in the *MM* offers a nominal definition that can only be taken in the preferential sense. This is just more of the same – unwarranted assumptions about the unanimity of Aristotle's three ethical treatises. Even those of us inclined to hold that the *MM* in substance, if not in form, is a treatise by Aristotle, should resist the pernicious temptation to efface all doctrinal discrepancies so that they come out saying the same thing. Doctoring the text simply won't help, if the surrounding argument pulls in different directions. Instead, we should at least allow the possibility that Aristotle's thinking about *prohairesis* evolved, and that subtle differences between the analyses in the three *Ethics* need to be acknowledged, and, if possible explained, in a way that does not regiment all differences until all three treatises serve up the same muddled porridge. The possibility that Aristotle's thought evolved should at least be kept a live option.

Two recent translations[19] of all eight books of the *EE* unfortunately show little improvement on this score.

5. In Inwood and Wolf's translation for *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*, the line is rendered as follows:
"But in a way the term gives us an indication. Decision is choice, not unqualifiedly so, but **of one thing in preference to another**." They then add a note, explaining that "Decision (*prohairesis*) is a compound of *pro* (in preference to, before) and *hairesis* ('choice')" (p. 35).

6. Anthony Kenny likewise offers a translation that is in equal parts lofty and odd:
   "Its very name already tells us something. **Choice is a matter of picking** – not random picking, **but picking one thing in preference to another**, and this is not possible without examination and deliberation."

Notice the awkwardness with which Kenny renders "*hairesis*" "picking" and "*prohairesis*" "choosing." The contrast between picking and choosing, first employed by Solomon, has no counterpart in Aristotle's text. On the contrary, making a choice of lives – *hairesis tou biou* – is in the *Eudemian Ethics* described as the most important choice we can make, since it sets us on the right or wrong path, depending on the nature of the end that we pursue. That Heracles at the crossroads should be "picking" the life of virtue, and that a *prohairesis* by contrast is an existential, weighty choice, is pure invention – whatever it entails, Aristotle's distinction between a *hairesis* and a *prohairesis* cannot be captured by this modern pair of contrasts. In his comments, Kenny thinks it is obvious that *prohairesis*

> is a very solemn kind of choice, made after deliberation, and on the basis of a thought-out plan of life. Carrying out a monastic vow or a New Year's resolution seems to be the closest thing in modern life to making an Aristotelian choice.
>
> (p. 159)

Even if we agree that a *prohairesis* is a solemn kind of choice, it doesn't follow that a *hairesis* is the opposite, especially since a *prohairesis* by Aristotle's explanation in the *EE* is a kind of *hairesis*. The picking and choosing meme, which appears to originate with Solomon, has not improved with age. The translation is as dissonant now as it was when it was first voiced a century ago.

If instead of importing assumptions from the *EN*, we look at Aristotle's definition in context, we will see that he anticipates this analysis of the relationship between *hairesis* and *prohairesis* already in book I. In the discussion of ultimate ends and the choice of lives in *EE* 1214a32; 1215b17; 21; 30; 35; 1216a13; 15; 21, Aristotle systematically relates one's *hairesis* to the adoption of an end. The *EN* likewise opens with a discussion of what end is most choiceworthy (1094a15; also 1097a26 and following). In discussing the completeness of different ends, Aristotle systematically uses *hairesis* without *pro*. It seems, then, that whereas a *hairesis* is of the end, a *prohairesis* is of the means for the sake of this end. If this is right, we can make two related points. First, Aristotle thinks of a *hairesis* as a kind of *boulêsis*, but not just any *boulêsis* – it is rather a commitment to an end as good that lays it down as a target to be aimed at. The actions we do for the sake of this end are objects of *prohairesis*. Primarily, a *prohairesis* is of the means, but since we only act on decision when we commit to an end as good, our decision will also reflect the kind of life we take to be worth living. This is not simply a life devoted to the procurement of necessities – as the *EE*

sternly observes, no one would choose to be alive rather than dead if all their activities were, in the words of the *Politics*, for the sake of living, rather than living well.

The Eudemian explication of the meaning of *prohairesis* highlights this relationship: a decision is a choice of one thing (an act) for the sake of another (an end), and this is what I have called the teleological conception of decision. The further discussion of deliberation that follows the real definition of *prohairesis* confirms that Aristotle thinks of deliberation as a search for a cause, namely the cause of the end that we want.

> The deliberative part of the soul is the part that recognizes a particular kind of cause, for a purpose is one kind of cause, since a cause is the reason why something obtains (…) that is why those who have no fixed aim do not go in for deliberation.
>
> (*EE* II 10, 1226b25–29)

The end that is kept fixed in deliberation functions like a *hupothesis* in the sciences – we reason from it, but not to it (*EE* II 10, 1227a8), since we need to deliberate with an end in mind: "A man who deliberates, once he has taken a survey from the point of view of the end, deliberates about what conduces to bring it within his reach, or what he himself can do towards the end" (1227a14–17). Aristotle's claims about the fixity of the end, and his repeated insistence that we do not deliberate about the end, but rather about what promotes it, need to be handled with care, however. Although the end itself must be fixed like a hypothesis in order for deliberation to be possible, this is just the end "*haplôs*," or without qualification, as Aristotle puts it in the *EE* – it does not preclude thinking about the end "*kata meros*." The distinction between an end "*haplôs*" and an end "*kata meros*" corresponds to the differences between a general and a more specific conception of the end. Notwithstanding his view that the end for the purposes of any particular piece of deliberation is fixed, Aristotle thinks we make the end more specific by means of inquiry. He even calls this type of inquiry deliberation "*kata meros*":

> The end is by nature always a good, and one about which people deliberate in particular (*kata meros*), as a doctor may deliberate whether he is to give a drug, or a general where he is to pitch his camp. For them there is a good, an end, which is the thing that is best in the abstract (*haplôs*).
>
> (*EE* II 10, 1227a18–21)

In the sphere of human activity, the "unhypothetical first principle" is living well, or *eudaimonia*, construed in the most formal way. But at any point beneath it, an end may be held fixed as a starting point for deliberation or may be considered a means to living well, by being part of it. In the latter role, it is subject to inquiry. That Aristotle allows for inquiry about ends is already

evident from the discussion of the nature of happiness and its preconditions in *EE* I 2. He here takes a new tack in his inquiry:

> Having acknowledged about these things that anyone capable of living in accordance with his own decision (*zên kata tên hautou prohairesin*) sets up[20] some target for fine living (*thesthai tina skopon tou kalôs zên*), whether honor or reputation or wealth or culture, with a view to which he will carry out all his actions (as not having one's life organized towards (*pros*) some end (*ti telos*) is a sign of great folly (*aphrosunês pollês*)), above all he must first determine in himself, neither impetuously nor hurriedly, in which of human affairs living well resides, and what are the necessary conditions for humans to possess it. For a healthy life is not the same as the necessary conditions for healthy living.
>
> (*EE* I 2, 1214b6–15)

Everyone capable of living in accordance with his own decision does set up such a target. That is the import of saying that by nature, what is desired is the good. This good, which is always given some specification, whether hurriedly or through the careful consideration that Aristotle recommends, is the target at which people aim in all their actions (*praxeis*). If the target is wrong, the actions that we choose for its sake will also be wrong, and it is our task to ensure that we have specified the components of living well correctly, and that we do not confuse these components with merely necessary conditions for living well – things without which the best life won't be possible, but the possession of which will not make us happy unless we use them well. It is in this light that we must understand Aristotle's remarks in the coda to *EE* II 10. Having presented his definition of virtue as a state that decides, he now asks in *EE* II 11 whether virtue makes the target correct or the things that promote it. He responds that virtue makes the target correct, since this is not the result of deliberation or reasoning, and the target must be hypothesized as a starting point (1227b25). Just as a doctor does not inquire (*skopei*) about whether one ought to be healthy or not, but about whether one ought to take a walk or not, and a trainer does not inquire whether one ought to be fit or not, but whether one should take up wrestling or not (1227b25–28), no discipline in general inquires about its end (*telos*), but rather about what promotes it. The end is the starting point of thought, and the conclusion of thought is the starting point of actions. Virtue, then, is what ensures that we aim at the right end, but aiming at the right end requires careful thought, of the kind that Aristotle engages in when he examines the nature of living well.

6.4 Questions and Proposals

We can now revisit the question posed at the start about the relationship between the nominal definitions of *prohairesis* in the *EE* and the *EN* and what they tell us about Aristotle's conceptions of deliberation and practical reasoning.

Is the *Nicomachean* analysis of decision in tension with that of the *EE*, or can the two accounts, despite their differences, be interpreted in the same way? Restoring the MSS of the *EE* precludes the temporal and preferential readings of "*prohairesis*," at least as far as the meaning of the term is concerned. If we deny that "*pro*" in the *EN* nominal definition can be read in the teleological sense, we should conclude that Aristotle changed his mind.

While Liddell and Scott's dictionary does not highlight a teleological sense of "*pro*," it is evident that Aristotle sometimes uses the preposition to mean "for the sake of."

Consider Aristotle's discussion of natural slaves as a type of servant in *Politics* I 4. Aristotle defines a slave as a sort of animate tool, and remarks that every servant is a "tool *pro* other tools" (*kai hôsper organon pro organôn pas hupêretês*) (*Pol.* I 4, 1253b32–33). Some translators take "*pro*" to mean "before" in some vague temporal sense. But the real meaning must be "for the sake of": a servant is a "tool for the sake of tools" because the servant uses inanimate tools in his activities. Had tools been able to complete their work themselves, like the statues of Daedalus – ancient self-moving puppets – we should not have any use of servants. Alas, the shuttle does not move automatically, and a plectrum does not strike the chords of a lyre by itself. The master craftsman needs servants to carry out the work since only a servant can put inanimate tools to use. Jowett captures the sense well when he renders "*pro*" "for," as does Reeve when he renders it "tools for using tools" (*Aristotle: Pol.* 6).[21] Irwin and Fine translate "a tool prior to <other> tools," but then explain in a note that a slave is needed *in order to* use the other tools (my emphasis).[22]

This suggests that the prepositions "*pros*" and "*pro*" have overlapping senses: they can both mean "for the sake of," and we need to expand the list of senses of "*pro*" distinguished in the literature. To the temporal and preferential senses, we should add a third, similar to that of "*pro*" in Latin expressions like "*pro bono*" and "*pro forma*." This sense is omitted from Liddell and Scott's dictionary, but included in other accounts of Greek prepositions, such as Gessner Harrison's Victorian grammar *A Treatise on the Greek Prepositions and on the Cases of Nouns with which These are Used* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1858).

From the entry on *pro*:

> In some examples *pro* with the genitive case expresses the ground or the motive of an action. The object introduced by *pro* is that "in view of" which or "looking to" which, the action is performed, and so is regarded as its ground or motive. And, again, it is obvious that the notion of "looking to", or "having in view", is to be referred immediately to the primary sense of "before", "in front of", belonging to *pro* (…)

From the entry on *pros*:

> *Pros* is only an augmented form of *pro*. Just as *eis* (*ens*) is a fuller form of *en*, and as *ouk* is of *ou*, and has the same root with the Latin *pro* and *prae*, with

> the English *for* and *fore*, seen in forehead, forecast, and *fro*, a transposed form of *for*, seen in froward. The radical *fir* in fir-st is only another from of *for*, as *pri* in pri-or and pri-mus is of *pro* and *prae*. Whether the s at the end of *pros* is inflectional, or merely formative, may admit of question.

That Aristotle uses "*pro*" and "*pros*" in the same sense is also evident at other points: he sometimes says that an inquiry is "*pros to ergon*" and sometimes that it is "*pro ergou*."[23] In light of this, three strategies for dealing with the apparent discrepancy between the *EE* and the *EN* nominal definitions present themselves. We can (i) emend the text of the *EE* so that it coheres with that of the *EN* – the strategy first proposed by Sylburg. This opens the *EE* nominal definition to temporal and preferential readings, of which the preferential seems to fit Aristotle's claims better than the temporal in context. Alternatively, we can (ii) maintain that nominal definitions of *prohairesis* in the *EE* and the *EN* are indeed different – perhaps even incompatible – and seek to explain this fact, for instance as reflecting the development of Aristotle's thought. Finally, we can (iii) accept that the nominal definitions differ lexically, but argue that they overlap in sense. They would overlap in sense if the "*pros*" in the *EE* is equivalent to the "*pro*" in the *EN*, insofar as both are teleological, or they could overlap because Aristotle does not privilege any of the three senses of "*pro*" in the *EN*, but instead wants us to hear all of them, including, but not restricted to, the teleological. If we prefer (iii), the seeming disparity in the nominal definitions comes down to a difference in emphasis rather than a substantial difference or change of mind.

The first and third approaches are conciliatory as far as doctrine is concerned, but only the second and third acknowledge what I take to be an indisputable fact: that Sylburg's emendation corrupts the text of the *EE*.

In principle, we could, of course, also attempt to emend the MSS of the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that it corresponds to the *EE*; this would simply be the reverse strategy of Sylburg's (i). This would be radical and inadvisable. Meddling with the manuscripts simply to preserve some preconceived assumption that the two treatises must cohere, not just in spirit, but also in the letter of their definitions, is unjustified and distorting. More fundamentally, the MSS of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are in much better shape than those of the *EE*, so even if the *EE* requires frequent editorial intervention, this "reverse" strategy of (i) is not a live option.

My own preference is for a version of (iii). Although I cannot defend my reasons for preferring (iii) in this chapter, the discrepancy between the two nominal definitions may in fact be less consequential than one might be inclined to think in light of existing interpretations of the *Nicomachean* theory of decision. For whereas modern scholars have asked us to choose between a preferential and a temporal reading of "*pro*," I have argued that the preposition, just as its Latin counterpart, can have a teleological sense. Perhaps, then, the distance between the *EE* and the *EN* on this score is not unbridgeable, and we should use the *EE* MSS to shed light on the meaning of the nominal definition in the *EN*, travelling in the opposite direction of Sylburg. This does

not require that we take the *EN* explication of the word to preclude other senses than the teleological. Aristotle may have wished to draw attention to several aspects of *prohairesis* at once in the *EN*, unlike in the *EE*, where the sense of the MSS must be teleological. The explication at *EN* III 2 lends itself to multiple readings, as my tentative translation reveals ("perhaps what is decided is what has been deliberated (be)for(e) (*to probebouleumenon*). For decision involves reason and thought, and even the name itself would seem to indicate that what is decided [*prohaireton*] is chosen [*haireton*] (be)for(e) [pro] other things" [*EN* III 2, 1112a13–17]). The surrounding argument does not tell decisively against any of them.

Whichever way we cut it, the questions raised by the MSS of the *EE* and Sylburg's emendation show that we should pause before translating Aristotle's notion "*prohairesis*" with terms that already decide the issue between the preferential, temporal, and teleological readings of "*pro*." The proposals "purposive choice" and "preferential choice" already highlight one of the three senses while precluding other readings, which is unfortunate (especially if the *EE* and the *EN* diverge in their understanding of the term – the *EE* defending the teleological reading captured by "purposive choice" and the *EN* the reading captured by "preferential choice"). If we render "*prohairesis*" "deliberate choice" we will build into the very term some of the points Aristotle takes pains to state in the course of his inquiry, making them analytically rather than synthetically true. "Purposive choice" seems to capture what Aristotle takes *prohairesis* to be in the *EE*, but this reflects his real definition of decision as much as his nominal definition of the term, which simply motivates his analysis. My own sense is that the *Nicomachean Ethics*, too, albeit less explicitly, sees a decision as a choice of an act for the sake of an end, where the end is the object of wish and the act is discovered through deliberation with a view to the end. A decision seems to be primarily a choice of "this for the sake of that," and a preferential choice only to the extent that we need to determine which of two courses of action promote the end best.[24] To fully defend that contention, however, is a task for another day.

Notes

1 A version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Southern Association of Ancient Philosophy in Cambridge in September 2016. My chair, Gabor Betegh, as well as Christopher Rowe, Catherine Rowett and David Sedley deserve special thanks for their challenging questions. In thinking about the Eudemian Ethics, I have benefited from many illuminating conversations with Terry Irwin, and especially during a graduate seminar on Aristotle's Three Ethics that we gave in Oxford in Trinity Term of 2014. I presented an early version of this paper at a conference at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin in 2016, and a paper on a related topic at the conference organised by Giulio Di Basilio at Trinity College Dublin in 2018. I wish to thank him for taking the initiative to publish this volume, and the participants for helpful discussion. Lesley Brown and Gail Fine offered characteristically insightful comments as my argument evolved.

2 As late as 1884, Susemihl printed [Aristotelis *Ethica Eudemia*] "Eudemi Rhodii *Ethica*" on the cover of the Teubner edition, agreeing with Schleiermacher, 1835 and Spengel, 1841 that it was inauthentic, possibly written by Aristotle's pupil Eudemus of Rhodes.

(Schleiermacher idiosyncratically held that the *Magna Moralia* was the only authentic Aristotelian treatise on ethics, but this view never caught on). In the early 20th century, Jaeger, 1923, turned scholarly opinion around, and since then, the designation "*Eudemus*" has gone out of style.

3 Harlfinger, 1971, p. 3.

4 Barnes, 1992, p. 18.

5 See also A. Kenny's cautious remarks in the preface to his new translation of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Kenny, 2011, p. xxix.

6 Kenny, 1978.

7 Translations of the *EN* follow Irwin, 1999. My translations from the *EE* are based on Kenny, 2011, with multiple changes that I won't flag as such.

8 "Choice," W. D. Ross (rev.) Urmson, *Aristotle* Nicomachean Ethics (in Barnes, 1984); "Commitment," Chamberlain, 1984; "Rational choice," Broadie, 1991, p. 78; "Deliberate choice," Sorabji, 1980; "Purposive choice," Kenny, 1979, p. 69; "Preferential choice," David Charles in a series of books and papers; "Decision," Terry Irwin, *Aristotle* Nicomachean Ethics 2nd ed. and 3rd ed. and a series of articles; "Election," Irwin, 2007.

9 Explicating translations like "rational choice" and "deliberate choice" moot observations Aristotle makes about *prohairesis* in the course of his inquiry, making his claims analytically true, which they are not in the original Greek. While capturing the goal-directed nature of *prohairesis*, "purpose" does not work well when Aristotle refers to decision as the efficient cause of action. We need an English term that covers all usages equally well, and that does not pre-empt Aristotle's analysis.

10 Sylburg studied under Henri Estienne (Stephanus) in Paris, and contributed to his *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* (1572). As an editor for the publisher Johann Wechel in Frankfurt (1583–1591), Sylburg corrected many Greek manuscripts, including all of Aristotle (1584–1587). He later became librarian in Heidelberg.

11 As well as by Bekker, 1831 and Fritzsche, 1851, prior to Susemihl, and Rackham, 1936 after him.

12 In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle makes multiple remarks about decision before the topical analysis of *EN* III 2–3, including in the discussion of the voluntary in *EN* III 1, where he defines vice as "ignorance in the decision," namely ignorance about good and bad. He does not, however, seek to determine whether the voluntary could be the same as decision, as he does in the *EE*, but rather takes it for granted that they differ.

13 This dialectical approach reveals that *prohairesis* was discussed by philosophers prior to Aristotle; as *EE* II 11, 1227b14 also makes clear (see also *EN* III 2, 1111b12: "those who say", 1112a1: "now presumably no one even claims that decision is the same as belief in general"). Although Aristotle's treatment of decision in his ethics is the first systematic analysis that has survived, Xenophon uses the verb *prohaireisthai* in explicating Socrates' position (and especially his denial of the possibility of *akrasia*) in the *Memorabilia* (e.g. at *Mem*. 2.7.10; 3.9.4; 4.5.7; and 4.8.11), though without regimenting it into a technical term. Plato uses the noun only once, at *Parmenides* 143c3; he occasionally uses the verb *prohaireisthai*, but only in a technical (and non-ethical) sense, to describe a stage in the method of division (*diairesis*), e.g. at *Sophist* 251e1; 255e1; *Statesman* 257c1; 279b5; *Parmenides* 136c3. I take Aristotle's dialectical approach to refute Danielle Allen's claim that Aristotle single-handedly introduced *prohairesis* into the philosophical lexicon. See Allen, 2006, p. 184. The many uses of the term in the Attic orators from the 350s and onwards was probably part of Aristotle's inspiration, rather than an effect of Aristotle's use of the term in his public lectures on rhetoric.

14 Contrast this with the more dismissive assessment at *EN* III 2, 1111b12–14: "Those who say decision is appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief would seem to be wrong."

15 Harlfinger writes: "Fest steht, daß Susemihls Beurteilung von P und C als codices optimi nicht aufrecht zu erhalten ist; wenn wir schon mit solchen Werturteilen arbeiten wollen, dann würde wohl eher der Kodex L – obwohl anderthalb Jahrhunderte jünger – dieses Prädikat verdienen" (p. 28).

16 I am grateful to Christopher Shields and Terry Irwin for helpful discussion on these points. Neither one of them should be presumed to share my views.

17 [Aristotelous Ēthikōn megalōn biblion 2 ...] = Aristotelis Ethicorum magnoru[m] libri 2. Ethicoru[m] Eudemiorum l. 7. De virtutibus & vitijs l. 1. Theophrasti characteres ethici. Alexandri Aphrodis. quod virtus non sufficiat ad beatitudinem. Francofurti: Apud heredes Andreae Wecheli.

18 Sylburg's references are to the text as printed in the edition in which his comments appear. It antedates Bekker's edition by two and a half centuries, and so uses its own numbering (rather than the Bekker numbers familiar to us). Anyone who has tried to work with older editions will appreciate the benefits of the Bekker convention.

19 I have not consulted a third, Simpson, 2013. See C. Rowe's review of all three, Rowe, 2015.

20 Walzer and Mingay print a comma after *epistêsantas*, and then obelize "*thesthai*," even though it's the unanimous reading in the MSS. "*Dei thesthai*" is a scholion from the margins of the Codex Vaticanus (P) added by someone needlessly worried about the grammar. See Barnes' apt observations, Barnes, 1992, p. 29.

21 Joseph Karbowski ends up in confusion while commenting on the passage in Karbowski (2013). In footnote 33, Karbowski remarks: "Reeve's translation 'tools for using tools' (*Aristotle: Politics*, 6) is not inaccurate, but it does not vividly convey the special status among tools slaves have suggested by the '*pro*' language; cf. *PA* IV.10, 687a19. For this reason I prefer Brunt's suggestion of 'before' for '*pro*'; see Brunt, *Greek History*, 387." The reasoning here is not clear to me. Later, Karbowski takes the "*pro*" to merit talk of the slave as a "second-order tool." To further complicate matters, Karbowski gives two divergent translations of the same line in short order on the same page. Just above the quoted passage he has offered: "So a piece of property is a tool for maintaining life; property in general is the sum of such tools; a slave is a kind of [*ti*] animate piece of property; and every assistant is like a tool beyond [*pro*] tools. (*Pol*. I.4, 1253b23–33)."

22 Fine, Irwin, 1995.

23 For instance, "*pro ergou*" ("contributing to the task"), at *EE* 1215a8; 1220a22; also *EN* 1113b28 ("*ouden pro ergou*" means "pointless"). He uses "*pros to ergon*" in the same sense at *EE* 1242a16 and *EN* 1098a31. In MSS of Plato's *Meno*, scribes frequently diverge on whether *pro* and *pros* is correct, for instance:

- 74B3 *probibasai* W F (advance, go forward)/*prosbibasai* B T (liken, convince, "bring something/someone over to").
- 75d6 *proshomologêi* BTW/*proshômologei* F/*prohomologêi* Gedike.

This shows that scribes are frequently confounded by these prepositions, and that in some cases, though not all, their choices affect the meaning of the passage. I am grateful to Lesley Brown for drawing this to my attention.

24 See my analysis in Nielsen, 2011, 2018.

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7 Justice in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*

Mi-Kyoung Lee

7.1 Introduction

Aristotle's two treatises on ethics, *Nicomachean* (*EN*) and *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*), have three books in common (*EN* books V–VII = *EE* books IV–VI), the so-called "common books," one of which is a book on justice (*EN* book V = *EE* book IV).[1] Aristotle's treatment of justice is the most detailed treatment of any of the virtues in either the *EN* or the *EE*. At the same time, it is less polished than the treatment of the other virtues in the undisputed books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Eudemian Ethics* and shows signs of editorial compilation.[2] It is also the only treatment of a moral virtue common to the *EN* and the *EE*; for the others, the *EN* and the *EE* have independent treatments. The book on justice is commonly read as part of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and only rarely considered in the context of the *Eudemian Ethics*. In this chapter, I will consider the book on justice in the context of both *Ethics*, and will consider what the *Eudemian Ethics* says about justice if we read it with the common book on justice.

The question of which treatise the common books belong to is difficult. The traditional view is that they belong to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the later, and more mature work.[3] But in 1978, Anthony Kenny argued, on the basis of stylometric analysis, that (i) the common books have more stylistic affinities with the *Eudemian Ethics*, and furthermore, that (ii) the *Eudemian Ethics* is the later and more mature work.[4] Kenny's evidence for Claim (i) has attracted some consensus that the common books originated in the *Eudemian Ethics*, whereas Claim (ii) has not. For it is compatible with Claim (i) that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the later, more mature work; the common books may have been works in progress first written at the same time as the *EE* but revised for inclusion in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Recently, Oliver Primavesi has offered evidence that runs counter to Claim (i); he argues that the common books were originally part of the manuscript of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that they were only later added by editors to the undisputed books of the *Eudemian Ethics* (I–III, VII–VIII) to fill a gap. Primavesi's evidence is based on the book numbers in the manuscripts and catalogues for the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*; they present strong

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though indirect evidence that the common books were in the manuscripts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as they were assembled after Aristotle died, not in the manuscripts of the *Eudemian Ethics* when that work was catalogued by editors in the Hellenistic period.[5] As Dorothea Frede rightly points out, this does not settle any questions about the order in which Aristotle wrote his ethical treatises – and thus any questions about which treatise the common books belong to must depend not only on stylometric and historical evidence, but also on focused studies concerning the similarities and divergences in doctrine between the common books and the undisputed *EE* and *EN*. Frede has accordingly put forward considerations in support of the thesis that the common books (*CB* V–VII) fit doctrinally better into the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and are inconsistent on important philosophical points with the *Eudemian Ethics*. In this chapter, I will offer additional support to Frede's line of argument concerning the common book on justice by considering in more detail and with additional evidence what the *Eudemian Ethics* together with the common books have to say about justice. For reasons of space, I cannot do a complete three-way comparison of *CB* V, the *EE*, and the *EN* on justice, though I will regularly bring in the *EN* when it helps to illuminate the way *CB* V fits or fails to fit with the *EE*.

As I will argue, the undisputed books of the *EE* are ignorant of many important ideas in the common book on justice. In the *EE*, Aristotle never alludes to his distinction between two kinds of justice, and it is often unclear whether he has in mind general or particular justice. He does not call justice "complete virtue" as he does in the common book on justice, and bestows that epithet upon *kalokagathia* "nobility-and-goodness" (*EE* VIII 3). In *EE* VII, he seems to be unaware of his solution in the common book on justice to the problem of whether injustice to the self is possible. He is also inclined to analyze justice as a mean between taking too much and taking too little; he has not yet come to recognize the objection that taking too little is not a sign of a defective disposition of which greed is the excess. However, the treatment in *CB* V 8 of voluntariness in just and unjust actions is on several points closer to the *EE* than to the *EN*.

7.2 Five Theses about Justice in *CB* V

I will proceed by listing (without much argument)[6] five major arguments that Aristotle puts forward about justice in *CB* V, and I then consider whether the undisputed books of the *EE* are consistent with or whether they diverge from those points.

7.2.1 Thesis 1: The virtue **dikaiosunê** *"justice" is a disposition to do what is just (***to dikaion***) and to do just actions (***dikaiopragein***)*

In the opening lines of the common book on justice, Aristotle announces that

> We see that all men mean by justice [δικαιοσύνην] that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just [ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ] and makes them act justly [ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι] and wish for what is just [βούλονται τὰ δίκαια].
>
> (*CB* V 1, 1129a6–9)[7]

The point of this is sometimes obscured in translation, because of the ambiguity of the English term "justice," which can refer to the personal virtue ("he is a just and righteous man") or the abstract quality of justice (e.g. John Rawls' two principles of distributive justice).[8] However, the difference is clearer in the Greek terms: the abstract nouns *to dikaion* "the just" and *to adikon* "the unjust" (which are formed from the adjective *dikaios*, *-a*, *-on* "just" "right" and its opposite *adikos*, *adikon* "unjust" "wrong") are distinct from the virtue terms *dikaiosunê* and *adikia*.[9] *To dikaion* and *to adikon* refer to objects of just or unjust action: states of affair, distributions, allocations, or exchanges which are "just" or "unjust," "fair" or "unfair." By contrast, *dikaiosunê* and *adikia* and the personal adjectives *dikaios* and *adikos* are virtue terms belonging to persons (and by extension to a *polis*), characterizing them as being "just" or "unjust." When, for example, Rawls defines justice he is not talking about the personal virtue, but justice "as the first virtue of institutions, as truth is of systems of thought" (Rawls, 1999, p. 3). Thus, far from being trivial or circular, the claim that *dikaiosunê* is the disposition to "do what is just" (and the corresponding claim that *adikia* is the disposition to "do what is unjust") connects two concepts, that of the virtue term *dikaiosunê* and the moral term "*to dikaion*," and shows that Aristotle recognizes that the notion of a fair or just outcome is prior to that of a fair or just person. This sets the terms of his project: to explain what *to dikaion* and *to adikon* are (to set out his "principles of justice," so to speak), and then to define the virtue terms *dikaiosunê* and *adikia* (the "good of persons" as Rawls puts it)[10] in terms of those concepts. This is exactly what he goes on to do: in *CB* V 1–5 he offers definitions of *to dikaion*, and then defines (in *CB* V 5) the concepts of just action and just character in terms of it.

In *CB* V 6 and 8, Aristotle makes the thesis more precise by distinguishing the following:

(i) Doing what is just (*to dikaion*)
(ii) Just action (*dikaiopragein*)[11]
(iii) Just action that speaks of a just character (*dikaiosunê*)[12]

Category (i) consists of performing some action type, such as obeying a law or correctly making a just distribution. But merely conforming to the law or bringing about a just distribution is not sufficient for acting justly (category [ii]), since one can obviously obey or disobey a law *kata sumbebêkos*, i.e. by accident, or unknowingly produce an unjust distribution. Just actions in category (ii) must be done knowingly and voluntarily. (I will return to this in Section 7.3.) To do a just act voluntarily in sense (ii) however is not the same

as (iii) just action that speaks of a just character; for that, Aristotle says that one must act from *prohairesis* or "choice." These distinctions capture the idea that merely complying with the law is easy but acting in a way that shows good character is more difficult.

This internal structure is unique to justice; for no other virtue does Aristotle make a threefold distinction corresponding to his distinction between justice as a state of affairs (*to dikaion*), justice in actions (*dikaiopragein*), and justice in character (*dikaiosunê*). Aristotle does not attempt to define courage (for example) in terms of doing what is courageous (*ta andreia*) or courageous action (*andreiopragia*?), or define *sôphrosynê* in terms of doing what is temperate (*ta sôphrona*).[13] The reasons for this include, first, the fact that *to dikaion* and *ta dikaia* were common in everyday language, while the corresponding adjectives were not so used in the case of the other virtues; second, justice alone cannot be defined purely in terms of a state of the soul (e.g. passions, appetites, emotions), but has to be defined in terms of an agent's intended object, and whether the agent correctly aims at what is just. One cannot know what the virtue *dikaiosunê* is without knowing what it is for an action or state of affairs to be *dikaion*; doing what is just and avoiding what is unjust are requirements for being just and unjust in character, respectively.[14] This, in turn, implies that the just person acts on reasons and that those reasons involve a correct evaluation of what things are worth, what people deserve, and what they are owed. By saying that the just *person* is one who does just actions, or brings about just states of affair, Aristotle makes it essential to being a just person that one possess the intention to do what is just – the just person doesn't do just actions unknowingly or by accident. Justice is not a matter of feelings or (mere) desires – one must have an awareness of something as being the just thing to do, and hence one must have a rational intention to do it, in order to qualify as being a just person. This is, of course, a consequence of the central role that practical reason and deliberation play in Aristotle's theory of virtue; justice, more than any other moral virtue, requires practical reason and deliberative awareness of what is just and morally valuable.

In the undisputed books of the *EE*, however, Aristotle nowhere acknowledges this distinction between the virtue of justice which is a disposition, and just actions and states of affairs.[15] Indeed, the *EE* says very little about *dikaiosunê* as a virtue. The term appears 15 times in the undisputed books, mostly to serve as an example of a virtue, not as an object of analysis. Notably, in his list of virtues in *EN* II 7, Aristotle lists the virtue *dikaiosunê*, whereas in the *Eudemian Ethics* he lists the term *dikaion* (*EE* II 3, 1221a4). This is the only virtue in the *EE* list for which he lists the abstract noun (or neuter adjective), and not the virtue term – without any explanation or apology. One might argue that his reason for listing the abstract noun *dikaion* instead of the virtue term *dikaiosunê* is because the former, not the latter, is a mean, and that he is here, already, registering his awareness that justice is anomalous. But then he does not clearly say so – and later in the chapter he explains the triad *kerdos–zêmia–dikaion* by naming the two associated vices as being profit-seeking (κερδαλέος) and

loss-seeking (ζημιώδης) (*EE* II 3, 1221a23) – and not, as he holds in the common book on justice, the one opposite for *to dikaion*, namely, *to adikon*. In this respect, the *EN* list looks more thought through than the *EE* list. I will mention other problems with this triad below.[16]

7.2.2 *Thesis 2: The justice terms are not univocal; there are two ways that something can be said to be just (***dikaion***) and correspondingly two kinds of justice (***dikaiosunê***)*

The first type of justice has to do with what is required by the law: what is just is what is legal, and what is unjust is what is contrary to the law (*CB* V 1, 1129a32–1129b1, 1129b11–1130a13). Unjust actions are those which violate laws in our community that prevent us from doing harm to each other, such as theft, murder, fraud, rape, violent attack; these action types are "unjust" in the sense of being criminal and illegal. To be a just person in this sense is to be law-abiding and conform to moral and legal norms; to be unjust is to violate those norms. The second type of justice has to do with equality: what is just is fair or equal, and what is unjust is unfair or unequal (*CB* V 1, 1129b1–11, V 2, 1130a14–1130b5). The paradigm example of this type of injustice is an unfair or unequal division of some shared good. Someone who is just in this sense is "fair-minded," aiming at, or respecting, fair distributions, allocations, or determinations between people, such as a fair and equitable judge. The two types of justice are usually labelled "general" and "particular," because Aristotle describes them in terms of whole and part, so that general justice is the genus of "virtue" and particular justice is one species of virtue among many.[17]

The *EE* does not acknowledge the distinction between two kinds of justice; it is often unclear whether Aristotle is referring to justice in the general or particular sense. Sometimes it is clear that justice in the general sense is intended, e.g. at *EE* II 7, 1223b10–12, "the continent man will act justly (*dikaiopragêsei*), for continence is more of a virtue than incontinence is, and virtue makes people more just" – since Aristotle has in mind continence with respect to actions done from appetitive desire (*epithumia*), such as adultery or excessive drinking, these actions would be "unjust" in the general sense of breaking the law, since such actions do not fall under the remit of particular justice (*CB* V 2, 1130a24–32; for another example, see *EE* II 7, 1223a36). But in *EE* II 3, when Aristotle lists *dikaion* in his table of virtues, he fails to acknowledge Thesis 2, the distinction between two kinds of justice, and lists the triad *kerdos–zêmia–dikaion*, which evidently corresponds to justice in the particular sense. By contrast, in the *EN* II 7 list of virtues, he explicitly acknowledges that there are two kinds of justice: "As for justice, since it is a term used in more than one way, we shall distinguish its two varieties after discussing the other virtues and say how each variety is a mean" (tr. Crisp) (*EN* II 7, 1108b7–9).[18] One might argue that we cannot put much weight on the fact that the list of virtues in the *Eudemian Ethics* lacks general justice, since *EE* II 3 is notoriously rough and has numerous difficulties.[19] But *EN* II 7 does alert us to the distinction between

two kinds of justice and is clearly looking forward to *CB* V 1–2 – which suggests that *CB* V 1–2 with its distinction between two types of justice was probably written after the *EE*, and was written for the *EN*. If we can speculate, Aristotle inherited the notion of particular justice from Plato, especially in the *Republic*, where Plato thinks of justice as a particular virtue and not as equivalent to virtue as a whole; furthermore, Platonic justice incorporates the notion of geometrical proportionality, of equals to equals, but this only applies to what Aristotle would call distributive justice.[20] Thus, it would make sense that Aristotle should begin with an early precursor to his notion of particular justice in the *EE*; then, when he wrote the common book on justice for the *EN*, he realized that there is not one but two kinds of justice, which is the position reflected in *EN* II 7.[21]

7.2.3 Thesis 3: General justice is "complete" virtue, and is a kind of super-virtue, which encompasses all the others

In *CB* V 1–2, Aristotle says that general justice is "complete virtue, although not without qualification, but in relation to another [ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον]" – and then offers quotations to support the thought that it is universally thought to be "the greatest of the virtues" (*CB* V 1, 1129b25–1130a1).[22] Aristotle concludes:

> Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but the whole of virtue, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but the whole of vice
>
> (*CB* V 1, 1130a8–10)

Justice is therefore *teleios* "complete" or "perfect" in two senses: it is "complete" in the sense of encompassing or entailing all the other virtues, and it is also "perfect" in the sense that it is the fullest exercise and expression of the virtues, because the just person exercises them even with respect to others and not just himself.[23] Whereas the first point makes general justice extensionally equivalent to possessing all the virtues, the second point implies that to be just in the general sense is an even greater achievement than it is to merely possess the other virtues.

Although there are a few passages in the *EE* where Aristotle may be referring to general justice in the sense of being generically equivalent to virtue (cited above), he does not recognize in the *EE* the privileged position that he gives to general justice in the passage just quoted from *CB* V 1–2 on account of its being "complete or perfect virtue." For example, at *EE* II 1, 1219a35–9, Aristotle defines happiness as "activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue [ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν]," with no mention of general justice here. Arguably the phrase – which also appears at *EN* I 7, 1098a17–18, I 9, 1100a4–5, I 13, 1102a6 – is used in different senses in different contexts, with no inconsistency.[24] Furthermore, *EE* II 1 and *EN* I

are preliminary, and we can't yet expect answers to the question of what "perfect virtue" might be or entail. However, when in the final chapter of the *EE*, Aristotle names καλοκἀγαθία "nobility-and-goodness" as a super-virtue which he says is "complete virtue [ἀρετὴ τέλειος]" (*EE* VIII 3, 1249a16–17), thereby using the same expression that he uses to describe general justice in *CB* V 1, we might have expected some awareness that his candidate earlier in *CB* V 1 for "complete virtue" was *dikaiosunê*. If *CB* V 1 was originally *EE* book IV, then wouldn't Aristotle have remembered in the conclusion to the book, *EE* VIII 3, that he had earlier given that crown to *dikaiosunê* and not to *kalokagathia*? Perhaps *kalokagathia* is simply the same as what Aristotle calls "general justice" in *CB* V 1. But he certainly never says so; in *EE* VIII 3 he is happy to regard justice and temperance as individual virtues that are parts of *kalokagathia*. Of course, *EE* VIII 3 is itself not well integrated into the rest of the *EE* – among other reasons because it introduces the topic of *kalokagathia* as though it has been discussed before (VIII 3, 1248b10–11), though this is the first mention of it in the *EE*.[25] It's possible that *EE* VIII 3 was not written as the conclusion for the *EE*, and that it, like other parts of Aristotle's books, may have originally been an independent essay that was later attached to the *EE*.

*7.2.4 Thesis 4: What is just (***to dikaion***) in the particular sense is what is equal*

Aristotle subdivides particular justice into three kinds: distributive justice (*CB* V 3), rectificatory justice (*CB* V 4), and reciprocal justice (*CB* V 5).[26] For all three, his main insight is that justice in the sense of fairness has to do with the correct apprehension of the values of goods and of the desert and merit in competing claims to those goods. Aristotle's aim is to show that there is an objective basis to judgments about what is just and unjust, namely, that they all have to do with a kind of equality: distributive justice and reciprocal justice aim at proportional equality, rectificatory justice aims at arithmetical equality.

In order to do this, Aristotle must explain the sense in which what is just is a mean or intermediate. Accordingly, he argues in *CB* V 3–5 that for all three types of particular justice, the just is a mean because it is a kind of equality (*ison ti*).

(1) The mean in distributive justice (*to dianemêtikon dikaion*) is proportional equality. For each division or distribution between two parties, the shares that each party receive should be proportional to the merit or desert of each of the parties, and the share of the thing divided which each receives. Aristotle concludes, "This, then, is what the just is – the proportional (τὸ ἀνάλογον); the unjust is what violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too small" (*CB* V 3, 1131b16–20). When we talk about fairness in distributions, we are aiming at equality of the proportional kind.

(2) The mean in rectificatory justice (*to diorthôtikon dikaion*) is the arithmetical equal. Each rectification aims at the equal; thus, for example, if party A suffered an involuntary and undeserved loss at the hands of B, the rectification aims at "the equal," namely, the restoration to A of what they lost from B. He concludes, that "the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss [ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον], namely, those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction" (*CB* V 4, 1132b18–20). When we talk about justice or fairness in rectification, we have in mind that the compensation should be "arithmetically" i.e. exactly equal to the loss suffered by the victim.

(3) The mean in reciprocal justice (*to antipeponthos*) is proportional equality (*CB* V 5, 1133a5–14): in trade exchanges or business transactions, in which one party A has rendered a benefit to another party B, B is obliged to return not a precisely equal return, but a return that is equally beneficial for A. When, therefore, we talk about justice or fairness in reciprocal exchanges, such as when two people are bartering, this aims at an equality in the value for each, as determined by need or demand.

Aristotle's goal is to explain how judgments about fairness and justice are normative: they aim to correctly hit on the relevant kinds of equality for each case. Knowing how to fairly divide shares, or to fairly compensate someone for a loss, or to make a fair exchange – all of these concern a type of equality that the just person gets right and correctly aims at, and the unjust person gets wrong and misses.

The undisputed books of the *EE* do not show any awareness of these results in *CB* V. One can admittedly find, in the undisputed books of the *EE*, both the claims that

(i) Justice (*to dikaion*) is a mean (*EE* II 3, 1221a4)

and that

(ii) Justice (*to dikaion*) and friendship are a kind of equality (*EE* VII 9, 1241b11–13).

But Aristotle does not put the two together in the way that he does in the common book on justice: in the undisputed books of the *EE* he doesn't recognize that justice is a mean *because* it is a kind of equality. This omission is particularly striking in *EE* VII 9, where one might have expected him to give a nod to the earlier treatment of justice as a kind of equality in the common book on justice. Its omission suggests (to me) that these represent two independent strands of thought, which he only attempted to put together in the common book on justice.

Furthermore, Aristotle's understanding of Claim (i) in the *EE*, that justice is a mean, is simplistic compared with the way he understands it in the common book on justice. There, he analyzes *to dikaion* as a mean between profit (κέρδος) and loss (ζημία) (*EE* II 3, 1221a4), in a table listing the virtues together with the extremes between which each virtue is a mean. This triad is quite puzzling.[27] For it suggests that the just outcome or state of affairs is always an intermediate between profit and loss. But why should it not be just (or at least not unjust) to sometimes earn a profit, and sometimes sustain a loss? In a fair transaction, is it not possible for both parties to gain from the exchange? Maybe he means by "profit" "more than one deserves" and by "loss" "less than one deserves." What is just (*to dikaion*) would then be a mean between *undeserved* profit and *undeserved* loss. But then one wants to complain that "profit" does not mean "more than one deserves" (it means an advantage or gain relative to what one had before), and also that the notion of desert cries out for explanation. Such an explanation is forthcoming in *CB* V 4, 1132b11–20 but is not hinted at here in *EE* II 3.

Finally, the "profit–loss–justice" triad from *EE* II 3 is insufficiently general, since it doesn't apply to general justice (general justice does not have a mean); even for particular justice, it only fits rectificatory justice (with some problems, as I just noted), not the other two forms, distributive and reciprocal justice. In the fuller argument in *CB* V 3–5, Aristotle uses the language of "profit–loss–mean" only for rectificatory justice. And he explains that rectificatory justice has to do with compensation *for someone who has sustained an involuntary loss or injury from another party*, one in which that second party is culpable: "the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss [κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας], namely, those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction" (1132b18–20). The judge's task is to equalize the victim's position, to make it what it was before the injury. Hence, the victim would wrongly "profit," so to speak, if she were compensated too much by the injuring party and would suffer a "loss" if she were compensated inadequately. This is odd for a number of reasons (as Frede, 2019, p. 97 points out) – first because he assimilates all cases of injury to the language of monetary loss (odd to say that a murderer makes a profit, the murdered a loss!) – which is presumably why Aristotle remarks on the fact that the terminology comes from trade (rectificatory justice involves "a *sort of* gain and loss" [κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας], *CB* V 4, 1132b18). Again, it is odd to describe just compensation for one party (suppose Alex was assaulted by Ben) as being an intermediate between Alex's profit (when Ben compensates too much) and Alex's loss (when Ben fails to compensate or does not compensate sufficiently). In the common book on justice, Aristotle modifies the triad to fit the case of rectificatory justice, and drops it entirely from his account of distributive and reciprocal justice. I conclude, then, that the triad at *EE* II 3 very much looks like a "first stab" by Aristotle at characterizing justice before he worked out the details in the common book on justice.

7.2.5 Thesis 5: Just action is intermediate between doing injustice and having injustice done to one. But justice (the virtue) is not a mean between two vices, because having injustice done to one is not a vice. (Corollary: It is not possible to do an unjust action to oneself, and it is not possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.)

As I noted under Thesis 1, Aristotle distinguishes between (i) just outcomes or states of affair, (ii) just actions that aim to bring about such outcomes, and (iii) the virtue of justice which consists (among other things) of a disposition to act justly. In his treatment of particular justice, he analyzes the first item "what is just" (*to dikaion* and *to adikon*, *CB* V 3–5), and concludes by saying, "We have now defined the unjust and the just [Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται]" (*CB* V 5, 1133b29). Next, he defines (ii) just action (*dikaiopragia*) as follows:

> These having been marked off from each other, it is plain that just action is intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is to have too much and the other to have too little [διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι·τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν].
>
> (*CB* V 5, 1133b30–2)

This is puzzling. First, it is not clear whether this is about particular justice, or whether this also applies to general justice. If the latter, then it is not clear whether and how the same action, described as being just (in the general sense) will have a mean that is compatible with its mean when it is described as (say) a courageous action. If the former, then the types of just actions Aristotle has been discussing in the common book on justice up to this point have to do with a judge's determinations of what would be fair in distribution, rectification, etc. But when a judge makes an incorrect rectification, or a distributor makes an incorrect distribution of goods, surely the judge's mistake is not to fail to hit the intermediate between acting unjustly *and being unjustly treated*, but to fail to hit the intermediate between the victim being compensated too much and too little. The *judge* being unjustly treated is not one of the extremes. Similarly, someone who makes an unfair distribution – of political authority, say – has not failed to hit the intermediate between acting unjustly *and being unjustly treated*. Rather, his mistake is to fail to hit what is just (*to dikaion*), which in this case is a proportional equality between divided shares. Why then does Aristotle conclude that just actions are intermediates between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated?

Either we have to suppose that Aristotle is still in the grip of the *Eudemian Ethics*' triad – which holds that being just is an intermediate between gain and loss – even though Aristotle has substantially modified that claim in the common book on justice. Or, as I believe, we should simply abandon the assumption that Aristotle is trying to fit just action into the doctrine of the mean – or that he's talking about the just actions of a judge – instead, he is evidently talking

more generally about right action and wrongdoing. Recall Glaucon's remarks about the origins of justice in Plato's *Republic*:

> [Justice] is intermediate [μεταξὺ] between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is a mean between [ἐν μέσῳ ὂν] these two extremes.
>
> (*Rep.* II, 359a5–8)

The sense in which justice is a "mean" in the *Republic* has nothing to do with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, where a mean is intermediate between two (vicious) extremes; instead, Glaucon is saying that it's intermediate on a scale from best to worst. The very best option is the ability to do injustice with impunity; the very worst is to suffer injustice with no way to protect oneself and no possibility of revenge. Being just by adhering to the laws of civil society is a way of staving off the worst option, while forswearing the best option. In my view, Aristotle is making a similar, and utterly familiar, point, echoing Glaucon (with approval): a just action is in between doing injustice to others (by getting more than one should) and having an injustice done to one (by getting less than one should). But he is not attempting to say (as the doctrine of the mean would imply) that every just action is an intermediate between two extremes, both of which are unjust actions by that agent. For example, if Charles and Dana have made a contract, and Charles abides by that contract, his just action is intermediate between cheating her which might be better for him, and being cheated by her which would be worse for him. If Charles is cheated by Dana, he has what is unjust done to him – but this is not an unjust action that *he* has done. Hence the trio (i) Charles cheating Dana, (ii) Charles abiding by his contract with Dana, and (iii) Charles being cheated by Dana is not parallel to the more standard example of the doctrine of the mean, where (i) Charles acts rashly, (ii) Charles acts courageously, and (iii) Charles acts cowardly. For Charles being cheated by Dana is (obviously) not a vicious action by Charles, and is not a defective state of Charles.

This is confirmed when Aristotle goes on to explain how justice the virtue is a mean at *CB* V 5, 1133b29–1134a16. For, he says, justice the virtue (i.e. particular justice) is not like the other virtues because it is not an intermediate between two (extreme) vices; for justice has only one opposite, injustice. Hence, it is anomalous with respect to the doctrine of the mean, which holds that each virtue is intermediate between two vices. *Dikaiosunê* is an intermediate only in the sense that it *aims at an intermediate*, namely, *to dikaion* which is a mean between two extremes. Thus, justice the virtue relates to the intermediate by producing or aiming at it (*to dikaion*), and injustice relates to the extremes by producing or aiming at too much or too little relative to the mean.

This allows us to address a famous complaint against Aristotle that goes back to Hugo Grotius, namely, that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean seems to imply that if someone gets less than his share voluntarily, he thereby willingly suffers

injustice, or does an injustice to himself, which indicates that he has a defective disposition and is unjust.[28] In *CB* V 9–11 – chapters of the common book on justice that are seldom read – Aristotle actually asks whether it's possible to do an injustice to oneself, or to suffer injustice voluntarily. He considers the case of Glaucus and Diomede in *Iliad* VI 232–6, saying

> one who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomede "Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred oxen for nine" is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be unjustly treated is not, but there must be someone to treat him unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not voluntary.
>
> (*CB* V 9, 1136b9–14)

His point is that if you voluntarily make a bad bargain, as Glaucus does when he exchanges his own golden armour for his guest-friend Diomedes' bronze armour, there is no injustice, and he does not do an injustice to himself or suffer an injustice, since he voluntarily and knowingly agrees to the exchange. Someone else must do the injustice to him.[29] Later, Aristotle makes this point more explicitly: one cannot do an injustice to oneself, whether by getting a bad bargain in a transaction, or even in suicide when one harms oneself intentionally (*CB* V 11, 1138a4–28) – for one thing, no one has a *boulêsis* "rational desire" for being unjustly treated, which is a requirement for actions done from choice (*CB* V 9, 1136b3–9, b23–5). To choose to do an injustice to oneself requires that one have a *boulêsis* for suffering injustice, and Aristotle thinks that no one has such a desire – not even someone who is willing to do harm to himself (e.g. suicide), or someone who is willing to endure an injustice in order to avoid a worse evil (e.g. protecting a friend from a tyrant even at the cost of one's life). Furthermore, *epieikeia* (often translated "equity," though that is inadequate) is the virtue of one who takes less than his share, or less than he is owed, this being the mark of a "decent" or *epieikês* person whose actions exemplify the virtue of supererogation (*CB* V 10).

In sum, Thesis 5 holds that the virtue of justice is not an intermediate between two vices, but has only one opposite, namely, injustice. When in *CB* V 5 Aristotle explains how the virtue of justice and the vice of injustice are intermediates, he correctly sees that the intermediacy should be located in the object of justice, not in justice itself. What is just is an intermediate in the sense spelled out in Thesis 4. Aristotle's decision to treat *dikaiosunê* and *adikia* differently from the other virtues is raised as a problem for the theory by Grotius, since it implies that the doctrine of the mean is not perfectly general. And it must have been embarrassing for Aristotle to discover that in the case of the central virtue (justice!) the triad of excess–mean–deficiency does not apply. If the doctrine of the mean is meant to explain all the virtues, we would expect that general and particular justice as dispositions must be "intermediates." But it is to his credit that he comes to realize this over the course of the common book on justice.

The undisputed books of the *EE* do not acknowledge Thesis 5 – and indeed at one point Aristotle says something inconsistent with it. For in *EE* II 3, Aristotle explains what it is to be a just *person* by reference to this analysis of the just as intermediate between profit and loss. For he goes on to explain that "The profiteer is the one who tries to get more from every situation, the loss-maker is the one who never does so other than occasionally [κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικός, ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαχόθεν]" (*EE* II 3, 1221a23–4); the profiteer is "pleonectic," wanting to get the larger share of any good, in cases where he is not entitled to get it. Thus, presumably, the just person gets profits whenever it is appropriate, neither too much nor too little. (Or so the reader must guess; Aristotle does not spell out the conclusion regarding the just person [*ho dikaios*], since in *EE* II 3 he does not discuss any of the virtues, only pairs of vicious extremes.) But this represents the opposite of the profiteer as the *zêmiôdês* or "loser," someone who habitually sustains a loss; the "loser" is by implication vicious, and has a defective disposition correlating with the vice of being *kerdaleos* "the profiteer." But why should we suppose that the person who loses or sustains a loss is necessarily vicious? *EE* II 3 seems to assume that justice is a mean between two vices, and has not yet come to see the point that the loser is not doing an injustice and is not an unjust person. In the *EN*, Aristotle drops any reference to "the loser" and it does not show up again.[30]

Furthermore, at *EE* VII 6, 1240a14–20, Aristotle asks whether someone can be a friend to oneself, and notes that this question is like the question, whether anyone can commit an injustice against himself. (No such remark about whether injustice to oneself is possible is raised in the undisputed books of the *EN*.) Aristotle says that such questions can be settled "in the same way": namely, by noting that insofar as a human soul is bipartite, one can make sense of "wronging oneself," e.g. by the appetite "wronging" the rational part of the soul, but otherwise, one cannot. Fine – but this is *not* the solution offered in the common book on justice, which I described above.[31] Again, note that Aristotle does not in *EE* VII 6 simply refer back to the discussion in *CB* V 9–11 (which would be *EE* book IV) or summarize the explanation given there, which suggests that the common book was never a part of the *EE* at all, or at least that the *EE* VII book on friendship was written independently of, and without any awareness of, the common book on justice.

7.3 Voluntariness in *CB* V 8

So far, most of the evidence we have considered suggests that the common book on justice fits better with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This is not universally true, however, since his treatment of voluntary action in *CB* V 8 fits better with the *EE* than with the *EN*. In my view, *CB* V 8 resembles the *EE* account of voluntary action on a number of points, in ways that suggest that it is both an application of and a refinement of the *EE* account of voluntariness. These

are refinements insofar as Aristotle is applying his account of voluntary action to the legal context in *CB* V 8, thus paving the way for the *EN* III 1–5 account of voluntariness.

A complete discussion of this topic would take us from justice to the complex question of Aristotle's evolving views about voluntariness.[32] There are two other passages in *CB* V 8 which bear on the question of how that book is related to the *EE*, but for reasons of space I will simply focus on what seems to me the most significant and telling point.[33] The common book on justice treats cases of ignorance and cases of coercion as being involuntary (with the *EE*), and not as voluntary (with the *EN*). In *CB* V 8, Aristotle holds that among involuntary actions, some are pardonable, when they are done in and from ignorance (ἀγνοοῦντες … δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι), whereas they are involuntary but not pardonable when they are done in but not from ignorance (ὅσα μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἄγνοοῦντες διὰ πάθος), "owing to a passion which is neither natural nor such as man is liable to" (*CB* V 8, 1136a5–9). That is, he holds that actions done in but not from ignorance – as for example when one acts in the grip of a passion such as anger or fear – are involuntary, but still inexcusable. Similarly, at *EE* II 9, 1225b8–10, Aristotle holds that

> whatever a man does that is in his power not to do, and does it not in error and of his own volition, he must needs do voluntarily; this is what voluntariness is. What he does in error, and because of the error, he does involuntarily.

Therefore, acts done in ignorance (or "in error" in Kenny's tr.) brought on by passion are involuntary. But Aristotle changes his mind about this in *EN* III 1, where he holds that actions done in though not from ignorance are voluntary (1110b24–27). Furthermore, the striking phrase in the *CB* passage "owing to a passion which is neither natural nor such as man is liable to [διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον]" (*CB* V 8, 1136a8–9) clearly echoes the *EE* account, in which Aristotle develops an account of the voluntary in terms of our natural and intrinsic impulses, and the involuntary as what is contrary to those natural and intrinsic impulses, and as originating from an external source. This idea is dropped in the *EN*.

Finally, at *CB* V 8, Aristotle holds that a person who repays a debt through fear does so involuntarily (1135b4) – which hearkens back to the *EE* account of involuntary actions as those which do not stem from one's own nature or which one cannot forbear acting on. In the *EE*, coerced actions are not voluntary (*EE* II 8, 1225a2–19), whereas the *EN* holds that such coerced acts are voluntary, "though in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself" (*EN* III 1, 1110a18–19). On these points, *CB* V 8 seems to be closer to the *EE* than to the *EN*, which holds that actions done from passion and in ignorance, and coerced actions are "voluntary," and hence offers a wider definition of voluntary action than the one offered in the *EE* or *CB* V 8.

At the same time, *CB* V 8 makes significant additions to and advances beyond what *EE* II says about voluntary action – in ways that foreshadow the *EN* account of voluntary action. David Charles has explored this in detail and proposed "an intelligible route from *EE* II to *NE* III 1–5 via *CB* V 8" (Charles, 2012, pp. 24–26). On Charles' account, the common book on justice introduces a legal context for questions of voluntariness, which the *EE* acknowledges with its mention of the aims of legislators (*EE* II 10, 1226b38) but does not go into; from there, Aristotle begins to rethink the prominence of the notion of nature in the *EE*, and replaces it with a more narrow and strict notion of choice (*hairesis*) as the relevant starting point for voluntary actions and states. Charles argues that *EE* II distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary actions by stressing that the latter are based on desires that are not natural (i.e. common to everyone) or ones that our nature is not able to bear. In the *EE*, Aristotle is not so much concerned with the question of how to assign responsibility especially in cases of ignorance and coercion. By contrast, Aristotle in *CB* V 8 is very much interested in the question of how to deal with ignorance and coercion – and that is a point on which *CB* V 8 paves the way for the *EN*.

7.4 Conclusion

In sum, certain parts of *CB* V fit better with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, others with the *Eudemian Ethics*. In my view, the *Eudemian Ethics* represents an early phase of Aristotle's thinking about justice. The *Eudemian Ethics* seems unaware of the distinction between two kinds of justice. Aristotle accepts a simplified formula for understanding justice as a mean between profit and loss. His commitment to the idea that justice is intermediate between profit and loss may be a sign of the lingering influence of Plato's way of thinking about justice in the *Republic*, where Plato has Glaucon put forward the thought – evidently spelling out what the many think about justice – that it is an "intermediate" between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; Plato also seems to have in mind what Aristotle calls particular justice, though presumably Aristotle's point is that Plato did not distinguish clearly between the two senses. Finally, Aristotle seems to think in the *Eudemian Ethics* that justice and friendship are both virtues of social life: many friendships revolve around just exchanges of goods and benefits between friends, and are dissolved over quarrels and disputes concerning what is just and fair.[34]

At some point, Aristotle got to work on his treatise on justice, and there, in the common book on justice, he began to develop new ideas and concepts of which the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but not the *Eudemian Ethics*, seems to be aware. These include Aristotle's distinction between general and particular justice; his new conclusions about how justice fits into the doctrine of the mean; and his treatment of justice as a form of equality. The common book on justice therefore "belongs" to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the sense that it is better integrated, doctrinally, with important points concerning justice than the *Eudemian Ethics* is.

These conclusions must be carefully qualified. Kenny's stylometric data gives some evidence that on points of style, and vocabulary, the common books are more like the *Eudemian Ethics*; though I'm sceptical about some of Kenny's data, the general impression is certainly that parts of the common book of justice may very well be coeval with the *Eudemian Ethics*. The main reason why the common book on justice cannot be connected tightly with either book remains the fact that it is itself loosely organized and shows signs of editorial compilation; that helps to explain why *CB* V 1–5 go better with the *EN* and *CB* V 8 with the *EE* without any inconsistency. It is probably hopeless to try to pinpoint exactly when Aristotle wrote the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* relative to each other, and relative to the common books – especially if the common book on justice was a work in progress, somewhere between lecture notes and a polished treatise. Even if one accepts my conclusions concerning justice, one will therefore want to be cautious about drawing conclusions about what it even means for the common books to "belong" to one treatise rather than another. Similar caveats are required for questions about developmentalism in Aristotle, and the extent to which Aristotle's views about justice have undergone demonstrable change. Even so, one can say with some confidence that Aristotle's theory of justice grew and developed, and shows signs of his willingness to rethink "received wisdom" and to add and revise in interesting and important ways to the base that he started with in the *EE*.[35]

Notes

1 In what follows I shall refer to the common books as *CB* and use their *Nicomachean* book number: *CB* V = *Nicomachean Ethics* book V = *Eudemian Ethics* book IV.

2 In *CB* V, chapters 1–2 have significant stretches that are repetitive, as do chapters 3–5; there are "doublets" repeating almost verbatim the same thoughts in these chapters. Chapters 6–8 are an assemblage of topics with some overlap; chapters 9–11 are loosely connected by a common thread of argument. Overall, *CB* V is not as polished as the introductory books for the *EN* and the *EE*, but even in the doublets, it is possible to discern important new points being made in the "double," much as a professor might add new points to the same set of lectures. Jackson, 1879 reorganizes chapters 5–11 as do Gauthier and Jolif, 1970, but see Rowe, 1971, pp. 104–105 for a judicious analysis of the given text with reasons against any such reorganization.

3 In the 19th century, the *Eudemian Ethics* was held to be inauthentic by Schleiermacher and Spengel (thus, Susemihl's 1884 Teubner edition is titled "the Ethics of Eudemus of Rhodes"). In the 20th century however, von der Mühll, 1909 and Kapp, 1912 established the authenticity of the *Eudemian Ethics*; Jaeger championed this and argued that it provides an important clue to Aristotle's development since it is earlier and closer in philosophical doctrine to the *Protrepticus* than the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Jaeger, 1923 [Engl. tr. 1934/1948]). Some of Jaeger's views were anticipated by Thomas Case, 1910 (reprinted 1996). For critical assessment of Jaeger's developmentalist hypothesis, see Rowe, 1971, pp. 73–76; Bobonich, 2006, pp. 16–18.

4 Kenny adduces evidence based on the relative frequency of particles and other common terms in the *EE*, *EN*, and the common books. Many scholars accept Claim (i) (for discussion and references, see the Introduction in this volume by Di Basilio, n. 16, p. 13), but fewer accept Claim (ii) (for reservations see Irwin, 1980). For considerations about

whether *CB* V fits better with the *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean Ethics*, see Kenny, 2016, pp. 6, 51, 55, 60–69, 276; Frede, 2019, pp. 95–99. Kenny identifies certain concepts used in the common book on justice, such as Aristotle's use of concepts of arithmetical vs. proportional equality (Kenny, 2016, p. 276), his use of the part/whole distinction, and argues that these concepts and other concepts are used more frequently in the *EE* than in the *EN* (Kenny, 2016, pp. 60–69); to me, these seem inconclusive for establishing that the common book on justice "belongs" to the *EE*.

5 According to Primavesi, 2007, there were two sets of Aristotle's works – and two different book catalogues for Aristotle – one for the Library in Alexandria (which used the later Hellenistic numbering system), and one for the older collection which was supposedly preserved in Scepsis (and whose dramatic rediscovery in the 1st century BC Cicero reports). Primavesi's key finding is that the books of the *EN* follow the older system of numbering, whereas the manuscripts of *EE*'s books are numbered by the Hellenistic alphabetic numerals. Primavesi can therefore confirm Harlfinger's careful preference for the *EN* as the original manuscript home of the disputed books, citing evidence from book marking (2007, pp. 70–73). (Harlfinger's 1971 study of the manuscripts is described by Kenny as saying that the disputed books were as much a part of the manuscript tradition of the *EE* as they were of the *EN*. But this is not what Harlfinger concludes [as Frede, 2018 notes; see also Huby's 1973 review of Moraux and Harlfinger, 1971].) The Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle's works only has a five-book *Ethics*, which must be (as Jaeger thought) the *Eudemian Ethics* minus the three disputed books (I–III, VII–VIII). After the rediscovery of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, its books V–VII were added to the five-book *EE* to become *EE* IV–VI. This, of course, does not imply anything about the order in which Aristotle wrote the *EE*, the *EN*, and the common books; it is possible that the *EE* was written after the *EN*, that the common books originally belonged to the *EE*, and that editors then took the common books and added them to the *EN*. But it would then be puzzling why the common books were missing from the oldest manuscripts of the *EE*. For a recent discussion of the manuscripts making up the Aristotelian corpus, see Hatzimichali, 2016.

6 I argue for this in more detail in my *Justice in Aristotle's Moral and Political Philosophy*, under contract with Oxford University Press.

7 Translations of the *EN* are from Ross/Brown, 2009; translations of the *EE* are from Kenny, 2011, unless otherwise noted.

8 The same ambiguity can be found in German (*Gerechtigkeit*) and in French (*la justice*). The question of whether the Greeks have the notion of the abstract quality of justice (and whether *dikê* can ever have this meaning) is a classic debate going back to Havelock, 1969, Lloyd-Jones, 1971, Gagarin, 1974.

9 These, in turn, derive from an older word *hê dikê* which, by Aristotle's time, is mostly used to mean "lawsuit." In the *EE* and *EN*, Aristotle uses this term only five times, mostly to mean "lawsuit" or "trial" (*EE* VII 10, 1243a9, *CB* V 6, 1134a31, *EN* VIII 13, 1162b30, *EN* IX 1, 1164b13), and only once in the older sense of "justice" in a bit of poetry he quotes to illustrate an older notion of reciprocity as justice (*CB* V 5, 1132b27).

10 In Part III of *Theory of Justice*, Rawls defines justice as a good of persons (Rawls, 1999, pp. 380–386).

11 Aristotle's terms for "just action [*dikaiopragia*]" (*CB* V 5, 1133b30) and "acting justly [*dikaiopragein*]" (twice in the *EE*, five times in the *EN*, nine times in *CB* V, once in the *Rhetoric*, and once in the *Topics*) are his own coinage, invented in order to have something corresponding to the term *adikein* "act wrongly" (e.g. *Rhet*. 1373b22 *adikein kai dikaiopragein*).

12 Cf. *CB* V 6, 1134a17–23, V 7, 1135a8–15, V 8, 1135a15–17, 1135b19–25.

13 Aristotle does use the expression *ta andreia* for "courageous actions" (*MM* 1.34.23.5) and *to andreion* in the sense of "manliness" or "courage" at *Rhet*. 1364b37 (which reflects its use elsewhere at Th. 2.39, E. *Supp*. 510, *Andr*. 683); he uses *ta sôphrona* for "temperate

actions" (*EN* II 4, 1105a18 ff.), though he does not use *to sôphron* in the sense of *sôphrosunê* which reflects its use elsewhere at e.g. S. *Fragm.* 786, 683; E. *Hipp.* 431, Th. 1.37, 3.82. But none of these are the counterpart to Category (i) above.

14 Aristotle would still qualify as an "evaluational internalist" (cf. Slote, 2001) and not an "evaluational externalist" (cf. Driver, 2001), because he thinks that what is required for justice is to intend to aim at just outcomes, and not simply the external fact of one's having brought them about.

15 With the possible exception of *EE* VIII 3, 1248b21: "justice, both itself and the actions based on justice" [δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις], though he does not use the vocabulary or conceptual distinctions that he draws so carefully in *CB* V 6 and 8.

16 It is well known that there are problems with the list of virtues at *EE* II 3 – e.g. its inclusion of *phronêsis* which is not a virtue of character. D. J. Allan proposes that the third column listing the virtues was an interpolation, and hence that *phronêsis* and *dikaion* were not originally on the list; in support of this is the fact that when he goes on to review the table, he only focuses on the vices, and not the virtues (Allan, 1966, p. 148). Di Basilio argues (in an unpublished paper "The Table at *Eudemian Ethics* II 3 1220b38") that the list in *EE* II 3 may not have been a list of virtues at all, but a list of *pathê*, which would also make sense, especially given his introductory remarks at *EE* II 3, 1221a13–15 and a possible back reference to the list at *EE* III 7, 1234a23–28.

17 Aristotle argues that there is a particular virtue of justice distinct from general justice at *CB* V 2, 1130a14–1130b5. Although he does not use the terms "general" and "particular," he does use the "whole"/"part" language characteristic of the genus/species relation at *CB* V 1, 1130a8–10, V 2, 1130a14–16, 1130b6–32 *passim*.

18 Cf. Frede, 2019, pp. 95–96.

19 Many thanks to Daniel Wolt for helpful discussion. Another explanation (suggested to me by Giulio Di Basilio) would be that the list at *EE* II 3 is meant to be a list of examples.

20 Many thanks to Dorothea Frede for help with these points.

21 Arguably, Aristotle is doing something similar when he carves out a notion of *orexis* as distinct from *epithumia*, and when he carves out a notion of *hypolêpsis* as distinct from *doxa* (cf. Moss and Schwab, 2019, p. 11).

22 Cf. Lee, 2014.

23 Kenny, 2016, pp. 67–68 argues that Aristotle's phrases – "perfect virtue," "part"/"whole" of virtue – are *Eudemian* and not *Nicomachean*, but his statistics are contestable. For example, "perfect virtue" occurs only 3 times in the *EE* (II 1, 1219a37, 39, and VIII 3, 1249a16), and 4 times in the *EN* (I.7, I.9, I.10, I.13); likewise, *meros* appears 14 times in the *EE*, and 12 times in the *EN*.

24 Cf. Woods, 1982, p. 90. For example, Aristotle appears to think that complete virtue includes both the practical and theoretical virtues in *EE* II 1, 1220a2–6.

25 *Kalokagathia* is found at *Politics* I 13, 1259b34, *EN* IV 3, 1124a4, X 9, 1179b10; it (and its cognates, e.g. *kalokagathos*) is not found in the *EE* outside this chapter. *EE* book VIII 1–3 are three independent essays, and were probably added by the editor to the *EE* by way of conclusion. It is unlikely that *EE* VIII 3 was originally intended by Aristotle to serve as the conclusion for the treatise; see Wolt, 2022 who argues that the reason why the *EE* discusses *kalokagathia*, whereas the *EN* does not, is that the role played by *kalokagathia* as the unified expression of all the virtues, is taken over by *phronêsis* in the *EN*, and that *EE* VIII 3 was originally intended to supply a similar "capstone" argument that *CB* VI 12–13 plays in the *EN*. For more on *kalokagathia* in the *EE*, see Bonasio in this volume, though she does not comment on this question about *teleios aretê* in *CB* V 1 vs. *EE* VIII 3.

26 There is some uncertainty about whether he regards reciprocal justice as one of the subspecies, for it is not listed in the introduction to particular justice in *CB* V 2. But *CB* V 5 gives an analysis that narrows down the traditional notion of justice as reciprocity ("*quid pro quo*") to the justice of fair business transactions (as when two people trade goods, or when a society uses currency as a medium of exchange).

27 Kenny, 2016, p. 214 notes the inconsistency, as well as the possibility of excising this triad as being a later addition to the text. But as Frede, 2019, p. 96 points out, if we excise it, then justice will not be on the list of virtues at all, which would be peculiar. As noted in n. 15 above, Allan, 1966 proposes that the third column listing the virtues could be a later addition, because the subsequent discussion does not mention any of the virtues, only the vices from the first two columns. If so, then the virtue for *kerdos-zêmia* is not justice, and "*dikaion*" was an editor's (possibly mistaken) addition. It's hard to imagine what other virtue Aristotle could have in mind though, unless it is, as Di Basilio has suggested, not a list of virtues in the first place. (Thanks to Daniel Wolt and Giulio Di Basilio for discussion.)

28 Grotius critiques Aristotle's virtue-oriented approach to justice in the *Prolegomena* to his *On the Law of War and Peace* §44 in 1625 (Grotius, 2005, vol. 3, pp. 1757–1758); cf. Schneewind, 1990, pp. 46–48.

29 Aristotle is tempted by the thought that perhaps he gets something else out of the exchange besides worse armour – gratitude and the benefits of guest-friendship (*CB* V 9, 1137a1).

30 The terms *kerdaleos* and *zêmiôdês* do not occur in the *EN*, and only occur in the *EE* in this passage.

31 Admittedly, Aristotle does mention at *CB* V 11, 1138b5–12 that "metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain parts of him," but this is not the main solution offered in V 9 and 11.

32 See Charles, 2012 for a detailed examination of *CB* V 8, and whether it fits better with the *EE* or the *EN* accounts of voluntariness.

33 There is a forward-looking reference in the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE* II 10, 1227a2) to *CB* V 8, 1135b9–11, but no such reference in the *EN* III 1. However, there is no substantial difference since Aristotle makes the essential point at *EN* III 2, 1112a14–16. Also, Aristotle's use of *mê kata sumbebêkos* at 1135a23–26 is more reminiscent of *EE* II 9, 1225b1 6 (though I find the latter very obscure), whereas in *EN* III 1 Aristotle drops the idea that actions done in ignorance are "incidental."

34 Here again I cannot go into the details. Outside the common book on justice, Aristotle mentions justice most frequently in his books on friendship in the *EE* and *EN*; there, he maintains a close connection between friendship and justice (*to dikaion*), and this connection helps to explain some aspects of his treatment of justice – in particular, its orientation towards the common good, and towards the types of rules and principles people must live by in communities and groups that are held together by such a commitment to the common good. He thinks that justice and friendship are the twin goals of any community (*koinônia*); they are both virtues of people who live together in societies and communities, bound together by law aiming at the common good. Justice is a necessary condition of *koinônia* "community" as well as friendship (*EE* VII 9; *EN* VIII 9). In both the *EE* and the *EN*, he connects these in turn with equality; Aristotle says that justice (*to dikaion*) is a kind of equality (*ison ti*), and that *philia* too lies in equality (*isotês*) (*EE* VII 9, 1241b12–14).

35 I am very grateful to Giulio Di Basilio, Dorothea Frede, Peter Hunt, Gagan Sapkota, Gisela Striker, and Daniel Wolt for helpful comments and discussion. I also thank Paula Gottlieb for sharing with me some of her forthcoming book on the *Eudemian Ethics*.

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8 *Sophia* in the *Eudemian Ethics*[1]

Christopher Rowe

> By *phronesis* [wrote Werner Jaeger in 1923] the *Eudemian Ethics* [hereafter "*EE*"] understands, like Plato and the *Protrepticus*, the philosophical faculty that beholds the highest real value, God, in transcendental contemplation, and makes this contemplation the standard of will and action; it is still both theoretical knowledge of supersensible being and practical moral insight.[2]

Jaeger's claim about *phronêsis* in the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) provided the core of his wider thesis of a development in Aristotle's thinking about ethics, from a "reformed Platonism" in the *EE* to the "late Aristotelianism"[3] of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*). The claim was widely, and rightly, disputed, ultimately receiving the *coup de grâce* in Anthony Kenny's 1978 book *The Aristotelian Ethics* (*AE*).[4] As Kenny pointed out, "[Jaeger's] account of the nature of *phronêsis* in the *NE* rested almost entirely on the description of that virtue in [the second of the 'common books' (hereafter, '*CB* 1–3')]." Since Kenny had himself shown

> that there are strong stylistic reasons for regarding [*CB* 1–3], as they stand, as belonging with the *Eudemian Ethics*, it would be possible to argue with as much justification as Jaeger that this *Ethics*, containing as it does the developed theory of *phronêsis*, must be the work of the later, mature Aristotle.[5]

In 1971, I had myself argued that despite the overwhelmingly negative reception of Jaeger's thesis about *phronêsis* in the *EE* and the *NE*, in the terms in which it was stated, nevertheless that thesis was right: "Aristotle [in *EE*] envisages no essential distinction between the two kinds of wisdom, speculative and practical."[6] Like Jaeger, and indeed under his spell, I assumed in 1971 that the *CB* belonged to the *NE*, but with the difference that I proposed that two of them, i.e. what we habitually call *NE* V and VII, could be shown to be reworkings of original *Eudemian* material, as could other parts of the *NE* that overlapped with the *EE*[7]; and I duly set out to try to show it. "*NE* VI," by contrast, including as it does the distinction between practical and theoretical reason, and so prominently, had on this account to be a new addition. But if Kenny's statistical arguments had truly demonstrated that the *CB* originally belonged to the *EE* "as they stand," little seemed left of my position. Once

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"*NE* VI" became *EE* V, the *Eudemian* account of *phronêsis* would be identical with what I, following Jaeger, had presupposed to be exclusively *Nicomachean*; and actually the "*NE* VI" account fitted at least as well, according to Kenny, with the undisputed books of the *EE* as it does with the undisputed books of the *NE*. This he showed under four heads. *Phronêsis* is

> (1) an intellectual virtue concerned with the truth about mutable matters and the whole good of man. (2) … the virtue of a particular part of the rational soul, … distinguished from other intellectual virtues by being deliberative rather than intuitive and practical rather than theoretical. (3) … indissolubly wedded to moral virtue … (4) The union of *phronêsis* and moral virtue is dependent on the pre-existence of certain natural qualities, intellectual and affective.[8]

The net outcome is indisputable: so far as *phronêsis* is concerned, there is no incompatibility between the undisputed books of the *EE* and the second of the "common" books.

But if Kenny is right, then we also no longer have good enough reasons for calling the "common books" exactly "common," since they will actually have been part of the *EE*.[9] Quite apart from Kenny's stylistic arguments, as presented in the *AE*, there was always the important but unanswered question why on earth in planning the *NE* Aristotle would have wanted to include two separate discussions of pleasure, in book VII and in book X – discussions which not only offer quite different treatments of their subject but fail to acknowledge the fact, containing as they do not a trace of a cross-reference between them. But then why not hand over one of those discussions to the *EE*, which is crying out for it? And if there is no reason against that, why not similarly hand over the rest of *NE* VII, too?

And so on. In short, if Kenny is right, there is now apparently reason enough for editors and translators to print the three "common" books as part of the *EE*, and – if both works are included in the same volume, and the *EE* comes first – no particular reason to print them again, as part of the *NE*. If, on the other hand, the *NE* is being printed separately, it will appear oddly depleted and lacunose if a gap is left between books IV and VIII, as it presumably did to whoever it was that first had the idea of importing three books of the *EE* into the *NE*.

But this is not the end of the story. One interesting new consideration is that there turns out to be a primary manuscript, i.e. one that does not derive from the three so far recognized as primary,[10] that labels *EE* VII–VIII as IV and V, with no indication that anything is missing between III and IV apart from the problem of any unfulfilled promises in the first three books that we might have expected to be fulfilled before IV = VII. Since it is undoubtedly descended from the same single archetype as the other three, which in different ways treat the *CB* as an integral part of the *EE*, this may be no more than an aberration; but it does suggest that in the early 15th century, when the manuscript

was written, there were at least some people who thought that "Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*" consisted only of five books.[11] If this is, admittedly, merely circumstantial, a more substantial consideration is that while the three *CB* may in some important respects fit better in between *EE* III and VII than they do between *NE* IV and VIII, that is not to say that the snugness of the fit is quite complete. One may wonder, for example, about the fact that if *NE* VI is also *EE* V, then Aristotle will raise the question of the *horos*, and about the relationship between practical and theoretical thinking, twice over in the same work, without forward or backward reference,[12] if not quite in the same terms; in other words, the same sort of problem arises in relation to these subjects in an eight-book *EE* as arose in relation to pleasure in a ten-book *NE*.

This particular case can perhaps be reduced to a mere matter of untidiness, in the way that – in effect – Kenny suggests,[13] and as such should worry us no more than the kinds of minor unevennesses, gaps, repetitions, or part-repetitions that we expect to find, and do find, in the Aristotelian treatises in general.[14] These are not, mostly, intended or written as finished, literary works, and Aristotle's style of argument is often one of starting and stopping, turning back on himself, beginning again, and so on. What we are used to treating as single treatises are in any case often assemblages of smaller, originally separate treatises, as notoriously in the case of the *Metaphysics* – and as in effect the *NE* would already be by virtue of its borrowing books from the *EE*; re-editing and revision, too (what I earlier called "reworking") may also leave its mark.[15] So, let us suppose that the *EE*, with its missing books back in place, is more or less of one piece. I say "more or less": "book" VIII looks and is fragmentary: it is unusually short, and both starts and breaks off abruptly. For its part, book VII, on friendship, is or could be self-standing,[16] like its counterpart in the *NE*, i.e. *NE* VIII–IX. Still, the *EE* with *CB* 1–3 feels reasonably complete, at any rate up to a point, and as Aristotelian treatises go; as complete, certainly, as the *NE* used to be, and indeed continues to be if it is allowed to keep its borrowed material. But this restoration to the *EE* of its original central books "as they stand" (to repeat Kenny's phrase) is still not, I think, quite straightforward. I propose to spend the rest of this chapter discussing what I see as the remaining difficulties, and exploring a solution.

The issue on which I shall mainly focus is the treatment of *sophia* in the *EE* and the *NE*. While granting that, by and large, *phronêsis* is handled in the same way in the *EE* (with or without *CB* 1–3) and in the *NE* (ditto), I notice that the same is not obviously true of *sophia*. This becomes clear if we use the same sort of test as Kenny applied in the case of *phronêsis*,[17] i.e. looking at the "doctrine … concerning" it first in the relevant "common" book, then in the *NE* without that book, then similarly in the *EE* without it.

The first part is easy enough. *Sophia* as described in *CB* 2 (i.e. *EE* V/*NE* VI) is (1) reserved for the highest kind of intellectual accomplishment or mastery, rather than the accomplishment of experts in particular skills (*EE*/*NE* 1141a9–16). (2) *Sophia* is the most precise of the kinds of knowledge, involving knowledge both of what follows from first principles and of first principles themselves;

thus a combination of *nous* and of systematic knowledge, *epistêmê*, of the highest things (1141a16–20).[18] (3) *Sophia* is distinct from *politikê* and *phronêsis* in not being concerned with things human and things one can deliberate about, or about bringing things into being (1141a20–b22). (4) *Sophia* and *phronêsis* are the excellences of two separate parts of *to logon echon* in us (1139a5–15, 1144a2). (5) *Sophia* produces happiness by being a part of it, as do ethical excellence and wisdom combined (1141a1–9). (6) *Sophia* is not prescribed to by *phronêsis*, but rather *phronêsis* prescribes on its behalf, seeing to it that it comes into existence (1145a6–11).

When we look at the *NE* minus the *CB*, we find nothing incompatible with any of these six features, and plenty that is either compatible with them or better than compatible. In book I, *sophia tis* appears as one of the things people have identified with *eudaimonia*, alongside *aretê* and *phronêsis* (and pleasure): "For some people think it is excellence (*aretê*), others that it is wisdom (*phronêsis*), others a kind of intellectual accomplishment (*sophia tis*: 1098b23–4)." *Sophia* without qualification is used as an example of an intellectual excellence, the other examples used being *sunesis* and *phronêsis* (1103a5–6); the justification for distinguishing intellectual from ethical excellences is then framed with *sophia* and *sunesis* alone, without *phronêsis*.[19] Then, in book X, *sophia* is what is achieved by, the goal of, *philosophia*, the love of it (*sophia*); it is the highest *aretê*, the *aretê* of the highest part of us, activity in accordance with which is *eudaimonia* (1177a12–27). This passage can then be connected, retrospectively, and is surely intended to be so connected, with the parenthesis at I 7, 1098a16–18: "if all this so, the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with excellence (and if there are more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and the most complete)." In 1177a29 and 33, the *sophos* is the person who lives the reflective or theoretical life successfully (and the more *sophos* he is, the more capable he will be of carrying on his reflections even on his own: a32–4); similarly at 1179a30 and 32.

In all these instances, with the possible exception of the second, *sophia/sophos* appears to be used in a way that conforms precisely with the treatment of *sophia* in *CB* 2. All six features of *sophia* listed above as deriving from that treatment are either actively or implicitly in play, especially in *NE* X but also, by virtue of the forward reference – assuming that that is what it is – at 1098a16–18, in *NE* I too. Indeed, *sophia* as defined in *CB* 2 comes to play *the* starring role in the discussion of the best life that (all but) rounds off the *NE* as a whole: see 1177a24, 29, 32, 33, 1179a30, 32. This is a special Aristotelian *sophia*, as book X confirms (i.e. in 1177a12–27). *Sophia* as used in ordinary speech – from which the specialized Aristotelian variety is distinguished at (*CB* 2) 1141a9–16 – is also in evidence here and there: see I 4, 1095a21; IV 7, 1127b20; IX 2, 1165a26; X 8, 1179a17. Maybe it is to distinguish Aristotelian *sophia* from this ordinary, common-or-garden *sophia/sophos*,[20] which is probably hardly distinguishable from ordinary, common-or-garden uses of *phronêsis/phronimos*, implying a quite unspecific – sometimes supposed, sometimes real – intellectual superiority, that Aristotle adds the *tis* in 1098b23–4: "For some people think it is excellence,

others that it is wisdom (*phronêsis*), others *a kind of* intellectual accomplishment (*sophia* tis)." What he is hinting at here is, perhaps, already the technical sense of *sophia* introduced in (*NE/EE*) VI; it is hard to think of anyone else who identifies *eudaimonia* with *sophia* as opposed to *phronêsis* – which has already done duty on its own, a couple of Stephanus pages before, as a representative of intellect in a listing of goods (I 6, 1096b23–5).[21]

When we turn to the undisputed *Eudemian* books, by contrast, whether preceding or following the putative *EE* V, there appears to be hardly a trace of the special kind of *sophia* introduced in that book; the only *sophia* that is indisputably in evidence is that of ordinary speech. *Sophia* and *sophos* appear in total only six times: (1) 1215a23, (2) 1220a6, (3) 1220a12, (4) 1243b33, (5) 1243b34, and (6) 1248a35.[22] Of these occurrences, none displays all of the features of *sophia/sophos* as defined in *EE* V/*NE* VI, and all but one display none. (1) refers to what we traditionally term the "older and wiser" (*kathaper tines ôithêsan tôn sophôn kai presbuterôn*). (2) is the *Eudemian* counterpart of *NE* I, 1103a5–6, giving examples of intellectual *aretai*; while the *Nicomachean* version gives us *sophia*, *sunesis*, and *phronêsis*, the *Eudemian* version has just *sunesis* and *sophia* (*epainoumen gar ou monon tous dikaious alla kai tous sunetous kai tous sophous*). In (3), *sophia* is again an example of an intellectual *aretê*, along with *deinotês* (*ou gar legomen poios tis to ethos, hoti sophos ê deinos, all'hoti praos ê thrasus*). In all of (1)–(3), *sophia* is used in a wholly untechnical and not the technical Aristotelian sense (the "we" in the last two cases surely refers to people in general). (4) and (5) are interesting insofar as they recall a familiar problem, about how to weigh wisdom/expertise (*sophia*) against wealth ("if one person complains that he has given wisdom, the other that he has given wealth"),[23] but the context is a discussion of justice in exchange, and *sophia* here need not be any particular kind of wisdom (or expertise). (6), for its part, is at least *prima facie* more interesting, as the only place in the undisputed books of the *EE* where *phronêsis* and *sophia* – actually, *phronimos* and *sophos* – appear together. I cite the whole sentence[24]: *alogoi gar ontes epitunchanousi*[25] *kai tou tôn*[26] *phronimôn kai sophôn tacheian einai tên mantikên, kai monon ou tên apo tou logou dei apolabein*: "though lacking the reasoning they match even the speediness of divination achieved by [*sc.* practically] wise and intellectually accomplished people, so that one could almost take it for the divination engineered by reasoning." The sentence describes those possessed of a special *eutuchia* that enables them to get things right over and over again despite their lack of reasoning: they can see or "divine" what they should do almost as if they were able to reason, whether like *phronimoi* or like *sophoi*. What Aristotle is describing looks not unlike the operation of *nous*, *tôn eschatôn ep'amphotera*, at *CB* 2, 1143a35–b5, as it grasps ("divines"?) the particular, whether in the practical or the theoretical sphere – only here without the *phronêsis* or *sophia* (/*epistêmê*).[27]

So, here is one possible mention of *sophia* in the mode of *CB* 2 in the *EE*. But it would be hard to insist on it when the term *nous*, so closely associated with it in *CB* 2 (*sophia* being a combination of *nous* and *epistêmê*), is consistently

used, in the same context, in a quite different way.[28] But in any case, the context requires just that *sophos/sophia* at 1248a35 be just any wisdom that is not specifically practical. I conclude that *sophia* and *sophos* are not used in the technical Aristotelian sense, as set up in *CB* 2, anywhere in the undisputed *Eudemian* books.

Does this matter for the issue in hand, that is, in relation to the question about the provenance of *CB* 2? Here is a possible reason why it might not matter. There is nothing in *EE* I–III or in *EE* VII–VIII that precludes the same sharp distinction that is conveyed in *CB* 2 through the opposition between *phronêsis* and *sophia*; *phronêsis*, it seems, is used according to the definition of it there, and given (a) that the intellectual excellences are said in *EE* II to have two functions, discovering "truth, either about how things are (*pôs echei*) or about how things come into being (*peri geneseôs*)"[29]; (b) that the second of these functions is clearly assigned, in the undisputed *Eudemian* books in general, to *phronêsis*; and (c) that *sophia* is said in *CB* 2 "not to be of any coming into being" (*oudemias … geneseôs*),[30] maybe there was just no occasion to introduce this special use of *sophia*.

But this, I think, is an unsatisfactory response. *Sophia*, in its technical sense, is a key element – even *the* key element – in the *NE*'s answer to the fundamental question about the nature of *eudaimonia*. It is the jewel in the crown, and *CB* 2 provides the setting (or, better, the backdrop?) for that jewel. Since the *EE* obviously raises the same fundamental question about *eudaimonia*, one is bound to ask why there is barely a trace, in the undisputed books, of the centrepiece of the *Nicomachean* account (i.e. *sophia*). *NE* I–IV – I claim – prepares for *CB* 2 on *sophia*, of which *NE* X then makes triumphant use; the *EE* (minus *CB*) meanwhile neither looks forward to *CB* 2 on *sophia*[31] nor makes any use of it.

Or is this just down to the fragmentary nature of *EE* VIII, and to the fact that Aristotle never gets round, in the *EE*, as he does in *NE* X 6–8, to giving a direct answer to the question he raises in *EE* I–II about the good life?

To answer this question, we need to look briefly at the structure and content of *EE* VIII as a whole. Aristotle does not go out of his way to link VIII 1–3 together, and indeed on the face of it the three chapters are on distinct topics: the difference between *phronêsis* and *epistêmê* (ch. 1); good fortune, *eutuchia* (ch. 2); the *horos* of *kalokagathia* (ch. 3). All three, however, can be seen as concerned – in effect, if not by design – with one overriding question, about the role of *epistêmê* in a successful life of practical activity, the question being approached by way of opposition to Socrates: that is, to Socrates in Plato, as the nature of the references makes clear.[32] VIII 1 finds Aristotle returning (without acknowledgement of the fact) to the Socratic identification of the *aretai* as *epistêmai* with which he began the discussion of *aretê* and *phronêsis* in book I.[33] He concludes that the Socratic saying "nothing is stronger than *phronêsis*" is correct, only he shouldn't have substituted *epistêmê* for *phronêsis*,[34] and the argument for that conclusion is a sort of commentary on Socrates' claim[35] in the *Hippias Minor* that the person who goes wrong voluntarily is preferable to the

person who does so involuntarily. The discussion in VIII 2 of good fortune starts from the premiss that doing well (*eu prattein*) comes from good fortune as well as from (the combination of) *phronêsis* and *aretê*. This is a premiss that Socrates in effect denies, in the *Euthydemus*, by identifying *eutuchia* with *sophia*; Aristotle adverts to the fact at 1247b14–15.[36] His question is: if there is such a thing as good fortune, and people really do get things right without apparently being intellectually equipped to do so, and regularly get them right, even continuously, not just every now and then, how does this come about? There then follows that notorious and extraordinary passage (1248a24–b3) in which, if we accept the text handed down by the manuscript tradition, as I think we should, the cause is said to be god, even a god that is somehow within us: an intellect, perhaps, that is indistinguishable – except by location – from the reason that operates in the universe at large, and that can function even unbeknownst to us.[37] Even though Aristotle starts in this chapter from an anti-Socratic position, his answer (after a winding, dialectical argument) to the initial question, about the cause of good fortune, seems to me to belong to the same general type as Socrates' own evocation of a personal *daimonion*, an inner voice that tells him not to do things he was intending to do, and by implication is right to tell him not to do them.[38]

VIII 3 has something of the same structure, to the extent that it begins with a set of ideas that contrast with Socrates', but circles round and ends up using language, and apparently taking up a position, that is distinctly Socratic. The chapter makes what looks like a new start, on the subject of "what we were already calling *kalokagathia*,"[39] i.e. the ethical virtues taken together, explaining the relationship first between the two elements of the term, *kalon* and *agathon*, and then, more briefly, in 1249a17–21, between them and the pleasant. Aristotle thus explains the thesis that he announced at the very beginning of the *EE*, about the convergence in *eudaimonia* of the fine, the good, and the pleasant, and by doing so ties the end of the work to its grand opening, justifying with a splendid clarity his disagreement there with the inscription from Delos.[40]

But now, having made the good man the measure, as he has, in action and in the choice of *haplôs agatha*, a.k.a. goods "in the abstract,"[41] Aristotle needs to say just how the good man will do the measuring; it's not sufficient to say "as reason dictates," "as we said earlier."[42] He proceeds to give his answer: the *horos* is whatever "choice and possession (? acquisition: *ktêsis*) of natural goods" will most produce (? *poiein*) *tou theou theôria*, contemplation of/reflection on, god; any such choice that "either through deficiency or through excess prevents service to (*therapeuein*) and contemplation of/reflection on god" will be bad.[43] *Theôrein* "the god" is usually taken as doing Aristotelian metaphysics, and this may be right, but we should probably consider taking "the god" here more closely with what has been said about god and the divine in the preceding chapter,[44] that is, as something more like "god/reason as operating in the universe (and us)." The addition of *therapeuein* to *theôrein* seems to me to point in the same direction. I have argued elsewhere[45] that the expression *therapeuein*

ton theon would have been recognizable to Aristotle's audience as referring to Socrates, and that "Aristotle is here treating Socrates as a philosopher and theoretician like himself."[46] On this interpretation, the addition of *therapeuein* will perhaps be for the purpose of clarifying *theôrein*: what Aristotle has in mind, more than anything, is *doing philosophy*, in a world that is supremely adapted as a subject for philosophy by the fact of its control by god/reason.

This gesture to Socrates, however, if such it is, is two-edged, insofar as it places Socratic philosophizing outside the very sphere to which he, Socrates, thought he was devoting himself: that is, the sphere of practical activity. A Socrates, like an Aristotle, may theorize about ethics, but the *kalokagathos* will apparently not require such theorizing in order to act in accordance with his *kalokagathia*. Socrates proposed that philosophy was itself the key to the good and happy life; not so, says Aristotle – the happy life is one lived according to the ethical *aretai*, accompanied by *phronêsis*, or according to *kalokagathia*, which unites all these into one. *EE* VIII 1 establishes that the ethical virtues are not matters of *epistêmê*; *EE* VIII 2 recognizes a sort of divine inspiration that enables successful lives for some even in the absence of reasoning altogether; *EE* VIII 3 then finishes off the Socratic position by *prima facie* freeing *kalokagathia* itself, and *a fortiori* activity in accordance with it, from any necessary involvement with *theôria*, even while endorsing Socrates' view of the supreme importance of philosophy in itself. As its concluding sentence confirms, this last chapter has been *about kalokagathia*, and *theôria* has only entered the picture as providing the *horos* for it, and the *skopos* of natural goods/goods "in the abstract": "so, as to the standard/limit of *kalokagathia*, and the aim/purpose of [our choice and possession/acquisition of] goods in the abstract, let this stand as our account."[47]

So where does this leave us, on the subject of *eudaimonia*, and of *sophia*, in *EE* VIII 3? *Kalokagathia* has just been identified as complete *aretê*, *aretê teleios*[48]; and happiness, *eudaimonia*, was said in book II to be the "activity of a complete life in accordance with *aretê teleia*."[49] But given how Aristotle defines the *horos* of *kalokagathia*, i.e. in terms of serving and reflecting on (*theôrein*) god, this "activity … in accordance with *aretê teleia*" ought also include reflective (*theôrêtikê*) activity: it is hard to see how, if one kind of activity is demarcated by its capacity to produce the conditions for another, and the first activity is essential to human *eudaimonia*, the second activity would not also be part of that *eudaimonia*. But then it would be odd to suppose that our first activity was meant to be defined by its capacity to produce the conditions for doing the second activity *badly*. So, if *eudaimonia* is activity in accordance with complete *aretê*, then that complete *aretê* will include the *aretê* relating to "service to and *theôria* of god" as well as the *aretai* that go to make up *kalokagathia*, and *kalokagathia* will be *aretê teleios* at 1249a16 strictly by comparison with doing fine (*kala*) things merely *kata sumbebêkos* (1249a14–16).[50] If the *aretê* corresponding to theoretical activity is to be given a name, it might as well be *sophia*. By this reckoning, even if the *EE* lacks an equivalent to *NE* X 6–8, and an explicit, final answer to the question about the content of *eudaimonia*, we can supply the one he perhaps

would have given, had he got round to it (*EE* VIII 3 ends, after all, with the sort of sentence[51] introduced by *men oun* that usually leads on to a new topic): namely that *eudaimonia* includes philosophical reflection as well as good practical activity, and that the first is a more important ingredient than the second.[52]

But this is not the only way of reading the concluding paragraphs of what Kenny[53] calls the "cryptogram" that is *EE* VIII, and I myself have more than a suspicion that it is an overinterpretation, in one respect at least. A point that is often overlooked is that Aristotle sums up his discussion of the *horos*, i.e. as announced at 1249a21–b3, by saying (in the text as I reconstruct it) "And this the soul has [*sc.* a faculty for *theôria*], and this is the best *horos*, to be least aware of the remaining part of the soul as such" (1249b22–3). This, so far as I can presently see, ought somehow to be the counterpart of what has just been said about the promotion of *theôria/therapeia* as the criterion for choosing and possessing natural goods (we don't need *another* criterion on top of that). If so, then the emphasis in the preceding context should be something to the effect of "and this the best *horos* for the soul, namely to be most aware of the rational part of the soul as such." That, I propose, will be when it is philosophizing – serving and reflecting on god – as well as issuing the orders that will keep the non-rational soul in its place. *CB* 2 would lead us to expect Aristotle here to distinguish two rational parts of the soul, one concerned with reflection, the other with issuing orders, but I suggest that he does not. "And so it is with *to theôrêtikon*," he says in 1249b13, referring back to "And this [*sc.* our *archê*]," he says, is twofold, for medicine is an *archê* in one way and health in another, and the former for the sake of the latter; and so it is with *to theôrêtikon*" – that is, I take it, *to theôrêtikon* includes both the counterpart of health in the analogy, which must be god (at the heart of the philosophizing self) and that of medicine, i.e. *phronêsis*. Even if, according to *CB* 2, theoretical and practical thinking belong to two different soul-parts, the *EE* is capable of treating them both as "theoretical": see *EE* II 10, 1226b25–6 *esti gar bouleutikon tês psuchês* as *to theôrêtikon aitias tinos*. But this need not be taken as contradicting *CB* 2. Aristotle is not here comparing or contrasting different aspects of human rationality, or talking about the choice between the practical and the philosophical life; he is not talking directly about kinds of life at all. We would expect him to talk about lives again at some point, given that he raised the subject at some length in book I,[54] but he is not raising it here. Perhaps he answered it in some other part of the fragmentary book VIII, now lost; perhaps not.

In sum, what is uppermost by the end of *EE* VIII 3 is the idea that we need to lead *rational* lives, whether practical/political or both practical/political and theroretical. On this reading, that *sophia* of the *CB* 2 type does not figure is not because the opportunity does not arise, but rather because the *Eudemian* Aristotle does not show, or have, the same level of interest in *sophia* as he betrays in the *NE* – an interest that runs in a direct line from the beginning of the work, through *CB* 2, to X 6–8. With regard to *sophia*, then, *CB* 2 meshes more closely with the undisputed *Nicomachean* books – both the earlier and the

later ones – than with the undisputed *Eudemian* ones. How to explain this state of affairs, if (as I am still minded to accept) the disputed books belonged originally to the *EE*? I have no definitive answer to this question. I am, however, struck by the fact that when we compare the text of *EE* I–II, the three references to *sophia* in *NE* I (i.e. references to *sophia* in Aristotle's technical use) look like additions specifically designed to look forward both to *CB* 2 and to *NE* X, binding them into a whole that is rather more unified, in this single but absolutely central respect, than the corresponding sequence *EE* I–II–*CB* 2 *EE*-VIII. I also note that all three references in *NE* I can be removed without any damage to the syntax of the sentences to which they belong. I speculate that they were the work of whoever was mainly responsible for organizing what we know as the ten-book *NE* (Nicomachus?). I also speculate that what we know of as *EE* VIII is a fragment of an Ur-*EE* V, abandoned in favour of another version, including some of the same topics but dealing with the intellectual virtues more systematically,[55] and written not long after the original version[56]; perhaps this Ur-*EE* fragment was installed in its present position, as *EE* VIII, by another editor, by false analogy[57] with *NE* X, after that was in place in the *NE*.

Both our ten-book *NE* and our eight- or five-book *EE* fall, and probably always fell, considerably short of the kind of unity suggested by labelling them "treatises." No more, as I said earlier, do many Aristotelian works. But the *EE* and the *NE prima facie* look different, insofar as they both have or appear to have beginnings and endings, and links between those beginnings and endings. In between, however, in both, are parts that sometimes sit well with these beginnings and endings, and with each other, and sometimes fit less well, thus suggesting that that first appearance is at least to some degree deceptive. Aristotle is a specialist in highly focused discussions of particular topics, and it is, by and large, not his habit to set out the big picture, systematically, in any given area. He may have intended to make an exception for ethics, but even here the results often betray Aristotle's preference for dealing with one sub-topic at a time (friendship; *akrasia*; pleasure). Maybe there was once a fully worked and fully organized *EE*, just as someone tried – and failed – to construct a fully coherent *NE*. But I would not bet on it. My own guess is that any original *EE*/collection of *Eudemian* books might have been hardly less uneven than the current version. I also hazard, on the basis both of the retention of the treatment of pleasure in what became *NE* VII, and of the apparent stylistic affinities to the *EE* of all three "common" books, that the degree to which *EE* IV–VII were reworked to fit them into their new home in the *NE* was relatively small. It may even be that the most extensive revision related to the *style* of the three books: not style as measured by Kenny's stylometrics, which for the most part reduces to word counts, but rather style that can be, for example, golden, flowing, and full, or crabbed, awkward, or elliptical. *EE* I–III and VII–VIII, by and large, belong to the second category, *NE* I–IV and VIII–X to the first – as, in my long experience as translator of the ten-book *NE*, do CB 1–3.[58] Here is a final hypothesis. After writing whatever

corresponded to what we may choose to call the original *EE*, that is, however rough and unfinished a collection of materials it might have been, Aristotle went on to write new ethical works – "books" – that nevertheless covered roughly the same territory as *EE* I–III and VII, in (what I claim to be) a more expansive style; he also wrote similarly expansive, flowing versions of the three intervening *Eudemian* books[59] that were much closer to the originals, one of the latter being the second *EE* V, i.e. the successor to the one that originally included the fragment we call *EE* VIII (or perhaps the fragment was always the whole?). But after that he also decided to write a completely new treatment of pleasure, along with the crowning chapters X 6–8, which Nicomachus could put together with the rest to make the (half-)finished article.[60]

Notes

1 This chapter represents a belated corrective to Rowe, 1971a, which is a longer version of the identically titled chapter II 1 of Rowe, 1971b, published later in the same year; in what follows I shall quote from the later version (henceforth "*The* EE *and* NE"). Earlier versions of this chapter were delivered at the Centre Léon Robin, Paris, in November 2016, to the "B" Club in Cambridge in May 2017, and to the Dublin workshop on *EE* and *NE* in June 2018.
2 Jaeger, 1934, p. 239. Jaeger's position here relies heavily on Kapp, 1912.
3 Jaeger, 1934, p. 231.
4 Kenny, 2016, including "Reconsiderations 1992" and "Reconsiderations 2016"; hereafter "*AE*."
5 Kenny, *AE*, p. 161.
6 Rowe, *The* EE *and* NE, p. 69.
7 An idea that – though little has been added to it since 1971 – continues to resurface: thus, e.g. "the common books may have been somewhat revised for reuse in the *Nicomachean Ethics*," say Rafael Woolf and Brad Inwood in the introduction to their translation of the *Eudemian Ethics*, see Inwood, Woolf, p. ix, while Hendrik Lorenz, reviewing Woolf and Inwood in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (1 October 2013) says "On stylistic grounds many scholars think that the common books were originally written to form part of the *Eudemian Ethics*, and so the recent trend to include them in translations of that work has something to be said for it. However, it is entirely possible, and in fact probable, that Aristotle himself revised and updated his discussions of such important topics as the nature of justice, the intellectual virtues, and lack of self-control for, and perhaps also after, inclusion in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Furthermore, there are fairly strong historical reasons for thinking that these three books were included in a ten-book edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* long before someone decided to fill the large and rather conspicuous gap [caused by the removal of three books for modification and reuse in *NE*?] in the middle of an earlier five-book edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* by inserting the corresponding *Nicomachean* books, thus creating the appearance of a complete version of the *Eudemian Ethics* and at the same time presenting those three books as common to the two treatises." Lorenz adds in a footnote "The reasons [for so presenting them] are presented with clarity and force in O. Primavesi, "Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung des *Corpus Aristotelicum*," *Philologus* 151.1 (2007), 51–77." I shall return to these issues later.
8 Kenny, *AE*, p. 163.
9 I still leave open the possibility that they belong to the *NE* more closely than simply through being borrowed "as they stand" from the *EE*. I shall explore this possibility below. (See Dorothea Frede's broadside in Frede, 2019, which is *inter alia* another useful

reminder, alongside e.g. Lorenz's review [n.7 above], that resistance to the view of the *CB* as the *Eudemian* is by no means dead.)

10 I.e. (1) P = Vat.1342, (2) C = Cant.I.i.5.44, and (3) L = Laur.81,15, to which can now be added (4) what was once Phillipps 3085 and is now Mon. 635, which I label as "B" (the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek having bought it at Sotheby's in 1976).

11 It is indeed the shared view of Renaissance scholars, and of their Byzantine predecessors, that the *CB* belong to the *NE*: the evidence is complex, but see e.g. the note by Cardinal Bessarion on f. 270^{v} of Par.2042 (a collection of excepts by him from Aristotelian treatises).

12 See Rowe, *The* EE *and* NE, pp. 109–113.

13 Kenny, *AE*, pp. 181–182 (followed by direct criticism of the pages in "*The* EE and *NE*" referred to in the last note); cf. Kenny, 1992, p. 100.

14 In which case, I note, the argument from the double treatment of pleasure will also lose its force as an argument against the integrity of our ten-book *NE*.

15 Cf. e.g. Burnyeat, 2004, p. 179: "The surviving treatises, unlike the 'exoteric' works he sent to the booksellers, remained with him, always available for additions, subtractions, and other forms of revision."

16 Cf. Kenny, *AE*, p. 42.

17 See above.

18 "*Nous* and systematic knowledge – systematic knowledge, as it were with its head in place, of the highest objects," a19–20 (translations are my own, from Broadie, Rowe, 2002, except that I here leave *nous* untranslated for reasons that will become apparent).

19 1103a7–8 "For when we talk about character, we do not say that someone is accomplished in a subject (*sophos*), or has a good sense of things (is *sunetos*), but rather that he is mild or moderate; but we do also praise someone accomplished in something for his disposition, and the dispositions we praise are the ones we call 'excellences.'" ("In a subject" and "in something" are, of course, fillers, which are justified if, as I think, Aristotle here finds it convenient to separate off his specialized *sophia* by reference to *sophia* more generally – though, of course, even the first is about *something*.)

20 A model for the *Nicomachean sophos* might be the Thales of Plato's *Theaetetus*, representing the "leaders of the [philosophical] chorus": *Theaetetus* 173c–174c.

21 Kenny, in correspondence, says he thinks the uses of *sophia* in *NE* I are untechnical; "s*ophia tis* means 'some kind or other of intellectual accomplishment' rather than 'the special [*sophia*] that is exercised in contemplation.'" But I think that *NE* I, as it stands, shows a clear interest in distinguishing *sophia* from *phronêsis*, and it is hard to see why we should look for a basis for this distinction other than that offered by *CB* 2.

22 Thomas Case, in his seminal *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article on Aristotle (1910), claimed that the distinction between *phronêsis* and *sophia* familiar to us from *NE* VI/*EE* V was not well "prepared for" in *EE* I–III, but was present in *EE* VIII (he concludes on this basis that "probably therefore this part [of *EE*] was a separate discourse"), and cites "1246b4 seq, 1248a35, 1249b14." (*EE* as a whole, Case thought, was a preliminary sketch for the *NE*; the treatment of *phronêsis* in I–III he calls "a chaos" [p. 31 of the reprint of Case's article in Wians, 1996.) The first and third of these passages do not mention *sophia*, and it must therefore be a moot point whether they contain a reference to the distinction in question.

23 Cf. Protagoras' practice of saying to his students "pay me what you think my teaching is worth"?

24 In the text as it will appear in my new Oxford Classical Text of *EE*, due for publication in 2023.

25 *epitunchanousi* Susemihl, following the Latin version in the *Liber de bona fortuna*, which is testimony to a Greek text earlier than any of our Greek manuscripts, i.e. P, C, B, and L: *apotunchanousi* PCBL.

26 *tou tôn* Sylburg: *toutôn* PCBL (*tou tôn* accounts for the following infinitive; *toutôn* as it stands is little short of nonsense: why "these"? We would anyway expect *toutôn tôn*).

27 Alternatively, or additionally, Aristotle's *sophôn* at 1248a35 covertly refers to the thesis with which Socrates shocks the young Clinias in Plato's *Euthydemus*, that *eutuchia is* actually *sophia*: 279d6. See further below.
28 I.e. for intellect or reason in general (1247a30, 1248a21, 29, 32).
29 II 4, 1221b30.
30 1143b20.
31 Cf. Case as cited in n. 22 above.
32 According to W. Fitzgerald, *Sôcratês* preceded by the definite article refers to the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, *Sôcratês* without the article to the historical Socrates (see Fitzgerald's *Selections from the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, Dublin 1853); "Fitzgerald's canon" is subsequently enshrined, but unattributed, in the 9th edition of Liddell–Scott–Jones's *Greek Lexicon*, s.v. *ho*, *hê*, *to*). That does not hold for the *EE*: see n. 36. One is tempted to explain this by supposing that Bishop Fitzgerald thought the *EE* spurious; but then the rule probably does not hold consistently for the *NE* either. Burger, 2008, is inclined to see the *NE* as a whole as a conversation with Plato's Socrates. A work or works on ethics written (as I suppose) not so long after Plato's death could not avoid being in some sense a dialogue with the Platonic Socrates; here in *EE* VIII Socrates is more immediately the moving cause.
33 I 5, 1216b2 ff.
34 *EE* VIII 1, 1246b34–6. The outcome of the chapter is a somewhat less expansive version of CB 2, 13, 1144b17–30.
35 Or takes off from it; in any case the connection between VIII 1 and the *Hippias Minor* seems to me to be close and undeniable.
36 "As *Sôkratês* said": the reference here to *Euthydemus* 279d6 is generally recognized.
37 So a *nous* after all: see text to n. 28.
38 Rowe, 2021.
39 Not in the undisputed books of the *EE*, or in the *CB*, but see *NE* IV 3, 1124a4, X 9, 1179b10: another illustration, perhaps, of the complex history of what we call the *EE*.
40 I 1, 1214a5–6.
41 Kenny's translation of the phrase, the reference being to things that are good if one "abstracts" them from the sort of person who possesses them (the "natural" goods): they will be good only if possessed by the good person, while in the wrong hands they can be positively bad. The standard translation of *haplôs* as "without qualification" is – as I now see – to say the least unhelpful.
42 1249b3–4; see *CB* 1, which says about the formula *kata ton orthon logon* almost exactly what *EE* VIII says about *hôs ho logos* here: *alêthes men, outhen de saphes*.
43 1249b16–21.
44 Cf. Kenny, *AE*, p. 175.
45 Rowe, 2013.
46 Rowe, 2013, p. 322. I also bring in, in this context, Sarah Broadie's important essay, Broadie, 2003.
47 1249b23–5.
48 1249a16.
49 1219a38–9. (The adjective *teleios* appears as indiscriminately two- and three-termination in both the *EE* and the *NE*.)
50 And so will not refer back to book II after all.
51 A sentence that Donald Allan proposed to excise, for no reason that has appeared in print.
52 Cf. Verdenius, 1971, p. 297.
53 Kenny, *AE*, p. 178.
54 "There are three lives that everyone chooses to live who has the choice, the political life, the philosophical, the life of enjoyment," 1215a35–b1; picked up again at 1216a27–9.
55 That is, rather than concentrating, as "*EE* VIII" does, on overturning the Socratic position and establishing that practical wisdom is not a matter of scientific knowledge. If the

fragment was itself once a part of a wider discussion of the intellectual excellences, it is hard to think, given the terms it uses in dealing with the issues it does deal with, that the larger whole would have included discussion of *sophia* and *nous* in the specialized uses in which they are introduced in *CB* 2.

56 Given that, stylometrically, *CB* 2 appears inseparable from *CB* 1 and *CB* 3, themselves stylometrically *Eudemian*.

57 The analogy might perhaps have been encouraged by the link (see above) between the first part of VIII 3 and the rather grand opening in *EE* I; but it is a false analogy because, as I have argued, despite some overlap *EE* VIII and *NE* X 6–9 are ultimately about different things.

58 Kenny, in correspondence, is sceptical about this claim, and/or about its importance, on the grounds that it is unquantified (and perhaps unquantifiable?). I think nonetheless that the differences are real. Even – or perhaps especially – after Kenny's stout defences of his statistical methods in "Reconsiderations 2016" in *AE*, I continue to worry about how exactly his measurements themselves relate to style. At *AE*, p. 280, Kenny cites G. R. Ledger's criteria for variables to be used "in a statistical inquiry into style," the third of which is that "they must have a fair chance of being linked with stylistic features": what, I want to ask, is the precise nature of the link in this case? The statisticians' reply is that this does not matter; *something* is being measured, and that something exhibits significant differences over given quantities of text. But if statistics do not lie, they do not tell the whole story. If some aspects of style go unseen by author and by reader, other aspects are surely entirely visible to both; despite the numbers, I still claim that *EE* I–III and VII–VIII are *written differently* from *NE* I–IV, VIII–X, and *CB* 1–3. (For criticism of Ledger's methods, see Young, 1994.)

59 To make them accessible to a wider public? Given that on any analysis there is a huge overlap between the *EE* and the *NE*, that seems a decent enough explanation.

60 My thanks to Tony Kenny and Malcolm Schofield for their comments on versions of this chapter. The blame for surviving missteps remains entirely mine. The arguments of the present essay are developed further, and its conclusions refined and modified, in Rowe forthcoming 1 and Rowe forthcoming 2.

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9 Neither Virtue nor Vice

Akratic and Enkratic Values in and beyond the *Eudemian Ethics*

Jozef Müller

9.1 Introduction

The task of determining the connections, similarities, and differences between Aristotle's accounts of self-control (*enkrateia*) and lack of control (*akrasia*) in the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) is perilous. Aristotle's most sustained discussion of the two conditions occurs in one of the common books, namely in *CB* VII 1–10.[1] We do not possess these books in the form in which they were originally written – there are clear signs of significant alterations which were likely meant to make the original text fit into its new context. Whatever the direction of this editorial process (whether, as seems likely to me, from the *EE* to the *NE*, or *vice versa*), the result is that it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle the original from the new layer. The many controversies surrounding Aristotle's theory of lack of control (and self-control) further complicate any efforts to distinguish two (or more) versions of the theory.[2]

In order to avoid these problems, I concentrate on Aristotle's claims about *enkrateia* and *akrasia* that occur in the *EE* but outside the *CB*. The *EE* contains two long chapters (*EE* II 7–8) in which self-control and lack of control play a prominent role, as well as a number of interesting remarks in books 7–8 that will prove of crucial importance. Although this selective focus on the *EE* may not yield a distinct theory of either self-control or lack of control, it can significantly enhance our understanding of Aristotle's overall view of the two dispositions. My particular interest is in the self-controlled and the uncontrolled agent's (from now on abbreviated as "S/U") conception of the good, that is the kind of values that they hold and the kind of ends or goals that they pursue in their decisions. On the face of it, there is little disagreement about this issue in the literature. The S/U have two contrary impulses, one originating in reason, the other in non-rational desires, primarily appetites.[3] They know that their appetites (or the actions those appetites urge them to take) are bad, but while the uncontrolled agent acts on her bad appetite and against her (good) decision, the self-controlled agent sticks to her good decision.[4] Since reason urges them both "correctly and towards the best things" (*NE* I 13, 1102b14–7), it is thought that insofar as their reason is concerned, they are

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committed to the right values. They have knowledge of the good in view of which they make their decisions, deciding on their actions with a view to the fine (*to kalon*).[5] They are just like the virtuous person when it comes to their reason and decisions, but unlike the virtuous person when it comes to their non-rational desires.

The main problem for this view is posed by Aristotle's insistence that it is *only* the virtuous agent that possesses practical wisdom.[6] If practical wisdom is (or essentially involves) knowledge of the good (*CB* VI 5, 1140b20–1), then Aristotle denies that the S/U have such knowledge. In response, some scholars have argued that the S/U lack practical wisdom because they fail to apply their knowledge appropriately to their circumstances. Terence Irwin's account exemplifies an attractive way in which this can be done.[7] Even as the uncontrolled agent has the correct conception of the good, he still acts on his (bad) appetite because he does not "steadily recognize the importance of thinking about his life as a whole," thus failing to see acting on his appetite as a mistake. Although the self-controlled agent makes a good decision that he also acts on, he does so reluctantly, believing that the good actions are rather costly, failing as they do to satisfy his appetites. A solution along these lines preserves the idea that the S/U have knowledge of the good but makes their application of that knowledge sufficiently deficient to disqualify them from possessing practical wisdom.[8]

A different kind of solution has been developed by Ursula Coope.[9] Instead of making the S/U bad at applying their knowledge of the good, it is rather their way of possessing it that is defective. The S/U do not experience the rational kind of pleasures that are connected with the appreciation of what is fine and that are supposed to underlie the possession of knowledge of the good. Consequently, they cannot aim at the fine (i.e. at the appropriate goal of virtuous actions) in their actions, since aiming at something as a goal requires that one finds it pleasant. They might know that the actions they decide on are fine, but they do not decide on them because of that. Rather, they aim at some other goal, such as health, that they find attractive and that the action also attains.

All solutions along these lines face an obvious problem – Aristotle's claims at *CB* VI 5, 1140b20–1 (that practical wisdom involves knowledge of the good) and *CB* VI 13, 1144b30–45a2 (that one cannot have practical wisdom without virtue of character) seem to concern directly what one knows, rather than how one can execute, apply, or relate to what one knows. The conception of the S/U agent that maintains that they know what is good and fine (but fail to act on it or only act on it with difficulty) does not fit well with the spirit of these statements. This remains so even as one extends the sense of what it means to know what is good and fine in a practical context. In recognition of this problem, Agnes Callard has recently (and boldly) argued that, despite Aristotle's claims that directly tie practical wisdom to virtue of character, at least the self-controlled agent should nevertheless be thought of as possessing practical wisdom.[10] If it is agreed that they possess

knowledge of the good and that they decide and act in accordance with this knowledge, there is no good reason to deny them practical wisdom.[11]

As I will argue, the evidence in the *EE* challenges the view that the S/U have knowledge of the good and that they are rationally committed to the values of the virtuous person. The problem is not that they fail either to apply or to possess their knowledge of it in the right way. Rather, they do not have knowledge of the good at all and, consequently, do not have the same values as the virtuous people. However, they are not vicious either since, as it turns out, they are still committed, although neither in the right way nor with true understanding, to virtue. The view that emerges makes the S/U – insofar as their rationally adopted values are concerned – a peculiar mixture of the intemperate and the virtuous person. Like the intemperate people, they think of the good in terms of bodily pleasure, but they are also, like the virtuous people, committed to virtue.

In Section 9.2, I review the evidence in *EE* II 7–8. I conclude that in these chapters, Aristotle operates with a coherent conception of the S/U, which is also compatible with the evidence in the *NE* and the *CB*. In Section 9.3, I concentrate on two claims from those chapters that tell us about the kinds of things that the S/U care about. As I argue, the *EE* allows us to develop a picture of a person whose reason leads her to make the right decisions but whose rational commitments and beliefs about values substantially differ not only from those of the vicious but also from those of the virtuous agent. In Section 9.4, I explain why rational commitments and values of this sort necessitate bad or excessive desires (i.e. desires that go against the demands of virtue). It is precisely these values and commitments that characterize the S/U. In Section 9.5, I provide two further arguments in favour of this conception of the S/U, extending its application to the *NE* and the *CB*.

The present study is constrained in scope in two significant ways. First, since I am interested in the general characterization of the S/U's rationally adopted ends and values, I am only interested in what they pursue insofar as their deliberations and decisions, but not their actions, are concerned. Accordingly, I do not distinguish between the self-controlled and the uncontrolled agent and so set aside questions concerning their particular characters. Second, I do not offer a theory (or theories) of either the self-controlled or the uncontrolled action. Although my interpretation has consequences for any such theory, their examination is beyond the scope of this chapter.

9.2 Enkrateia and Akrasia in *EE* II 7-8

The first mention of self-control and lack of control in *EE* occurs in Aristotle's discussion of the nature of voluntariness in *EE* II 7–8.[12] Although self-control and lack of control are not under investigation, Aristotle uses various claims about them as premises in arguments about voluntariness. Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether Aristotle is committed to any of these claims. Not only are there identical (or closely related) claims in arguments for contradictory

conclusions, but these are also accompanied by claims that are unlikely to be Aristotle's. For example, Aristotle appeals to the view that the uncontrolled agent acts against her reasoning in an argument in favour of the thesis that voluntary is that which is in accordance with appetite (*EE* II 7, 1223a36–b3) while in the immediately following argument that denies the thesis (*EE* II 7, 1223b5–18), he appeals to the claim that she acts against what she thinks is best. Both arguments contain questionable claims (insofar as Aristotle's views are concerned). The former that lack of control is wickedness (*mochthēria*), and the latter that if one does something voluntarily, one does it wishing it so. Aristotle does not indicate which premises he accepts and which he rejects. Still, we can determine which claims concerning *akrasia* and *enkrateia* are likely to be Aristotle's by examining their internal coherence in the two chapters. If some appear incompatible, we can determine which to exclude by testing them in relation to the rest of the *EE* or, if this should prove inconclusive, in relation to the *NE* or the *CB*.

In *EE* II 7, Aristotle investigates whether what is voluntary belongs in the category of things that are "in accordance with desire" (*kat' orexin*) (1223a26). Since he divides desire into three types (namely, appetite, spirit, and wish), there are three different options for what "in accordance with desire" can mean and Aristotle discusses them separately: in accordance with appetite (1223a29–b17); in accordance with spirit (1223b18–28); and in accordance with wish (1223b29–36). The investigation continues in *EE* II 8, first by a quick rejection of the suggestion that voluntary is that which is in accordance with decision (1223b38–4a4). Aristotle then concludes that voluntary is to be found "in acting somehow accompanied by thought" (1224a7). This view is, however, only investigated in *EE* II 9. The rest of *EE* II 8 is taken up by an investigation of things done by force. Here, self-controlled and uncontrolled actions feature again prominently (1224b31–5a2) since, on a certain account of what it is to act by force, they appear both voluntary and involuntary.

Rather than analyzing the arguments in detail, I list the claims about self-control and lack of control that occur in them, grouping them (for the sake of easier orientation) roughly by topic:

Ethical claims:

a) Lack of control seems to be a form of wickedness (*mochthēria*) (*EE* II 7, 1223a37; 1223b32) while self-control is a virtue (*EE* II 7, 1223b11).
b) The uncontrolled person acts unjustly when acting without control (*EE* II 7, 1223b1–2) while the self-controlled person acts justly (implied at *EE* II 7, 1223b11).

Internal motivational conflict:

c) In acting without control, the uncontrolled person acts against reasoning (*logismos*) and in accordance with appetite (*EE* II 7, 1223a38–9),

while in acting with self-control, the self-controlled person acts in accordance with reasoning (*logismos*) and against appetite (*EE* II 7, 1223b12–13).

d) In acting without control, one acts, as a result of one's appetite, against what one believes to be best (*EE* II 7, 1223b7–8).
e) The uncontrolled person does not wish to do what she does when she acts without control (*EE* II 7, 1223b6–7 and 1223b33).
f) The self-controlled and the uncontrolled people have two contrary impulses, driving them to opposite actions (*EE* II 8, 1224a33–b10).

Voluntariness:

g) Self-controlled and uncontrolled actions are both voluntary (*EE* II 7, 1223b2–3; *EE* II 8, 1224b28).

Pleasure and pain:

h) The self-controlled and the uncontrolled person experiences both pleasure and pain (*EE* II 8, 1224b15).
i) The self-controlled person drags himself away from appetites for pleasant things and feels pain when he does that (*EE* II 8, 1224a34–35) while the uncontrolled person goes by force against reasoning (*EE* II 8, 1224a35).
j) The uncontrolled person suffers less pain as he follows his appetite with enjoyment (*EE* II 8, 1224a37).
k) One who acts with self-control suffers pain in that he is even now acting against appetite but gets enjoyment from the expectation that he will benefit in the future or from the fact that he is even now benefiting from being healthy (*EE* II 8, 1224b16–19).
l) The uncontrolled person gets enjoyment from getting what he has an appetite for when he acts without control, but suffers pain from an expectation, as he thinks he will fare ill (*EE* II 8, 1224b19–21).

The S/U's reason:

m) In the case of self-control, reasoning knocks out or drives out (*ekkrouetai*) appetite, while in the case of lack of control, appetite knocks out or drives out reasoning (*EE* II 8, 1224b23–24).
n) The self-controlled person is motivated towards what he has found persuasive (*EE* II 8, 1224a38) while the uncontrolled person is driven by appetite without having been persuaded (*EE* II 8, 1224b1).

Other claims:

o) Self-control and lack of control concern not only appetite but also spirit (1223b18–19).

p) Without qualification, the S/U act in accordance with (their) nature, although not in accordance with the same one (in each case). Hence, in a way they do not act in accordance with nature (1224b35–37).

Several observations can be made immediately. First, there is no obvious contradiction among claims (a)–(p). This points to the view that in building the various arguments in *EE* II 7–8, Aristotle is operating with a coherent conception of the S/U. Second, statements (c)–(p) are consistent with Aristotle's claims in the *NE* and the *CB*,[13] in some cases adding details that are not present elsewhere (esp. h–l, m, and p). Third, there is heavy focus on the internal motivational conflict that characterizes both agents. The conflict involves two impulses (f), one of which rests on one's reasoning or belief about what is best (c, d, i, k, l, m, n), while the other involves appetite (c, d, i, j, k, l, m, n) or spirit (o). This focus is understandable. The internal conflict gives rise to the puzzles about uncontrolled and self-controlled behaviour that form the core of Aristotle's investigation of voluntariness in the *EE*.[14] Finally, there is no mention of the most prominent feature of the discussion of lack of control in *CB* VII 1–3, namely that the uncontrolled agent acts against her knowledge. In this respect, the *EE* is consistent with both the *NE* and *CB* VII 4–10 where the uncontrolled agent's knowledge (rather than a belief, decision, or reasoning) is mentioned only once in *CB* VII 10 and even there it is in a passage which rather conspicuously brings up the analogy of the uncontrolled person with those who are mad, drunk, or asleep (1152a14–6) which was made previously in *CB* VII 3.

In its broad outline, then, the picture of the S/U in *EE* II 7–8 is coherent and consistent with evidence in the *NE* and the *CB*. Nevertheless, there are claims that go beyond what we find in the *NE* and the *CB*. I concentrate on a subset of those claims, namely on (a), (b), (k), and (l) since they concern the character of the S/U. Claim (b) can be disposed of quickly. It can be understood in two ways – either as saying that the S/U act with or without particular justice or with or without general justice. The former understanding is unlikely. When Aristotle introduces the claim, he says that *all* vice makes people more unjust (*EE* II 7, 1223a26). This is not true of particular justice since some virtues and vices, such as courage, have nothing to do with the distribution of goods. But it might be true of general justice since justice in this sense is equivalent to virtue as a whole (*CB* V 1, 1130a8–10). Since uncontrolled actions are like intemperate actions, they are also vicious and so could be called unjust in this general sense.

Concerning (a), it is uncontroversial that, in a technical sense, Aristotle treats lack of control, self-control, vice, and virtue as four distinct states of character.[15] Accordingly, (a) is either a non-technical claim that lumps together vice and lack of control as bad modes of life[16] or it represents someone else's view. There is little indication in the chapter as to which of these options is correct. There are, however, two passages in the *EE* in which Aristotle reports or draws connections between lack of control (*akrasia*) and vice (*kakia*, *mochthēria*,

or *ponēria*) (as well as between self-control and virtue). First, there is a passage in *EE* VII 6–7, where Aristotle says that the wretched person (*poneros*) is marked by disharmony just like the uncontrolled person (*EE* VII 6, 1240b14). The disharmony might concern either her past and present actions (*EE* VII 6, 1240b17–19) or her appetite and reason (*EE* VII 7, 1241a20–1). Here, Aristotle likens the vicious person to the uncontrolled one rather than the uncontrolled to the vicious one. He does so in virtue of a certain disharmony that characterizes them both and for which (it seems presumed) the uncontrolled person is especially well known. The passage, however, does not support the view that lack of control is a form of vice (or vice in a more technical sense). At best, it could be used to support the claim that vice is a form (perhaps an especially objectionable one) of lack of control. However, the passage merely states that vice shares a feature with lack of control.[17]

The second passage is in *EE* VIII 1. After raising the question of what could produce distortion in one's practical wisdom so as to make one who possesses it act "foolishly" (*aphronōs*) (1246b6), Aristotle asks whether this could happen just as it does in the case of lack of control which "is said to be a vice of the non-rational [part] of the soul (*kakia tou alogou tēs psuchēs*), and as the uncontrolled person is intemperate (*akolastos*) while having understanding (*nous*)" (1246b13–4). The preserved text of the passage is quite corrupt, but the basic idea is clear. In the uncontrolled agent, the bad non-rational part of the soul (i.e. the bad appetites) twists or distorts her reasoning. The agent then reasons in an opposite way to how she would reason normally (i.e. when not experiencing the bad desire) (1246b14–15). Analogically, then, practical wisdom could make one act "foolishly" if it too were, somehow, twisted or distorted by the bad non-rational part of the soul.

Aristotle rejects this possibility, concluding that

> it is clear that, at the same time, men are wise and the states of the non-rational parts of their souls are good, and the view of Socrates is correct, that nothing is stronger than wisdom; but in saying that it is knowledge, he was not correct; for it is a virtue, and not knowledge, but another form of understanding.
>
> (*EE* VIII 1, 1246b33–36)

This conclusion rules out the possibility that the S/U have practical wisdom since it correlates "being wise" (*phronimos*) with being good (*agathos*) where being good must be understood as referring to the non-rational part of the soul.[18] However, it does not rule out the possibility that the S/U's reasoning can be twisted or distorted by their bad non-rational desires. But if this were Aristotle's view, it would mean that due to her appetite, the uncontrolled agent comes to (temporarily) judge the bad course of action as good and to be done. Such judgment would immediately imply that she also comes to wish to act in that way. This contradicts claims (c), (d), and (e) according to which the uncontrolled agent acts on appetite but against her wish and reasoning. Accordingly,

the view of lack of control in the passage, one that implies the possibility of distortion of reasoning by bad appetites, likely belongs to Aristotle's opponent who wants to allow for the possibility of misusing practical wisdom. If this is correct, then in reporting the view that lack of control is "*kakia tou alogou tēs psuchēs*," Aristotle does not commit himself to any specific claim about the relationship between vice and lack of control.

9.3 Enkratic and Akratic Ends

This leads us to claims (k) and (l). The S/U experience both pleasure and pain since they satisfy one but frustrate another of their impulses. Ordinarily, it is assumed that the S/U's decision is correct insofar as it picks the right action in the given circumstances and does so for the sake of the right end or goal (i.e. the fine).[19] But this is not what Aristotle says the S/U do. The self-controlled person is not enjoying the fact that she is doing something fine, for example that she abstains (*NE* II 3, 1104b5–6). Instead, her enjoyment centres on benefitting her health and on other future benefits. Similarly, the uncontrolled person is pained by the prospect of future bad consequences (we can assume, sickness) rather than by the shamefulness of (or lack of fineness in) her action. The language of enjoyment and expectation strongly suggests that this is what they aim at (self-control) or try to suppress (lack of control). The S/U decide on their actions for the sake of health and other future benefits.

This description of the S/U's goals is significant since health is not something the virtuous person particularly cares about (e.g. *EE* VIII 3, 1248b8–37). In particular, it is not the goal that a virtuous person sets for herself in acting temperately. Although it is, obviously, not a bad thing, it does not trump considerations pertaining to the goods of the soul and to the fine (e.g. *EE* VIII 3, 1249b19). Although the virtuous person avoids acting so as to harm her health, she aims at the fine (*NE* III 12, 1119b16), desiring what is healthy and beneficial only moderately and only on the condition that it is not contrary to what is fine (*NE* III 11, 1119a1–20). But she would not purse health "at the cost of eating anything and everything" (*NE* X 3, 1173b27). Rather, she aims to avoid bodily pleasures (even good ones), setting her sight on more important (i.e. fine) objectives (*CB* VII 12, 1153a26–35). But health is also not something the intemperate person cares about. Her concern is with bodily pleasure, and she pursues it in excess, irrespective of her health (e.g. *EE* III 2, 1230a17–25).

In sum, health is the kind of goal that is pursued by people who do not understand temperance (e.g. *NE* I 4, 1095a22–8) yet act in accordance with it because they see it as providing other benefits, including health. It is thus a goal that is distinct from both the virtuous and the vicious person's goal. Still, if the S/U aim (in their deliberation and decisions) at health, they share similarities with both the virtuous and the intemperate agents. They are primarily concerned with the body and so are more like the vicious, but they aim at its excellent state (health) rather than at unlimited pleasures and so are more like the virtuous.

The following objection will help to clarify this initial picture of the S/U's goals. Aristotle claims that: (1) self-control makes reasoning correct (*EE* II 11, 1227b15); (2) we praise both the self-controlled and the uncontrolled agent's reason (*NE* I 13, 1102b14–7); and (3) in their decisions, the self-controlled and the uncontrolled agent choose the right actions (*CB* VII 9, 1151a33–b4). It is commonly thought that since the S/U have bad non-rational desires, these claims can only be explained if they have the correct conception of the good life: their reasoning is correct and leads to the right action because it starts with the right conception of the end. If so, their end should be the same as that of the virtuous people.

But the *EE* presents us with another possibility. Reason can urge one towards virtuous behaviour even if one does not have any real understanding of the good or of the true nature and value of virtue. There are people who are committed to virtue but not for what it is (or for itself) but, rather, for some *other* reasons. At the end of the *EE*, Aristotle draws a distinction between those who are fine-and-good (*kalokagathoi*) and those who are good but not fine-and-good:[20]

> **(a)** There is a certain civic state (*hexis politikē*), such as the Laconians have or others like them would have. This is a state of the following kind. **(b)** There are those who think one must (*dei*) have virtue but for the sake of the natural goods. Hence, they are good men (*agathoi andres*)[21] for the natural goods are [good] for them, but they do not have *kalokagathia* since they do not possess fine things for themselves but those who do possess them for themselves also decide on things that are fine and good [for themselves]. **(c)** And [so for them] not only those things, but also things that are not fine by nature but good by nature are fine. For they are fine when that for the sake of which they act and choose is fine since to one who is *kalokagathos* things that are good by nature are fine. For what is just is fine and that is what is in accordance with worth and this man is worthy of these things. And what is fitting is fine and these things are fitting for him: wealth, noble birth, power. And so to one who is *kalokagathos* the same things are both beneficial and fine. **(d)** But for the many they are in dissonance. For the things that are good without qualification (*haplōs*) are not good for them but are good for the good man. **(e)** But to one who is *kalokagathos* they are also fine since he does many fine actions because of them. **(f)** But one who thinks that virtues should be possessed for the sake of external goods does fine actions incidentally. **(g)** And so *kalokagathia* is complete virtue.
>
> (*EE* VIII 3, 1248b37–a17)

In the immediately preceding passage (*EE* VIII 3, 1248b25–36), Aristotle contrasts someone who is good (*agathos*) with someone who is vicious or foolish (1248b31): while the former is benefited by natural goods (such as honour, wealth, strength, or good fortune), the latter is not (presumably because they use such things foolishly and so to their own harm). In our passage, the good people – understood as people for whom natural goods are good – are divided

into two further kinds.[22] On the one hand, there are the fine-and-good people (*kalokagathoi*) for whom the naturally good things are not only beneficial but also fine since they choose them for the sake of the fine, which they value and possess for itself, as Aristotle explains in (c).

On the other hand, there are people like the Spartans for whom the naturally good things are still beneficial but who do not possess the fine things for themselves but, rather, for the sake of the naturally good (or external) things. They thus value the same kinds of things as the fine-and-good people, but in reverse order (the fine for the sake of the naturally good things rather than the naturally good things for the sake of the fine). Consequently, although they too engage in fine (virtuous) actions and although those actions are, as (b) makes clear, beneficial to them, their actions are not fine or commendable (1248b20) since they do not engage in them for the right reasons. As Aristotle says in (f), they perform such actions "incidentally." For example, whereas the virtuous person would perform a brave act because she is motivated to do so by the fineness of that act (or by the very purpose of bravery as such, whatever that might be), the Spartan kind of person would perform it for the sake of a quality that attaches to brave acts but does not define them as brave, such as honour.

Two conceptions of the Spartan type of agent might immediately come to mind. On the one hand, Aristotle might have in mind people whose commitment to virtue is conditional on their belief that virtue is beneficial (to them). As they pursue their ultimate goal (say, honour, wealth, or reputation), they act virtuously but they only do so to the extent to which doing so is beneficial to that goal. Should, however, virtue prove harmful to it (or non-virtuous actions more useful), they would be ready to discard it. On the other hand, Aristotle might think of people who think not only that virtue is beneficial but also that it is a necessary means to their goal. They act virtuously because they think that if they did not so act, they would inevitably jeopardize what they are striving for. Their commitment to virtue might thus appear more stable since it remains in place as long as they aim at the goal for the achievement of which they consider virtue necessary.

Aristotle's description of the Spartan kind as people who think that "one must have virtue but for the sake of the natural goods" in (b) suggests the latter picture. Now, it would be misleading to think that since the Spartans have an instrumental commitment to virtue of this sort, they lack genuine commitment to it. Aristotle's discussion of a condition that he calls "a kind of civic (*politikē*) bravery" is especially helpful for discerning the alternative. The civic kind of bravery is not the virtue of bravery but rather something ordered by law but akin to it (*EE* III 1, 1229a29–30). Although people who are brave in this (non-virtuous) way also face mortal danger, just like the truly brave, they do not do so for the same reason. Rather, they do so from fear of legal penalties or from a sense of shame (*EE* III 1, 1230a16–22). The slightly more detailed, but essentially the same, *NE* description of this condition is particularly informative:

> For citizens seem to endure dangers because of legal penalties, [because of] reproaches, or [because of] honors. That is why those seem to be

> bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonor and brave men in honor. Homer also depicts people of this sort, for example, Diomedes and Hector: "Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach on me", and "For one day Hector will speak among the Trojans his harangue: 'the son of Tydeus fleeing from me'". This is most similar to the kind [of courage] we discussed previously because it comes about due to virtue since it comes about due to shame and a desire for something fine (since honor is noble) and because of aversion to reproach (since it is shameful).
>
> (*NE* III 8, 1116a17–22)

The Homeric kind of hero that Aristotle describes in the passage is not acting bravely because he sees the act of bravery as itself fine or worthwhile. And yet, his motivation to act in that way is not purely instrumental but also reflective of his values. He acts as he does because he wants to avoid reproach (*oneidos*) that would result from failing to act bravely (or from acting with cowardice). If this were all that motivated him, however, he would not be a decent person.[23] He also possesses positive motivation, seeing his action not only as a way of avoiding bad consequences (say, reproach) but also as a way of bringing about something he wants, namely, honour. Honour, "the greatest of the external goods" (*NE* IV 3, 1123b20),[24] is a naturally good thing even if it is not a thing that is fine by nature, as Passage A reminds us (see also *CB* VII 4, 1148a24–5). In other words, although he is not motivated by the (true) fineness of the action, he nevertheless sees the action as fully belonging to and required by his values.

People who are brave in this civic way, then, reliably perform virtuous (brave) actions on account of (a) an aversion to reproach coupled with (b) a desire for honour. This double motivation is crucial. Although an attachment to honour is an attachment to something good, it need not lead to honourable (brave) actions. One could plot to receive honour even while avoiding the dangers of brave actions.[25] The civic kind of bravery is thus characterized not only by a desire for honour but also by an accompanying (internalized) aversion to reproach and disgrace which is responsible for one's commitment to achieving honour in the right way. Similarly, a mere aversion to reproach could be compatible with, for example, a tendency to avoid situations in which brave actions are called for or with general reluctance to engage in such actions. At the same time, it is not difficult to see why, on Aristotle's view, such a person is not virtuous. He is not motivated as the virtuous agent is (say, by the quality that defines those acts as brave – the fine) but by a quality that attaches to them incidentally (such as being honourable or praiseworthy). He acts virtuously (or bravely) but only incidentally since it is not the fine (*EE* II 1, 1230a22–32) but honour that motivates him (*EE* VIII 3, 1248a15–6).

Still, there is no reason to suppose that a person who displays the civic kind of bravery can easily dispose of her commitment to it should it prove, in one way or another, inconvenient. The fact that it leads her to perform brave actions shows that this cannot be so. As Aristotle says, people displaying civic

bravery get killed while standing their ground because "fleeing is shameful to them and death more choiceworthy than saving their lives in such a way" (*NE* III 8, 1116b19–20). Although a person of this sort does not exhibit the ideal (i.e. the virtuous person's) commitment to virtue, her commitment is not disingenuous.

A well-known example of a genuine commitment to virtue, which is nevertheless based on an instrumental (and so misguided) conception of it, can be found in the *Euthyphro*. Euthyphro thinks of pious behaviour primarily in terms of what meets with gods' approval (or what is commanded by gods). Socrates shows to Euthyphro that in doing so he is not deciding on pious actions for themselves (i.e. for what makes them pious) but, rather, for a quality that they all happen to possess (*Euth.* 11a–b). There is little doubt that Euthyphro treats pious actions as having instrumental value – they are means of pleasing the gods (7a) or of getting rid of (religious) pollution (4c). And yet there is also little doubt about Euthyphro's sincere commitment to piety. Socrates never doubts it, even as he doubts Euthyphro's knowledge of piety. In fact, Euthyphro displays commitment to piety that goes well beyond what one could ordinarily expect. Certainly, Socrates finds it surprising that he is willing to prosecute his own father if piety demands it.

9.4 Whence the Bad Desires

We have arrived at an answer to the objection raised at the beginning of Section 9.2. As long as the S/U pursue what they think is good in accordance with the virtues, their reason can be praiseworthy (*NE* I 13, 1102b14–7). They can still engage in reasoning that is correct (*EE* II 11, 1227b15) both in terms of validity and also insofar as it leads them to choose the right actions (*CB* VII 9, 1151a33–b4). They can reliably decide on virtuous action (and, in the case of the self-controlled agent, also perform them), even as they lack the right motivation and knowledge of the good.[26] But the S/U are characterized not only by correct decisions, but also by non-rational desires that run contrary to those decisions. How do these fit into the picture?

We can begin by observing that the civic kind of bravery, as Aristotle describes, is only intelligible when people who display it act bravely despite having contrary desires (or at least mixed feelings) concerning the brave actions required of them. Otherwise, they would not need motivation stemming from aversion to legal penalties, reproaches, or shame. It is the very function of shame to prevent one from acting on non-rational desires or feelings that incline one to act in bad ways (*NE* IV 9, 1128b15–21). But is this true in a general way? Does an instrumental conception of virtues necessitate desires that go against the very demands of virtue?

Aristotle holds that once something is desired as a goal, then insofar as it is desired as such, there is no natural limit to its pursuit. He makes this point in his discussion of the difference between two kinds of wealth acquisition: a natural one related to the needs of household management and an unnatural one

aimed at wealth itself. The former kind treats wealth as a means to the acquisition of things necessary for life, thus "filling a natural lack of self-sufficiency" (*Pol.* I 9, 1257a30). Since wealth is treated as an instrument, it is desired only insofar as it is useful for those other things which then provide the limit to wealth acquisition. The latter, however, aims at wealth as its goal and insofar as it does so, aims at it without any limit:

> For just as medicine pursues health in an unlimited way, so also every other craft pursues its goal with no limit since each wishes to achieve it as much as possible. But of the things that promote the end there is limit since the end is always the limit.
>
> (*Pol.* I 9, 1257b25–8)

As Aristotle sees it, non-rational desires, and in particular appetites have a built-in tendency to be limitless (e.g. *NE* III 9, 1119a35–b17). This tendency can be, at least to some extent, explained by the fact that their objects are always goals – having an appetite for something means desiring it because one finds it pleasant and that is one way to desire something as an end.

Now the Spartan kind of agent desires honour not only as a goal but also as the ultimate or central goal of her life. Accordingly, she has no higher goal that could restrict her pursuit of honour by providing an upper limit to its usefulness or expediency. To such a person, honour is always attractive. And yet, this agent does not pursue it without limit but in accordance with virtues. Given the place of honour in her system of values, this (virtuous) restriction on her pursuit of honour cannot come from within her desire for it. It must originate in something else, for example in a sense of shame (i.e. an ingrained desire to avoid disgrace and reproach) or in a fear of legal penalties.

It will be useful to revisit the different ways in which the Spartan kind of people and the fine-and-good people relate to naturally good things. For the fine-and-good people, the naturally good things are useful because they pursue them in accordance with the virtues. Since they aim at the fine, they pursue the naturally good things only to the extent to which they are beneficial for the sake of that end (the fine). They thus restrict their pursuit of those goods, but they do so in a way incidentally, as a result of not aiming at them in the first place. In contrast, when the Spartan kind of person restricts her pursuit of honour by virtue, she cannot be doing so in such an incidental way. For her, it is honour and not virtue or the fine that is the ultimate goal. Accordingly, she must be consciously imposing the (virtuous) constraints or demands on her pursuit of honour and doing so despite the fact that honour is her actual and ultimate goal.

This is a precarious condition to be in. It is not just that there is something that appears attractive to one even though one has decided against it (as when, for example, one sees a nice doughnut in a pastry shop but refrains from buying it because one thinks that one has already had enough sweets for the day). Rather, it is a condition in which one has organized one's whole life around

the pursuit of something that one thinks and perceives as the unconditionally best thing *and yet* one also keeps restricting that pursuit by paying heed to demands (i.e. virtues) that must often appear to complicate, or even prevent one's success in achieving it. This dissonance can, of course, be alleviated, say by a strong sense of shame, an aversion to reproach, or a firm belief that acting in a virtuous way leads to more honour overall. Still, it should be obvious that there is an inherent problem in trying to adhere to the demands of virtues in the belief that doing so will reliably attain other than the properly virtuous goals.

Now, for the Spartan kind of person the ultimate goal is honour. Although this is not a goal of the sort that the virtuous person would elevate to a similar status, honour is still a good thing (as we remarked, the greatest of the external goods). Accordingly, even if the Spartan kind of person should pursue it beyond what virtue dictates, she would not necessarily be blameworthy or open to reproach. The situation is different, however, should one's idea of the good coincide with bodily pleasure. Aristotle tells us that lack of control and self-control are concerned with the same kind of things (or the same pleasures) as temperance and intemperance but in a different way (*CB* VII 4, 1148a12–6). This claim is surprising as it ties the two character states to a specific virtue and vice rather than to virtue and vice overall. Although Aristotle discusses lack of control and self-control in relation to other things than bodily pleasure (*CB* VII 4), he calls them "lack of control" and "self-control" only with qualification. This only adds to the oddity of their classification since virtues other than temperance (or vices other than intemperance) are not called virtues only in a qualified sense. The oddity disappears when we conceive of the S/U as people who pursue bodily pleasure as their good. It is not just that they are self-controlled or uncontrolled in relation to those pleasures, it is also that their lives are organized around them. However, unlike the intemperate or vicious people, they are not seekers of unrestrained pleasures. Rather, they seek pleasures within the limits of temperance which they understand as a way of making sure their pleasures are healthy and socially acceptable (i.e. not open to reproach). But this means that she must be consciously imposing the demands of virtue on her pursuit of pleasure and doing so despite the fact that pleasure is what she regards as the good.[27] Her rational mindset necessitates contrary desires.

9.5 Character, Ends, and the Persistence of Bad Desires

The view I have argued for explains why Aristotle ties practical wisdom to virtue of character. If practical wisdom presupposes the correct grasp of the good, the S/U lack it. Not only have they a misguided conception of *eudaimonia*, but they also misconstrue the nature and value of virtues even as they adhere to them. The view thus explains why Aristotle never says that the S/U have knowledge of the good, even as he says that their reason is praised (because it urges them towards good things) and that they reason correctly and decide on the right actions.

Still, one might raise the following objection. The S/U agent is supposed to know that her desire (or the action the desire drives her to) is bad (*CB* VII 1, 1145b12–14) and that she should not act on it (e.g. *NE* IV 9, 1136b8–9). Since on the view I argued for, the S/U do not have knowledge of the good, how could they be said to *know* that their desires are bad? Admittedly, if knowledge is here used in a strict sense according to which they would have to possess the full correct explanation of why their desires are bad, then the S/U do not have such knowledge. Although they know that their desires (or actions on those desires) are bad or shameful since they go against the demands of the virtues and, to that extent, also undermine the kind of life the S/U are aiming for (say, a healthily pleasant one), they do not have the right explanation of the badness (since that would require the correct grasp of the good). It is, however, very doubtful that Aristotle has this sense of knowledge in mind. To begin with, he tells us that it does not matter whether we think of the uncontrolled people as acting against knowledge or belief (*CB* VII 3, 1146b24–6). More importantly, however, it is the S/U's knowledge of their own decisions, reasons why they made them, and the way their desires and actions relate to those decisions that is at stake (*EE* II 10, 1226b21–30).

I conclude with two more reasons for thinking that my interpretation is correct. First, there is a rarely addressed problem about self-control. If the self-controlled person reliably refuses to give in to her bad appetites, how can she have and maintain a stable disposition to have those desires? According to Aristotle's general theory of desire formation through habituation, one forms dispositions to desire certain things through repeated exposure to those things and from developing a taste for them. But as such dispositions are developed, so they are destroyed: if one does not regularly satisfy certain desires, the underlying disposition to feel those desires is appropriately affected, gradually losing its force due to lack of exercise. The desires are bound to lose their urgency and intensity and one's interest in the objects of those desires cannot but wane (e.g. *NE* VIII 5, 1157b5–24; *EE* VII 3, 1245a23–4). How is it, then, possible to have a stable disposition for (not mild but strong) desires that one reliably refuses to satisfy?

The mindset of the S/U agent, as described above, ensures that, at least in their thinking and decisions, they conform to the demands of virtue. But it also ensures that they have desires that go against those demands. Although the self-controlled agent aims at healthy pleasures, her appetites still retain their natural tendency to indefinite growth. As Aristotle recommends, the best the way to keep them in check would be to pull away from them (e.g. *NE* II 9, 1109b7–13). On my account, however, the self-controlled person does the opposite – she leans into them. Although she does not go for excessive pleasures, she still satisfies appetites for the same sort of pleasures, enjoying them more than she should (since she enjoys them as one should enjoy what is actually the good). In doing so, she increases her appetites for bodily pleasures in general, just like in enjoying contemplation of some particular truth, one increases one's desire for contemplation in general. The continual presence of strong bad desires is

the result of her trying to moderate her pursuit of bodily pleasure even as she pursues such pleasure as her ultimate good.

Second, Aristotle famously (and controversially) tells us that it is the non-rational part of the soul that is responsible for one's character (*NE* I 13, 1103a5–14; *EE* II 1, 1220a5–13) and, in fact, for the end or ends that one pursues in one's decisions (*CB* VI 12, 1144a31–6; VII 8, 1151a15–9; VII 12, 1144a7–9; VII 13, 1145a4–6; *EE* II 1, 1227b22–5; *NE* V 8, 1178a16–9). Since the non-rational part of the S/U is characterized by bad non-rational desires, it should follow that their ends – those that they aim at in their deliberations and decisions – are, ultimately, bad too (i.e. reflect those desires). Any view of the S/U that ascribes them knowledge of the good and decisions that aim at the right ends or values will find these claims difficult to explain. My interpretation avoids this issue since the S/U's rationally adopted end is of the same sort as the end of their non-rational desires, namely pleasure. This makes the S/U also more intelligible and unified as human characters. Although it is possible to imagine people whose rational values and non-rational desires run entirely contrary to each other, it is unclear whether this is, on Aristotle's view, a psychological possibility.[28] His description of views that postulate such a radical gap between the value orientations of the two soul parts and yet allow that they can decisively influence each other on a temporary basis as absurd in *EE* VIII 1 should make us wary of it.

Notes

1 In this chapter, I use "*EE*" to refer to the exclusively *Eudemian* books (i.e. *EE* I–III and VII–VIII), "*NE*" to the exclusively *Nicomachean* ones (i.e. *NE* I–IV and VIII–X0), and "*CB*" to the three common books (i.e. *EE* IV–VI/*NE* V–VII) for which I use the more familiar *Nicomachean* numbering.
2 See Müller, 2015a for an overview of some of the major interpretations.
3 *NE* I 13, 1102b14–7; *EE* II 8, 1224a33–b10.
4 *NE* III 2, 1111b14; *EE* II 7, 1223b14; *CB* VII 11, 1145b12–15; *CB* VII 10, 1151a29–52a25.
5 For example: Charles, 1984, p. 174; Pakaluk, 2005, p. 234; or Irwin, 2007, pp. 186–187.
6 *CB* VI 13, 1144b30–45a2; *NE* X 8, 1178a16–18.
7 Irwin, 2007, p. 186.
8 There are, of course, other solutions. For a brief discussion, see Price, 2006, pp. 247–249.
9 Coope, 2012. Coope's discussion specifically targets the self-controlled agent and so she might not agree with my extending her thesis to the uncontrolled agent.
10 Callard, 2017.
11 Callard offers an interpretation of *CB* VI 13, 1144b30–45a2 which hinges on denying that in the passage Aristotle means that it is (full-fledged) virtue of character that is required for practical wisdom rather than merely good ethical condition (i.e. one sufficiently conducive to good conduct). I cannot examine her argument here in detail, but I will note that unless one assumes, as Callard does, that Aristotle *cannot* mean that practical wisdom requires virtue of character, it is exceedingly difficult to read expressions like "being good *kuriōs*," "being good *haplōs*," and "ethical virtue" as not signifying (full-fledged) virtue of character.
12 In the *NE* books preceding *CB*, Aristotle makes informative remarks about self-control and lack of control only twice: in the argument for the two parts of the soul (*NE* I 13,

1102b14–3a2) and in a short argument against the view that decision is appetite (*NE* III 2, 1111b13–6). Just like in *EE*, there are also interesting remarks concerning lack of control and vice in his discussion of friendship, primarily in *NE* IX 4 and IX 8.

13 For counterparts to the internal psychological conflict claims, see: *NE* I 13, 1102b14–3a2; IX 4, 1166b7–8; *CB* VII 1, 1145b12–15; VII 3, 1147a34. For the voluntariness claims, see: *CB* VII 10, 1152a14–6. The pleasure and pain claims (h–l) do not all have direct counterparts. However, that the uncontrolled person experiences pleasure is clear from the fact that she is overcome by pleasure and acts on her appetite (e.g. *CB* VII 6, 1149b1–5 and 25–7) and that she experiences pain can be inferred from the fact that she regrets her action (*CB* VII 8, 1150b30–1). For claims concerning the state of the S/U's reason, see *NE* III 12, 1119b8–10 and *CB* VII 2, 1146a31–b1. Although there is no direct counterpart to (p), see *CB* VII 6, 1149a25–b27 for (o).

14 In the *NE* and *CB*, the rational side of the conflict is prominently characterized in terms of (correct) decision (e.g. *NE* III 2, 1111b13–6; *CB* VII 7, 1150a19–27; 7.8, 1151a6–7) rather than, as in *NE* II 7, in terms of reasoning or belief. However, decision is implied at *EE* VII 2, 1238b3, where the virtuous person is said to be potentially useful for the uncontrolled person's decision. This must be the good but abandoned decision (since the uncontrolled agent does not act on decision when acting without control and since the virtuous person could only get behind a good decision in any case). Moreover, in *CB*, the rational side of the conflict is also characterized in terms of belief (e.g. *CB* VII 3, 1146b25–31) or reasoning (e.g. *CB* VII 7, 1150b24).

15 *NE* IV 9, 1128b33–4; *CB* VII 1, 1145a15–17; *EE* II 11, 1227b16–7; and III 2, 1231a25–6. Although this much is uncontroversial, it is not obvious how much can be read into the claim that self-control and lack of control are states of character. For example, Coope, 2012 supposes (in line with many other scholars) that self-control is a stable disposition such that one who has it "reliably makes, and acts upon, the right decision" (p. 152). But is this true across the board? Is the self-controlled person self-controlled (i.e. deciding and acting correctly) in *all* situations, independently of whether they require courage, temperance, magnanimity, truthfulness, or wit? If so, why does Aristotle constrain both unqualified self-control and lack of control to bodily pleasures? I revisit this issue at the end of the chapter.

16 For example: *Probl.* 949b11–24 and 949b37–50a18.

17 For some suggestions about how to understand the disharmony in the case of the vicious agent, see Müller 2015b.

18 Although Callard, 2017 discusses *EE* VIII 1, 1246b12–36 at length, she does not take notice of this conclusion, focusing instead on the claim at 1246b23–4 which equates self-control with the ability to turn intemperate non-rational desires towards temperate actions. On her reading, this claim might suggest that self-control is just *phronēsis* but one that has to exercise control over one's non-rational desires. However, even if the short remark about self-control in 1246b23–4 expresses Aristotle's view (as she supposes), it does not imply that self-control is ἡ φρόνησις ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ. The whole passage expounds the consequences of a view that accepts Aristotle's division of the human soul into two parts (rational and non-rational) and allows that one part of the soul can turn the other part from vice to virtue and *vice versa*. If so, then as Aristotle points out, we should not deny that *phronēsis* could make an intemperate non-rational part act temperately. But once we do that (and this is the sense of the remark), we reduce *phronēsis* to self-control since *phronēsis* would be or do just what self-control is or seems to be or do (ὅπερ δοκεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια). This, as he goes on to say, is among the many absurd (*atopa*) results of the view he is examining (1246b26).

19 For example, *NE* III 6, 1115b2–3; IV 1, 1120a19–20; IV 2, 1122b6–7; IV 6, 1127a6; or IX 8, 1168a33–5. I set aside the question of what the fine is.

20 As often in the *EE*, the text of (A) is exceptionally badly preserved. My translation largely follows the *Oxford Classical Text* (OCT) version.

21 It should be noted that "good" (*agathoi*) is an editorial incursion (which I accept). The manuscript reading is *agrioi* (savage, wild, harsh). The manuscript reading seems out of place. There is no obvious reason why Aristotle should call people with an instrumental conception of virtue (one familiar, for example, from Adeimantus' speech in *Rep.* 362e–367a) "wild" or "harsh" in the context of distinguishing them from, on the one hand, the many and, on the other hand, those who are fine-and-good (*kalokagathoi*). Having an instrumental conception of virtue does not make one similar to a wild animal, one whose aroused spirit makes them act recklessly (*EE* III 1, 1229a25–7). It is also not obvious that such conception of virtue implies exclusive concern with bodily pleasure, which could perhaps lead to such designation (*NE* III 11, 1118b16–26). It is true that in *Pol.* VIII 4, 1338b9–38, there is a discussion of the Spartans valuing brutality or animal ferocity (*to thēriōdes*) over the fine. But Aristotle does not thereby imply that they are savage or uncivilized (even as he denies that brutality amounts to true courage). But even if this connection could be made, the claim in (A) is quite general, concerned with people (who are like the Spartans but not just them) who value virtue (not just courage or courage understood as brutality) for the sake of natural goods. Lastly, even if the meaning should be closer to "harsh" or "fierce" (as in *Pol.* VII 7, 1327b37–28a10 where the guardians are said to be harsh towards those they do not know), the term would remain unmotivated insofar as the discussion that ensues is about how and to what extent different kinds of things are good or fine for different kinds of people depending on their character, and not whether the way they value things makes them wild or civilized or harsh or gentle. However, see Terence Irwin's chapter in this volume for a defence of reading the passage in a way that preserves the manuscript reading.

22 Additionally, there are "the many" mentioned at 1248a12. These cannot be identified with the Spartan kind since neither the naturally good things nor fine things are good or beneficial for them. They are, rather, the vicious or foolish people distinguished earlier.

23 As Aristotle says, it would absurd (*atopon*) (*NE* IV 9, 1128b26–8) to think that someone is decent simply on the basis of him or her avoiding disgrace.

24 As is, apparently, also friendship (*NE* IX 9, 1169b10).

25 Plato's vivid description of the (undeserved) honours bestowed on the completely unjust man makes this obvious (*Rep.* 361a–62b).

26 Although these are the two most extensive discussions of a condition of this sort, Aristotle mentions it in passing in a number of other places. For example, in his account of generosity he says that "if someone does not give to whom they should or gives [rightly] but not for the sake of the fine but for some other reason (μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν), he will not be called generous but some other sort of person (οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις)" (*NE* IV 1, 1120a27–8). Although the remark is brief, it is clear that Aristotle has in mind somebody who reliably (i.e. as a matter of character) does the right (generous) actions but does them for the sake of some other reason than the virtuous person.

27 In view of this, it seems to me that, realistically, the condition of the S/U agent and specifically the self-controlled agent, cannot be reliably (or always) leading to correct actions as many scholars (e.g. Coope 2012, p. 152; Cooper, 2009, p. 12) seem to suppose. This need not be a matter of resolving into another character (say, *akrasia* into vice) (e.g. Anton, 2006, p. 60) but perhaps even a matter of occasionally failing to control the desires, perhaps by justifying acting on them by rationalization. Further investigation of this issue is however beyond the scope of this chapter.

28 It is worth noticing that in Plato's description of the various characters in the *Republic* (aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical), such radical breaks between the values of reason and non-rational desires or soul parts occur only as unstable (and perhaps fictional) temporary states in the transitions from one character to another. The characters themselves, including the relevant parts of the soul, are unified around a single value (such as honour, wealth, freedom, or unrestrained pleasure and power). It is the adoption of a wrong value as this central focus of one's soul that makes the non-ideal characters inherently (and progressively more) conflicted and unstable.

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10 Two Kinds of Pleasure (and Pain) in Aristotle's *Ethics*

Dorothea Frede

10.1 Preliminary Remarks: The Many Meanings of "Pleasure"

There is, probably, no song worldwide that is as famous as Schiller's *Ode to Joy* – in the version of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*. The reason why I start out with this remark is that Schiller, who had written the poem in 1786 (aged 26) for his friend and supporter Körner,[1] later expressed deep dissatisfaction with it[2]:

> Your liking of this poem may be due to the epoch of its origin. But that is the one factor that gives it the only value it has, and it has it *only for us* and *not for the world*, let alone for poetry.

With all due respect, one has to admit that from a philosophical point of view Schiller's self-criticism is justified: If you take a closer look at the *Ode*'s text you will see that it misses what should be a prime concern for every philosopher. One expects, if not a definition, then at least a clear determination of "joy." But the *Ode* merely lines up a succession of euphoric states and upsurges of different sorts and leaves it quite unclear what nature Schiller attributes to joy. His enumeration contains phenomena of quite different kinds: There are general overwhelming feelings of indistinct sympathy: "be embraced millions, this kiss to all the world"; there is friendship – friend to friend, united in brotherly love even unto death; there is love for a lovely woman. Joy is common to people good and evil, as well as to all creatures down to the lowly worm. And there is, of course, a loving father above us all in the starry heavens.

There is no point in picking on Schiller, let alone on Beethoven; but the philosophically minded Schiller had good reasons for his later critical attitude towards his early effusion. His sweeping praise of joy mirrors the fact that in everyday life we have a tendency to speak of joy/pleasure indistinctly in all sorts of connections, with respect to any kind of positive experience, feeling, or impression, and without reflecting on what nature we attribute to them.[3] Thus, we do not ask ourselves whether or not we attribute a unitary nature to whatever pleasure we feel in one way or another. As one might say: Joy concerns all things rosy in all ranges of life.

What the *Ode* ignores was clearly seen by Plato, namely that there is no such thing as "pleasure" pure and simple, as the name suggests, but that pleasure is

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always "of," "taken in," "concerned with" something or other, and that this "something" – its intentional object – determines its nature and value. Thus, Plato at the beginning of the *Philebus* lets Socrates object to the hedonist's undifferentiated treatment of pleasure (12c–d):

> Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets pleasure, as well as that a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise that a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom.[4]

It is this need for differentiation that prompts Socrates to recommend the dialectical method of collecting every multitude into a generic unity and of dividing that again into its specific plurality. That method is supposed to put taxonomical order into quite heterogeneous fields. And in what follows, Plato does indeed provide a unitary generic definition of pleasure and pain, by enjoining that pain is a kind of disturbance or dissolution of the natural equilibrium, while pleasure is its restoration, provided that those processes are intensive enough to affect the soul (*Phlb*. 30a–34a). Whatever we may think of Plato's treatment of pleasure and pain in the *Philebus* and of its results, he has drawn attention to an important point about the nature of pleasure and pain: that they are determined by their intentional objects and that these objects are of a wide variety, quality, and worth.[5]

10.2 The Definition(s) of Pleasure in *EN* VII and X

That a philosopher worth his salt must state in no uncertain terms whether a central concept has a unitary nature or not, is, of course, a fundamental conviction of Aristotle's. After all, he frequently raises the question whether a term is "said in more than one way." But in his treatment of pleasure (and of the mostly neglected pain) in his two essays on that topic in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) he does not even address the question of unity and plurality and gives only brief indications as to their nature. To be sure, in his criticism of the Platonic conception of pleasure he enjoins (VII 12, 1153a13–16): "pleasure should rather be called 'activity of the natural state', and instead of 'perceptible' – 'unimpeded'" (*tês kata physin hexeôs… energeia anempodistos*). He thereby focuses on actions that contain their ends in themselves. But that is all we learn about his position on the nature of pleasure at that point.[6]

In book X, Aristotle presents a somewhat different account of pleasure. Pleasure is a perfect activity, or rather the manifestation of the perfection of an activity, an activity that is natural to the person in the sense that she has a natural affinity with it. There is no pleasure connected with "alien" activities, or if there is, it will be short-lived. The particular twist that Aristotle adds to this depiction of pleasure is famous for its poetic flair (X 4, 1174b33): "Pleasure completes the activity … like an end that supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age." In order to be perfect, the objects of the activity must be in perfect condition as must be the person's disposition,

and the respective organ, e.g. the object seen, the seer's disposition, and the condition of her eyes.

Whether the shift in the specification of pleasure in *EN* X from "natural and unimpeded" to "perfect activity," represents a substantial change is still a controversial question, but it is a question that can be left aside here. The treatment of pleasure in *EN* VII and X shows, in any case, that pleasure is not supposed to be a separate, independent phenomenon, but always tied to some activity or other; it is a *mode* of being active. There should, therefore, be as many kinds of pleasure as there are kinds of activities that are natural and capable of perfection. The pleasures are as different as are the activities. It does not, in fact, make sense to ask oneself whether the pleasure of reading a good book is the same as the pleasure of an exciting philosophical discussion or that of hiking or playing music under perfect conditions, although we may ask ourselves which one we take more pleasure in.

It is easy to see that the conditions of "unimpededness" and "perfection" are not without problems. How about pleasures taken by bad people and in bad activities? After all, Aristotle does not assume that only good or perfect people enjoy their activities. On the contrary, in his general discussion of virtue and vice in *EN* II he indicates that both virtuous and vicious persons take pleasure in their actions, because they suit their character and agree with their general principles. But Aristotle does not address the question of the wicked person's pleasure in either book VII or X, apart from noting in book VII that they are excessive.[7] He occasionally mentions harmful and shameful pleasures, but he leaves open whether he regards them as pleasures, properly so called, or whether they are only seeming pleasures – or not the pleasures that the person takes them to be. Aristotle's comments on the pleasures of sick persons are also unclear in that respect.[8] His extraordinary claim in book IX that very bad persons take no pleasure in their lives at all, but will eventually put an end to themselves, is in itself problematic; it says nothing about the pleasures of medium-bad or somewhat bad people. In book X, Aristotle does not comment on the nature of pleasure of less than perfect activities, but only refers to the fact that people tend to get tired of their activities or get distracted by activities to which they have a stronger affinity.

10.3 The Neglect of Pain

There is also the question of what nature Aristotle assigns to pain or unpleasant experiences of all sorts. Does he, in book VII, regard pain as impeded and/or unnatural activities? And does he, in book X, hold that incomplete and imperfect activities are painful or unpleasant? The few examples in the text do not shed any light on this question; for instead of referring to perfect actions in a moral sense, Aristotle only cites actions such as seeing or contemplating, actions that are allegedly perfect at every moment and require no time. He ignores the fact that good moral actions may involve a lot of time, quite some trouble, and even fail to achieve their end. Aristotle's apologists have to invest quite some

ingenuity to explain the possibility of enjoying what *prima facie* seem to be process-like activities such as playing a piece of music, solving a philosophical problem, helping a friend out with money, or fighting for the fatherland.[9]

That Aristotle disregards these questions and pays hardly any attention to pain in his two "excursions" on pleasure in the *EN* may be due most of all to two factors: (i) he is concerned only with the best kinds of activities; (ii) his aim is to discard the Platonist conceptions of pleasure and pain that treat pain as a disturbance and pleasure as a restoration of the natural equilibrium. Plato indeed defines pleasure as a kind of change (*kinêsis*) and generation (*genesis*).[10] That this Platonist conception is Aristotle's target is more obvious in book VII than it is in book X. In book VII, he devotes quite some time to a systematic refutation of a catalogue of positions concerning pleasure that treat it as a "perceptible process of restoration of a natural state" (12, 1152b33–35). To this conception Aristotle opposes his own conception that pleasure is, rather, a natural and unimpeded activity. In book X, Aristotle starts out with a critique of Eudoxus' pro-hedonistic position, offers a shorter discussion of the Platonist position, and devotes more time to explaining his own position. But in both versions, the critique of the Platonist conception of pleasure as a restoration is central, and it seems that it was a position that was not just indicated in *Republic* IX and defended in the *Philebus*, but that enjoyed quite some popularity in the Academy. To counter that position, in book VII Aristotle proposes even the "shocking thesis" that the pleasure taken in certain activities is the highest good (13, 1153b7–14).[11] And although in book X the opposition against the Platonist position is less prominent, Aristotle spends quite some time and effort on its refutation.

That overall concern explains why Aristotle pays little attention to imperfect, bad, or noxious kinds of pleasure. Thus, in book VII he mentions only at the very end that bad pleasures are the activities of a bad nature, either from birth on or due to habit (15, 1154a31), but he does not explain why those activities are, nevertheless, pleasant. He does not discuss pain at all, but very briefly states that pleasure is sought as an antidote or analgesic against it. What nature he attributes to pain remains an open question. If it is the opposite of pleasure, pain must indeed be some kind of disturbance, which permits only an impeded or no activity at all. But that admission would get Aristotle into Platonic waters; for the assumption that pain is a disturbance or destruction would suggest that pleasure as its opposite is a kind of restoration or filling of a lack. It must remain a moot point whether it was considerations of that kind that made Aristotle avoid a discussion of pain. He may just not have wanted to bother with it, on the assumption that it is, somehow, the opposite of pleasure, and left the "somehow" to itself. But it should be clear that "impeded," "unnatural," or "imperfect activities" do not cover the entire spectrum of painful experiences.

The one-sidedness of Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in the two sections dedicated to that topic in the *EN* and the neglect of pain is not its main drawback. Its greatest shortcoming lies, rather, in the fact that Aristotle does not

fulfil the natural expectation of his readers that he is going to explain the relevance of pleasure and pain for his ethics *tout court*. After all, Aristotle started out his investigation of the virtues of character in book II with the assertion that pleasure and pain have a central role to play in ethics. He treats it, there, as a crucial aspect of the acquisition of virtue that people become habituated to be pleased or be pained in the right way (II 3, 1104b4–9):

> We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that supervenes (*epiginomenê*) on acts; for the person who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this fact, is moderate, while the person who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and the person who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the person who is pained is a coward. For moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains.[12]

Given these general pronouncements, one expects Aristotle to be concerned with precise determinations of those kinds of pleasures and pains. But this expectation is disappointed. There is no systematic treatment of that question in the specifications of the virtues of character through books III 6–V. In addition, it must confuse readers that Aristotle repeatedly treats pleasure as unconditionally bad and as the source of all evil. Thus, in *EN* I 5 the life of pleasure as a whole is called slavish, a life fit for animals.[13] And in the subsequent books there is an abundance of deprecating remarks of a similar kind. There are only a few indications that these negative judgments are limited to the excess of purely physical pleasures, i.e. that of eating, drinking, and sex. Because Aristotle does not emphasize that fact, readers may form the impression that overall he regards pleasure as a negative or at least as a highly ambivalent element in human life.

10.4 Two Types of Pleasures and Pains: Actions and Affections

But more important than these polemical remarks about (certain) kinds of pleasure is the fact that Aristotle fails to make explicit that his depiction of the virtues of character presupposes two different kinds of pleasure and pain. This is the distinction that concerns us here. Pleasure and pain, on the one hand, concern the actions, *praxeis*, and on the other hand they concern the affections, *pathê*. If Aristotle sees a difference between them right from the start, he does not point it out, but speaks as if they somehow go together (II 3, 1104b13–16): "Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and affections, and every action and affection is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains."[14] But both kinds, the pleasures and pains, related to actions as well as those related to the affections, supposedly are the objects of the appropriate kind of moral education.

But, as reflection shows, pleasant or painful actions and affections cannot be phenomena of the same sort. This point is nowhere explicitly addressed in the text in the *EN*; Aristotle rather speaks as if the "normative parameters"

that specify "the oughts" that are to be observed not only apply to actions: what ought (*dei*) to be done, to whom, in what way, when, and so on, but equally to affections. That is why he rejects the contention of certain philosophers that virtue is a state of impassivity (*apatheia*) and tranquillity (*êremia*) (II 3, 1104b24–27):

> because they speak absolutely, and do not say "as one ought" (*hôs dei*) and "as one ought not" and "when one ought or ought not" and all the other things that may be added. We assume then, that this kind of virtue tends to do what is best with regards to pleasures and pains, and vice does the opposite.

Apathy is clearly not a good state of character.

Although Aristotle most of the time treats "active" and "affective" pleasures and pains as on a par, it is noteworthy that the affections play a prominent role in the search for a definition of the virtues of character: their genus is determined exclusively in terms of the affections (II 5). In that search, Aristotle refers to three states in the soul as the candidates for that determination: affections (*pathê*), capacities (*dynameis*), dispositions (*hexeis*). He argues that people are not praised or blamed on account of their affections or of their affectability, i.e. their capacity to experience them, but rather because of their dispositions towards the affections, and therefore concludes that virtues are dispositions to be affected in the right way (II 5, 1105b25–28):

> by states of character we mean the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the affections, e.g. with respect to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it in an intermediary way; and similarly with reference to the other affections.

Given the prominence of the affections in that chapter, one would expect that Aristotle is going to treat them as constitutive of the virtues of character to an equal degree as the corresponding actions, and it feeds into that expectation that in the subsequent discussion the actions and the affections are often mentioned in one breath: A person of good character should both act and be affected in the appropriate way. Both actions and affections are, therefore, accompanied by the respective pleasures and pains.

So what is the nature of those kinds of pleasures and pains? The definition of pleasure in book VII as "unimpeded activation of a natural disposition" can, with some adjustments, be used as an explanation of the pleasure taken in good moral actions. The good person is pleased to act the way she ought to, towards the person she ought to, when she ought to, and so on. There is no account of the pleasures of the wicked person in either book VII or X.[15]

The case of the affections is problematic. Although affections are also actualizations of capacities of the soul, they are reactive impressions of a positive or negative kind to impacts from outside that give rise to the desire to avoid what

appears bad or to pursue what appears good. It would clearly be quite unsuitable to conceive of pleasant affections as either unimpeded or perfect activities, just as it is unsuitable to conceive of painful affections as impeded, unnatural, or imperfect activities.

In his *Ethics*, Aristotle nowhere proposes a definition of the affections. That omission was noted already by the commentators in later antiquity.[16] But Aristotle seems to see nothing amiss there; for after the establishment of the genus of moral virtue in terms of the affections he refers indistinctly to both actions and affections, in the specification of the intermediaries that are characteristic of the virtuous person. Not only does he treat the active and passive pleasures and pains on a par, but he also assigns the "moral parameters" to both of them: what one ought to, as one ought to, when one ought to.

Aristotle is not only silent about a definition of the affections, but he is also equally silent about the nature of the respective "pathetic" pleasures and pains. That he is aware of the distinction comes to the fore only sporadically. Thus, in connection with moderation and courage he mentions the need for a special training of the affections (II 2, 1104a32–b4):

> by abstaining from pleasures we become moderate, and when we have become so we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are fearful and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.

In the determinations of the virtues of character, Aristotle does not make much of the difference between active and affective pleasures and pains, but at times he at least indicates that there *is* a discrepancy between them (II 2, 1104b6–9):

> We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that supervenes upon actions; for the person who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and the person who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the person who is pained is a coward.

The modest person takes pleasure in acting in the right way, even if it means refraining from the affective pleasure, while the immoderate person's action is painful, because of the loss of that kind of pleasure. The courageous person's action is pleasant, the coward's is unpleasant; but both have to cope with fear, a painful affection.

That pleasures or pains of acting in a certain way are of a different nature from the affective pleasures or pains that give rise to them, is more indicated

than made explicit in the text, because Aristotle wants to show that overall they must be in harmony (II 5, 1106b16–28):

> For moral virtue is concerned with affections and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity, and in general pleasure and pain, may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not right; but to feel them at the time we ought, to the objects we ought, towards the people we ought, for the reason we ought, in the way we ought, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Likewise with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with affections and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is a form of success. […] Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, as we have seen; it aims at what is intermediate.

This passage indicates that actions and affections work in tandem. Both allow for a right mean, excess, and defect, and both are accompanied by the corresponding pleasures or pains. That there can be a combination of pleasure and pain comes to the fore when the affections and actions diverge, i.e. where one is of a negative, the other of a positive kind. In the case of moderation, e.g. the affection is pleasant but the action is so only if the agent likes to abstain from that pleasure (II 2, 1104b6–8): "The person who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is moderate, while the person who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent." The discrepancy between affection and action is most obvious in the case of courage (1104b8–10): "He, who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained, is brave, while the person who is pained is a coward." In the case of courage, Aristotle is careful not to exalt the pleasure of acting courageously to an undue degree. As he points out, with courageous actions it is not easy even to recognize that there is any pleasure at all, because in combat fear and pain prevail. He compares the predicament of soldiers with that of boxers: because of the amount of blows that they have to put up with, their sport seems to be so painful that it is hard even to see any pleasure in it; what pleasure there is can be due only to the hope for victory (III 9, 1117a35–b6).

Modern critics find it objectionable that Aristotle speaks of pleasure in the case of combat in war at all, on the ground that killing and wounding should not be regarded as pleasant activities in the first place. Aristotle does indeed emphasize that only bloodthirsty people would aim for war and killing as an end as such (*EN* X 7, 1177b10–12).[17] If he, nevertheless, attributes a kind of pleasure to the action of the courageous person, he must have in mind the readiness to incur what is unpleasant and to risk his life for the good of the community. Some commentators also find Aristotle's approval of retaliation in anger objectionable. But such censorship ignores that Aristotle's catalogue of virtues of character and his specifications of the respective actions reflect the

values of his own time. The ancient Greeks did not see any virtue in turning the other cheek at an insult, but rather in retaliating in kind. The wide gap between certain Aristotelian and Christian virtues is, however, a topic that cannot be pursued here.

10.5 The "Fading" of the Affections

Many commentators overlook the fact that pleasure and pain are associated with both actions and affections. This oversight seems to be due to three reasons. First, Aristotle does not make much of an effort to put the difference into full relief. Second, the *pathê* are not purely passive reactions to external impacts, but contain an active element that connects them with actions: Every pleasant and painful *pathos* contains a kind of desire, a desire to seek (*diôkein/zêtein*) or to avoid (*pheugein*) (II 3, 1104b21–24 *et pass.*). And this "passive-aggressive" nature of the *pathê* may appear to blur the borders between the affections and the actions, except in cases where the respective action is not carried out. That possibility is most prominent in the discussion of *akrasia*, where the rational desire (wish) for something good is suppressed by a non-rational desire. Third, from book III on the affections lose their importance. This fact was pointed out 40 years ago by Kosman.[18] As he observes, the fact that the main emphasis in the analysis of the virtues is put on deliberation and decision has the consequence that the affections fall by the wayside: "It is not that Aristotle simply leaves the question of feelings out, but their importance fades in the context of a particular theory of deliberation and choice and their place in moral context."[19]

But there is more to it than that. In the *EN*'s further discussion of the particular virtues of character, only three affections are explicitly mentioned: Appetite (*epithymia*), the pair of fear (*phobos*) and confidence (*tharsos*), and anger (*thymos/orgê*). In the description of the rest of the virtues, affections are only hinted at, as in the case of ambition (*philotimia*). That all virtues of character presuppose affections comes to the fore only in a general statement such as that everyone is a "lover of such-and-such" – a *philotoioutos*, sometimes in a negative sense when the predilection concerns something bad (I 8, 1099a9; III 11, 1118b22; IV 4, 1125b14). Although Aristotle sweepingly refers to the lover of justice (*philodikaios*) and to the lover of virtue, quite generally (I 8, 1099a11: *philaretos*), it remains an open question whether he attributes affections to all kinds of character virtues.

There are, however, general considerations that support the view that every virtue of character is based on some affection or other. If this were not so, the general determination of virtue of character in *EN* I 13 would not hold, namely that it is based on the obedience of the soul's non-rational part to the commands of the rational part. There is no reason for assuming that virtues of character are limited to moderation, courage, and even-temperedness. Aristotle must therefore have attributed non-rational affections to all virtues of character and assumed that they all turn into virtuous affections through

habituation under the direction of reason. And he must have assumed so even in those cases where he does not mention the respective affections, as in the case of liberality, magnificence, high-spiritedness, and ambition, as well as in that of friendliness, truthfulness, and ready wit. If that presupposition is less than transparent, that is not only due to the fact that the affections are neglected in the discussion of the virtues of character in books III–V, but also due to the fact that in the later books of the *EN* affections are referred to as the condition of persons who live under their influence only. This tendency may have increased once the affections had been identified as the cause of the various kinds of *akrasia*.

The "fading" of the affections also incites commentators to misinterpretations of Aristotle's treatment of pleasure – misinterpretations of the kind I myself was guilty of years ago.[20] The search for an account of the more complex treatment of pleasure in the *EN*'s first two books led me to a distinction between an "adjectival" and an "adverbial" aspect of pleasure and pain, i.e. between *object* of pleasure and pain on the one hand and the *mode* of the action, on the other. That distinction was to preserve the unitary nature of pleasure in Aristotle. But it is actually a useless effort, because it ignores that he clearly intends to make a distinction between the "active" and the "pathetic" kinds in the *EN*'s early books. Interpreters are led into such temptations if they start out with Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in *EN* VII and X – where pleasure is treated exclusively as a mode of action – and then read that account back into the discussion of pleasure and pain at the beginning of the *EN*. Although it is a mistake that is avoided by commentators who confine their interpretation of Aristotle's conception of pleasure to books VII and X,[21] these interpretations come at the price of ignoring the pleasures and pains of the affections altogether.

10.6 Pathetic Pleasures in the *EE*

One of the most significant differences between the undisputed books of the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) and the *EN* lies in the fact in the *EE* pleasure and pain are assigned only to the soul's non-rational part, not to the controlling rational part. That is why the affections stand in the limelight in the *EE*'s discussion of the virtues of character (*EE* II 2, 1220b7–10):

> We must say then, what it is in the soul in respect of which character-traits are qualified in a certain way. They are so in respect of capacities (*dynameis*) for affections (*pathê*), with respect to which people are termed affective (*pathêtikoi*).[22]

The affections are closely tied to pleasure and pain (1220b12–20):

> By affections I mean things like spirit, fear, shame, appetite, and in general things that are usually accompanied, in their own right, by perceptible (*aisthêtikê*) pleasure or pain. It is not in virtue of these that a quality (*poiotês*)

> exists – the soul is just affected… Dispositions *(hexeis)* are the causes of these affections being either in accordance or contrary to reason.

In view of this emphasis on the importance of the affections for the virtues of character, readers will expect enlightenment on the nature of the *pathê* as well as on the special kinds of "perceptible pleasure and pain" that are connected with the affections. But this expectation is fulfilled only to a very limited degree.[23] There is no explanation in the *EE* of the nature of the *pathê* or of the "perceptibility" of the respective pleasures and pains.[24] And although the "pathetic" aspect of the virtues is supposed to be important, it is not treated in a systematic way, so that the explanations are quite hard to follow. In the *EE*, Aristotle does not emphasize, as he does, time and again, in the *EN*, that virtues of character are equally concerned with actions (*praxeis*) and affections (*pathê*).[25] Not only that, there is no argument, as there is in the *EN*, that the virtuous life is at the same time pleasant (I 8, 1099a7–31):

> For pleasure is a condition of the soul (*tôn psychikôn*), and to everyone that which he is said to be a lover of (*philotoioutos*) is pleasant, e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the horse-lover, and a spectacle of sight to the sight-lover, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice, and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue (*philaretos*).

That the pleasures are tied to the *actions* is made explicit in what follows; for Aristotle treats the pleasure taken into the action as a kind of litmus test of the possession of virtue (1099a17–21):

> An agent who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good, since no-one would call a person just who does not enjoy acting justly, nor anyone liberal who does not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in the other cases. If this is so, noble actions must be in themselves (*kath' hautas*) pleasant.

This injunction at the same time provides the final argument against the alleged separation of the best, the noblest, and the most pleasant in the inscription of Delos (1099a24–31): "Happiness is therefore the best, the noblest, and the most pleasant state, for all three apply to the best activities (*tais aristais energeiais*)."

The condition that the virtuous person will enjoy her actions is maintained throughout the discussion of the virtues of character in *EN* book II where Aristotle insists, time and again, that the pleasures and pains contained in the actions are a sign of the person's character (esp. II 3). This remains a basic condition despite the fact that the genus of the virtues of character is determined exclusively on the basis of the affections in *EN* II 5; for in what follows, Aristotle hastens to affirm that the need to aim for the right intermediate applies *equally* to the affections and to the actions, and that equipollence is reasserted after the official definition of virtue of character "as a disposition lying in a mean" (II 6, 1106b36–1107a8). The fact that subsequently the actions

get the upper hand and the affections "fade" in the further determination of the virtues of character does not contradict the diagnosis that initially both are treated even-handedly.

That there is no such even-handedness in the *EE* and that actions are not connected with either pleasure or pain need further corroboration. For, at first Aristotle gives the impression that actions are the focus of his determination of virtues of character. According to *EE* II 1, 1220a22–37:

> Virtue is such a condition (*diathesis*) that comes to be from the best processes (*kinesis*) around the soul and that issues the best actions (*erga*) and affections (*pathê*); they come to be from the same conditions that also destroy them, and their use is concerned with the things that both increase and destroy them, but also leads to the best condition (*diathesis*).

If this seems like a promising beginning, in what follows virtues and vices are determined exclusively in terms of the affections. A few references have to suffice to show this: At II 2, 1220b7–10 the virtues are determined only with respect to the person's "affectability" and that line is further pursued in chapters 4 and 5, after the presentation of the catalogue of virtues and vices in chapter 3.

The explanation of this extraordinary decision on Aristotle's side must be kept short.[26] It is due to the assignment of the virtues of character to the soul's non-rational part and to the strict separation of the rational and the non-rational part, despite the fact that the latter is supposedly obedient to reason's decrees. The non-rational part is not just the locus of the affections, but also the exclusive locus of desire (*orexis*) (4, 1221b30–34): "The virtues of the non-rational, that possesses desire (for not every part of the soul has desire), therefore the character must be vicious or virtuous by pursuing of avoiding certain pleasures and pains." As only a closer look at the text could show, by pleasure and pain Aristotle has in mind here only those of the body; for in the *EE*'s detailed discussion of the virtues of character in book III there is no reference to pleasures such as that due to love of virtue and there is also no mention of pleasure or pain taken in actions.

The reason for that abstemiousness as far as the soul's rational part is concerned can only be indicated here. Although actions are referred to a few times at the beginning of *EE* II, Aristotle attends to them only in chapter 7 ff., where he makes "a different start." The different start consists in the long-drawn-out dialectical investigation of the voluntary or involuntary nature of actions, of deliberation and decision, an investigation that is made hard to penetrate by the inclusion of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*. In this discussion, no attention is given to the question of the pleasantness or painfulness of the actions as such. In the detailed discussion of the virtues and vices of character in *EE* III there is, again, no emphasis on the fact that the actions are either pleasant of painful.

A certain change of mind might be indicated by Aristotle's declaration at III 7, 1234a23–30, that the affective intermediate states concerning envy,

indignation, shame, friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and ready wit are not virtues proper, nor their opposites vices, because they are not based on decision (*proairesis*); they are *pathê* and to be associated with the natural virtues. But it is difficult to evaluate the elimination of these "pathetic affections" from the catalogue of virtues and vices proper: It may be due to an afterthought; it is, at any rate, not clear why Aristotle does not grant the possibility of fixed dispositions towards the respective actions to them. In the *EN*, he has clearly changed his mind with respect to the so-called social virtues of friendliness, truthfulness, and ready wit (IV 6–8).[27] That change of mind may be due to his recognition that it is not the affections as such that are the subjects of choice and decision, but rather how *to act* on account of them, an insight Aristotle mentions at *EN* II 5, 1106a3.

That actions contain their own pleasures is acknowledged only quite late in the day in the *EE*, in the discussion of friendship. This consideration comes to the fore not so much in the comments on pleasure-friendship and on the fact that good persons are also pleasant to each other, but rather in the final elucidation of the need for friends in the good life (VII 12). Living together (*syzên*) is pleasant, anyway, but it is so most of all if friends share activities such as that of attending to music together or of doing philosophy together (1245a23). Being with a friend as another self provides the opportunity not only for seeing oneself in the other, but also for joining together in "more divine pleasures," such as in contemplating and feasting together (1245a18–b9: *syntheôrein kai syneuôcheisthai*). That discussion leads to the conclusion that sharing one's life with friends is pleasant in general, within limits and in some conditions rather than others (1245b20–1246a9).

10.7 Concluding Remarks

Given these observations concerning the *EE*'s overall focus on "pathetic" pleasures and the neglect of active pleasures, the question is how the excursus on the nature of pleasure was supposed to fit in that work. Although it has come down to us only as part of *EN* VII, most scholars regard it as a remnant of the *EE*. This is not the occasion to review the reasons for that consensus. But if the excursus was an integral part of the *EE*, Aristotle seems not to have anticipated that treatment of pleasure before; for he does not make any preparations for it in the *EE*'s undisputed books where he ignores the pleasures of action, that turn out to be the only kinds considered in the excursus. Furthermore, a problem lies in the fact that in *EE* II Aristotle associates pleasure as well as the virtues of character with "processes" in the soul, with *kinêseis*. He states that virtue is due to a kind of motion (*kinêsis*), and repeatedly affirms that a *praxis* is a *kinêsis*.[28] In the *EN*, by contrast, he avoids any such associations with the Platonist conception of pleasure.[29]

If Aristotle was not extremely careless, what explains his seeming insouciance about how the excursus on pleasure was to fit into the text? Given our lack of knowledge about the shape of the lost books in the *EE*, any explanation

must remain conjectural. But it stands to reason that the excursus on pleasure was a text that Aristotle had written for a different purpose and inserted in the *EE* only provisionally. For the battery of arguments against pleasure as a process of restoration seems to have originated from a controversy on the nature of pleasure within the Academy. Aristotle may have taken notes on that altercation and made use of them in order to defend his own "activist" interpretation of pleasure. This assumption does not solve all problems; for if Aristotle's critique of the Platonist account of pleasure and his defence of pleasure as an activity were of an early origin, why did he not argue for pleasures of action early on, i.e. in the *EE*'s account of the virtues of character?

The two discussions of pleasure in the *EN* represent, of course, problems of their own. There is the question of why Aristotle left the earlier version in the text. And there is the observation that the discussion in book X reflects even less than that in book VII Aristotle's insight that there are two different kinds of pleasure and pain, active and passive ones. Suffice it to observe that both versions reflect the controversy in the Academy; they are designed as a critique of the Platonist position of pleasure as a kind of restoration, a position that seems to have been taken up by other members of the school. This explains why in book X Aristotle includes a discussion of the pro-hedonist position of Eudoxus, an associate of the Academy for some time.[30]

If the excursions on pleasure had an origin of their own, Aristotle must have eventually noticed that neither of the two are satisfactory treatments of the concept of pleasure (and pain) for the purposes of his ethics, because that purpose requires an account of active as well as of affective kinds. He may have intended a further revision than the one we find in book X, but did not finish it. At any rate, it is hard to believe that he had simply forgotten his insight that is of fundamental importance in the early books of the *EN*: That a properly brought-up person needs both *to act* as she should and *to be affected* as she should. But this is, admittedly, only an argument based on considerations of plausibility. It does not allow us to reconstruct the fate of Aristotle's manuscripts in the years before and after his death when they remained in the hands of the members of his school.

Notes

1 Christian Gottfried Körner was a free mason, lawyer, and amateur composer; after Schiller's early death he acted as the editor of his collected works.
2 Letter to Körner, 21 October 1800. (*Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Körner*, ed. K. Gödecke, Leipzig1874.)
3 German does not have a separate term designating joy as a more elated state of mind than pleasure.
4 Translation Frede, 1993.
5 Here, I leave aside the question of "brute" pleasures and pains, i.e. of simple positive or negative stimulations in the body that we can often identify only locally (e.g. a toothache).
6 At this point, book VII will be treated as an integral part of the *EN*.
7 VII 14, 1154a14–18.

8 Restorative pleasures are called pleasures "only accidentally" – or only for that person at that time, or they are no pleasures at all and only seem so, or they are due to "our remaining nature" (*tês hypoloipou physeos*) (VII 12, 1152b29–1153a3). Later, it is explained that this is due to that part that has remained healthy (*hypomenontos hygious*) (15, 1154b17–20).
9 On the problems of perfect and allegedly "timeless" activities, see Frede, 2020, pp. 938–950.
10 See the summary at *Phlb*. 53c–55c.
11 Rapp, 2009, pp. 218–220.
12 See *EE* II 1, 1220a34–37; 4, 1221b27–1222a5.
13 This view about the life of physical pleasure is also found in the *EE*'s comparison of the three forms of life (*bioi*) at I 4, 1215a33–1216a2.
14 Aristotle does not say that actions and affections *are* pleasures and pains, but only that they are accompanied by them ("*hepesthai*," 1104b14; 1105b23 *et pass*.). He seems to have in mind not a temporal sequel, but a close relationship of "going with," "being contained in."
15 With respect to pleasures taken in bad actions, Aristotle is somewhat evasive: they are either not choiceworthy or only for that person and only at that point of time (12, 1152b29–31). Although he indicates at one point that they are not unimpeded activities (13, 1153b9–12), he does not say that they are not pleasures, including the physical pleasures that are sought for as antidotes of pain or remedies for all sorts of deficiencies (ch. 14).
16 Aspasius *In EN* 44.19–45.16. Because he refers to the explanations provided by his predecessors Andronicus and Boethus, the omission by "the ancients" must be Aristotle, Theophrastus, and "Eudemus." Aspasius regards Eudemus as the author of the *EE*; on the "Eudemian question" see Frede, 2019. The complaint about this omission of the *pathê* by the ancients suggests that the *Rhetoric* was no longer studied in the 1st century BC; for no mention is ever made of the *Rhetoric*'s determination of the *pathê* in book I 10–11 and of the extensive discussion of their particular kinds in book II 2–11.
17 In the *Politics*, Aristotle is highly critical of warfare for the sake of the spoils and domination over others (VII 14, 1333a5–1334a10).
18 Kosman, 1980.
19 Kosman, 1980, p. 115.
20 This is a *retractatio* of my contentions in my articles of 2002 and 2009, as well as that in my 1996 article, that the conception of pleasure proposed in *EN* VII and X represents a later and more mature stage.
21 Representatives are, for instance, Gosling/Taylor, 1984; Wolfsdorf, 2013; Heinaman, 2011; Warren, 2014; Harte, 2014.
22 Translation, with modifications, Woods, 1982.
23 For problems with the composition of the chapter and its integration in the text, see Woods, 1982, pp. 107–111.
24 The difficulties contained in the text have to be passed over here.
25 *EN* II 3, 1104b13–16; 6, 1106b16–28; 1106b36–1107a9; 8, 1108b15–19 *et pass*.
26 See Woods' acknowledgement 1982, p. 124: "The *E.N.* lays much greater stress on the fact that virtues and vices have to do with means in actions as well as affections." That is clearly an understatement.
27 Only "shame" is mentioned at *EN* IV 11 – and it is denied that it is the subject of a virtue.
28 *EE* II 1, 1218a36–37; 2, 1220a29–31; 3, 1220b26–27; 6, 1222b18–29.
29 Where "*kinêsis*" is used in the *EN*, it refers only to the agents' physical movements, especially in carrying out their decisions (see VI 2, 1139a31–36: "reason does not move anything").
30 The version in *EN* VII starts with a line-up of what Aristotle regards as mistaken points of view and largely confines itself to their critique. His own conception of pleasure

is mentioned only incidentally in that discussion. This version seems to have been an original part of the *EE*, while *EN* X 1–5 represents a later version of that discussion (on Aspasius as a witness, see Frede, 2019, pp. 89–91).

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11 Complete Virtue

Giulia Bonasio

In the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*), Aristotle distinguishes between the virtues of character and the virtues of thinking. These virtues are explored in long-standing debates. Interpreters disagree on their respective roles in a happy life and on their relation among each other. One component of Aristotle's theory, however, has so far found less attention, at least as far as the *EE* is concerned: the notion of complete virtue. Aristotle's definition of happiness refers to complete virtue. Thus, we must be clear about complete virtue if we are to understand how Aristotle conceives of happiness. In this chapter, I argue that in the *EE*, complete virtue is the super excellence of *kalokagathia*, the virtue of the best person as Aristotle conceives of her in the *EE*, rather than some other virtue that Aristotle holds in high regard.

In *EE* II, Aristotle says that happiness is activity according to complete virtue (ἀρετὴ τελεία).[1] In *NE* I, he says that happiness is activity according to the best and most complete (ἀρίστη καὶ τελειοτάτη) virtue.[2] The expression ἀρετὴ τελεία can be read in many ways.[3] It can be translated "complete virtue," "perfect virtue," or "final virtue." I argue below that "complete virtue" best captures Aristotle's view in the *EE*. Scholars predominantly focus on ἀρετὴ τελεία in the *NE*.[4] Two exceptions are Cooper and Kenny, who examine also the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness in the *EE*.[5] Cooper offers a formal characterization of ἀρετὴ τελεία as it occurs in the definition of happiness in *EE* II, 1219a39, namely that it is human excellence as a whole.[6] Kenny offers a substantive identification: ἀρετὴ τελεία, he argues, is the virtue of *kalokagathia*.[7] Kenny's view is, in fact, a specification of Cooper's proposal insofar as he argues that *kalokagathia* is the virtue which is virtue as a whole. By focusing on wholeness, I submit, Cooper showcases *kalokagathia*'s most theoretically challenging feature, which connects the *EE* with Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. My chapter goes beyond Kenny's (and Cooper's) work because I explore a different route to arrive at the conclusion that *kalokagathia* is the complete virtue mentioned in the *EE*'s definition of happiness. What is more, I base my argument on the premise that Aristotle understands complete and whole – τέλειον and ὅλον – in the sense that these expressions have in the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*.

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In what follows, I develop a set of criteria for virtue's completeness, based on the *EE* and relevant passages from the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. By reference to the long-standing discussion about inclusive versus dominant readings, I set up the Inclusion Criterion: virtue is complete only if it includes the character virtues and the virtues of thinking. By reference to wholeness as defined in the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*, I defend the Wholeness Criterion: complete virtue must be a whole. Insofar as Aristotle argues that what is complete and whole must have a limit, I propose the Limit Criterion: complete virtue must have a limit.

In Section 11.1, I introduce the definition of happiness in the *EE*, where virtue is not only said to be complete, but also whole. In Section 11.2, I explain and defend the premise of my argument, that we need to refer to the *Physics* and to the *Metaphysics* in order to understand what Aristotle means by complete, whole, one, and limit. In Section 11.3, I offer an argument by elimination for the identification of complete virtue and *kalokagathia*; four other contenders – *megalopsychia*, *dikaiosunê*, *phronêsis*, and *sophia* – are ultimately not good fits for Aristotle's notion of complete virtue. I show that *kalokagathia* is one virtue that includes *all* the virtues *qua* parts. *Kalokagathia* has all its parts connected so that they form a whole, and it has a limit. For these reasons, it is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. This proposal has larger implications for our reading of the *EE*: it supports the hypothesis that *kalokagathia* is a core concept of Aristotle's *EE*, one that is not simply used in ways that reference traditional notions, but rather, one that is theoretically innovative. What is more, it shows that we need to have all the virtues in order to be happy.

11.1 The Definition of Happiness

The much-debated question of which activities – those of theorizing, practical wisdom, the virtues of character, to name the main contenders – make up a happy life matters for present purposes.[8] If happiness consists only in theoretical activity, *sophia* is a good candidate for complete virtue. In that case, we would need to specify in which sense *sophia* is complete. If happiness consists both in theoretical and practical activities, complete virtue must be a virtue that includes virtues of character and virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. Two readings, both of which have been formulated in a number of ways, are now "classic" approaches: the so-called dominant and the inclusive reading.[9] According to the former, happiness consists in contemplation. According to the latter, the best life includes both contemplation and the exercise of the virtues of character and *phronêsis*.

With regard to the *EE*, the inclusive reading has been considered more plausible.[10] Scholars argue that in the *EE*, the life of the happy agent combines contemplation and the activities of practical wisdom and the character virtues.[11] Notably, this proposal is not presented in comparative terms. Aristotle does not rank kinds of happiness and he does not discuss a virtue that is most complete. Rather, he simply talks about "complete virtue" and of happiness.

With regard to the *NE*, among defenders of the dominant reading, some scholars argue that the best and most complete virtue is *sophia*, others that it is *nous*.[12] There are also what we may call hybrid views: some scholars argue that the best and most complete virtue is a combination of *sophia* and *phronêsis*.[13] Scholars who support the inclusive reading argue that the best and most complete virtue is a virtue that includes virtues of thinking and of character.[14] In *NE* 1097a25–29, Aristotle says that an end is most complete if it is chosen always as an end and never as a means for something else. Happiness is most complete because it is chosen for its own sake and for nothing else.[15] It is, thereby, the ultimate or chief end, the end for the sake of which other ends are pursued. As many scholars argue, this is how completeness or finality is explained if it is happiness – an activity – that is most complete.[16] But what does it mean that a virtue is complete? Let us consider two options: (i) A virtue is complete if it is by itself final, namely insofar as it is the virtue of the activity that most of all is self-sufficient and chosen for its own sake. (ii) A virtue is complete if it does not lack any parts.[17] In this sense, a virtue is complete if it is a whole with all its parts. My hypothesis is that we can distinguish completeness-*qua*-finality and completeness-*qua*-unity-of-virtue. I submit that the former characterizes complete virtue in the *NE*, while the latter applies to complete virtue in the *EE*.

11.2 What It Means for a Virtue to Be Complete

In *EE* II, Aristotle defines happiness as follows:

> (T1) Happiness, then, is the activity of the good soul. And since happiness is something complete (τέλεόν), and a life can be complete (τελέα) or incomplete (ἀτελής), and so too virtue (since it can be a whole (ὅλη) or a part (μόριον)), and the activity of what is incomplete (ἀτελῶν) is itself incomplete (ἀτελής), it follows that happiness would be the activity of a complete (τελείας) life in accordance with complete (τελείαν) virtue.[18]

The two expressions – τέλεος (complete) and ὅλος (whole) – are connected. Three things are called complete or whole in the passage:

- life can be complete or incomplete;
- activity can be complete or incomplete;
- virtue can be complete/whole or incomplete/a part.

What it means for a life to be "complete" is controversial.[19] For present purposes, I assume that a "whole" life is either a complete lifespan including all life stages and ending with death, or it is a sufficiently long lifespan to permit development of excellent activities.[20] With regard to activity, Aristotle says that the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete. But what does it mean for an activity to be *of* something incomplete (ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια)? In *Metaphysics* 1048b11–14, Aristotle says that activity is activity *of* a δύναμις – an

ability.[21] For example, we may say that there is an activity of the ability of seeing which is seeing. The activity of seeing can be exercised *according to* virtue (κατ'ἀρετὴν) – with good sight – or without virtue – with poor sight. According to *Metaphysics* 1048b20–35, activities like seeing are always complete. Roughly, this means that the activity of seeing is, at any moment in which it is exercised, complete. However, in T1, Aristotle seems to speak of activities in a general sense that admits activities to be incomplete. For present purposes, I should set aside the discussion of incomplete activities. An activity can be performed according to virtue or not. And this virtue can be complete or incomplete. Hence, there are four combinations: activity of something complete according to complete virtue, activity of something complete according to incomplete virtue, activity of something incomplete according to complete virtue, activity of something incomplete according to incomplete virtue. In the case of happiness, this activity is complete insofar as it is activity of something complete – the ability to do virtuous actions and to contemplate. What is more, this activity is according to complete virtue.

While in the case of life and of activity, Aristotle speaks of being τελέα and ἀτελής, virtue is said to be τελεία and ἀτελής since it can be ὅλη and μόριον. In T1, two lines before the definition of happiness, Aristotle mentions a virtue which is a whole (ὅλη). This virtue which is a whole is different from the virtue which is only a part (μόριον). But why is virtue said to be τελέα/ἀτελής since it is ὅλη/μόριον, while life and activity are said to be τελέα/ἀτελής with no further specification? My hypothesis is that with this difference, Aristotle stresses a dimension of the virtue he aims to characterize: this virtue must not only be complete, but also a whole. In the *EE*, Aristotle does not specify what τέλειον and ὅλον mean. In *Metaphysics* 1021b12–34, Aristotle defines τέλειον as (i) that which has all its parts; (ii) that which cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence and whose proper excellence does not lack any part; (iii) that which has attained its end. He says that virtue is τελείωσις – completion or perfection.[22] In the *Physics*, Aristotle clarifies not only what is complete, but also what is a whole:

> (T2) That of which there is nothing left out (ἔξω), it is complete (τέλειον) or whole (ὅλον). For we define a whole precisely as that from which nothing is absent, for example, a "whole man or a whole chest." And as with particular wholes, so it is in the main sense (κυρίως) [GB: that is, for the whole that is not a part of something else]: the whole is that of which there is nothing left out; whereas that from which something, no matter what, is missing and left outside is not "all" (ἀπῆ). And "whole" and "complete," if not altogether the same, are close in their nature (σύνεγγυς τὴν φύσιν), and nothing is complete (τέλειον) unless it has an end (τέλος); but an end is a limit (πέρας).[23]

Aristotle says that something is whole or complete when nothing is left out. Something is complete if it has an end and this end is a limit. Limit translates

the Greek πέρας.[24] For present purposes, it is sufficient to invoke the definition of limit that Aristotle provides in *Metaphysics* 1022a4–10. Aristotle says that the limit is

> (a) The furthest part of each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can be found, and the first point within which all parts are contained. (b) Any form (εἶδος) of magnitude or of something possessing magnitude. (c) The end of each thing. […] (d) The substance (οὐσία) or essence of each thing.[25]

As (a) suggests, there is continuity among the parts contained within the limit. That is, the parts are connected and identifiable as parts of the same whole insofar as there is a limit that divides what is part of the whole and what is not.

T2 specifies that τέλειον and ὅλον are not the same, but they are close in their nature. As Aristotle says at 228b13: τέλειον and ὅλον are close in their nature insofar as they are attributes of what is one.[26] In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains the relative notion of oneness*:*

> (T3) Most things, then, are said to be "one" because they produce, or possess, or are affected by, or are related to, some other one thing; but some are called "one" in a primary sense, and one of these is substance. It is one either in continuity or in form or in definition (ἢ συνεχείᾳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ λόγῳ); for we reckon as more than one thing which are not continuous, or whose form is not one, or whose definition is not one. Again, in one sense we call anything whatever "one" if it is quantitative and continuous; and in another sense we say that it is not "one" unless it is a **whole** (ὅλον) of some kind, i.e. unless it is one in form (τὸ εἶδος ἔχῃ ἕν) (e.g., if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow, we should not say that they were one – except in virtue of their continuity (συνέχειαν); but only if they were so put together as to be a shoe, and to possess already some one form). Hence the circumference of a circle is of all lines the most truly one, because it is whole and complete (ὅλη καὶ τέλειός).[27]

The passage is fraught with interpretative difficulties that I cannot discuss in this chapter. Aristotle addresses the way in which we call substances "one." He considers three options: something can be one in terms of continuity, or form, or definition. For present purposes, we are interested in the most ambitious notion of oneness, according to which something is one only if it is a whole, and that is, unless it is one in form. Aristotle uses two examples to illustrate the point. First, consider a shoe: the components of the shoe could be put together in such a way as to be continuous; that would provide the item with the weak oneness of continuity. But the item would not yet be a shoe. For that the components must be put together so that their continuity has the form of a shoe, and thereby the oneness of being a whole. Second, the circumference is said to be whole and complete. It is whole because there is

continuity among the different parts that form the circumference: namely, it is a circumference and not a bunch of disconnected points. The circumference is complete insofar as it has a limit – πέρας (as established by what Aristotle says in T2).

In light of all this, virtue is complete when (i) it has all its parts connected in a way that they form a whole; (ii) it has a limit that defines what belongs to the whole; (iii) it is one virtue that has other virtues as genuine parts rather than as a mere bundle that fails to be composed in the way that wholeness requires. Since we are talking about a virtue that has other virtues as parts, it seems plausible to say that the virtues that are parts are connected if they interact and co-function.[28]

11.3 What Is the Complete Virtue of the *EE*'s Definition of Happiness?

Prima facie, *megalopsychia*, *dikaiosunê*, *phronêsis*, *sophia*, and *kalokagathia* are candidates for the role of complete virtue as it appears in the *EE*'s definition of happiness.[29] Each of these virtues meets some important criteria: *megalopsychia* is called the strongest and greatest state and it occurs together with some virtues; *dikaiosunê* is, albeit with qualification, called complete virtue; *phronêsis* occurs with the character virtues; *sophia* includes already two virtues – intelligence (*nous*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*); and *kalokagathia* is called complete and whole. When Aristotle ascribes any of these virtues to a person, it is clear that he intends it as high praise. Each virtue is a comprehensive accomplishment, which pertains to important domains of life. Nevertheless, only *kalokagathia* meets the stringent criteria (Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit) for complete virtue.

Megalopsychia and *dikaiosunê* are the least promising candidates. They fail to meet what, earlier, I called the Inclusion Criterion. Namely, scholars agree in ascribing an inclusive position to the *EE*, and that this ascription seems well founded. That is, happiness as it is understood in the *EE* includes both activities according to the character virtues and according to the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. In line with this reading, complete virtue should include both the virtues of character and the virtues of thinking. *Megalopsychia* and *dikaiosunê*, however, are virtues of character that do not include the virtues of thinking.

In the *EE*, the discussion of *megalopsychia* differs in some respect from the more widely studied discussion of this virtue in the *NE*.[30] In *EE* II, 1221a10, Aristotle includes *megalopsychia* in the list of character virtues, describing it as the mean between conceitedness and weak-heartedness.[31] That is, *megalopsychia* is unequivocally characterized as a character virtue. This is sufficient reason against the identification of complete virtue and *megalopsychia*; but it is not the only reason.

In *EE* III, 1232a33–34, Aristotle says that greatness of soul, as we may translate *megalopsychia*, is the greatest and strongest (κράτιστη) state.[32] At first sight,

this claim seems to speak in favour of the identification of *megalopsychia* with the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. Aristotle says:

> (T4) Moreover greatness of soul even seems to follow (ἀκολουθεῖν) all the virtues. After all, correctly judging what is great and small among good things is praiseworthy; and the great goods are thought to be those pursued by the possessor of the strongest state regarding such matters, the strongest state being greatness of soul. What virtue in each sphere does is judge the greater and the lesser correctly; as the wise person and as virtue would bid. Hence all of the virtues will accompany (ἕπεσθαι) greatness of soul, or it will accompany all of them.[33]

Megalopsychia follows (ἀκολουθεῖν) all the virtues and all the virtues accompany (ἕπεσθαι) it. Aristotle does not specify whether he is talking about all the character virtues or all the virtues including the virtues of practical and of theoretical thinking. However, the passage occurs in *EE* III, which is a book dedicated to the virtues of character. Hence, we may suppose that Aristotle is talking about the virtues of character: these are the virtues that accompany *megalopsychia*. The verb ἀκολουθεῖν – to follow – signals that *megalopsychia* occurs with the other virtues, but it does not say that it includes the virtues. In addition, there is no indication that *megalopsychia* includes the virtues of thinking.[34] *Megalopsychia* occurs with practical wisdom – even though it does not include it – insofar as there cannot be virtues of character in the proper sense without practical wisdom (according to the theory of mutual entailment).[35] In T4, Aristotle says explicitly that the *megalopsychos* and the *phronimos* (the wise person) are able to judge the greater and the smaller correctly. The *megalopsychos* has practical wisdom, but nothing is said regarding the virtues of theoretical thinking.[36]

The *megalopsychos* is characterized by the capacity to judge correctly what has value in life. In T4, Aristotle says that the *megalopsychos* is the measure of great goods insofar as this agent pursues great goods. The *megalopsychos* does not care about life or wealth.[37] This agent cares only about honour. Gauthier argues that there are important differences between the discussion of *megalopsychia* in the *NE* and in the *EE*: in the *NE*, *megalopsychia* is characterized by self-sufficiency, while in the *EE*, it is characterized by honour.[38] In agreement with Gauthier, I think that honour has a special role in the discussion of *megalopsychia* in the *EE*. This relation with honour is an important element that disqualifies *megalopsychia* from the role of complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness.

> (T5) Greatness of soul is the best disposition concerning the choice and the use of honour and the other honourable goods, and it is with regard to this and not to what is useful that we grant this disposition. At the same time the most praiseworthy disposition is the mean. Clearly, then, greatness of soul too would be a mean.[39]

Megalopsychia is defined as the best disposition in relation to the choice and use of honour. The same expressions "choice and use" appear in *EE* VIII where Aristotle talks about natural goods.[40] As Aristotle says in *EE* VIII, 1248b28, honour is a natural good. While another plausible candidate for the role of complete virtue – *kalokagathia* – allows us to choose and use all the natural goods in a way that promotes contemplation, *megalopsychia* is the virtue of choosing and using honour and honourable goods. However, there is no mention of contemplation as the final purpose of this choice and use of honour and honourable goods. This is a further argument that speaks against the identification of *megalopsychia* with the virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness: *megalopsychia* does not have any explicit relation to contemplation.

In *EE* II, 1221a4, *dikaion* (the just) is listed among the character virtues. It is the mean between profit and loss. Justice does not satisfy the Inclusion Criterion: in Aristotle's reinterpreted Thrasymachean formulation, justice is the "good of the other." It includes all the virtues, but merely in a qualified sense, namely insofar as virtuous action relates to others. In *NE* V = *EE* IV, Aristotle calls *dikaiosunê* (justice) complete virtue.[41] He says explicitly that justice is a whole (ὅλον).[42] That is, though justice does not meet the Inclusion Criterion, it has a kind of completeness.

> (T6) This form of justice is complete virtue, not however *simpliciter* but in relation to other people. That is why justice is often thought to be the strongest virtue, and "neither Evening star nor Morning star is so wondrous." And we affirm the old saying: "Justice contains within it all of virtue together." It is complete virtue to the highest degree because it is the use of complete virtue. And it is complete because one who possesses it has the capability to use virtue not just on one's own behalf but in relation to others.[43]

Justice is said to be, as *megalopsychia*, the strongest of the virtues.[44] Aristotle quotes Theognis who says that justice is all virtues together. Aristotle does not agree with Theognis. Instead he develops his own proposal, according to which justice is specifically concerned with our relation to others. Justice contains all the virtues, and is the use – χρῆσις – of complete virtue, insofar as the agent relates not only to herself but also to others. This makes justice complete in a qualified sense and not *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς).[45]

Let us move to more plausible candidates: *phronêsis*, *sophia*, and *kalokagathia*. Aristotle says that *phronêsis* (practical wisdom) always functions in conjunction with the character virtues.[46] For this reason, scholars speak of a unity of the virtues that includes practical wisdom and the character virtues. Practical wisdom and the character virtues entail each other: one cannot have one without the other. However, Aristotle does not say that practical wisdom includes all the virtues. It does not include the virtues of theoretical thinking. Aristotle says that *phronêsis* prescribes (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of theoretical wisdom.[47] That is, practical wisdom "serves" or "prepares the ground" for theoretical wisdom:

sophia. Practical wisdom cannot be the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness in the *EE* insofar as it does not include *sophia* – and this is clear insofar as it prescribes for its sake. What is more, it does not include any of the other virtues of theoretical thinking.[48]

One of the most promising candidates for the role of complete virtue is *sophia* (theoretical wisdom). *Sophia* already includes two virtues: *espistêmê* and *nous*. Yet, one passage clearly excludes *sophia*. In *EE* = *NE*, 1144a1–6, Aristotle says that *sophia* is *part* of complete virtue.

> (T7) These states [GB: that is, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom] must be choiceworthy in their own right, since each is certainly the virtue of its own part of the soul, even if neither of them accomplishes anything. Next, they do indeed accomplish things, not in the way that medical knowledge brings about health but in the way that health does. That is how theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) causes happiness, since theoretical wisdom is a part of the whole virtue and by being possessed and by being active it makes a person happy.[49]

Here, Aristotle introduces a distinction between two ways in which something can be productive of something, or in other words, accomplish something. His comparandum is health. Medicine brings about health in one way; in another way, health brings about health. If someone is sick, medicine can produce health. If someone is healthy, however, then it is in the nature of being healthy that health sustains itself. In that sense, health brings about health. This is the very sense, according to T7, in which theoretical and practical wisdom are productive. They are ways of being active which sustain themselves. And hence it is not just true to say that they bring about themselves; insofar as one can engage in excellent activities such as contemplation and activities that display practical wisdom, they bring about happiness. At the conclusion of this line of thought, Aristotle makes the claim that interests us here: *sophia* is part of complete virtue.[50] This shows that *sophia* is not the complete virtue mentioned in the *EE*'s definition of happiness. Insofar as *EE* = *NE* 1144a1–6 occurs in one of the so-called common books, it may also raise a problem for the interpretation of complete virtue in the *NE*. That is, if *sophia* is said to be part of complete virtue, how can it be the most complete virtue of the *NE*? The answer to this question is not clear. One way to solve the problem is to view the common books – or at least this passage – as part of the philosophical argument in the *EE*. Another way to read the passage is that *sophia* is τέλειον in the sense of finality rather than completeness.[51]

Kalokagathia is the virtue of being-beautiful-and-good – as I translate it – and it is discussed in detail in *EE* VIII 3.[52] In 1248b14–16, Aristotle compares this virtue to a whole (ὅλον):

> (T8) We have spoken earlier about each virtue qua part (κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον); but since we have separately

> distinguished the capacity of each of them, we have to discuss the virtue composed by them, which we actually call being-beautiful-and-good. Now it is evident that whoever truly has this appellation must have the individual virtues (τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς). For it cannot be otherwise in other cases, either. For no one is healthy in his body as a whole (ὅλον), yet not in any part (μέρος) of it; rather, all parts, or most parts and the most important ones, should be in the same state as the whole (ὅλῳ).[53]

Aristotle uses the same term – ὅλον – to describe the virtue according to which happiness is complete activity in T1 and to describe *kalokagathia*. In T8, he says that *kalokagathia* is composed by the virtues. Elsewhere, I proposed an argument that shows that it is composed of *all* the virtues discussed so far in the treatises.[54] Insofar as *kalokagathia* is composed by all the virtues of character and by all the virtues of thinking, it meets the Inclusion Criterion. In *EE* VIII 3, Aristotle says that *kalokagathia* is complete virtue:

> (T9) Goods are beautiful when the aim in acting and choosing them is beautiful. That is why the natural goods are beautiful for the beautiful-and-good person. For the just is beautiful and this in the sense of what accords with worth; this person is worthy of these things. What suits him is also beautiful, and these things (wealth, high-born status and power) are suitable for him. Consequently for the beautiful-and-good person the same things are both advantageous and beautiful. But for most people there is a discrepancy here. Things which are simple goods are not good for them too, but they are good for the good person; but for the beautiful-and-good person they are also beautiful, since he performs many beautiful actions on their own account. But he who thinks that he ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods performs beautiful actions only incidentally. Hence being beautiful-and-good is complete virtue.[55]

The last sentence of the passage sums up several reasons for the claim that *kalokagathia* is complete virtue. All these reasons are connected to the beautiful. First of all, Aristotle says that the so-called natural goods are not only good for the agents who possess *kalokagathia*, but they are also beautiful. Second, the beautiful is the ultimate motivation for their actions and choices. Third, the agent who possesses *kalokagathia* is worthy (ἄξιος) of things beautiful such as the just, the suitable, wealth, high-born status, and power. Fourth, things that are advantageous (συμφέροντα) are also beautiful for this agent. For the many, there is a discrepancy between what is advantageous and what is beautiful. Finally, beautiful actions are done for their sake and not for the sake of acquiring external goods. The virtue of *kalokagathia* allows the agents who possess it to have a special relation with the beautiful. This is due to the very nature of *kalokagathia*, as the name of this virtue suggests. What matters for present purposes is that Aristotle discusses the relation to the beautiful as evidence that *kalokagathia* is complete virtue. As part of the definition of τέλειον that

Aristotle offers in *Metaphysics* 1021b12–34, Aristotle says that what is τέλειον cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence. As T9 shows, *kalokagathia* cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence. That is, for the agent who has *kalokagathia* things are not only good, but they are also beautiful. And the beautiful is the final aim of all of the agent's actions and choices. Insofar as all the virtues that compose *kalokagathia* co-function in order to attain one common end – the beautiful – there is continuity among the parts that constitute the whole of *kalokagathia*. This meets the definition of being one and whole given in *Metaphysics* 1016b7–18. In light of this and of what is said in T8 in relation to being composed by all the virtues, *kalokagathia* meets the Wholeness Criterion.

In *EE* VIII, 1249b13, Aristotle mentions explicitly τὸ θεωρητικόν – the theoretical capacity. This seems to be the ἀρχή – principle – to which we need to subordinate. In *EE* VIII, 1249b17, Aristotle says that the choice and the acquisition of natural goods should promote the θεοῦ θεωρίαν – the contemplation of the divine. And this is the most beautiful limit (ὅρος κάλλιστος). This ὅρος has to do with *kalokagathia*: in *EE* VIII, 1249b24, Aristotle seems to suggest that this is the ὅρος of *kalokagathia*.[56] As he argues, we need: (i) to perceive the irrational part of the soul as little as possible,[57] and (ii) to be able to choose and acquire natural goods in a way that promotes contemplation. The choice and acquisition of natural goods is the most beautiful limit because it promotes the most beautiful activity, namely contemplation.[58] Insofar as the limit is a limit of *kalokagathia*, it is this virtue that allows us to choose and acquire natural goods so that they promote contemplation. This provides further support in favour of the idea that *kalokagathia* meets the Inclusion Criterion: that is, if the final aim of this virtue is theoretical contemplation, the virtues of theoretical thinking must be included in *kalokagathia* in addition to the virtues of character and practical wisdom (which are necessary in order for the aim of our actions to be beautiful).

The idea of a ὅρος of *kalokagathia* reinforces the hypothesis that *kalokagathia* is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. In T2, in the *Physics*, Aristotle says that something is complete when it has an end and the end is a limit – πέρας. Πέρας and ὅρος are two different expressions, but they are closely connected and for present purposes, they can be treated as synonyms.[59] As Aristotle states, *kalokagathia* has a ὅρος. This is enough to show that *kalokagathia* meets the Limit Criterion. Insofar as it satisfies the Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit Criteria, *kalokagathia* is the most plausible candidate for being the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness.

11.4 Conclusion

I investigated the complete virtue mentioned in the *Eudemian* definition of happiness. I focused on three criteria: complete virtue is one virtue that includes *all* the virtues *qua* parts, all its parts are connected so that they form a whole, and it has a limit. I analyzed the explanations of τέλειον, ὅλον, oneness, and limit that Aristotle offers in the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*. In light of these

explanations, I examined some possible candidates for the role of complete virtue in the *Eudemian Ethics*. First, I examined *megalopsychia* and *dikaiosunê*, which *qua* virtues of character must be ruled out, though they have some relevant features. Next, I turned to two virtues of thinking: *phronêsis* and *sophia*. Even though these two virtues occur with other virtues, they fail to meet the Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit Criteria. Finally, I brought evidence in favour of *kalokagathia*. I argued that *kalokagathia* is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness insofar as it meets all the criteria. This proposal has upshots for our reading of the *EE* insofar as it elucidates what virtue we should have in order to lead a happy life. What is more, it shows that with regard to complete virtue and to happiness the *EE* differs in important respects from the *NE*.[60]

Notes

1 *EE* II, 1219a39, ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν (all translations of the *EE* in this chapter are by Inwood and Woolf modified by the author). *Eudaimonia* is translated "happiness" for lack of a better term: I use this translation for the sake of clarity insofar as it is ingrained in the literature on the topic.
2 *NE* I, 1098a17. Aristotle specifies in *NE* I, 1098a17 that complete virtue is here to be understood as the best and the most complete. In *NE* I, 1100a4, b10, 1101a15, 1102a5–6, Aristotle speaks of complete virtue: in all these occurrences, complete virtue has to be understood as specified in 1098a17. That is, it is the best and the most complete virtue.
3 Cooper, 1986, p. 100; Kenny, 1992, p. 16; Irwin, 2012; P. Destrée argues that in the *Metaphysics*, *teleios* is connected to *agathos*, see Destrée, 2003, p. 56.
4 Some of the major contributions to the discussion on happiness and its definition in the two treatises are: Donini, 2014; Donini, 1994, pp. 98-110; Kenny, 2016 (first edition: 1978); Kenny, 1992; Rowe, 1971; White, 1992.
5 In his commentary on the *EE*, Woods says that in the *EE* definition of happiness, complete virtue is *kalokagathia*. But he does not offer an argument to support this claim. Woods, 1992, p. 90.
6 Cooper, 1986, p. 100.
7 Kenny, 1992, p. 19.
8 The debate is vast. I only summarize some contributions relevant for present purposes.
9 The distinction between a dominant and an inclusive reading is first proposed by Hardie 1968. Defenders of the inclusive reading argue that the most complete virtue includes all the virtues. A. Long summarizes the debate in Long, 2011. See also Destrée, Zingano, 2014; Reeve, 2012; Lännström, 2006; Lear, 2004; Kraut, 1989; Ackrill, 1974.
10 Even though there are not many studies on the *EE*, comparatively speaking to the *NE*, the discussion of happiness is one of the most investigated topic: see Kenny, 1992 and Cooper, 1986. Lear, Cooper, Kenny *et al.* think that in the *EE*, happiness includes activity according to the character virtues and contemplation. According to Cooper, 1986, the *EE* proposes an inclusive view of happiness. According to Rowe, 1971, there is an incongruity between happiness in *NE* I 7, X 7 and *EE* II 1. As Rowe says, in the *NE*, happiness is "the actuality of the virtue of the superior part of the soul" and in the *EE*, it is the whole of virtue. Rowe says that in the *NE*, happiness seems to be mostly theoretical while in the *EE*, it is practical and theoretical. Buddensiek goes beyond the dominant/inclusive debate: he argues that happiness is a whole and many things are necessary to achieve it, but theoretical activity is the most important one, see Buddensiek, 1999, p. 20.

11 Cooper and Kenny argue that in the *EE*, happiness is activity according to all the parts of the soul.
12 Among others, Cooper, Kraut, Kenny, and Donini argue that the best virtue is *sophia*. In antiquity, the first to defend this interpretation is Aspasius. Labarrière argues that the best virtue is *nous.* See Cooper, 1986; Kraut, 1989; Kenny, 1992; Donini, 1994, pp. 98–110; Bodeüs, Labarrière, Lefebvre, 2003. With regard to the *NE*, Cooper argues that happiness must be in accordance with the best and most complete virtue, but it is not the activity of a single virtue (Cooper 1987).
13 In antiquity, Eustrate argues that the best virtue is *phronêsis*. Natali argues that the best virtue is a combination of *phronêsis* and *sophia*. See Natali, 1989.
14 See Ackrill, 1974; Destrée, 2003.
15 Cf. *NE* 1097b1 and 1176b31.
16 See Kenny 1992, p. 5 and 18; Cooper 1986, p. 100; Irwin, 2012.
17 Cooper and Irwin argue that in the case of complete virtue, being complete means that the virtue includes all the other virtues.
18 *EE* II, 1219a35–39.
19 Irwin, 2012; Horn, 2013.
20 For a discussion of this, see Woods, 1992, p. 91.
21 See Kosman, 1994, p. 201.
22 *Metaphysics* 1021b21.
23 *Physics* 207a9–15. Translation by GB.
24 LSJ reports "limit" as a possible translation of *peras*, as well as "end" and "boundary."
25 *Metaphysics* 1022a4–10, trans. by H. Tredennick.
26 Radice argues that the two terms are hendiadys. Cf. Aristotele, *Fisica*, trad. by R. Radice, Milano: Bompiani, 2011.
27 *Metaphysics* 1016b7–18, tr. by Tredennick with changes by GB.
28 I argue in favour of this in Bonasio, 2020.
29 Décarie discusses complete virtue: he considers as candidates justice, *sophia*, and *kalokagathia*. See Décarie, 1975, pp. 60–76.
30 *NE* 1124a1. In the *NE*, Aristotle points out that *megalopsychia* is the adornment (*kosmos*) of the virtues. Scholars debate on how to understand this claim: they suggest that either *megalopsychia* is not a virtue at all, or it includes all the virtues and somehow it perfects them. Curzer argues that Aristotle's notion of *megalopsychia* is an attempt to reconcile the Homeric virtue of grandeur with his new virtue of moderation. See Curzer, 2012.
31 In his edition (under preparation) of the *EE*, Rowe proposes to put the third column of the list of virtues in round brackets to signal that there is something suspect about the text. That is, right after the list, Aristotle refers to this list as a list of *pathê*. However, the third column is a list of virtues and not of *pathê*. The disposition of the items in columns is not Aristotelian. Even if the third column, where *megalopsychia* occurs, was not Aristotelian, *megalopsychia* is discussed in book III, which is about the virtues of character. Hence, it is undoubtedly a virtue of character.
32 *EE* III, 1232a34.
33 *EE* III, 1232a31–37.
34 Stover, 2003; Pakaluk, 2004, pp. 265–268; Crisp, 2006.
35 *EE* III, 1234a24–29; *EE* V, 1144b17.
36 Aristotle distinguishes a particular form of *megalopsychia* and a more general form of *megalopsychia*. In his discussion of this virtue, he focuses on the particular form. The more general form of this virtue could be a better candidate for the role of the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. However, Aristotle does not offer any discussion of this general form. Insofar as this general form is a virtue of character, it could be excluded. Cf. *EE* III, 1232b23–25. Cooper argues that this distinction between a general and a particular form is introduced to solve the tension between *megalopsychia*

as the virtue of doing great deeds and the virtue of acting moderately. See Cooper, 1986, p. 196.

37 *EE* III, 1232b10.

38 Gauthier, 1951; Rees, 1971. See also Schmidt, 1967. See *NE* 1124a4. In the *NE*, Aristotle says that *megalopsychia* cannot occur without *kalokagathia*. This is the only occurrence of *kalokagathia* in the *NE*. For this reason, it is even more difficult to understand what Aristotle means by saying that *megalopsychia* cannot occur without *kalokagathia*. If *kalokagathia* is conceived in the same way as in the *EE*, it means that *megalopsychia* cannot occur without all the virtues of character and all the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. However, this must remain speculative as there is no evidence regarding how Aristotle conceives of *kalokagathia* in the *NE* (in 1179b10, Aristotle mentions *kalokagathia*, but he does not elucidates what he understands with this virtue except perhaps that if one possesses it, she is a lover of the beautiful – *philokalon*).

39 *EE* III, 1233a4–9.

40 *EE* VIII, 1249b17.

41 *EE* = *NE* 1129b26.

42 *EE* = *NE* 1130a16.

43 *EE* = *NE* 1129b27–33.

44 *EE* = *NE* 1129b27–28.

45 *EE* = *NE* 1129b27–30.

46 *EE* = *NE* 1144a30; 1144b15.

47 *EE* = *NE* 1145a7; *EE* VIII, 1249b15. In *EE* VIII, Aristotle says that practical wisdom prescribes for the sake of the divine. What it means is obscure: one possible interpretation is that practical wisdom prescribes for the theoretical capacity (mentioned a few lines before the passage). The divine is the highest object of this capacity.

48 See Cooper 1986, p. 121. In addition, in *MM* 1184a34, Aristotle says that practical wisdom is not complete because when one acquires this virtue, one still wants and needs other things. In *MM* 1198b12–18, practical wisdom is called the steward of *sophia*.

49 *EE* V, 1144a1–6.

50 Aristotle compares theoretical wisdom to health. See Burnet, 1900, p. 283; Joachim, 1951, pp. 216–217; Reeve, 1992, p. 95.

51 Cooper argues that *sophia* is most final (*teleion*) insofar as the activity of contemplation does not need other goods. See Cooper, 1986, p. 118.

52 *EE* VIII, 1248b8–1249b25.

53 *EE* VIII 3, 1248b8–16.

54 Bonasio, 2020. Kenny, 1992, Buddensiek, 1999, Monan, 1986, and Gastaldi, 2003 argue that *kalokagathia* includes the virtues of thinking. Verdenius and Moraux and Harlfinger argue that it does not include the virtues of thinking. On *kalokagathia* as complete virtue, see Kenny, 1992, p. 94. Arius Didymus describes *kalokagathia* as *aretê teleia*.

55 *EE* VIII 3, 1249a6–16. I accept Spengel's emendation at 1249a13.

56 See Peterson, 1988, pp. 233–250. Irwin suggests to me an alternative reading according to which *horos* is a definition.

57 The "irrational" part translates the term ἀλόγου. An alternative reading of the manuscripts (defended by Rowe) is ἄλλου – namely, "the other part" of the soul.

58 Buddensiek argues for a similar interpretation, see Buddensiek, 2014.

59 LSJ reports that *horos* can be translated as standard, limit, and measure. Ancient commentators stress the connection between *peras* and *horos*. Simplicius in his *Commentary of De Anima* 407a18, mentions *horos* and *peras* in nearby passages: he calls *peras* the limit of the line and *horos* the limit of the whole structure which is also its form. In the same passage, he talks about *holon* – the whole – of which *peras* is the limit. (Cf. Simplicius, *Commentary on the Soul*, tr. by Urmson, footnote 207 and 187, pp. 73–74.) Of course, Aristotle may understand *peras* and *horos* in *De Anima* in a way that is not consistent with

how he understands them in the *EE*. Steel argues that *horos* is that by which the essence of something is constituted and determined. He says that it is used interchangeably with *eidos*. Steel lists both *horos* and *peras* as possible translations of boundary (Simplicius, *On Aristotle on the Soul*, 3.6–13, tr. by Steel).

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12 The Wild and the Good

Conditions for Virtue in the *Eudemian Ethics*

Terence Irwin

12.1 Questions about Fine-and-Goodness

At the end of the *Magna Moralia* (*MM*) and the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*), Aristotle looks back at his account of the virtues of character, and adds a discussion of the composite virtue that he calls fine-and-goodness (*kalokagathia*). Since the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) has no parallel to this discussion, it is worth asking what it adds to the account of the virtues. Two questions naturally arise: (i) What is distinctive of kk, according to this chapter?[1] (ii) How well do his claims about kk fit into his general account of the virtues?

Aristotle distinguishes (in 1248b26–37) the good person (the one for whom natural goods, such as health, wealth, strength, and honour, are good) from the kk (the one who has fine things, and does fine actions, for their own sake). From this distinction, and from the rest of the chapter, some readers have inferred that he means that it is possible to be good without being kk. Later in the chapter (1248b40, 1249a14–15), Aristotle mentions people who choose virtue for the sake of external goods. These people include the Spartans and others who have had the same sort of training. Some readers have taken these passages to give us examples of people who are good without being kk.

If we understand the argument this way, we will take Aristotle to accept three claims about the difference between good people and kk people:

1. It is possible to be good without being kk.
2. It is possible to be good while believing that virtue is to be chosen only for the sake of natural goods.
3. The Spartans are examples of people who are good, but not kk.[2]

To see whether Aristotle believes any of these things, I will examine his explanation of the claim that the good person is the one who benefits from the natural goods. If we examine the rest of the chapter in the light of this explanation, we should conclude:

(a) Contrary to (1), necessarily the kk is the only one for whom natural goods are good. Necessarily, then, people are good if and only if they are

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kk, because "kk" and "good" pick out different properties of the same person.

(b) Contrary to (2), natural goods are not good for anyone who takes an instrumental attitude to virtue, and hence such a person is not good.

(c) Contrary to (3), the Spartans are not good, because the natural goods are not good for them.

If my argument for (a) is sound, (b) and (c) follow. But the converse is not true. I will try to show that even if I am wrong about (a), we should accept (b) and (c). And even if I am wrong about (a) and (b), we should still accept (c), and therefore should deny that the Spartans, as Aristotle describes them, are good.

At some points in the chapter, we face real or imagined textual difficulties.[3] I will try to show how a reasonable view of the argument should inform judgments about the text.

What views about kk does Aristotle presuppose in his readers? The abstract noun "*kalokagathia*" and the cognate adjective "*kalos kagathos*" (or "*kalos kai agathos*") are often applied to people who show some virtue that is salient in the relevant context. In this respect, these terms are similar to "*agathos*," "*andragathia*," and "*aretê*." A brave person, for instance, is sometimes said to have proved himself a "good man" (*anêr agathos*) by his brave action. If we say this, we do not take "*agathos*" to mean "brave"; nor do we imply that bravery is the only virtue, or, conversely, that brave people have all the other virtues as well. We speak of a brave person as good because we are thinking of circumstances in which this is the relevant virtue. Similarly, someone who shows an appropriate virtue is said to be kk, and different types of people may be credited with this quality in different circumstances. Polydamas the Pharsalian was regarded as so kk that he could be relied on to handle money honestly (Xen. *HG* vi 1.2). Willingness to overlook past offences is taken to be a mark of kk (Dem. 18.93). The kk has a public-spirited outlook (Dem. 18.118). The Athenians who voted a crown to Demosthenes because of his "virtue and *kalokagathia*" did not mean that he displayed all the virtues that one could think of, but that he displayed those that made him a valuable and patriotic citizen.[4] In such contexts, "kk" might be replaced by "*agathos*" without changing the point.

Since "kk" refers to the virtue that is relevant to specific circumstances, there may be room for argument about which virtues are needed if one deserves to be praised as kk. Nicocles, as presented by Isocrates, maintains that bravery, cleverness, and the other conditions that gain people a good reputation can be found in bad people, but justice and temperance are confined to kk people. He means that a good ruler needs these virtues above all, and that this is why "they are the most genuine and most stable, and deserve the highest praises" (Isoc. 3.43).

Aristotle does not simply reproduce these common opinions about kk. But, as we will see, he keeps them in mind in his discussion of the relation between kk and the individual virtues.

12.2 Types of Goods and Types of Goodness

Aristotle begins with a backward reference. He has already used "kk" as the name of the virtue that is composed of the specific virtues, but some further articulation is needed (1248b8–10).[5] In *EN* VI the *phronimos* has this composite virtue, because the virtues that require *phronêsis* are inseparable (1144b30–1145a2). The person who has these virtues is fully good (*agathon kuriôs*, 1144b30; cf. *to kuriôs agathon*, 1144b7); such people act and elect "in such a way as to be good" (*hôst' einai agathon*, 1144a18–19). They are fully good by having full virtue (*kuria aretê*). In the passage he refers to, then, he has apparently used "kk" as a name for the virtue of someone who is fully good. This will be worth bearing in mind while we read through the present chapter.

He sets out to "articulate" (*diarthrôteon*, b10) his claim. In his first step (marked by "*men oun*"), he argues that kk requires the individual virtues, just as a healthy body has to have healthy parts.[6] Someone who has this composite virtue will be completely good and will have complete virtue; for the composite virtue mentioned in *EN* VI is composed of all the virtues, since the full virtues are inseparable. *EN* VI does not actually use the expressions "completely good" (*teleiôs agathos*) or "complete virtue" (*teleia aretê*). *EN* V, however, uses "complete virtue" for general justice (1129b25–1130a1), and the *MM* uses it in passages that correspond to *EN* VI 12–13 (1198a6, 9, 31; 1200a3, 9). If, then, we are to articulate the composite virtue that was called "kk," we should be able to show that kk is complete virtue. At the end of the discussion, Aristotle says that he has shown this (1249a16–17), using the expression that he uses in the *MM*. How should we conceive kk, if we are to show that it is complete virtue?

An easy answer would be that "kk" simply means "good person," so that it is a trivial move to substitute one term for the other. When the Athenians recognized Demosthenes' virtue (*aretê*) by voting him a crown, they might have said that he had proved himself to be good (*agathos*), given the usual connexion between having virtue and being good. When they declare him to be kk, they seem to say what they would have said if they had simply declared him to be *agathos*. Aristotle, however, believes we ought to distinguish the characteristics of being kk from those of being good (1248b16–18).[7] It is not trivial to claim that the kk is completely good. We need to understand what the kk is like, and what the good person is like, so that we can see why we are justified in using "kk" to refer to complete virtue.

To show that being kk is not the same as being good, Aristotle divides non-instrumental goods into two classes (1248b18–26), and uses this division to distinguish the good person (1248b26–34) from the kk (1248b34–7). He argues that the kk meets the conditions for being a good person (1248b37–11249a11). He concludes that kk is complete virtue (1249a11–17). This description of the argument does not tell us whether Aristotle takes being kk to be necessary, or only sufficient, for being good. Nor does it tell us whether he thinks "kk" and "good" introduce different concepts that pick out the same property, or

introduce different properties of the same subject. We will need to see whether we can reach any more definite conclusions from the details of the argument.

To prepare for his distinction between being good and being kk, Aristotle introduces two types of non-instrumental goods, the first of which bears on his account of being good, and the second on his account of being kk. He distinguishes fine from non-fine non-instrumental goods. In contrast to non-instrumental goods such as health and strength, fine goods are proper objects of praise (1248b18–26).

Some non-praiseworthy instrumental and non-instrumental goods are natural goods[8] – goods that are good by nature, but not good for everyone. Aristotle describes them in the same way as *EN* V describes goods that are subject to fortune. These are good without qualification, but not always good for someone (1129b1–4). Vicious people do not benefit at all by their use of these goods (1248b30–2), just as sick people would not benefit if they used things that are good for a healthy person (1248b32–4).

12.3 Use and Misuse of Natural Goods

When Aristotle says that someone does or does not benefit from the use of these natural goods, "benefit" might be understood in two ways:

1. If an agent gains some benefit from a particular good, this good is a *pro tanto* good. Similarly, whatever does some degree of harm to an agent is thereby *pro tanto* bad for that agent.
2. A good for an agent benefits the agent overall: whatever *pro tanto* harm may be suffered is less than the *pro tanto* benefit that one gains. Similarly, an evil is harmful overall; whatever *pro tanto* benefit may be gained is less than the *pro tanto* harm that one suffers.

On some occasions, Aristotle refers to *pro tanto* benefit and harm. He observes that sometimes a good benefits people and sometimes it harms them; some people have been destroyed because of their wealth, and others because of their bravery (1094b16–19). One of these harmful goods is an external good, but the other is a virtue. Aristotle observes that bravery does brave people some harm sometimes. He does not say, however, that bravery is ever harmful overall for the brave person.

Deliberation relies on the same division between *pro tanto* and overall goods. It is sometimes hard to discriminate what should be chosen at the price of what, and what should be endured in exchange for what (1110a29–30). In such cases there is something to be said for different courses of action, which are *pro tanto* good, but the one that we should choose, at the price of some *pro tanto* evil, is the one that is better overall. Deliberation about goods rests on our wish (*boulêsis*) for the good (e.g. *EN* III 4). Wish is for the overall good. If we believe x is a *pro tanto* good, but y is better than x, and is therefore an overall good, our wish is for y as good overall. Sometimes, Aristotle makes this

comparative aspect of our wish for the good explicit (e.g. *De Anima* 434a5–10). It is taken for granted in the deliberation that seeks the means to our end and inquires into the best of the available course of action (e.g. 1226b13–15; *EN* 1112b16–20).[9]

In the light of this division between *pro tanto* and overall benefit, we can see how natural goods are good for the good person. Aristotle does not mean that for a virtuous person natural goods are never harmful to any degree; on the contrary, a virtuous person who is rich or powerful may suffer *pro tanto* harm as a result of being rich or powerful. Similarly, a bad person may be *pro tanto* benefited by a natural good. If Phalaris the tyrant is hungry and eats a healthy meal, or takes medicine that cures his illness, he gains some benefit. Aristotle means that the good person benefits overall from natural goods, and that the bad person would gain no overall benefit for himself (*ouden an onêseeie*, 1248b31) if he used them.[10]

Next, we need to explain why the bad person cannot benefit overall from the use of natural goods. Two explanations might be offered:

1. The overall benefit might be restricted to non-fine goods. Intemperate people may use good food badly to ruin their health, and greedy people may use their wealth badly so that they impoverish themselves by reckless speculation. But for virtuous people, natural goods result in an overall improvement in non-fine goods.
2. The overall benefit includes fine goods, which take precedence over non-fine goods. Unjust people harm themselves because they use their health, strength, and astuteness to reach unjust goals that make them even more unjust, or, at best, make them no more just. Good people, however, benefit overall from the use of natural goods, because benefit is measured by the standard of fine goods.

If Aristotle had the first conception of overall benefit point in mind, his claim that the bad person would gain no benefit from the use of natural goods (1248b30–2) would be mistaken. Unjust but cautious people may use their wealth unjustly to make themselves richer and healthier, so that they enjoy life more. Such people want to spread out their pleasures so that they last longer; they are "temperate because of intemperance," as Plato says in the *Phaedo* (68c–69c). But if Aristotle has the second conception in mind, his generalization is true. Unjust people use natural goods unjustly, so that they remain unjust, and gain no benefit. They would gain an overall benefit only if they could become less vicious; but the mere acquisition of natural goods will not make them less vicious.

It is reasonable for Aristotle to rely on the second conception of overall benefit rather than the first. In his ethical works, he does not promise, any more than Plato promises in the *Republic*, that good people will always outdo bad people in the accumulation of non-fine goods. The goods that come first are the fine goods, and these regulate the appropriate pursuit of non-fine goods. If

we aim only at the "contested" goods, those that seem greatest to non-virtuous people (1248b27–9), we take no account of the priority of fine goods, and hence we cannot benefit overall.

12.4 What Does It Take to Be Good?

Since Aristotle tells us that the good person is the one for whom the natural goods are good, our understanding of how natural goods are good for us should tell us what the good person is like. The answer is simple: to be a good person – one for whom the natural goods are good – we have to have the Aristotelian virtues, and therefore we have to choose fine actions because they are fine. The virtues require us to choose fine actions for themselves, and to give priority to these actions over those that secure the natural goods. That is how we keep the natural goods in their proper place, and prevent them from harming us as they would if we preferred them to fine goods.

If the natural goods are good for us overall, we do not believe we would be better off if we chose vicious (unjust, intemperate, etc.) action over virtuous action, in order to gain some natural good; for we see that we would choose the less beneficial option, and would be harmed by the natural good that we chose over virtuous action. If natural goods are beneficial for us, then, we believe that virtues and virtuous actions are better than any combination of natural goods, and we act on this belief. If we did not believe that virtue and virtuous action are always better, we would be ready, in some circumstances, to choose some combination of natural goods over virtue and virtuous action. That choice would harm us, by making us worse. Hence, natural goods would not be good for us. Hence, we would not be good.

Our conclusion, that the good person has to have Aristotelian virtues, needs to be examined in the light of what Aristotle says next. After he has described the good person, Aristotle returns to the other half of the contrast that he introduced earlier (in b16–18) between the good person and the kk.[11] He relies on the division between fine and non-fine goods that he explained (in b18–24) before he described the good person. The kk has fine and praiseworthy goods "because of themselves" and engages in fine actions "for their own sake" (1248b35–6). He is therefore distinguished from other people by the combination of these actions and this attitude to them. This description is different from the description of the good person in so far as the description of the good person mentioned the use of natural goods, but mentioned neither fine goods nor the good person's attitude to them.

Aristotle has now defended his claim that the difference between being good and being kk is not simply a difference in name. "Being good" and "being kk" introduce different descriptions of the good person and of the kk; only the first mentions using natural goods, and only the second mentions fine goods and one's attitude to them. But it does not follow that they are different people. We have found that the natural goods are good for us only if we regulate our pursuit of them by the Aristotelian virtues. Since these virtues require

us to engage in fine actions for their own sake, they require us to be kk. The two descriptions ("good," "kk") are not simply non-synonymous descriptions of the same property. They pick out different properties because being good and being kk have different explanatory roles. To be kk is to have a specific attitude to fine goods. To be good is to benefit from the use of natural goods. A more exact understanding of these two features shows us why only the kk gains the relevant sort of benefit from natural goods.

We can now see the point of the section that describes the good person (*agathos men oun*, 1248b26–34) and the kk (*kalos de kagathos*, 1248b34–7). The two descriptions do not pick out two non-coincident groups of people. The description of the good person states a necessary and sufficient condition for being good (the natural goods are good for all and only good people), and the description of the kk tells us who satisfies this necessary and sufficient condition for being good. If we doubt whether Aristotle intends this identification of the good person with the kk, we need only look back at his claim that a bad person cannot benefit from the natural goods. Once we understand the grounds for this claim, we see that only the kk benefits from the natural goods.

12.5 The Political State

Aristotle now introduces a "political state," which we find in Sparta and perhaps among other peoples (1248b37–9). The expression "*politikê andreia*" is used for the type of apparent bravery that Aristotle says is closest to genuine bravery. He says it is the apparent bravery displayed by well-trained soldiers who stand their ground because they are ashamed to run away and face reproach, and because they obey the law that tells them to stand their ground (1229a13, 1230a16–21, 1229a29). Aristotle's examples of the relevant type of shame are Homeric, but the use of "*politikê*" and the reputation of the Spartans for bravery make it reasonable to suppose that the "political state" includes the state that is called "*politikê andreia*."

A natural rendering of "*politikê andreia*" is "civic bravery" or "citizen bravery." This may, however, be misleading, if we take it to imply that this is the only kind of bravery that citizens can achieve. If that were indeed implied, who would be really brave? It would be a curiously small class of non-citizens. It might be better to speak of "political bravery" to mark the fact that Aristotle is not speaking of the bravery (or approximation to it) of anyone who is a citizen of any city. He refers more precisely to the state that is deliberately formed in the citizens by the training imposed by the city. Sparta imposed systematic training aimed at producing bravery, but Athens and many other Greek cities did not. These other cities had bravery, or some approximation to it, among their citizens, but it was not political bravery. Indeed, the Athenians prided themselves on not having political bravery, because, in their view, they did not need the training that the Spartans imposed on the Spartiates.[12]

The introduction of political bravery in the argument of *EE* VIII reminds us of Aristotle's judgment on Sparta's approach to moral education. He does not

agree with the attitude of the Athenians, as Thucydides describes it. Cities are mistaken if they refrain from intervention in moral education, especially if they think that freedom requires non-intervention (*Pol.* 1310a25–36; 1317b11–17). A non-interventionist attitude to moral education is the attitude of the uncivilized Cyclopes who had no political institutions (*EN* 1180b26–9). Sparta is one of the few states that have grasped the importance of systematic moral education for the virtues (1180a24–6; 1102a10–12). The "political state" is the state that results from the systematic education undertaken by the city or people (*ethnos*), in Sparta and some other cities and peoples.

Why is it relevant to introduce this political state at this point in the argument about kk? Aristotle has just finished describing the kk, after previously describing the good person. He has just said that the fine things are the virtues and the works produced by virtue, which the kk does for their own sakes. A reference to the virtues and the actions they produce might reasonably bring to mind people who have been systematically trained in the virtues and in virtuous actions, people such as the Spartans. Such people have a reputation for martial bravery, which is often taken to be the mark of kk people. Admirers of the Spartans praise them especially because the city undertakes to train the citizens collectively (*dêmosia(i)*) in virtue, which Xenophon describes both as kk and as "all the virtues" (Xen. *Resp. Lac.* 10.4–6). Unlike cities that only punish specific offences against other people, the Spartans punish failure to display the virtues. Xenophon, then, clearly believes that the political state of the Spartans is kk, and someone might reasonably ask Aristotle whether Xenophon is right. In the next few lines he answers this question.

12.6 The Spartan Character

Aristotle now describes a Spartan outlook, and contrasts it with the outlook of the kk.

> §7 ἔστι δέ τις /38/ ἕξις πολιτική, οἵαν οἱ Λάκωνες ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι /39/ ἔχοιεν ἄν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἳ οἴονται τὴν /40/ ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκεν. διὸ / 1249a/ ἄγριοι[13] μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσί· τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς /2/ ἐστίν, καλοκἀγαθίαν δὲ[14] οὐκ ἔχουσιν - οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς /3/ τὰ καλὰ δι' αὑτά.
>
> But there is a certain political state, such as the Laconians have, or others of that sort might have. And this is the sort of state it is. For there are some who think one ought to have virtue, but for the sake of the natural goods. That is why they are wild men; for they have the natural goods, but they do not have fine-and-goodness – for the fine things do not belong to them because of themselves.[15]

In "For there are some," Aristotle does not say whether these "some" are the only ones who take this instrumental attitude, or whether all who take an

instrumental attitude are wild men. His comments do not apply to all logically possible political states or to all logically possible people who take an instrumental view of virtue. He says only that the Spartans and similar people take an instrumental view of virtue, and that their instrumental view makes them wild. "Wild" (*agrioi*) is sometimes applied to those who are untamed by the virtues.[16] We might, however, wonder whether it fits the Spartans and similar people. Have they not been trained to obey the laws, and does their law-abiding outlook not exclude their being wild?

Aristotle alludes to the Spartans on the assumption that his hearers will be familiar with his view of them. Probably he assumes that his hearers have heard or read what he has said about Sparta. We can find his view set out at some length in the *Politics*. It is closely connected with some of the main themes of the *EE*.

Politics VII opens with a summary of some ethical doctrines that are relevant to questions about the proper aim of a city, and especially of the best city. The relevant doctrines are about the constitution of the best life (1323a14–b23). Many people value the virtues to some degree, but only instrumentally, as means to external goods (1323a34–8). Aristotle answers that, on the contrary, external goods are good only if they are limited by the virtues, and that happiness consists primarily in the exercise of the virtues (1323b7–21). Many people, then, make the mistake that Aristotle mentions at the beginning of the *EE*; they treat goods that are really only instrumental to happiness as though they were parts of it (1214b24–7). The prevalence of this mistake explains why Aristotle takes it to be important to identify the parts of happiness, by finding the greatest non-instrumental goods. He has returned to this task in the section on kk, by affirming that the kk chooses fine actions for their own sake. This is how the virtues ensure the correct use of other goods (1323b7–21). Those who do not limit their use of external goods find that they are harmed by them; hence, these external goods are not good for them overall. To avoid this sort of harm, they need the virtues.

The true conception of happiness and its parts should also determine our views about legislation. But cities that legislate for education of character do not legislate well. Sparta and Crete aim at war, and they share this aim with the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts, who encourage people to acquire aggressive virtues (as they conceive virtues) (1324b1–22). Aristotle does not believe that acquiring this aggressive and domineering (*pleonektein*, 1324b10) outlook makes someone a good person, or that it ensures that external goods will be good for one. On the contrary, the one-sided pursuit of martial virtue encourages injustice.

From this description of the Spartans and others, we can form a view of the condition that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of a "political state" in our chapter of the *EE*. He refers to the states of character that result from the training that is prescribed in Sparta and in the other states that he mentions here. This training is all directed towards the conduct of wars. Aristotle does not mean that the only possible aim of an educational system is the conduct of

war, but he says that this is the only aim that has been pursued systematically in education. If the Spartans were people for whom the natural goods are good, they would not value virtue only for instrumental reasons, and they would not share this one-sided view of the purpose of education.

Later in *Politics* VII, Aristotle returns to questions about education for character. Greek cities that seem to have the best constitutions do not aim at the correct end, or at the virtues at which they ought to aim. They take the vulgar view that the virtues that seem to be useful and more domineering (*pleonektikôteras*, 1333b10) are to be developed. The Spartans are mentioned among those who take these mistaken views about education (133b12–14). To show how wrong they are, Aristotle quotes Thibron's expression of admiration for Spartan education, which made Spartans rulers over many people. He remarks that now that the Spartans no longer rule over other peoples, the error in their educational system is even clearer. In encouraging the domineering qualities, Spartans encouraged citizens to believe they should seek domination in their own city too; that was how Pausanias thought when he tried to seize power for himself (1333b15–35).

It is not surprising, then, that Aristotle speaks of Spartan wildness in book VIII, when he repeats his criticism of the Spartan outlook. Even among the other animals it is not the wildest (*agriôtatois*, 1338b18) who are the bravest, and it is a mistake to cultivate wildness with the aim of cultivating bravery. We should encourage the fine rather than the bestial (1338b9–38).[17] The Spartans, however, make their citizens like wild beasts (*thêriôdeis*), because they suppose that this is the best way to cultivate bravery.

Does Aristotle exaggerate? How can the Spartans be wild, if they are law-abiding and disciplined? He might reasonably reply that the law and discipline are intended to make the Spartans more effective in their aggressive and domineering efforts, and do not make them any less disposed to violence and aggression when they have the opportunity. The practice of temperance and justice – as the Spartans conceive them – is subordinate to the overall aim of training Spartans to dominate other peoples. Since they have such a narrow view of the relevant type of virtue, they become aggressive and unjust, not only abroad but also at home. Aristotle's reference to Pausanias shows that the Spartans' supposed virtues do not prevent the injustice and intemperance that make natural goods harmful to us.

These passages in the *Politics* are relevant not only to the discussion of kk in the *EE*, but also to the aim of the *EE* as a whole. The ethical introduction to *Politics* VII is similar to the introduction to the *EE*, and the ethical remarks about different types of people and cities illustrate some of the arguments in the *EE*. Aristotle's account of the virtues describes the states of character that regulate the pursuit of external goods by reference to goals that are set by the virtues. Virtuous people do not rely on instrumental arguments about how to maximize external goods overall by restraint on particular occasions ("temperance because of intemperance," as the *Phaedo* says). On the contrary, they restrain the pursuit of external goods by goals that require us to value virtuous

action for its own sake. In this respect, the discussion of the good person and the kk person is an appropriate conclusion to the discussion of happiness and virtue in the *EE*.

We have seen that Aristotle has a good reason to introduce the Spartans after the kk, if some of his readers might think, as Xenophon does, that the Spartans are kk. The Spartans take moral education seriously and believe that laws should be used to inculcate the virtues. We might infer that they exemplify the attitude that Aristotle has just described in his remarks on kk people. He replies that the Spartans are not kk, because the kk has to regard the virtues as fine and worth choosing for their own sake.

Aristotle explains (in *diho*, 1248b30) that the Spartans are wild because they treat virtue as instrumental to the natural goods. The natural goods that the Spartans aim at are wealth and power, and their unrestrained pursuit of these goods causes them to ignore the requirements of temperance and justice when they get in the way of gaining natural goods (as the example of Pausanias shows). Since the Spartans have the natural goods, they are capable of being wild and aggressive; if they lacked individual strength, collective power, and material resources, their neighbours would have had nothing to fear from them. Since they have enough natural goods to commit successful aggression, and since they lack the kk to use these natural goods for their benefit, they use their power for unjust aggression. They illustrate Aristotle's remark that human beings are born with weapons (*hopla*) that are naturally suited for intelligence and virtue, but which can be used for the wrong goals. If they are misused, a human being "without virtue is the most unholy and the wildest of animals" (*Pol.* 1253a31–7).[18] The point of calling the Spartans wild is clear to anyone who is familiar with Aristotle's views on the Spartans, as he expresses them in *Politics* VII–VIII.

12.7 The Fine-and-Good Person and the Natural Goods

Aristotle now moves on from the Spartans, and returns to the kk (1249a3–10).[19] The description of the kk resumes from the earlier remarks. So far, we have learnt (in 1248b34–7) that they have the fine goods, and that they do fine actions for their own sake. Aristotle now tells us something about their attitude to non-fine goods. The natural goods are among these non-fine goods. We have learnt so far that (i) these non-fine goods are good for the good person; and (ii) the Spartans think they ought to have virtue for the sake of these non-fine goods, and therefore they do not have the fine goods for their own sakes (1249a2–3). The kk differ from the Spartans not only in choosing the fine goods for their own sake, but also in using non-fine goods in such a way that, in the right circumstances, they become fine. If kk agents use a certain degree of wealth for a fine purpose, that wealth is itself fine on that occasion, when used for the right purpose. Similarly, if kk agents are correctly honoured for fine actions, it is fine for them to be honoured. They make natural goods good for them, by using them well, and fine for them, by using them finely.

Kk people, therefore, are good because the natural goods are good for them. Previously, Aristotle has considered only the relation of kk people to fine goods (1248b34–7), not to the natural goods. He now tells us that the natural goods become fine for kk people on the occasions when they are appropriate. If they are fine for them, they are also good for them, since fine things are also good. Kk people do what the Spartans fail to do. Since they do not aim at virtue for the sake of natural goods, but they use natural goods only for the aims that are prescribed or allowed by virtue, they pursue natural goods only to the appropriate degree, and hence natural goods are good for them.

The conclusion that kk people are also good is not trivial, since Aristotle has stated logically distinct conditions for being kk and for being good. He has now connected being kk with being good by explaining how the kk agent uses natural goods so as to make them good for him.

12.8 Conclusion on the Good and the KK

Aristotle now mentions four agents: (i) The kk. (ii) The many. (iii) The good agent. (iv) The one who thinks we should have the virtues for the sake of external goods.

> ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ /11/ συμφέροντα καὶ καλά ἐστι. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ /12/ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κἀκείνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστί. τῷ /13/ δ' ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθά. τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ[20] καὶ καλά · πολλὰς / 14/ γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις δι' αὐτὰ ἔπραξεν. ὁ δ' οἰόμενος /15/ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, κατὰ τὸ συμ/16/βεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει. §10 /14/ ἔστιν οὖν καλοκἀγαθία ἀρετὴ τέ/17/λειος.
>
> (1) And so for the fine and good person the advantageous things themselves as well are also fine.
> (2) But for the many this is in discord; for the unqualified goods are not good for them also.
> (3) But for the good person they are good. But for the good person they are also fine; for he has achieved many fine actions because of them.
> (4) But the person who thinks that one ought to have the virtues for the sake of external goods coincidentally does the fine things. Fine-and-goodness, therefore, is complete virtue.

The many differ from kk people in so far as the same things are not both fine and beneficial for them; for (*ou gar*) the unqualified goods are not good for them (1249a10–12). If "for" explains why the many differ from the kk in this respect, Aristotle implies that if the natural goods were good for the many, the same things would be fine and advantageous for them. If the natural goods were good for them, they would be good. If the same things were fine and advantageous for them, they would be kk. Hence, if they were good, they would be kk. Therefore, good people are kk people. This sentence leaves no room for people who are good but not kk.

We need to keep in mind this identification of good people with kk people when we consider the repetition of "But for the good" in the next sentence (1249a12–13). Aristotle says, as he has said before, that for the good person the unqualified goods are good, but he now adds that for the good person they are also fine. This second claim about the good person is justified by the identification of the good person with the kk (in a10–12). In the light of this identification, we can now attribute to the good person what we have attributed to the kk. For good people the natural goods are good, because their use of such goods is fine.

In the fourth part of this division Aristotle recalls the Spartans, by introducing people who share their instrumental attitude to the virtues (1249a14–16), and therefore do fine actions only coincidentally – as means to natural goods – and not because they are fine.[21] Aristotle contrasts these people with those for whom the natural goods are good; as we have seen, the natural goods are not good for those who take a purely instrumental attitude to the virtues.[22]

The conclusion that kk is "complete virtue" (1249a16–17) uses an expression that Aristotle has not yet used in the course of the chapter.[23] But he mentioned the same feature of kk when he said that he has used the term "kk" for the virtue composed out of the specific virtues. He has said that if someone is entitled to the name "kk," which refers to this composite virtue, they must have all the specific virtues, just as a healthy body must be composed of healthy parts, either all, or the most and the most important (1248b11–16). The adjective corresponding to "healthy" in this analogy is "good." Someone who has all the specific virtues is a good person. Hence, the kk should be a completely good person. This is what Aristotle claims to have proved in the conclusion that kk is complete virtue. Aristotle has told us why a proof is needed, when he observes that being good and being kk differ in themselves, and not only in name. Since the good person is the one for whom the natural goods are good, the kk is a good person if one's being kk ensures that the natural goods are good for one. Aristotle has argued for this claim in the two parts of his description of the kk (1248b34–7, 1249a11). Since the kk does fine actions for their own sakes, he uses natural goods finely, and thereby ensures that they are good for him. Hence, he is a good person.

When we look back over the argument, then, we can see the point of the initial distinction between the good person and the kk. It indicates not that they are different people, but that the good person has an essential property that we need to connect with being kk. We connect the two properties when we show that kk people, precisely by being kk, make the natural goods good for them.

12.9 Are There "Merely Good" People?

In the view of some readers, Aristotle does not draw the conclusion that I have just attributed to him, but, on the contrary, holds that some people are good without being kk. One argument for this view depends on an unwarranted

alteration of the text in 1249a1. According to the manuscripts, Aristotle says that the Spartans are wild (*agrioi*)[24] and not kk. Many editors, however, want Aristotle to say that the Spartans are good but not kk. They alter "*agrioi*" to "*agathoi*" in a1.[25] I have already argued implicitly against this alteration, since I have argued that the manuscript text gives us an excellent sense in the context.[26]

The altered text gives an inferior sense. Aristotle has said that the good person is the one for whom the natural goods are good, and that the kk is the one who has fine goods and does fine actions for their own sake. The altered text says that some people (*eisi gar hoi*, 1248b39) are good because (*diho*, 1248b40) they think they ought to have virtue for the sake of natural goods. We have already seen (in Section 12.3), however, that this instrumental attitude to virtue is incompatible with being good, because the natural goods are not good for someone who has this attitude. We should not alter the text in order to make Aristotle say something that he has good reason to deny.

Would Aristotle, in any case, be likely to mention the Spartans as clear examples of people for whom the natural goods are good because they think virtue is simply instrumental to the natural goods? His description of the Spartans in *Politics* VII–VIII makes it clear that they take an instrumental attitude to virtue, and that natural goods are not good for them. They care too much about the "contested" goods that Aristotle has mentioned (*perimachêta*, 1248b27), and therefore they act unjustly when they see an opportunity to get more of these goods; that is the attitude that Pausanias exemplifies. Once we see all the difficulties that arise for Aristotle if he claims that the Spartans are good and that the natural goods are good for them, we may reasonably reject the alteration in the text that would import these claims.

If, then, we are not convinced that the text in 1249a1 should be altered, does the argument offer any other reason to believe there are merely good people who are not kk? One might argue that the last section (1249a10–17) distinguishes them (1249a13), and that it recalls people who think one ought to have the virtues for the sake of external goods (1249a14–15). Does Aristotle mean to say that these people who take an instrumental attitude to virtue are merely good people? Three answers may be given:

1. As we have seen (in Section 12.8), even the appearance of a division between good and kk people depends on Spengel's unnecessary conjecture in 1249a12. Even if the conjecture were accepted, it would not imply this division.[27]
2. Aristotle says nothing to suggest that the instrumentalists are good people. On the contrary, he mentions them only after he has already discussed good people; he implies that they are not good people.
3. If we have given the right account of what it takes for natural goods to be good for us (in Section 12.3), Aristotle does not believe that anyone who takes a purely instrumental attitude to virtue can benefit from the natural goods.

If, then, an instrumental attitude to virtue excludes benefiting from natural goods, is there a merely good person who takes the virtues to be non-instrumental goods, but does not value them because they are fine? Does Aristotle leave this possibility open, and does he intend to leave it open?

To answer these questions, we need only notice that the kk agent's view that fine things are worth choosing because they are fine influences his conclusions about what is good overall. If a brave or just action is fine, a kk chooses it for precisely that feature of it. Such choices express the correct belief of the kk that it is better overall to choose the fine because it is fine than to choose non-fine goods at the cost of losing the fine goods. Since it is better overall to recognize this priority of the fine, the correct use of natural goods depends on the recognition of this priority. Hence, someone who does not recognize the priority of the fine does not benefit overall from the use of natural goods.

The case for recognizing "merely good" people, therefore, rests partly on mistaken alterations to the text, and partly on a misunderstanding of Aristotle's conditions for benefiting from the natural goods.

12.10 Conditions for Virtue in *EE* III

If this chapter were to recognize two types of good people (contrary to the arguments I have offered), ought readers of the *EE* to be surprised? Do the earlier books leave open the possibility of being good without choosing fine things because they are fine?

In the description of bravery (III 1), Aristotle affirms that reason prescribes to brave people that they choose the fine (1228b38–1229a11). They must choose brave actions as fine, and therefore as worth choosing for their own sakes (1230a26–33). The end of virtue is the fine, and this is why bravery aims at the fine. Bravery is to be distinguished from conditions that are similar to it. Among these conditions is "political bravery" (1230a16–17). These conditions all fall short of bravery because agents in these conditions endure the same things as the brave person, but not for the same end (1229a16–17). Political bravery, then, is not a type of bravery, but a condition that resembles bravery. Aristotle leaves no room for the claim that the Spartans are brave without being kk.

Nor does he suggest that agents who have political bravery benefit from their use of natural goods. On the contrary, he mentions Hector, who is moved by shame to fight Achilles (1230a19). Aristotle's audience all knew that Hector's shame caused him to make the wrong decision, when other people were calling on him to not endanger Troy by endangering himself. He was too afraid of being denounced by Polydamas, and too attached to honour. His attachment to this external good led him astray.

The aim that Aristotle attributes to the brave person (and to virtuous people in general) is the aim that he attributes to the "true politician," who is the best representative of the political life (1216a19–27). He chooses fine actions for their own sake, but most of those who are called politicians aim at wealth and power over others. These people share the aims that Aristotle attributes to the

Spartans in book VIII and in *Politics* VII–VIII. He does not leave room for a politician who believes that virtue is worth having only for the sake of external goods, but who still benefits from the use of external goods.

If, then, Aristotle intends to separate the good person from the kk, he introduces a division for which he leaves no room in the rest of the *EE*. If we are to be convinced that he introduces this entirely new division in book VIII, we need some clear evidence. But we have not found it.

Should we be disappointed by this conclusion? On the contrary, we should recognize that Aristotle has done what he says he has done. He has argued that kk is complete virtue, and that therefore the kk is completely good; he is the good person who was described in the account of the virtues. Aristotle would depart sharply from common sense (see Section 12.1) if he tried to persuade his readers that "*agathos*" and "kk" referred to different people. He does not try to persuade them of this. He argues for a different conclusion – that "kk" calls our attention to the role of the fine in making a person good, and therefore in making the natural goods good for us.

The explicit distinction between the good and the kk, however we take it, is unique to the *EE*. The *MM* has a chapter on kk at the corresponding place in the argument,[28] but it does not distinguish the person who has all the virtues from the kk. The *EN* has no separate treatment of kk, but mentions it in the discussion of magnanimity and of the conditions for happiness (1124a1–4, 11, 1179b10; cf. 1099a6). Although kk itself has this smaller overt role, the connexion between the virtues and acting for the sake of the fine is mentioned more often in the *EN*. Aristotle thereby emphasizes the fact that being good – understood as having the virtues – requires being kk.

What I have said about the *EE* implies that the *EN* is right to argue that kk, as the *EE* understands it, is a general feature of the virtues and not a special feature of some condition that a good person may lack. If the *EE* means that the good and the kk are the same, but different in being, it agrees in substance with the view of the *EN*.[29]

Notes

1 I use "kk" both for forms of the adjective and for the abstract noun. I discuss VIII 3 only up to 1249a17. I believe – for reasons that may be disputed – that the rest of the chapter does not require a modification in what I say here about kk.

2 All these claims are defended by Kenny, 1992, pp. 9–15, referring to Broadie, 1991, p. 378 (and revising Kenny 1978, in the light of Broadie's discussion). Broadie, 2010 explores this option more fully. See especially her discussion of "the Laconian type" (which assumes that the Spartans are good). The same three claims are accepted by Whiting, 1996, and by Buddensiek, 1999, pp. 199–224.

3 In this chapter, we have the usual three primary Greek MSS (P, C, and L). As well as the complete Latin version (cited as Λ1) that is dependent on the Aldine, we also have a fragment of an earlier Latin version, cited as Λ3, which Harlfinger and Mingay take to be derived from a Greek source that is earlier than, and independent of, the parent of PCL (see the Stemma in the Oxford Classical Text [OCT], p. ix). The *Aristoteles Latinus Database* attributes Λ2 (i.e. *De Bona Fortuna*) and Λ3 to William of Moerbeke.

I have normally followed the text in the OCT. Conjectures cited by the editor's name are taken from the apparatus in the OCT. I discuss departures from the OCT that affect the interpretation. I have benefited from consulting Christopher Rowe's draft (marked "third draft") of a new text of the *EE*, which greatly improves on the OCT.

4 Most of these passages are cited in the clear discussion by Dover, 1974, pp. 41–45.

5 In 1248b10, the MSS have *ekaloumen*. Λ1 "vocamus" is probably a conjecture. I see no reason to reject the MS text, or to deny that it is a backward reference, since I do not believe that *EN*VI, as it stands in our MSS, is identical to the original *EE*V.

6 Does the "appellation" (*prosêgoria*) mentioned in b12 refer to "kk" or "composite virtue"? Aristotle says it is evident (*phaneron*, b12–13) that someone to whom it is truly applied has the specific virtues. Since he compares the relevant state with a whole healthy body, his claim is most evident if the appellation is a "composite virtue." He has already used this analogy with health at 1220a2–4 (probably *telea* should be read in 1220a4).

7 ἔστι << **δὲ** >> [?δὴ] τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ κα/17/λὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ /18/ ἔχοντα διαφοράν. In b16, all MSS have "*dê*." Λ3 has "itaque." But we might prefer "*de*," to answer "*hoti men oun*" in b11 (otherwise that "*men*" is solitarium). If we retain "*dê*" we should understand it as "Now in fact." In this sentence, the adjectives refer to properties of persons. The distinction between the kk and the *agathos* is what Aristotle claims to prove in b26–37, *agathos men* (b26) … *kalos de kagathos* … (b34). He proves this distinction through the division of *agatha*, i.e. good things. In this chapter, he does not use "*kalon kagathon*" to refer to a type of good thing. (The appearance to the contrary, in 1249a3, is the product of a mistaken conjecture.)

8 The *sômatos aretai* mentioned in 1248b28–9 should include strength (*ischus*), which was said to be a non-fine non-instrumental good in b24.

9 Failure to consider all the relevant aspects of the situation may cause us to believe falsely that something is good without qualification (*DA* 433b5–10). Here, Aristotle – in line with his consistent but sometimes confusing use of "without qualification" – uses "good without qualification" to refer to an overall good, whereas he uses it elsewhere (e.g. *EN* 1129b1–6) for a *pro tanto* good.

10 The use of "*endechetai*" in 1248b30 and the optative "*onêseien*" in 1248b31 shows that the claim is counterfactual. Even if someone is not actually harmed by natural goods (because he does not have enough to misuse them, for instance), they are not good for him if he would misuse them if he had them.

11 He began the description of the good person with *men*, and he begins the description of the kk (1248b34–7) with a responding *de*.

12 This Athenian attitude is mentioned by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration (ii 39.1; 40.3).

13 On the text, see Section 12.9.

14 The MSS have *gar*, which editors reasonably alter to *de*.

15 The whole clause "for they have … goodness" supports the claim that they are wild men. It says that though they have the natural goods, they do not have the fine-and-goodness that would ensure the right use of them. This punctuation makes the first *men* (*agrioi men*) solitarium, but provides a *men* answered by *de* in *ta gar phusei*. The second "*gar*" clause (*ou gar huparchei*) explains the first by mentioning the proof of their lack of kk.

16 Odysseus wonders whether the people he will encounter are *hubristai te kai agrioi, oude dikaioi* (*Od*. 9.175, just before he meets the Cyclops). The *EE* mentions wild boars as apparent examples of bravery (1229b25), and describes excessively angry people as wild (1231b9).

17 Dirlmeier mentions these points in *Pol*.VII–VIII, but argues that the last passage cannot apply to the Spartans, who were not an ethnos (cf. *Pol*. 1338b17). He believes that *agrioi* is a conjecture (496).

18 I owe this account of the passage to a suggestion by Rachana Kamtekar.

19 In 1249a3, I read << ὅσοις δ' ὑπάρχει δι' αὕτα>> καὶ προαιροῦνται, καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. ("But those to whom they [sc. the fine things] belong because of themselves, and who

elect them, are fine-and-good.") The supplement (Zeller) may seem too elaborate, and shorter supplements might be considered. But it is supported by Λ3 (*quibuscumque autem existunt propter ipsa*).

20 Editors accept Spengel's conjecture τῷ δ<ὲ καλῷ κ>ἀγαθῷ. Λ3 omits τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά (if it is right, the phrase is a gloss). Spengel's conjecture is attractive. Aristotle has just been saying how the kk's use of natural goods makes them fine for him, and he has not been saying that about the good person. If he says "for the good person natural goods are good, and for the good person they are also fine," he seems to express himself awkwardly. Moreover, the following "for he has achieved" repeats what he said about the kk (in 1249a3–10), but he has not said this about the good person.
But this is not a decisive argument for the conjecture. We have seen why, in the light of 1249a11–12, the good person is also kk. In a13, both the MS text and the text of Λ3 state a consequence of that identification. Even if we accept the conjectural addition, we still have a reason to identify the good person with the kk, because of the previous description of the many.

21 Aristotle does not say that these people attach the same value to military success as the Spartans do, or that they are wild in the way that the Spartans are.

22 This contrast between these instrumentalists about virtue and those for whom the natural goods are good gives us a further reason to deny that the Spartans are good, and therefore a further reason to prefer *agrioi* to *agathoi* in 1249a1. If Aristotle had said that the Spartans are good, it would be difficult to see why he separates – as he does – the instrumentalist attitude to virtue from the outlook of the good person.

23 But see Section 12.2.

24 Λ3 has "silvestres," which supports the Greek MSS.

25 The resulting text is: διὸ ἀγαθοὶ (Aldine) μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσί – τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ <ἀγαθὰ (Solomon)> αὐτοῖς ἐστίν – καλοκἀγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν – οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι' αὑτά ("That is why they are good men – for the natural goods are goods for them – but they do not have fineness and goodness – for the fine things do not belong to them because of themselves"). Since the first "*men*" is answered by "*kalokagathian de*," the "*men*" in "*ta gar phusei men*" is solitarium.
Most. edd and tr, accept "*agathoi*" from the Aldine. Dalimier (who translates by "farouches," citing *Pol.* 1327b40) and Simpson keep the MS text. Some who favour "*agathoi*" think Solomon's supplement gives the right sense, but is unnecessary. The interpretations offered by Kenny and Broadie (n. 2 above) assume "*agathoi*."

26 Moreover, if "*agathoi*" originally stood in the text, why was "*agrioi*" substituted? (1) A misreading is not very plausible, since "*agathos*" occurs often in the context, whereas the less common word "*agrios*" does not. (2) Nor is a deliberate alteration very likely; we would have to attribute it to a reader who knew *Politics* VII well. But this hypothesis of the well-informed copyist is much less plausible than the supposition that it was Aristotle himself who was familiar with the views in the *Politics*.

27 See n. 20 above.

28 By "corresponding" I mean that it follows the section on good fortune. The *MM* differs from the *EE* in having the treatment of friendship at the end.

29 I am grateful for discussion with participants in a conference at Stanford in February 2020, and in seminars at Stanford and Cornell. I have especially benefited from comments by Huw Duffy, Roy Lee, Rachana Kamtekar, Landon Hobbs, and Giulia Bonasio, and from a draft paper by Chris Bobonich.

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